R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME ONE

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

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PREFACE

Just as it is impossible for anyone to become a perfect theologian unless he has first laid firm metaphysical foundations, so I have always understood that it would be worthwhile, before I wrote theological commentaries (which have partly already come to light and which I am partly working on so that they may be completed as soon as possible, God willing), to send forth in advance this work, which I now offer to you, Christian reader, carefully elaborated. However, for just reasons, I could not defer my studies on the third part of St. Thomas, and it was necessary to send those to press first of all. Nevertheless, day by day I perceived more clearly how much that divine and supernatural theology desired and required this human and natural theology, to such an extent that I did not hesitate to interrupt that work I had begun for a little while, so that I might give, or rather restore, to this metaphysical doctrine its proper place and seat. And although I have lingered longer in elaborating this work than I had initially thought, and longer than the demand of many who desire those commentaries on the third part, or (if it can be hoped for) on the entire Summa of St. Thomas to be completed, nevertheless I could never regret the labor I undertook, and I am confident that the reader will approve my judgment, even if led by experience itself.

Thus I play the philosopher in this work, yet I always keep before my eyes that our philosophy ought to be Christian and the handmaid of divine theology. This goal I have set for myself, not only

in treating questions, but much more in selecting opinions or positions, inclining toward those which seemed to serve piety and revealed doctrine more. And for this reason, sometimes interrupting the philosophical course, I turn to certain theological matters, not so much to linger in examining or accurately explaining them (which would be beside the point of what I am now doing), as to indicate to the reader, as it were with a finger, in what manner the principles of metaphysics are to be referred and accommodated to confirming theological truths. I confess that in contemplating the divine perfections, which they call attributes, I have lingered longer than perhaps the present undertaking might seem to require; but I was compelled first by the dignity and sublimity of these matters, and then because I never seemed to myself to transgress the limits of natural light, and therefore not of metaphysics either.

And since I have always judged that great power lies in understanding and penetrating things through inquiring into and judging them by a suitable method, which I could scarcely or hardly observe if, in the manner of expositors, I were to treat all questions as they occur incidentally and as if by chance around the text of the Philosopher, I therefore thought it would be more expeditious and useful, preserving the order of doctrine, to investigate all those things and set them before the eyes of the reader which could be investigated and desired concerning the entire object of this wisdom. What that object is, the first disputation of this work explains, and at the same time we there discourse on the dignity, utility, and other things which writers of sciences are accustomed to promise in their prefaces. Then in the first volume the most ample and most universal aspect of that same object, by which, namely, it is called being, and its properties and causes are carefully examined. And in this contemplation of causes, I have lingered more extensively than is usually done, because I have considered it both extremely difficult and most useful for all philosophy and theology. In the second volume, however, we have pursued the lower aspects of that same object, taking our beginning

from that division of being into created and creator, inasmuch as it is prior and closer to the quiddity of being, and more suitable for the course of this doctrine; which then proceeds through the divisions contained under these parts, down to all the genera and grades of being which are contained within the boundaries or limits of this science.

Because, however, there will be very many who will wish to have this entire doctrine applied to the books of Aristotle, both so that they may better perceive on what principles so great a philosopher relies, and so that its use for understanding Aristotle himself may be easier and more useful, I have also studied to serve the reader in this matter, through an index elaborated by us, by which, if it is read attentively, all the things which Aristotle treated in the books of the Metaphysics can most easily (unless I am mistaken) both be comprehended and retained in memory: and again all the questions which are usually raised in expounding those books can be had at hand.

Finally, we have thought it fitting to admonish the benevolent reader that this is indeed one work, nor should its disputations have been separated from one volume, unless some reason had compelled us. For first, lest it should cause some trouble by its bulk, we divided it into two volumes; then, however, so that, as far as possible, we might perform our due service to those devoted to our labors, we sent forth this first part as soon as it came from the press; although the other has already proceeded to such a point that I think this part will not be read through before that one has been published. Would that both, and the other things we are undertaking, may redound to the great glory of God Most Good and Greatest, and to the utility of the Catholic Church.

Farewell.

The Plan of the Indices of this Work

The first index, placed at the commencement of this sacred work, presents the disputations and their divisions, serving as a guide through the structure of the work.

The second index elucidates the order and plan of the venerable Metaphysics of the great philosopher Aristotle. In it is offered a succinct summary of each book and chapter, accompanied by the principal questions which are either customarily raised or may rightly be raised therein. To each such question is assigned the corresponding location within this present work. Moreover, should any matter necessary for the comprehension of Aristotle's text have been omitted in the disputations themselves, it is here briefly resolved according to the measure of the difficulty. Though this index properly belongs at the beginning of the work, it has been composed so that, at the discretion of the diligent reader, it may be appended to the other indices at the close.

The third index is philosophical in nature, comprising metaphysical questions arranged in the order in which they are customarily disputed in the schools of philosophy.

The fourth index is theological, containing the questions treated across all volumes of this labor, disposed according to the order in which they are ordinarily handled by theologians in reference to the Summa Theologica of the blessed Doctor St. Thomas.

On the English Translation

This English rendering of the Disputationes Metaphysicae of the Most Illustrious and Profound Doctor, Father Francisco Suárez, of the Society of Jesus, has been undertaken from the original Latin, with the technical assistance of the artificial intelligence system Claude Sonnet 4. Every effort has been employed, with as much fidelity as

human limitation permits, to preserve the precision, subtlety, and luminous order of the Doctor's thought. Yet let it be stated plainly that for purposes of true study and assured scholarship, recourse must always be made to the original Latin, wherein alone resounds the authentic voice of the most holy and pious doctor, unmediated and undiminished. Critical editions, prepared with the utmost diligence by learned men, remain indispensable for those who aspire to penetrate more fully the vast and ordered edifice of his metaphysical system. This translation, therefore, is offered not as a substitute, but as a humble aid, a guide for those who seek to ascend toward the Doctor's meaning whilst not yet able to dwell fully within the Latin school. Proper citation, scholarly reliance, and rigorous disputation must ever return to the fountainhead, the Latin itself.

In the preparation of this work, I am bound in gratitude to the labors of Salvador Castellote, Jean-Paul Coujou, John P. Doyle, and Michael Renemann, whose monumental endeavors have rendered the entirety of the Disputationes Metaphysicae accessible in digital form. Their edition, both reliable and convenient, has provided a secure foundation upon which this present rendering rests, and to their industry I render devout acknowledgment. Thus may the reader, guided by this English edition, be led more readily into the mind of Suárez, wherein every stone is laid with art, every argument ordered with precision, and every conclusion shines forth with the clarity of truth.

It must be observed, moreover, that among all the writings of the most illustrious and most profound Doctor, Father Francisco Suárez of the Society of Jesus, there is found no genuine error whatsoever. For he, by singular grace and divine providence, was raised up as the prince of scholastic wisdom, the light of Salamanca, the defender of truth, and the glory of our schools. Therefore, should any blemish, obscurity, or infelicity be detected here, let it be attributed not to him, but either to the frailty of my own hand, to the imperfections carried over from printed Latin editions, or, should

malice intrude, to the contrivances of those who have ever sought to obscure the brilliance of the Orthodox faith. In all his authentic writings, Father Francisco Suárez may rightly be said, without hesitation, to be wholly free from error: not by inspiration, which was sealed with the beloved Apostle John, but by the singular gift of Almighty God, who deigned to preserve in His servant the clarity of doctrine and rectitude of judgment. It is therefore meet and just that all who read him should do so with reverence, with gratitude, and with unshaken confidence in the surety of his teaching.

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Index on Aristotle

In which the order and structure of the books and chapters is revealed, and a brief summary of all things is proposed, and all questions which are customarily or could be raised in them are designated, along with the places where they are discussed in the following work. If any briefer matters pertaining to the understanding of the text have been omitted in the work itself, they are briefly resolved in this index according to the difficulty and utility of each matter.

Book One of the Metaphysics

This entire book is introductory and is divided into two parts. The first part properly contains the preface, in which the subject matter and dignity of this doctrine is revealed: first more generally in the first chapter, then more specifically in the second. In the latter part, through seven other chapters, the opinions of ancient philosophers concerning the principles of things are reported by Aristotle and refuted.

Chapter I. On the Preface

Question 1. What is the true meaning of that axiom of Aristotle: "All men naturally desire to know"? Disputation 1, section 6.

Q. 2. Whether sight is more useful than the other senses for knowledge, and is loved above them for this reason? Ibid.

Q. 3. Which brute animals participate only in sensation, which indeed in memory, and which also in experience or prudence, and in what manner? Ibid.

Q. 4. In what way does man acquire experience through memory, and art and science through experience, and what difference should be established among these? Ibid. The opinion of Polus, which Aristotle here cites, namely: "Experience generated art, inexperience fortune," appears thus in Plato's Gorgias: "Many arts indeed are present in men, skillfully discovered through experience. For skill brings it about that our way proceeds through art, while lack of skill causes it to wander recklessly through fortune." This opinion seems quite different both in the meaning of words and in sense, yet Aristotle's words explain that the terms skill and lack of skill in Plato are not to be taken as broadly as they present themselves in their absolute signification; for skill is predicated not only of experience, but also of art, and therefore it could not properly be said that skill generates art, except by reason of experience. The second part of that opinion seems better explained in Plato; for inexperience does not so much generate fortune as expose man to fortune and chance.

Q. 5. Whether experience is absolutely necessary for knowing the principles of the sciences? Ibid.

Q. 6. In what sense Aristotle said that all actions are concerned with singulars? Disputation 34, Section 9. Here, however, concerning Aristotle's text, it should be observed that he asserts that the physician cures Socrates, or a singular man, per se, but man per accidens; he suggests the reason, because it is accidental to Socrates that he is a man. Both statements have difficulty, because Peter is not accidentally but essentially a man. If "to be accidental" there does not signify to belong by accident, but to be present absolutely, as St.

Thomas explains, Aristotle does not correctly infer that man is cured per accidens. Nor does the other exposition seem to satisfy, which the same St. Thomas and Hales offer, namely, that although it does not happen to Peter absolutely to be a man, it does happen to Peter as cured; for this does not seem true because, in order that Peter can be cured, it is necessary that he be a man; therefore the physician's cure is not exercised per accidens concerning man, since by its proper nature it cannot be performed concerning another nature, just as vision does not occur per accidens concerning color, even if it must always and necessarily be exercised in the singular concerning particular color; for just as color is the object of sight, so in its own way the human body is the object of medicine. The response is that Aristotle is not speaking of cure absolutely and abstractly, in which way it is rather conceived than exercised, but he speaks of this action of curing as it is exercised in reality; and he says this is concerned per accidens with man, not because this happens to it entirely, but because it is not concerned per se primarily and as it were adequately with man as such, but as contracted to this singular man, upon whose proper complexion and condition the cure chiefly depends. Hence that "per accidens" seems to be the same as "through another," at least distinct in reason; or it is the same as "through a part," in the way that the singular is a subjective part of the specific whole: for thus the whole is said to be moved per accidens by reason of the part. And according to these considerations, the exposition of the other proposition fits very well, namely, that it is accidental to Socrates that he is a man, that is, it belongs to him as a part subjectively contained under man. Or certainly it can be said to be accidental in the way that a lower difference is accidental to a genus, that is, outside its essential nature; for thus the proper conditions of the individual are outside the essential nature of the species, which is sufficient for man to be said to be healed per accidens, that is, through another. Although in this sense it would rather be said that Socrates is accidental to man than the converse; nevertheless in reality the same thing is signified, and all things tend to the same point, namely, that it

be understood that action depends for the most part on the conditions of the individual, which fall more under experience than under art, and therefore art without experience is exposed to error and fortune, as was said above.

Q. 7. Whether only speculative science or also practical science is desired for the sake of knowing truth. Disputation 1, section 6.

Q. 8. Whether the science of metaphysics is most desirable to man for its own sake. Disputation 1, section 6, throughout.

Chapter II. On the Preface

Question 1. What wisdom is, and in how many ways this word is used. Disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 2. How wisdom contemplates all things and their causes and principles. Disputation 1, section 2, throughout; and section 4 and section 5.

Q. 3. Whether the most universal things are most difficult for us to know. Disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 4. Whether metaphysics surpasses other sciences, especially mathematics, in certainty. Ibid.

Q. 5. Whether metaphysics or wisdom is more certain than the habit of principles. Ibid.

Q. 6. Whether metaphysics demonstrates properly through all causes. Ibid.

Q. 7. Whether metaphysics is more apt than other sciences for teaching. Ibid.

Q. 8. Whether metaphysics is a speculative science, which is pursued for the sake of knowing truth. Disputation 1, section 4, beginning; and section 5, from the beginning.

Q. 9. Whether and how wisdom or metaphysics commands other sciences. Ibid.

Q. 10. Whether all sciences are subalternated to metaphysics. Disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 11. Whether metaphysics is simultaneously science and wisdom. Ibid. throughout.

Q. 12. How useful metaphysics is to other sciences, section 4.

Q. 13. Whether and how metaphysics demonstrates the objects of other sciences. Ibid.

Q. 14. How metaphysics is compared to other sciences in the order of doctrine. Ibid.

Q. 15. How metaphysics demonstrates first principles. Disputation 1, section 4.

Q. 16. What the habit of principles is. Ibid.

Q. 17. Whether metaphysics or dialectic treats the instruments of knowing, and what is proper to each in this function. Disputation 1, section 4.

Q. 18. Whether wonder arises from ignorance. For this axiom is customarily taken from this chapter; for Aristotle says that men began to philosophize because of wonder, namely so that by acquiring knowledge they might dispel ignorance. But it should be noted that Aristotle only said: "He who doubts and wonders clearly considers himself ignorant." He therefore joined two things, namely doubt and wonder; it does not therefore seem necessary that everyone who wonders is ignorant, but only he who doubts while wondering. This should be noted in passing concerning Christ's wonder, which although it was true wonder, was nevertheless not proceeding from ignorance, as I have declared at length in tome 1 of the third part, in the commentary on article 7, question 15 of St. Thomas, from which place the true exposition or rather limitation of that axiom should be sought.

Q. 19. Whether it is expedient for man to devote himself to the study of wisdom. Concerning this question, which is very clear, it will be sufficient to consult Aristotle and to note carefully what he says there in praise and commendation of wisdom. For he has several

opinions worthy of consideration. The first is: Divine science or contemplation concerning God, which is called wisdom, is most free, and therefore cannot be perfect in human nature, which is enslaved in many ways, but God alone claims this honor for himself. But it should be noted that Aristotle reports this last saying from a certain Simonides, and signifies, as St. Thomas, Boethius and others interpret, that he felt that man should not seek divine wisdom, because it does not befit his nature, but belongs to God alone; and therefore (says Aristotle) if, as the poets say, envy falls upon God, he would especially envy men seeking this divine wisdom. To this accords that saying of Socrates: "What is above us is nothing to us." The advice of the Wise Man will also apply: "Seek not things higher than yourself." But the Philosopher rightly reproaches that saying in that sense, or rather, as Aphrodisias explains, he understands and moderates that opinion in such a way that God alone is believed to possess this wisdom exactly and perfectly. From this it does not follow that man should not seek this wisdom in order to become like God as much as he can. And this is what Aristotle later says disjunctively: "And either God alone has it, namely wisdom, or has it most of all." Therefore he denies that man seeking this science is hateful to God, both because divinity cannot be envious, and also because otherwise man would be unhappy who would attain this science. For what greater unhappiness than to have God as an adversary and envious of one's own goods? But it is absurd to say that the wise, insofar as they are wise, are unhappy, since human happiness and excellence rather consist in wisdom. And in the same opinion the same Philosopher, in Ethics 10, chapter 7, reproaches those saying that we ought, since we are human, to think human thoughts, and mortal thoughts since we are mortal. But he himself says we ought, as far as possible, to vindicate ourselves from mortality, and do all things so that we may live in accordance with that part of us which is best in us, that is, the mind; and in chapter 8 he adds that he who lives thus and cultivates wisdom is most dear to God, and is most honored and rewarded by him. These things, however, should be

understood concerning those who soberly and according to their capacity seek divine wisdom; for those who wish to comprehend or measure divinity by their reason or judgment are without doubt hateful to God. To these the Wise Man counsels not to seek things higher than themselves, because, as he said elsewhere, "he who scrutinizes majesty will be overwhelmed by glory." Not because God envies them, but because he is the avenger of their temerity and pride. If these things which Aristotle said concerning natural wisdom are true, as they indeed are, they apply with much higher reason to supernatural and divine contemplation, which renders men almost divine, and in some way free and immune from the slavery of the body: but concerning this elsewhere.

Q. 20. Whether this science treats of God as an object, or only as the principle and cause of all things. Disputation 1, section 1. How, however, according to natural reason it is true that God is the principle and cause of all things, and has in himself whatever is of perfection and excellence, and envies no one, but benefits all, and only he himself perfectly knows and understands himself (for Aristotle indicates all these things concerning God), is treated extensively in disputations 30 and 31, which concern the natural knowledge of God.

Chapter III. On the Various Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers Concerning the Principles of Things

Question 1. How many causes there are of natural things; this is treated extensively around book 5, from disputation 12, through several [disputations].

Q. 2. What were the opinions of the ancients concerning the principles of things, ibid., disputation 13, sections 2 and 3.

Q. 3. Whether the same thing can move itself, extensively disputation 18, section 4, throughout. But in this place the words of Aristotle are: "Neither does that which is subjected effect its own change," which are explained at the end of the said section.

Q. 4. Whether it is evident that the order of this universe was established not by chance, but from the action of some agent, extensively disputation 30, section 2, and some things disputation 23, section 1. The words of Aristotle in this place are very noteworthy: "Neither is it fitting (he says) to attribute so great a thing, namely the order of the universe, to chance and fortune. Therefore, he who said that mind, just as in animals, so in nature, is the cause both of the world and also of the entire order, appeared sober compared to those who spoke rashly before him"; thus also Socrates speaks in Plato's Phaedo, greatly praising Anaxagoras in this regard, because he said that mind adorns all things and is the cause of all.

That comparison which is made with animals can be understood in two ways: first, that by animals, as if by antonomasia, humans are understood, so that an argument is made from the small to the great world. Second, it can be taken generally for all animals, in which the composition and arrangement of all members is so artificial that the wiser philosophers have held it as certain that it cannot happen without an author endowed with mind. From this an argument is taken to prove that this should be believed with greater reason concerning the whole universe, in which all things are so composed and ordered that for this reason it has been called like one animal by many philosophers also, as Albert noted at the beginning of the Metaphysics, treatise 3, chapter 3.

Chapter IV. On the Same Opinions

In this chapter no new question occurs. Let it only be noted that Aristotle confirms in this place what he had said in the previous chapter, opinion 4, about mind and the maker of the world, and having adduced a most beautiful example, he simultaneously praises and reproaches the ancient philosophers who had acknowledged that truth, just as (he says) those inexperienced in fighting do: for when they are carried in every direction, they often inflict notable wounds,

but neither do they do this from art, nor do these seem to hold what they say by knowledge.

Chapters V. & VI. On the Same Matter

Question 1. A particular question could be treated around these chapters concerning Plato's opinion, since that is more celebrated, namely, whether he posited ideas in the way that Aristotle attributes to him; and whether in that sense he is rightly attacked by Aristotle, especially when he infers here, chapter 6, that he took away efficiency from ideas, positing them as immobile. Concerning this matter, however, it has been said in treating of universals, disputation 5; and of exemplary cause, disputation 25; and of the efficiency of intelligences, disputation 35, final section. The second question here can be around the end of chapter 6, whether besides the four genera of causes an exemplary or other should be posited, is treated disputation 25, section 2; and is touched upon disputation 12, final section.

Chapter VII. The Opinions of the Ancients are Refuted

Question 1. Around this chapter two or three things can principally be inquired. First, whether Aristotle's arguments against the ancient philosophers, especially against the Platonists, are effective. Second, whether what Aristotle treats in chapter 7 about numbers and magnitudes is true. Third, whether form is the whole quiddity of material things, as Aristotle signifies here chapter 7, text 5. But I judged the first question should be omitted, both because those opinions of the ancient philosophers, as they are treated by Aristotle, are now antiquated and completely banished from philosophy; and also because in those arguments the Philosopher touched nothing that could bring any utility for knowing other things; and therefore I consider it useless to linger in explaining or defending those arguments, but let the expositors be read, and especially Fonseca,

whose translation is so elegant and clear that it can be understood by anyone almost without an expositor. The second question embraces many things which are treated by us in the disputations on quantity, which are 40 and 41. The third is treated disputation 36, section 1.

Book Two of the Metaphysics

Concerning this book there are various opinions of the expositors, because it does not seem to cohere with the others; omitting these, it seems to me to be a certain part of the proem, or a certain addition to it. And I take this from Aristotle himself, book 3, text 2, where, referring to what he had said in this book, he says: "In those things which were said in the place of a proem." For because in the proem Aristotle showed that this science contemplates truth most especially, and afterwards demonstrated how much the previous philosophers had erred in its investigation, in this place he wished again to reveal the difficulty that exists in the investigation of truth, and what method should be held in it, and what principle or foundation we should use, lest we labor in vain.

Chapter I. That it is Difficult to Find the Truth Which this Wisdom Seeks

Question 1. Whether to attain truth worthily is not only difficult for man, but even impossible. This question is more theological than metaphysical; and it is usually treated by theologians at the beginning of the doctrine concerning God's grace. Aristotle proposes it at the beginning of this chapter, and defines it quite consistently with Catholic doctrine. For he absolutely denies that any man can attain truth worthily. What he means when he says "worthily" can be understood from what he adds below, that knowledge of truth is in part easy, because according to the old proverb, "Who misses the door?" that is, as St. Thomas and Averroes explain, because he does

not easily attain principles, which are like the door and gate of finding truth? or, as Alexander explains, who does not attain at least those things which are easy? For just as an archer, if the whole door is proposed to him as a target, does not err, because of the ease of hitting it, so we can attain some truths that are easy, but not all. Hence Aristotle adds: "But that we cannot have the whole and the part," that is, principles and conclusions, "namely, integrally and without error, declares its difficulty." Where also by whole and part we can understand what theologians say, individual truths, or the collection of all. Therefore, to attain truth worthily is to know the whole and the part; that is, not just one or another truth, but all, without error. Which sense perhaps Aristotle himself did not entirely attain; nevertheless, when led by the natural light he sensed man's weakness for contemplating truth, he declared it in those words which would comprehend the thing itself and be consistent with Catholic doctrine. And this very thing confirms that indication which he uses, namely, "Because each of those who seek truth contributes little to it; but from all collected into one, a certain magnitude exists." Where it is also worthy of observation that he did not say one perfect and exact knowledge of truth is made from all, but only a certain magnitude, because truly what each can find by his own industry is either nothing or little. But what all together, or each aided by the labors and industry of others, can know is something greater, yet not perfect, nor free from all errors; and therefore it is absolutely impossible for man to contemplate truth worthily by human powers. What can be achieved in this through divine grace is a matter of higher contemplation; and therefore concerning this question these things are sufficient for the opportunity of this place.

Q. 2. Whence arises the difficulty which befalls man in the knowledge of truth, is treated extensively disputation 9, section 2.

Q. 3. Whether first principles are naturally known. This question is only implicitly touched by Aristotle, wherefore it is inappropriately disputed here; but we have touched it for the

opportunity of this doctrine disputation 1, section 6, and disputation 2, section 3, at the beginning.

Q. 4. Whether we can in this life know quidditative substances actually and maximally intelligible, namely separate substances, disputation 35, section 2, extensively.

Q. 5. Whether speculative and practical science differ by their end, in that the former rests in the contemplation of truth, the latter refers it to work; and therefore the former inquires the cause of truth per se, since there is no absolute science of truth without cause; but the latter only investigates cause insofar as it contributes to work: concerning this matter some things have been touched disputation 1, more in 44, which is on habits.

Q. 6. What is the true sense of that pronouncement: "What is cause to others that they be such, is itself maximally such." From this place this axiom is usually elicited in another way, namely: "What is maximally such, is cause to others that they be such." Thus St. Thomas reports this principle, 1 p., q. 2, art. 3, argument 4, and q. 44, a. 1, and 1 contra Gentiles, c. 13, in which places Cajetan and Ferrara defend it in this sense, and Capreolus, in 2, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 1, at the end, and extensively in 1, dist. 3, q. 1. But by Aristotle it is not put forward except as we have proposed, and in rigor one does not follow from the other, because a universal affirmative proposition does not convert simply. That this is Aristotle's meaning is clear, both from the words and from the context and intention of the Philosopher. For he intends to conclude that this science is about things maximally true, because it discusses the first causes and principles of truth of other things; but what is cause of truth in other things is in itself maximally true, because each thing is maximally such which is cause to others that they be such. And the axiom explained in this way coincides with that proposed in book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 2: "On account of which each thing is such, that also more"; but here it is said more explicitly that the cause ought to be such as to agree with effects in name and definition; which Scotus explains concerning univocal

agreement; but it is sufficient if it be understood by unity of formal reason or of the same objective concept, as will be taught more extensively by us below in explaining the analogy of being, disputation 28, section 3. And in this way almost all expositors explain that pronouncement in this place: Alexander, the Commentator, and St. Thomas, concerning which more things are treated below, disputation 29, section 2.

Chapter II. That There is No Infinite Regress in the Species or Number of Causes

The Philosopher inserted this treatise in this place, both to show that knowledge of truth, which depends on knowledge of causes, although it is difficult, is nevertheless not impossible; and also to show that there are first causes of beings, around which he had said this wisdom is concerned. But because the material pertains to the disputation on causes, we have inserted in the disputations on causes all the questions which could be desired here.

Question 1. Whether the genera or species of causes are in some definite number, Disputation 12, section 3, throughout.

Q. 2. Whether in material causes there is an infinite progress, or whether one must stop at some first matter. Disputation 15, section 6.

Q. 3. Whether in physical formal causes there is an infinite process. Disputation 15, section 6.

Q. 4. Whether in metaphysical formal causes or in quidditative predicates there is an infinite process. Disputation 25, section 7.

Q. 5. Whether essential predicates of the same thing differ formally from the nature of the thing or by reason alone. Disputation 5, section 2, and disputation 6, section 1, and more extensively in section 5.

Q. 6. Whether an infinite progress in efficient causes can be given, both those subordinated per se and per accidens. Disputation 29, section 1.

Q. 7. Whether an infinite progress in final causes can be given. Disputation 24, section 1.

Q. 8. Whether the infinite falls under science so that it can be known exactly. This question is usually treated in this place on occasion of Aristotle's words, text 11: "Knowledge itself is also overturned: for how can those things which are infinite in this way be understood?" and text 13: "But that which is infinite by addition cannot be traversed in finite time." According to which latter words, the former are to be explained or limited, and thus the question has no difficulty. For it can be treated either concerning infinite being simply, and in the whole latitude of being, or concerning infinite created being in a qualified sense. Likewise the discourse can be either concerning the uncreated intellect, or concerning any created one, or especially concerning the human, concerning which alone Aristotle spoke. And finally the question can be concerning any knowledge, even confused and imperfect, or concerning perfect distinct knowledge, concerning which similarly Aristotle spoke.

Concerning infinite being, therefore, such as God alone is, we treat extensively disputation 30, section 11 and following, where we declare how God, although he comprehends himself, is invisible and incomprehensible to every creature. Concerning created being, however, since we more truly hold that it is impossible for any created being to be given actually infinite in any respect, that is, both in intension and in magnitude or multitude, it consequently follows that such infinite cannot be known by true and distinct knowledge. For that which is not enclosed under the latitude of being is not per se true nor intelligible; but this infinite, since it is impossible, is not enclosed under the latitude of being; therefore it is not properly knowable, since this is a property consequent upon the nature of being, but only through finite being, with the addition of negation of limitation or

term, can it be conceived or thought out as impossible. But positing the contrary hypothesis, namely, that this infinite is possible, it would have to be said that it could most easily be known and comprehended by the divine intellect, since it is of infinitely far superior power. Concerning the created intellect, however, no universal judgment can be made, because neither does such a way of understanding necessarily belong to every created intellect, nor does it repugnant to every intellect. Hence the human intellect, since it is the most imperfect of all, does not have such great power; but the angelic, as I think, can have it, because its power is of a superior order, and it understands in a more abstract and subtle way.

Therefore, granted that there cannot be given in things a created being actually infinite, nevertheless it can be increased infinitely, either in intension or in magnitude, and that whole increase can be known simultaneously in one intuition, which is most certain concerning the divine intellect, as we showed in the aforesaid disputation 30, section 12. Concerning the created intellect seeing clearly the divine essence and creatures in it, theologians also admit this more frequently, and rightly, as I treated tome 1 of the third part, disputation 26, sections 2 and 3. But outside that vision some deny this concerning knowledge of the infinite in itself, which theologians call in its proper genus; I think, however, that it does not repugnant not only through elevated and supernatural knowledge, as I treated concerning the infused science of Christ's soul in the aforesaid place of the third part, but also by the proper and natural power of some created intellect; especially if there is not discourse concerning the whole infinite collection of possible creatures, but in some determinate respect. For, as I was saying, although it is not necessary that every created intellect have such great power, and therefore neither the human intellect nor perhaps the lower angels have it, nevertheless it does not exceed the whole order of created intellect, because infinite power simply is not necessary for this knowledge, nor

infinite perfection in the genus of being, but finite power of a superior species and nature suffices.

Nor does it obstruct that finite power, the more it is engaged with more things, the more it is diminished in individuals, so that for that reason it seems unable to know individuals perfectly, if they are infinite. For that axiom must be understood when those many things are such that individuals adequate the power of the potency, and therefore the multitude of them exceeds such power; but when all are comprehended under one adequate nature and power of such a potency, it is not necessary that knowledge and attention be diminished so much that individuals cannot be known exactly, and all simultaneously, because then they are considered to be known by way of one. And in this way theologians say, and we will touch below, that superior angels through one intelligible species simultaneously know several genera or species of things, knowing individuals exactly and sufficiently. And by equal reason an angel can be so perfect in the ultimate species that by one intuition he knows some infinite multitude of things (as they say) syncategorematically contained under some certain genus or species; because this does not require infinity simply in the knower, but only in a qualified sense, or eminence of superior nature.

But I have always said, by one intuition, because successively it is impossible for such infinite to be known so as to be exhausted, because it is impossible for infinite to be exhausted by successive numbering; otherwise the whole that is innumerable would be numbered successively, and one would arrive at the end of that which is infinite, which involves open repugnance against the very nature of the infinite, as is clear from Physics 3, chapter 7. And for this reason, because humans do not know the causes of things simultaneously, but gradually, Aristotle considered it the same to infer absolutely first that knowledge of a thing through infinite causes is impossible for man, and afterwards that it is impossible to know infinite causes. Especially since that succession lasts only for finite time in any man. Nevertheless

this holds true not only in the human intellect, but also in the divine; because this repugnance does not arise from defect of intellective power, but from the very nature of the infinite, which consists in this, that it cannot be traversed successively. Especially since succession must always be in something actually finite; which all admit regarding one extreme, namely the posterior, or the term of cessation, and it is per se evident, because succession is always finished in it; but regarding the other extreme, the anterior, or of inception, many think otherwise; but I also think this is true because I think there cannot be real succession, whether continuous or discrete, which lacks a beginning and is eternal, as I will touch below, disputation 29, section 1, disputation 30, section 3. For this reason, therefore, universally and without limitation it is true that the infinite cannot be known successively, which Aristotle principally intends in this place. Nor does any difficulty of any moment occur against this.

Chapter III. On the Method & Order to be Observed in Investigating Truth

Since the Philosopher had said that the cognition of truth is difficult, but not impossible, here he declares what method should be maintained in investigating it, and what impediments should be avoided; and his opinion is clear, concerning which few questions can be raised.

Question 1. Whether the method of learning should be accommodated to custom. This question is sufficiently treated in the text, where he first declares that the force of custom is so great that often fabulous things are preferred to true ones on account of it; and things that are contrary to custom are immediately judged foreign. Hence it happens that because of various customs, men also desire different methods of learning; for some delight in conjectures, others in examples, others in testimonies, still others in exquisite reasonings. From this Aristotle seems tacitly to conclude that no certain rule can

be taken from custom, but that the learner ought to be instructed so that according to the requirement of the matter, he may investigate and approve each thing. Here two things must be observed: one is that the same judgment is not to be made concerning every custom; for some custom is corrupt and contrary to reason, like that of those who have become accustomed to demand equal demonstration of all things; or conversely, of those who think only those things should be believed which they find in authors familiar to them, and immediately reject all other things as new and unusual. These people ought to read and ponder attentively the words of the Philosopher in Ethics book 1, chapter 6: "Perhaps it will seem better, and it will be necessary, to refute even one's own things, especially for philosophers, for the sake of preserving truth; for when both are friends, it is sacred to prefer truth to honor." Therefore, when custom is of this kind, the method of teaching is not to be accommodated to it, but rather it should be overcome or moderated by the efficacy of reason itself. Sometimes, however, custom is excellent and accommodated to sound doctrine, and then the best counsel is to accommodate the method of learning to custom; because, as Aristotle says here, what is customary is always better known; but the method of learning should be taken from things better known, insofar as it can be done. Custom is also considered a second nature; and things that are more consonant with nature are more easily learned. Therefore, as Aristotle says in Ethics book 2, chapter 1, it matters not a little, but very much, or rather it matters entirely, that men become accustomed thus or not thus from adolescence. This is true not only in morals, but also in learning science.

The second thing to be noted is that not only from custom, but from natural talent and the peculiar constitution of each person, it arises that some desire to learn or teach in one way rather than another, as Fonseca correctly noted here. And when it arises from this source that a discipline is treated otherwise than it ought to be, it is more difficult to correct or change nature, as is evident per se.

Q. 2. In what sense it was said by Aristotle: "It is absurd to seek science and the method of science simultaneously." Nearly all interpreters understand dialectic by the method of knowing, whence some take occasion to treat here of the nature of dialectic, whether, namely, it is a science, and whether it is necessary for other sciences; since Aristotle in the aforesaid words seems to distinguish it from science, and to teach that it ought to be premised before science. Nevertheless, I think these questions should be relegated to dialectic itself; and it should be supposed that the proper doctrine of dialectic, which they call teaching dialectic, is true science. For it proceeds from evident principles to demonstrating its conclusions, sometimes a posteriori, or from the impossible, sometimes also through the proper cause, as is sufficiently evident from the discourse of that doctrine. However, because that entire doctrine tends to the end of teaching the method of knowing, although it teaches that method demonstratively, it was called by Aristotle the method of knowing from its end, and distinguished from other sciences, which are only sciences and do not demonstrate the method of knowing, but only participate in it from dialectic.

You will say: therefore at least in dialectic itself it will not be absurd to seek science and the method of knowing simultaneously. It is answered by conceding the consequence, because in that science the method of knowing, taken broadly and generally, is investigated as an end, or as an object to be known; but science itself is investigated as the form and perfection to be obtained by such study. In other sciences, however, since the method of knowing is not sought as object or end, it should be supposed as an instrument serving to obtain science; and therefore in other sciences it would be absurd and laborious to investigate science and the method of knowing simultaneously, and about these, as I said, Aristotle spoke.

But that in dialectic it is not impossible to investigate the method of knowing and science simultaneously, the reason is that the intellect reflects upon itself, and thus while it investigates in its own

acts the method by which they are aptly disposed for acquiring science, it investigates this very form or disposition of its acts through proper causes, and in demonstrating them it maintains the same disposition or method of reasoning, and thus in the investigation and demonstration of that method of knowing, it observes the method of science, and thus simultaneously acquires science. It is also aided in this by natural dialectic, which in man is the principle of all science, as regards the form and method of discoursing. Finally, this is especially not absurd in dialectic because it cannot be done otherwise, nor can another acquired method of knowing be supposed before it, nor should one proceed to infinity, but one must stop at a form which is simultaneously both what and by which, that is, both science and method of knowing.

Finally, it can be added that besides dialectic, which is general to all sciences, there is in each science a peculiar and proper method of proceeding, which can also be called a method of knowing. In this sense Averroes distinguished common logic from that proper to each science, as Alexander of Hales noted here; for he called that proper method of knowing proper logic; for it is a certain application of dialectic, or of some part of it. And this method of knowing should also be premised in individual sciences, lest one proceed confusedly, as Aristotle also touched upon in On the Parts of Animals book 1, chapter 1, and Ethics book 1, chapter 3, and observes in the Physics and almost all other sciences. And this is also observed by almost all authors in transmitting dialectic, so that in the beginning they prepare the way of knowing perfunctorily and without exact demonstration; but afterwards through dialectic itself they perfect the method of knowing demonstratively.

Q. 3. Whether in all sciences there is equal certainty or evidence. This question is moved by occasion of Aristotle's words, text 6: "The accurate method of teaching of mathematicians is not to be demanded in all things." Which he repeats below in book 6, chapter 1, and has similar things in Ethics book 1, chapters 2 and 7. And in

general, how there can be inequality in certainty is treated in Posterior Analytics book 1, although theologians have expounded this more exactly in the matter concerning faith; but in the present we discuss below the degree of metaphysical certainty compared to mathematical and physical, in disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 4. Whether every natural thing has matter. This is proposed because of that particle "perhaps" which Aristotle places in text 16, saying: "Perhaps every nature has matter," where by the name of nature he understands natural things subject to physical motion, according to his phrase, as is clear from book 12, chapter 7, and other places. Some therefore think that Aristotle used that particle "perhaps" because he did not believe the heavens have matter. But it can more easily be said that he placed it because he thought they have matter, though not with as much certainty as concerning other natural things. Or certainly he used it because the matter of the heavens is of another nature. More truly, however, I think there is no mystery in that word, but it is Aristotle's custom to speak thus for the sake of modesty, when he does not dispute a matter ex professo. Therefore that question is little necessary in this place; but it is treated below in disputation 13, sections 10 and 11.

Q. 5. Whether there is one science of all things or many. The Philosopher touched on this in the last words of this chapter, and for the opportunity of this science it is discussed in disputation 1, sections 2 and 3.

Q. 6. Whether metaphysics should be learned before or after other sciences. This is touched on by Aristotle in the same place; it is briefly expedited in disputation 1, section 4.

Book Three of the Metaphysics Containing Summarily All the Doubts that Occur in This Science

Expositors are accustomed to inquire why Aristotle in this place consumed an entire book in proposing questions without their

resolution. I think, however, that he did this to emphasize the difficulty and utility of this doctrine, and perhaps to excite in the reader the desire to investigate the science in which so many doubts are expedited; and for other reasons which he himself touched on in chapter 1, and which are sufficiently clear in it. Therefore Aristotle proposes various questions in the first chapter: in the others, however, he brings forward reasons for doubting on both sides, but defines nothing. And in proposing these questions he observes almost no method or certain order, but seems to have poured them out as they came to mind. I warn of this so that no one may think that we are bound either to give the reason for that order or to observe it when we have disputed concerning these questions. For both reasons, therefore, we shall propose all the questions with the places where they have been treated and defined by us. But if some have been omitted as useless and of little moment, we shall also warn of this.

Chapter I.

Question 1. Whether it belongs to one science or many to contemplate all causes. This is agitated by Aristotle immediately in chapter 1, at the beginning. The truth is that this is especially the office of metaphysics, insofar as it can belong to one science; see disputation 1, sections 1 and 5.

Q. 2. Whether this science considers only the simple principles of substance, or also the first complex principles. This is disputed on both sides by Aristotle here in chapter 2, text 4; but the affirmative part is defined in book 4, chapter 3, and by us in disputation 1, section 4, and disputation 3, section 3.

Q. 3. Whether this science disputes concerning all substances. This is treated on both sides here by the Philosopher in chapter 2, text 5, and is defined in book 4, chapter 2, book 6, chapter 1, and by us in disputation 1, section 2.

Q. 4. Whether besides sensible substances there are given other separate ones. This is treated here by Aristotle only concerning ideas and mathematical things, concerning which above in book 1, chapters 6 and 7, and below in book 7, chapter 12 and following. But in this sense I consider the question useless, and therefore it is briefly expedited by us in disputation 4, sections 1 and 2, and disputation 5, throughout; and we have added some things in disputation 25, on the exemplary cause. The proper question, however, is concerning angelic substances, which is treated by the Philosopher in book 12, chapter 8, and by us in disputation 35.

Q. 5. Whether the same science treats of substances and of those things that happen to substances per se. This is treated in the following chapter, text 6, and the affirmative part is defined in book 4, chapters 1 and 2. And the matter is clear, and more dialectical than metaphysical, and in relation to this science it is expedited by us in disputation 1, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 6. Whether the common affections of being, such as same and different and similar ones, are considered in this science, in the same place.

Q. 7. Whether genera and differences should be considered principles of things, or rather physical parts, such as matter and form. Aristotle treats this on both sides in chapter 3 of this book. To us, however, it does not seem to require special disputation; for we think both can be called principles, the former metaphysical, the latter physical. But because metaphysical composition is only through reason, while physical is real, therefore we consider physical principles to be proper to material things, and we dispute concerning them throughout disputations 13, 14, 15 and 16. Metaphysical principles, however, are only principles according to our mode of conceiving and according to reason, and concerning these we speak when treating of universals, disputation 5, sections 1 and 2, and disputation 6, throughout.

Q. 8. Whether among genera those that are more universal are more principles. Aristotle treats this very extensively throughout almost all of chapter 3. It is truly useless; for remote genera can be called more principles extensively, proximate ones intensively, or the former more in the nature of potency and matter, the latter in the nature of form and perfection; but these things pertain only to the mode of speaking.

Q. 9. Whether besides matter there is some per se cause, and whether it is separable or not, and whether one or many in number. Aristotle poses this in almost the same words toward the end of the chapter; but it has an ambiguous sense. For if the proper words are taken as they sound, it seems to ask whether beyond the material cause there is given a formal cause and others. And in this sense this question is treated below in book 4, chapter 2, and by us extensively in disputation 12, on causes in general, and in the following ones. It does not seem, however, that this is Aristotle's sense here, because immediately in chapter 4 he disputes this question with the following ones in a far different sense. The other sense of the question, therefore, will be whether besides matter, that is, outside singular things, there is some per se cause. For Aristotle is accustomed to use that word "besides" in the Platonic sense; for he often agitates this question with Plato, and in this sense he treats it in chapter 4, text 12, and it has been defined by us in disputations 5 and 6, treating of universals. Only the difficulty remains that then the following question seems to coincide with this one.

Q. 10. The tenth question is, therefore, whether there is something besides the material individual whole itself. Aristotle proposes this question in text 2 with those obscure words: "Whether there is something besides the simultaneous whole?" But he explains what he understands by simultaneous whole, saying: "I call simultaneous whole when something is predicated of matter," that is, as I interpret, species of a material individual. He seems therefore to ask whether in material things species is something besides

individuals, and in this sense the question is with Plato. But it appears to be the same as the preceding, as it has been expounded by us. Unless we say that there it is asked from the nature of quiddity, and thus it is materially the same question, but formally diverse; or certainly there it is asked concerning real separation, here concerning formal separation or from the nature of the thing, as is disputed by us in disputation 5, section 2. Others, however, understand that here it is asked generally whether what-it-is in material things is the same as that of which it is. This question Aristotle pursues extensively in book 7, chapters 4 and 15, and we extensively in disputation 34, almost throughout.

Q. 11. Whether principles are definite not only in species but also in number, that is, proper to each thing and diverse in distinct things. This is treated below in chapter 4, text 13, and book 12. But one should not linger on it, for it is certain that intrinsic principles are multiplied in number when individuals are multiplied, and not more than those; and this is true in one way in forms, in another way in matter. For forms are multiplied according to their entities in diverse individuals; but matter not always, because one entity of matter in number underlies successively diverse forms; but it varies according to dispositions, and thus proximate matter is always diverse, either in species or in number, according to the nature of forms. Extrinsic principles, however, are not thus multiplied, because one can be the principle of diverse things; but sometimes they are multiplied, and they are always in finite number, because in no multitude of causes is there progress to infinity, as was noted above in book 2.

Q. 12. Whether of corruptible and incorruptible things there are the same principles. This is treated by Aristotle below in chapter 1, text 15, and book 12, chapter 4. By us, however, in disputation 13, section 11, where concerning intrinsic principles, but concerning extrinsic ones in disputation 29, section 2.

Q. 13. Whether all principles, even of corruptible things, are free from corruption. This is treated by Aristotle in the same places,

but in particular there is discussion concerning matter by us in the proper disputation. Concerning form, however, there is controversy only in the rational soul, which does not pertain to this science. In extrinsic causes, however, there is almost no place for this question; for the proximate and univocal cause of corruptible things ought to be corruptible; but the superior cause can be incorruptible and eternal. It is also necessary that all incorruptible species draw their origin from some eternal and incorruptible thing, as is demonstrated by us in disputation 29, section 1.

Q. 14. Whether true and being is the very substance of things, or whether something else is subjected to them. This is disputed by Aristotle in chapter 4, text 16. It is nevertheless useless and Platonic. For if the discourse is about transcendental being and one, it is sufficiently established that they are not something besides the substance or indivisible essence of each thing, concerning which we discourse sufficiently in disputations 4 and 5. If, however, it is taken by antonomasia for the first being per se one, thus it is established that it is something separated from other things, yet not their substance nor subject, but their first cause, concerning which we discourse copiously in disputation 22, section 1, and disputation 29, sections 1 and 2. If, however, being and one are taken in other hidden and metaphorical significations, let those be explained, and the response will be easy.

Q. 15. Whether the principles of things are universals themselves, or singular things. This question is treated below in chapter 5, text 20, and book 7, from chapter 13, and it can be understood to be moved against Plato, whether, namely, ideas are principles of things, and thus it has already been treated in the said place and often elsewhere. It can also coincide with that by which it is asked whether actions belong to singulars, which was touched on in book 1 and treated in disputation 34, section 9; or, as St. Thomas expounds, whether principles are such according to universal or singular nature, and thus it was touched on in disputation 5, sections 3, 4 and 6.

Q. 16. Whether the principles of things cause otherwise than through motion. This seems to be treated properly concerning the efficient cause alone, as in disputation 22, section 1. Aristotle, however, never disputed it ex professo in this sense, but seems to propose it because of Plato's ideas, which he said introduced forms in another way, and he seems to discuss it below in chapter 6, text 18. In which sense also it is transmitted by us in disputations 15 and 18, where we discourse concerning the eduction of substantial form and its effective principle.

Q. 17. Whether principles are in act or in potency. This is disputed concerning individual principles below in their places, namely concerning matter, form, etc. But it seems to be proposed here by Aristotle because of the elements which are principles of the mixed body, concerning which the question is whether they are in act or in potency in the mixed body. This question he disputes in chapter 6, text 19, and we in disputation 15, section 10.

Q. 18. Whether numbers, figures, lengths and points are certain substances or not. This is treated by Aristotle below in chapter 5 and books 13 and 14 very extensively; but nothing should be said about it beyond those things which we dispute below concerning quantity, disputations 40 and 41.

Chapter II. On the Reasons for Doubting the Five Primary Questions

I consider it superfluous to annotate individual reasons, since they can be read and easily understood in the text and other commentators. Although Aristotle does indeed present some opinions worthy of knowledge and discussion while proposing these reasons, nevertheless, since he always proceeds by arguing from both sides, we can have nothing firm concerning his opinion, as Averroes also noted at the beginning of his commentaries on this book. And therefore, if one is to proceed correctly, Aristotle provides no foundation in this

entire book for treating the questions that they call incidental or textual. Nevertheless, the following are customarily treated around this chapter.

Question 1. Whether the mathematical sciences demonstrate through efficient and final cause; for Aristotle assumes the negative part as true while arguing in example 3. However, since Aristotle apparently strives to confirm something false with that argument, namely, that there is no science which considers all causes, it is clear from that testimony that nothing can be affirmed about Aristotle's opinion. But I judged that question should be omitted in this work, both because it pertains more to declaring the nature and reason of the mathematical sciences, and also because it is very easy. For it is established that those things about which mathematics disputes have, according to themselves, efficient and final causes, for quantity, line, points are made by something and for the sake of something; nevertheless, insofar as they are considered by the speculative mathematical sciences, they are abstracted from these causes, because they are abstracted from motion and from all use. And thus Aristotle did not say that mathematical things do not have efficient and final cause, but that mathematical sciences do not demonstrate through these causes.

And the reason seems to be a priori, because mathematics does not consider the proper essence and nature of quantity, but only certain proportions and properties that follow upon them, not through real causality, but through inferential consequence only. From which it is permitted to understand that mathematics also does not demonstrate through material causality, which Aristotle seems to have left as more obvious, because these sciences abstract from matter. Hence they cannot demonstrate through proper and physical form either, because form and matter are as it were correlative. And from this some finally infer that mathematics does not demonstrate through any cause, and therefore is not properly science of the reason why, and only demonstrates that its conclusions are true sometimes from the

impossible, sometimes from a sign and as it were to the senses. But, although this is true of many mathematical demonstrations, nevertheless it must not be denied that demonstration of the reason why, which is through cause, sometimes occurs in those sciences. But one must distinguish concerning cause: one is real through proper influence, which is said in the order of being, and concerning this it is true that it does not intervene in mathematical demonstrations, as Averroes insinuated, 1 Physics, in the beginning. Another is cause in the order of knowledge, which is more properly called reason, which suffices for demonstration a priori, as is evident when we demonstrate one divine attribute through another, and in this way the mathematician demonstrates through cause, as when through the definition of triangle something is shown about this or that triangle.

Q. 2. But on the occasion of Aristotle's words, it is customarily asked here secondly whether mathematical beings are good, which we have sufficiently touched upon in disputation 10, section 2.

Q. 3. Whether all actions are with motion. For Aristotle also affirms this in the discourse of that reason, where he also says many things pertaining to the matter of causes, such as that immobile things do not have efficient cause, nor end. This is false concerning created intelligences; but, as I said, none of those things which are assumed here by Aristotle need be affirmed by him from his own opinion. Concerning the prior proposition, however, we dispute extensively in treating creation, disputation 12, section 1, where we demonstrate the negative part. But what Aristotle assumes here can be explained concerning physical action, for he supposes that mathematical things do not have another superior action. The other proposition is disputed in the same place, and disputation 29, section 1 and 2, and disputation 35, section 1. But in this place by immobile things only mathematical things are understood, and these are said not to have cause not only according to the thing, but according to such abstraction and consideration, as has been declared.

Chapter III. On the Question Concerning Principles Whether They are the Genera Themselves or Elements or Physical Principles

Concerning the question which Aristotle disputes ex professo, nothing new occurs beyond those things which have been noted in chapter 1, question 7. But concerning those things which the Philosopher touches upon in passing, some questions occur, especially around text 10.

Question 1. Whether genus is predicated per se of the differences by which it is contracted, or as it is customarily asked otherwise, whether it is of the nature of genus that it have differences outside its own nature, that is, in whose intrinsic and essential concept the genus itself is not included. For the Philosopher clearly supposes this in the reason which he constructs in text 10. And lest anyone say that he is not proceeding here by defining, but only by arguing, the same Philosopher proves this ex professo in book six of the Topics, chapter three. Therefore this question is metaphysical in one sense, dialectical in another. For it is metaphysical insofar as it distinguishes the question between genus and difference, and the precision of one from the other, and the mode of composition of species from those, and in this sense it is indicated by the words placed above later, and it has been sufficiently treated by us in disputation 6, section 5, and section 6, and to the same will contribute those things which are treated in disputation 2, section 6, and disputation 39, section 2.

But this question is dialectical insofar as it inquires into the quality of predication, namely, whether that predication of genus concerning difference, or vice versa, is per se, as, rational is animal, or, animal is rational. And in this sense Iandinus treats it here extensively, question 12, who affirms it to be per se; and Antonius Andreas, question 2, and Iavellus, question 2, who deny it; and Niphus, disputation 2, who uses various distinctions, but the matter is both

foreign and sufficiently clear. For those propositions are not in the first or second mode of saying per se, which Aristotle posited in book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, because in them neither is the predicate of the nature of the subject, nor the subject of the nature of the predicate. And the reason a priori is taken from the decision of the prior sense. For since genus and difference are so compared that one is outside the concept and essential nature of the other, and otherwise difference would not be a property flowing from the nature of genus, as is self-evident, it happens that one cannot be predicated of the other either per se in the first way or per se in the second way. But if someone according to other modes per se posited by Aristotle, book 5 of the Metaphysics, chapter 18, or others which can be devised, namely, as per se is distinguished against per aliud, or as it excludes composition per accidens, thus difference as it is joined per se to genus, that is, immediately and not through another, or as genus and difference compose one per se, and not per accidens, thus it can be said that one is predicated of the other per se. But these modes per se applied through predications are not so customary as the former; beyond the fact that those predications are not very natural, but in some way improper, and in this also they fall short of propositions per se. For, although divisive difference is compared to genus through the mode of form, nevertheless it is less universal than genus; on the contrary, although genus is more universal, it is nevertheless compared to difference as potency, and not as act, and therefore is not so properly and directly predicated. Therefore absolutely these propositions should be rejected from the number of propositions per se.

Q. 2. Whether to have differences outside its own nature, in which it is not included, nor is predicated of them per se, is not only of the nature of proper genus, but also of the nature of every univocal predicate, or having one objective concept common to all things contained under it. We have touched upon this question in disputation 2, section 5 and 6, where we showed that it is not necessary that this property agree with every common predicate

according to the same objective concept; and disputation 39, section 2, we showed it does not agree with every essential or quidditative predicate, and that Aristotle in this place spoke only concerning proper genus, whatever some commentators contend. And we have touched upon the same in disputations 32 and 30.

Q. 3. Whether species is predicated per se of the difference constituting it, as rational is man. The authorities cited above treat this here, and some affirm, others deny, others use distinctions. But it has been omitted by us, both because it is dialectical, and because (as Fonseca well indicated in his commentaries) Aristotle considered the negative part so clear that he left it without proof and declaration. Nor do those things which others object stand in the way, namely, that in that proposition the subject is of the nature of the predicate, and therefore it is in the second mode of saying per se, for this is its definition. Likewise because this proposition: Man is rational, is in the first mode of saying per se; therefore the converse will also be per se at least in the second mode. These things (I say) and similar ones do not stand in the way; for that proposition is not natural, but indirect, most improper and beyond nature, and therefore is outside every latitude of propositions per se. For those definitions of modes per se should be understood concerning proper and connatural predicates and subjects, not concerning those which are composed and converted by us in reverse and contrary to natural order. Hence it can also be said that genus in those definitions proposed per se is a proper and natural proposition. And by the same reason it is not necessary that a proposition per se be converted into another per se, when through conversion it becomes indirect and improper. Add also that this is per se in the first mode: Man is animal; but this animal is man, in no mode. I see there is controversy concerning the mode of speaking; and many judge this proposition, Risible is man, to be per se in the first mode, although it is indirect. But nevertheless the prior mode is more formal and more proper. Otherwise also that proposition: Rational is man, would be in the first and second mode per se; which is absurd.

Therefore these indirect propositions are outside the order of propositions per se. See Cajetan, book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, chapters 4 and 18.

Chapter IV.

Here Aristotle disputes in both directions several questions proposed in the first chapter, namely from question 9 up to 14. Nevertheless he defines nothing, nor brings anything new, or needing our disputation or notation.

Chapter V.

Here he disputes question 18 concerning mathematical things, or quantity, whether, namely, this is substance, or not; and he says nothing worthy of notation, or needing new disputation; those things which we discuss concerning quantity in disputation 40, sections 1 and 2 suffice. Nevertheless this place should be observed for those things which are handed down there.

Chapter VI.

Here he disputes the remaining questions premised above, and almost always returns to useless disputation concerning ideas with Plato. Therefore nothing new is customarily disputed here either.

Book Four of the Metaphysics on the Subject of This Doctrine, its Parts, Properties, & Principles

Chapter I. On the Subject of Metaphysics

Question 1. Whether being qua being is the subject of metaphysics; which Aristotle affirms in this place, disputation 1, section 1, throughout.

Q. 2. What beings or what natures of beings metaphysics attains in its contemplation. Disputation 1, section 2, throughout.

Q. 3. Whether being according to itself has properties which belong to it per se, and are demonstrated concerning it in this science. Disputation 3, section 1.

Q. 4. How many those properties are, and what order they maintain among themselves. Disputation. 3, section 2.

Q. 5. Whether this science is concerned with first principles, and what office it exercises concerning them. Disputation 1, section 4.

Q. 6. Whether by reason of object or principles, other sciences are subalternated to metaphysics. Disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 7. Whether this science has some first principles from which it demonstrates. Disputation 3, section 2.

Q. 8. Whether this science considers the first causes and principles of things, and in what way. Disputation 1, section 4, and disputation 12, in the beginning.

Q. 9. Whether being qua being has real causes. In the places just cited.

Q. 10. Whether being qua being signifies some one objective nature. This question has its place here because of those words of Aristotle: "Since we seek principles and highest causes, it is necessary that it be clear that these belong to some nature per se." And at the end of the chapter he concludes: "Therefore we must take up the first causes of being insofar as it is being." From which opinions compared among themselves it seems to be established that, according to Aristotle's opinion, being qua being signifies some nature, or some common nature through the mode of one nature, whose properties per se, principles and causes can be investigated in this science. But we treat the said question in disputation 2, section 2. To which question the following are annexed.

Q. 11. Whether being has in us one formal concept common to all beings. Disputation 2, section 1, throughout.

Q. 12. Whether being qua being is something really separated from inferiors. Ibid., section 3.

Q. 13. Whether it can be separated at least according to reason. Disputation 4, section 2.

Q. 14. Whether being qua being includes actually or potentially inferiors. Disputation 2, section 2.

Q. 15. Whether being qua being signifies immediately all supreme genera, or only mediately. Ibid.

Q. 16. In what the common and separated nature of being is posited. Ibid., section 4.

Q. 17. Whether being is predicated essentially or accidentally of particular beings, especially of created ones. Ibid.

Q. 18. Whether the nature of being transcends all things, so that it is included in all modes and differences. Ibid., section 5.

Q. 19. How being is contracted to inferiors. Disputation 2, section 6.

Q. 20. Here also can be treated whether the existence of a creature is distinguished from its essence, concerning which matter there is copious disputation 31, which contains several questions, which can be seen both there and also in the index of disputations, disputation 31.

Chapter II. On the Analogy of Being & Some of its Properties

Question 1. Whether being is univocal or analogous both to created and uncreated being, and to substance and accident. The prior question is treated in disputation 28, section 3; the latter, disputation 32, final section.

Q. 2. Whether Aristotle correctly compared the analogy of being with the analogy of healthy. And the reason for the difficulty is

that they seem to be of far different nature, as is established from the aforesaid disputations. This can be answered in two ways: first, that he compared those things in analogy absolutely, but not in the mode of analogy, because in mode they are not similar; for healthy is analogous in such a way that the form which it signifies belongs intrinsically to only one signified thing; to others through extrinsic denomination. But being signifies a form or nature inherent intrinsically in all signified things. Hence it happens that healthy does not signify one concept common to all signified things, as being signifies.

From which it further happens that, when Aristotle equates being and healthy in this, that just as one science deals with healthy regarding all its significations, insofar as they are derived from one health, so one science treats of being, when (I say) he compares these things, it should also be understood according to similitude, not according to equality. For healthy, according to its whole analogy, is not the adequate object of one science, directly comprehending under itself its signified things as proper subjective parts of such an object, directly, or (as they say) in recto pertaining to the object of such science; for only the principal signification of healthy is the adequate and direct object of medicine; but the rest, which are said to be healthy analogically, pertain obliquely to that science, as signs of health, or instrument, or something of this kind. But being is an adequate object directly embracing its quasi-subjective parts, as has been shown in the disputations cited in the preceding chapter. Hence it happens that being according to adequate signification can be the extreme of demonstration, in which properties adequate to it are demonstrated concerning it; but healthy minimally, but only by reason of the primary signification.

Secondly, it can be answered that we can speak of being in two ways: in one way, as it comprehends only true beings of reality, and transcends all those and contains them under itself. In another way, as it extends to many things which are not truly and intrinsically beings, but are only called beings through a certain extrinsic

attribution, as are privations, or beings entirely per accidens or of reason. In the prior way Aristotle seems to have spoken of being in the superior chapter, and in that way it is properly the adequate and direct object of one science, as it has analogy with unity of concept, and of intrinsic objective nature found in all signified things even secondary ones, as we have shown in the said places, and regarding these things it is comparable with healthy not according to equality, but only in the way which we have now explained. In the latter way Aristotle seems to have spoken of being here, and thus it includes with respect to many signified things analogy of several concepts, and according to extrinsic denomination with respect to some, and regarding these things it is compared with healthy, even in the mode of analogy, and in the mode in which it falls under one science, as is easily established from the things said.

Nor should it seem strange that Aristotle takes the name of being in different signification in these two chapters, for in them he speaks in different ways; for in the prior one, when he constitutes the adequate object of metaphysics, he deals with being according to its proper objective concept; but in this chapter he deals with the whole amplitude of signification of the name of being; hence he quite expressly enumerates several things which are not true beings, such as privations and similar things, which he himself excludes from the direct and adequate object of metaphysics, book 6, at the end.

Q. 3. Whether it pertains to metaphysics to deal with the proper nature of substance, and its proper principles. Disputation 1, section 2.

Q. 4. Whether metaphysics treats of species of being, according to their proper natures, and in general whether science concerning genus is also concerning species. This is treated in disputation 1, section 2. And the resolution is simply negative. But the words of Aristotle in text 2, on which this question is founded, namely: "Of one genus there is one science, therefore also of being, however many species there are, it belongs to one science generically

to contemplate, and of species the species," these words (I say) are ambiguous, and are there extensively explained. Only let it be noted in this, that the discourse is formal concerning species of being in the genus of the knowable. And thus it can be said that the genus of being as knowable as such pertains to the genus of science; but various species of knowables to various species of sciences. Or also all beings insofar as they agree in some one nature of the knowable fall under one science, which although it is one in species, is called general on account of universal treatment of all beings under another nature. Nevertheless however species of beings, under proper natures (certainly of knowable objects), pertain to sciences specifically diverse.

Q. 5. Whether being and one are the same and one nature. Disputation 4, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 6. Whether being and one are convertible, or (as Aristotle says) mutually follow each other. Disputation 4, section 1.

Q. 7. Whether in this reciprocation Aristotle correctly compared being and one to principle and cause. Disputation 13, section 1, in the solution of arguments.

Q. 8. Whether those things which are generated by the same generation, and corrupted by the same corruption, are one. Disputation 7, section 2.

Q. 9. Whether one is privatively opposed to multitude, as Aristotle here signifies. Disputation 4, section 6.

Q. 10. Whether dialectic and sophistic are concerned with every being, and in this agree in some way with metaphysics. For Aristotle seems to affirm this in the text, nevertheless it pertains to dialecticians rather than to us. And therefore it should be briefly observed that this should not be understood concerning the proper doctrine of dialectical and sophistical art, but their use. For the doctrine of dialectic or topics (for here it is taken in the same signification) is only concerned with teaching the mode of probably concluding or arguing, especially by reason of matter. But sophistic is

concerned with the mode of apparently concluding. Hence under this nature they are not concerned with being, or all beings, but with such works of the intellect. But the use of dialectical and sophistical art extends to all things, because in every thing or matter probable or apparent reasons can be made. In which these parts of logic exceed demonstrative doctrine; for its use does not extend to all things, but is concerned only with true and necessary things. Therefore the doctrine of metaphysics is not equated with the doctrine of dialectic, but with use, and it is proportional comparison, not entirely similar, and thus the matter is clear.

Although Aristotle in this chapter does not so much dispute concerning one, as say that it should be disputed, all questions pertaining to unity are customarily treated here, indeed also to other properties of being. Concerning which we have dealt extensively from disputation 4 up to 11, as can be seen in the superior index, lest useless repetition be made here. Some also dispute here concerning the being of existence, how it is compared to being or essence. Concerning which matter it has been extensively said in disputation 31.

Chapter III. That First Principles Pertain to This Science, & Especially that Which is the First of All

Question 1. Whether this is the first principle of all: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. Disp. 3, sect. 3.

The remaining matters which are discussed here concerning the treatment of principles have been treated both there and also in disp. 1, sect. 4, and have been annotated in the preceding sections.

Chapters IV. – VIII. The First Principles are Defended: It is Impossible for the Same Thing to Be & Not to Be at the Same Time, &: It is Necessary that Anything Either Be or Not Be

Aristotle consumes these five chapters in refuting certain philosophers who either denied these principles or pretended to deny them; unless perhaps he himself fabricated this for the sake of argument. However that may be, scarcely anything occurs in these chapters that brings special utility or provides occasion for any question, except for one or another passage.

Question 1. can be treated in chapter 4, around texts 13 and 14, whether one accident can be the subject of another; this question we have treated in disp. 44, sect. 4. And the present passage is explained there.

Q. 2. Around text 16 could be treated whether that which is not can effect anything; on the occasion of those words of Aristotle: "But those things which are not, how will they speak or walk?" However, such a question is sufficiently foreign to Aristotle's present purpose, and is only indicated so that Aristotle's said words might be noted; but it is treated by us extensively in disp. 48 and disp. 31.

Q. 3. Around chapter 8 the question can be raised whether and what kind of definite judgment of the good is required to move the will. For this passage is to be carefully noted for that question, as we observe in disp. 23, sect. 8, where we treat that question.

Q. 4. The fourth question can be around the end of the same chapter 4, whether truth and falsity admit of more and less, that is, whether one is greater than another. For Aristotle considered the affirming part so certain that he used that principle to demonstrate the first principle: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. Although, as he himself states at the beginning of this chapter, in these arguments he does not argue from things more known, but refutes the adversary from what has been conceded. Hence it is likely that that affirmative part had been conceded by the adversary. However, that false opinion can be seen to be absolutely wrong, for since truth consists in something indivisible and in complete adequation of the intellect to the thing, it does not seem able to admit of more or less. And for the same reason neither does falsity,

because if it removes truth, it removes it completely, and thus none can be greater. But it must be said that in falsity there can be more and less not formally through a mixture of truth and falsity, as the argument made correctly proves, but as it were radically through greater or lesser distance from truth. And this is plainly the Philosopher's intention: for this suffices for him to conclude that something is determinately true. But indeed in truth there is not said to be more or less through approach to or recession from falsity; for falsity is opposed to truth by way of privation, and therefore is measured by it, but not conversely. Therefore only by reason of the foundation, or of the greater firmness or necessity of that thing in which truth is founded, can one truth be called greater than another. However, this whole matter can be established more fully from those things which we treat in disp. 8 and 9, concerning truth and falsity.

Q. 5. Whether contraries are so repugnant concerning the same subject, as contradictories are concerning anything whatsoever. For Aristotle seems to affirm this in this place. From which some infer that even in relation to absolute power it is repugnant for two perfect contraries to be in the same subject. Concerning this matter we speak in the predicament of quality, disp. 45. Now it is established that Aristotle speaks only insofar as one contrary entails the privation or negation of the other; but if this is prevented, it is established that there is not equal repugnance. Whether indeed it can be prevented, Aristotle does not know, and he would indeed deny it; but we have no reason to deny it, except where a special reason intervenes, concerning which is spoken in the cited place.

Q. 6. Whether two contraries in a remiss state can naturally be simultaneously in the same thing, as Aristotle here thinks, is disputed in the same place.

Q. 7. It can be treated moreover whether all things are always moved, or all things always rest, and whether something is entirely immobile, which is the first mover. But these things are treated in Physics, and are proper to that science, although concerning the first

mover, not under the aspect of first mover, but of first cause, or first being, we treat in disp. 20 and 29.

Q. 8. Concerning all these chapters it is customarily asked whether there is pure truth without falsity in affirmations and negations, and whether this can be perceived by us. Concerning this matter, what seemed worthy of disputation we have said in the disputation on truth and falsity.

Book Five of the Metaphysics on the Triple Meaning of Common & Analogous Names, & its Distinction

Aristotle does not yet approach the matter itself, namely, the proper treatment of the object of this science. But first he distinguishes the meanings of certain names in this book. For, because being, which he had established as the object of this science in the preceding book, is most common, the properties, causes, principles, and parts of it are also signified by most common names, which are customarily multiple. And for this reason it seemed necessary to Aristotle to expound the analogy of these terms before the treatment of things. And this is the scope of this book, as the Commentator noted. For, although this doctrine treats principally not of words but of things, nevertheless because things cannot be explained except through words, it seemed necessary to the Philosopher to deliver exact knowledge of these very words. Hence it happens that this book also, if we regard Aristotle's mind, should be numbered among the preambles to delivering the true science of metaphysics. But if we consider the custom of interpreters, in it the very things pertaining to the object of metaphysics are customarily treated, especially all the predicaments and the causes of being qua being; in the knowledge of which a great part of this doctrine consists.

Chapter I. On the Common Notion & True Meanings of This Term, Principle

This chapter is declared ex professo in disp. 42, sect. 4, where the following questions are briefly dispatched.

Quest. 1. In how many ways principle is said, and how its meanings can be reduced to some certain notion. Disp. 12, sect. 1.

Q. 2. Whether being prior is common to every principle. Ibid.

Q. 3. What is the definition of principle in common. Ibid. The definition given by Aristotle is declared, and the division there adjoined.

Q. 4. Whether principle is analogous, and what kind of analogy it has. Ibid.

Q. 5. Whether principle and cause are convertible. Ibid. And there various sayings of Aristotle concerning this matter, both in this chapter and in others, are expounded.

Chapter II. On Causes

Aristotle delivers the same doctrine concerning causes in this place which he had taught in Physics 1.2, and in nearly the same words, although the dignity and amplitude of metaphysics seemed to demand a more accurate and universal disputation. But why he did this, expositors declare for various reasons. But I think that Aristotle had nothing to add beyond those things which he disputes in books 7 and 8, concerning the principles of substance, and in book twelve concerning God and the intelligences. In the exposition of this chapter we have consumed a great part of the following work, from disp. 12 up to 27, in which first we made a general partition of causes in common, then individually concerning each in particular, and concerning their members or subdivisions we have discoursed copiously, and finally we have compared them both among themselves and with effects; to which three points the doctrine of this chapter is reduced. But it would be superfluous to transcribe here the titles of all the sections or

doubts, since they are contained in order in the following index of disputations, and can easily be sought from that.

Chapter III. On Element

The first question, can be in this chapter, whether element is correctly defined by Aristotle. But this is of little moment, for the description given by Aristotle is only a certain explanation of the meaning of that word according to its common use, and therefore we briefly declare it in disputat. 15, sect. 10. And the same must be judged concerning all questions which depend on that word; for they are more about the name than about the thing.

Q. 2. Whether matter is an element, concerning which disp. 13, sect. 10.

Q. 3. Whether form is an element. In the same place.

Q. 4. Whether genus and difference are elements. Concerning which nothing seems to be said, because it is only a question about the name; but those things can be read which I noted concerning a similar question under the name of principle above, lib. 3, cap. 1, q. 7.

Q. 5. It can also be asked here whether it is of the nature of an element that it formally and through itself compose that of which it is an element. Which nearly falls into that celebrated question, whether elements remain formally in a mixture; concerning which it has been said in disp. 15, sect. 10.

Chapter IV. On Nature

Question. 1. This chapter, insofar as it regards metaphysical consideration, we have expounded in disp. 15, sect. 11, where we have briefly dispatched that common question, what is the proper meaning of this word, and whether it has been correctly delivered by Aristotle. Nor does any difficulty of moment occur here, either in the letter of

the Philosopher or in the thing itself, because he treats here only of the meaning of the word.

Q. 2. But the question concerning the definition of nature delivered in book 2 of the Physics is not of this place, although some dispute it here.

Q. 3. But a certain question, which is customarily treated here in passing, whether parts of matter which have diverse forms can be continuous, has been dispatched in disput. 40, while explaining the necessity of continuous quantity.

Chapter V. On the Necessary & its Modes

The modes of the necessary which Aristotle delivers are clear: for he posits a double necessary from the end, namely, either simply, or for better being, and a third from the efficient cause, which he calls violent.

Quest. 1. Concerning which mode it could be asked whether everything necessary from an efficient cause is violent. But because the matter is easy, let it be noted briefly that something can be necessary from an efficient cause in two ways. In one way from that alone; in another way not from that alone, but simultaneously from the part of the patient or recipient. What is necessary in this latter way is not violent, as is clear from the motion of a stone downward, even if it happens to be made by an extrinsic agent; therefore only the prior mode of necessity, which proceeds merely from the extrinsic, pertains to violence. But again in that a distinction is needed; for sometimes the patient does not resist the effect or motion, although it does not seek it, and then also that necessity is not violent, as is clear from the motion of the heavens, or (beyond every opinion) from the motion of fire in its proper sphere. Therefore only that necessity is violent which is made with the patient resisting, which Aristotle sufficiently declared here in those words: "Besides inclination and choice." Where incidentally he insinuated that the violent generally said above is

something superior to the coercive; for the coercive properly taken is against choice (where understand every elicited appetition); but the violent is either against this, or against the appetite and inclination of nature, founded in natural power, whether active or passive. For Aristotle distinguished nothing between these. Hence he also tacitly explained, in Ethics book 3, chapter 1, and said the violent to be that which is from the extrinsic, with the patient not contributing force, which is to be understood positively as not contributing, that is, resisting, or (so to speak) not patiently bearing.

You will say: therefore another mode of the necessary can be added, namely, that which is from an efficient cause without violence or connaturality. It is answered that such a necessary either is nothing, or is reduced to the fourth mode, which Aristotle immediately posited, namely, that which cannot be otherwise, which he said to be necessary simply, and through its participation all other things are named necessary. But I declare this thus; for either that effect is from an agent cause from necessity of nature, and thus such a necessary pertains to the necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise, and does not have another special reason of necessity. Or that effect is from a free cause, and is only said to be necessary from supposition, because, with that acting, the patient cannot resist. And this mode of necessity, with respect to the agent, is reduced to that by which a thing, when it is, necessarily is, which seems to be omitted here, as being most improper and inducing no necessity except conditional; but with respect to the recipient it pertains to the fourth mode, because that patient cannot be otherwise with the other so acting. Hence immediately Aristotle seems to add a certain division of that fourth mode of the necessary; for some has a cause of such necessity, but another which does not have a cause, but is such through itself.

Q. 2. Concerning this partition it is asked whether according to Aristotle and truth there are given some necessary beings through themselves and having no cause of their necessity. For Aristotle seems to affirm this here, and many think Aristotle thinks thus. But this place

does not compel that this be imputed to Aristotle. For first that division can be understood, not of beings as to existence, but only as to the being of essence, or as to the truth of complexions abstracting from time, which are called necessary because they are of eternal truth. And among these some have a cause of their necessity, like mediate propositions, which are demonstrated through prior principles, others which do not have a cause, like principles known through themselves. Or if Aristotle speaks of existing beings, although he delivers the division in the plural, it is not necessary that both members be verified in the plural. Hence at the end he concludes only under condition, if some such beings exist, those are sempiternal. But what he thought in other places we shall see in what follows; and we dispute the whole matter in various places of the following work; for in disp. 20, throughout, we treat of the emanation of all beings from one through creation; but in disputation 29, sect. 1, of the necessity of the first being; and sect. 2, how this is proper to it; but in disp. 30, sect. 16, whether the first being acts from necessity of nature, and what Aristotle thought about this.

Q. 3. On the contrary it can also be asked here whether there are some beings which, although they have a cause, can be called necessary beings. This is treated in disp. 28, sect. 1, and in disp. 35, sect. 3, near the end.

Q. 4. Finally it can be asked whether complex truths, which are called necessary, have a cause of their necessity, and what kind their necessity is. However, we have touched on this in disp. 1, sect. 4, and disp. 8 on the true, sect. 1 and 2, and more broadly, disput. 31, sect. 2, and sect. 12, toward the end.

Chapter VI. On the One & Its Various Modes

Those things which can be disputed concerning this chapter, and pertain maximally to the matter, are treated in disp. 4, 5, 6 and 7, through several questions which can be seen in the following index.

Concerning the text, however, some things can be disputed about the unity of quantity and about continuation, such as whether the continuous is correctly defined through motion, namely, that to be continuous which is moved by one motion through itself. Second, whether heterogeneous bodies are truly continuous. Third, whether parts or substances having several diverse forms can truly be continued. Fourth, whether one is a principle of number, and what kind of principle it is. Fifth, whether this equally befits every unity, or whether the ultimate unity is said to be the form of number in a special way. Sixth, whether the notion of measure befits unity in a special way. However, all these things are easy in themselves, and therefore are briefly touched upon and dispatched while disputing about continuous and discrete quantity, disp. 40 and 41.

Q. 7. Seventh, it can be inquired how Aristotle said that to be one or the same is more truly predicated of things diverse in species with the addition of a remote genus than of a proximate one, as man and horse are more truly said to be the same living thing than the same animal. And the reason for doubt is that there is greater unity in the proximate genus than in the remote. It is answered that Aristotle is not treating of the thing, but of the figure of speech. For as to the thing it is certain that there is greater unity in the proximate genus, nevertheless in the mode of predication the predication becomes more true and less equivocal under that form which Aristotle posited. And the reason is, as St. Thomas noted, that with respect to the remote genus species agree not only in the genus itself, but also in the difference contracting it; hence when man and horse are said to be the same living thing, it is signified that they agree not only in the genus of living thing, but also in its contractive difference, which is true; but when they are said to be the same animal, it is similarly signified not only that each is an animal, but also that they are of the same nature in some determinate notion of animal; for those are determinate animals which differ by differences of animal; therefore when they are said to be one or the same animal, they are indicated to agree in some difference

contracting animal, and by the same proportional reasoning, Peter and Paul are not said to be one man, speaking absolutely: but they are more easily said to be the same animal. Although, because these things regard only the mode of speaking, common usage must be observed, and every equivocation must be avoided.

Q. 8. Many things are also customarily asked concerning that division which Aristotle posits in text 12: "Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy." Namely, in what way this division differs from the first, by which one is divided into one by continuation, one by reason of form, one by genus, definition, or species, and one by complete indivision, that is, individual, or indivisible, as others wish. However, I say briefly that the division is partly the same, partly diverse, because some members are formally contained in the first which are omitted in the second, and conversely, although virtually they fall into the same. For the unity of continuation and indivision, which are distinguished in the former, are comprehended under numerical unity. The unity of definition and form likewise pertain to specific unity, as also the unity of difference, which Aristotle does not expressly mention in either definition; but it pertains to the unity of species. To which also is reduced (according to some) the unity of property and accident; but these rather pertain to unities per accidens. But indeed the unity of analogy, because it is imperfect, was omitted entirely in the first division; indeed in the second the unity of analogy of attribution seems to be omitted; for Aristotle mentions only proportionality. But Aristotle's words can easily be accommodated to both, or one can easily be reduced to the other, especially that analogy of proportion which is merely extrinsic; for that which is through intrinsic and proper agreement can in some way be reduced to the unity of genus. And thus is clear both the diversity and agreement between those divisions, and also their sufficiency.

Q. 9. But they ask further whether these divisions are of reason or real, and whether they are logical or metaphysical. However,

the question is of little moment, if we suppose (what has been extensively disputed in the said place) that every universal unity is of reason, but the formal is in some way of the thing. For hence it is easily established that several members of those divisions can be explained either according to the thing or according to reason, and thus both logically and metaphysically. But they are chiefly delivered by Aristotle as they are real, although he often declares common unities through logical terms, because they are more apt for explaining the foundation which these unities have in the thing; but numerical unity, because it is more real, he declares simply through real terms. Therefore both divisions can be considered partly real, partly of reason.

Q. 10. Again concerning that definition of Aristotle: "Things are one in number whose matter is one," here is customarily treated at length the principle of individuation; concerning which matter we have completed nearly the entire fifth disputation. But as to the sense of Aristotle's proposition, although the Scotists contend that he does not speak of matter which is a part of the composite, but of material difference, which they call haecceitas, nevertheless the simpler and truer sense is that the Philosopher speaks of proper matter; for this is the meaning of that word among Aristotle, and no other. And he uses it in the same way treating nearly the same thing, book 7, text 28, and book 12, text 49, as I have shown more broadly in the said disputation. And therefore it is difficult to accommodate those words so that they contain an adequate definition of numerical unity, because in Angels and accidents there is numerical unity without matter. Wherefore the Commentator says that transcendent one is not defined there adequately, but quantitative one. And St. Thomas falls into nearly the same thing, while he says that the individual in common is not defined, but is explained in material things. Indeed it must be added that it is only explained in material substances simultaneously existing, or it must be understood of matter not absolutely, but signed with certain accidents. And truly Aristotle here did not sufficiently declare

the principle of individuation, but in some way indicated to us what the individual is.

Q. 11. By generic unity Aristotle plainly here understands predicamental unity; hence it is also customarily asked here whether the predicaments differ by predicamental figure; but because this question has its proper difficulty in the division of the nine predicaments of accidents, therefore we treat it explaining that division, disput. 39, sect. 2.

Q. 12. Finally it is inquired in what way it is true that posterior unities follow prior ones, as Aristotle says, that is, those which are one in number are also one in species, genus and analogy. For Peter, who is one in number, is not one analogically, and Peter and Paul, who are one in species, are not analogically one. It is answered that the sense is that in an individual and singular thing are all superior unities, and thus those things which are one in inferior unity are necessarily one in superior unity, even if that analogy exists, it is nevertheless not necessary that with respect to those there be that analogous unity, but it suffices that the analogous predicate common to them be. In which sense this rule is equivalent to that which dialecticians deliver, that of whatever an inferior predicate is said, a superior is also said, in whatever way it may be one. For if Peter is this man, he will also be man, and substance, and being, and thus if Peter and this man are the same in number, they are also one in species, genus and analogy, that is, they are one in formal, specific, generic and analogical notion.

Chapter VII. On Being, & Its Various Modes or Meanings

Quest. 1. The prior question here can be concerning the division into per se and per accidens, which we explain broadly in disp. 4, sect. 4.

Q. 2. Another is concerning the division of being into being in act and being in potency. Concerning this some things have been

touched on in disp. 2, sect. 4. But it is treated ex professo in disput. 31, through the first three sections.

Q. 3. There can be added here the question what it is for something to be true or false, on account of those things which Aristotle here interposed concerning being, which is in the truth of a proposition. But this matter is treated partly in disput. 8 and 9, which are on truth and falsity, partly in the last disputation, which is on beings of reason. For this being true, which Aristotle here distinguished, is only objective being in the true or false composition of the mind, which is only being of reason, or through extrinsic denomination from the work of reason. But as pertains to Aristotle, it must be noted that he therefore interposed discourse concerning this being here, so that he might indicate that, although this being true is said in some way of negations, nevertheless it does not pertain to proper and per se beings, nor to the predicaments, except by a certain reduction.

Q. 4. Finally here is also touched the division of being into predicaments, which we treat in disput. 32 and disput. 39. Here I only advise that Aristotle numbered only seven members of accident, omitting position and habit; which although it was perhaps done by chance, we nevertheless gladly note from the Commentator that those two predicaments are of little moment and of scarcely any consideration, and therefore concerning them we discourse very briefly in disp. 52 and 53 of this work.

Chapter VIII. On Substance

In this chapter nothing occurs worthy of special note, but concerning the thing itself we dispute extensively in Disputations 31 through 36, through several questions, whose titles and locations can be seen in the following index.

Chapter IX. On the Same, the Diverse, & the Similar

The divisions which Aristotle handed down concerning the one per accidens and per se, and concerning the various modes of the one, he also treats here concerning the same, and consequently concerning the diverse, which can be said in as many ways as its opposite, and therefore nothing requires disputation here. For what is said about the distinction between the diverse and the different pertains only to the use of terms, just as also what is said about similars and dissimilars. Concerning the same and the diverse, however, we add a brief question to the Disputation on the One, Disputation 7, section 3.

Chapter X. On Opposites & Those Differing in Species

Single Question. Here it is customarily asked whether two accidents differing only in number can simultaneously exist in the same subject, on the occasion of Aristotle's words at the end of the chapter, where among those things which differ in species, he places all things which, when they are in the same substance, have differences. This is treated extensively by us in Disputation 5, section 8, where we judged that Aristotle should not be understood universally, but concerning accidents entirely similar in their individual nature, as we explain there at length. The remaining things which Aristotle says here about opposites and contraries are copiously disputed in dialectics; we have touched upon some matters, however, in Disputation 45, where we discuss the contrariety of qualities.

Why Aristotle returned to declaring specific diversity after the enumeration of opposites and contraries need not be asked, because I see no certain reason or method observed by Aristotle either in the order of these chapters, or in their individual members, or in enumerating the significations of these words. For why did he treat first of the one, then of being and substance, then of the same and

diverse? He certainly did this for no reason, but only because he thought it mattered little to place this or that first, especially in these more minute matters.

Chapter XI. On the Modes of Prior & Posterior

Question 1. First of all here it can be asked what the nature of prior and posterior is, and whether it consists in some real relation or relation of reason. This can be asked either concerning Aristotle's meaning or concerning the thing itself. For Aristotle at the beginning of the chapter says that those things are prior which are closer to some principle (or first thing). In this description he seems to place the nature of the prior in a relation of proximity to some third thing, not between themselves. From this it seems to follow that what is first is not prior to the rest, which is absurd. On account of this, it does not please some that this should be the general description of priors as such, but rather the assignment of a certain mode of priors. For in two ways can one thing be said to be prior to another, either through respect to some third thing, or through the relationship which they have between themselves. Aristotle touched upon the first member in the aforementioned description; whence he also tacitly insinuated a division, while saying that certain priors are such. Then after the explanation and subdivision of that member he concludes thus: "And these indeed are called prior in this way." And immediately he seems to subjoin another principal member, saying: "In another way, etc." But the Philosopher does not declare this latter member by any common description, but only through a certain two-membered division, namely because certain things are so compared among themselves that one is either prior in reason to another, or prior in nature or in consequence of subsistence.

This interpretation is indeed probable; but that first description can rightly be accommodated to all priors. For when it is said that one thing is prior to another because it is closer to the first, it

is clear that it is supposed, and tacitly said, that the first itself is much more prior to the rest, because (if it may be said so) it is much more close to itself, or something more than close; as, for example, if that body is prior in place in the universe which is closer to the first heaven, much more is the first heaven itself prior to the rest. Therefore, generally priority consists in a certain relationship or relation between those things which are denominated prior and posterior; sometimes indeed this relationship is measured by some third thing, and is quasi-founded in another relationship or proximity and distance from that; sometimes however in the sole condition of the extremes which are compared among themselves as prior and posterior, because namely one has existence when the other does not yet have it, or because one is cause, the other effect, or because one is more worthy than the other. And indeed priority, considered per se and intrinsically, consists in this relationship of the extremes among themselves: in order to a third thing it is remotely and fundamentally, or (so to speak) quasi-mensuratively.

This relation, however, since it is of a certain order, as the very name of prior suggests, can be either in the order of place, or of time, or of motion or generation, or of causality, or of knowledge, or of nature, or of consequence of subsistence. And thus are numbered the various modes of the prior, which are sufficiently clear in Aristotle, both here and in the Posterior Analytics. From this it happens that this relation of the prior, speaking per se, is not real, because it is often attributed to those things which are not distinguished in reality. As man is said to be prior to Peter in consequence of subsistence. Sometimes it is attributed with respect to a non-existing thing, as I say I am prior in time to the Antichrist. Sometimes indeed the notion of the prior is completed by a certain negation; for something is said to be prior in time to another because it has or had existence when the other did not yet exist. Sometimes however it consists in a certain comparison of relations, as when it is said to be prior which is closer to the first. Finally, sometimes this priority has its foundation in nature,

sometimes however in human estimation or designation alone, as Aristotle also noted here. Therefore per se a real relation is not required for priority; insofar as such a relation sometimes coincides with some other which is real, it can also be real: as, for example, when a cause is said to be prior in nature to an effect, that relation of the prior is really not other in reality than the relation of cause, which on account of a certain agreement or proportionality is named priority; then therefore the relation of the prior will also be real, and perhaps it will never be found real in any other way. Finally, it is easily understood from what has been said that this enumeration of priors is not some univocal division, but analogous, imperfect, and of proportionality. For there is not here attribution to one first signification, but there is a certain proportion. And indeed it seems that the aforementioned notion of prior and posterior was first said in motion or time: thence however it was transferred to other things through a certain proportional similarity.

Q. 2. Finally, it can be asked here why Aristotle here omitted that priority of nature which exists in causality. It is answered that he either omitted it because, unless it includes some other priority in consequence of subsistence, it is improper, or certainly he comprehended it under the priority of nature, or under those things which are said to be prior in potency. See what has been said about this matter in Disputation 26 on causes, section 1. Damascus certainly, in his Dialectics, chapter 7, recognizes no other priority of nature except that which is in consequence of subsistence.

Chapter XII. On Potency

Question 1. First, it is customarily asked about the definition of active potency, namely: "It is a principle of transmuting another, or insofar as it is another"; for it has several difficulties. The first, because it does not comprehend the power of creating: concerning this see Disputation 20, section 1. Let it be said briefly that Aristotle used

more familiar terms, but it can be accommodated or extended if by the name of change we use it not rigorously but broadly, for any leading forth from non-being to being, and consequently by "another" we understand not only the subject but also the term of the production.

The second difficulty is that it does not comprehend active potencies with immanent action. And let the third be that it does not comprehend gravity and lightness, which are principles of moving not another but the very thing in which they are. Concerning these see Disputation 18, section 3, and Disputation 43, section 2. I say briefly that they are comprehended by reason of that particle "insofar as it is another," because they do not act on their proper subject except insofar as it lacks such act or motion. Nor is it necessary that such potency, when it is present in him who is moved through it, should be present to him per accidens, as some interpret. For although in the example which Aristotle brings forward, of the doctor healing himself, it so happens, nevertheless Aristotle did not say it is necessary that it always happen thus. Others reject these faculties, gravity, etc., because they are only instruments of motion. But this does not please me, because they are truly most proper active potencies, although with respect to the generator they receive the denomination of instrument, quite improperly and broadly, as I explained in Disputation 17, section 2. The fourth difficulty on the contrary is that under this definition are comprehended not only potencies but also habits, such as art, in which Aristotle places an example. It is answered (because the matter is easy) that here potency is not taken strictly for the second species of quality, but broadly for any principle of acting, and thus is also comprehended substantial form insofar as it can act something. Just as passive potency also, concerning which Aristotle immediately treats, comprehends matter and quantity insofar as it is receptive. And similarly in another acceptance of potency, which he immediately posits, namely that he can be said to be able who can well, it comprehends habit and disposition which confers that facility by reason of which someone is said to be able well.

Q. 2. Again it can be asked what is the potency of resisting, which Aristotle here also seems to number among potencies, and likewise whether impotence is a privation of potency or also a positive potency. But the former question is treated in Disputation 43, section 1, the other however in Disputation 40, section 3.

Q. 3. Whether objective potency is some real potency, and consequently whence a thing is said to be possible when it is not in act. Concerning this matter I have spoken partly in Disputation 31, section 3, partly in Disputation 43, at the beginning. The remaining things which are said here about passive potency and about other acceptations of potency have no difficulty, given what has been noted about active potency; for in proportion to those the rest are to be understood; for, as Aristotle said at the end of the chapter, that is the first potency, and through some relationship to it every other denomination of potency has been taken. Concerning this matter, namely concerning potency and act, we have treated extensively in Disputation 43.

Chapter XIII. On Quantity or Quantitas

Concerning this chapter grave questions occur, which we pursue in Disputations 40 and 41, and therefore it is not necessary to review them in this place. Concerning Aristotle's text, however, no special difficulty occurs which is not treated there, especially since the letter is clear and the whole difficulty is in the things themselves.

Chapter XIV. On Quale & Quality

This chapter we expound ex professo from Disputation 42 through 46, nor is there anything we should add here.

Chapter XV.

This chapter also we treat copiously in Disputation 47, and therefore nothing needs to be annotated.

Chpater XVI. On the Perfect

In this chapter no question occurs which requires our disputation. For Aristotle hands down the common description or signification of the perfect, saying that to be perfect is that to which nothing is lacking of those things, namely, which are owed to it for its completion. This description he declares in various genera, or proposing diverse modes by which certain things are said to be perfect, namely by magnitude, and integrity of parts, and completion, and virtue, and attainment of end, all of which are clear in the text, and in Disputation 10, treating of the good, we hand down what seems necessary concerning the perfect; since the good and the perfect either are the same or seem to be much connected among themselves, as we note there.

Chapter XVII. On Term

Nothing also occurs here to be noted or disputed, because here only the significations of this word "term" are treated, which are sufficiently clear in the text and are customarily handed down also in the first rudiments of dialectics. Concerning the thing itself, however, no question occurs, both on account of the great analogy and most ample signification, for "term" is said both of the significative word itself, in which way it is treated by dialecticians, and in a peculiar way it is said of definition, as Aristotle here notes; it is also said of real term, either of quantity, concerning which is treated in the predicament of quantity, or of time, motion, relationship or relation, inquiry, potentiality, concerning which various places discuss. But especially because the common appellation of term, as it is considered metaphysically, either consists in a certain negation, insofar as a thing

does not tend beyond the term, or in extrinsic denomination, because it is that to which another tends or in which it rests, as we touch upon in Disputation 45, section 10, explaining the term of relation.

Chapter XVIII. On "According To Which" & "According To Itself" & "Per Se"

From the very summary of the chapter it is established that here we do not treat of things but of the significations of these words; for these are syncategorematic words which do not signify certain things but relationships of things. And thus Aristotle says that the expression "according to which" often signifies the relationship of formal cause, as if we should say that man is studious according to virtue; sometimes however it expresses the relationship of material cause proximately, as when it is said that a wall is white according to its surface; often also it is extended to other genera of causes. And finally sometimes it signifies the relationship of position, as when it is said that Peter sits according to the king. This last acceptation is to be noted; for it is little used in the schools; in reality however it is Latin, and in rigor it signifies to be proximately after another. Whence it is extended not only to signify the order of position but also the order of perfection, as if you should say that faith is the most perfect virtue according to charity, that is, proximately after charity.

Then Aristotle transfers his discourse to the signification of this word "according to itself" and "per se," which he regards as synonymous, indicating that "according to" often signifies the same as "through," as can also be gathered from the prior significations of "according to which"; for the particle "through" excellently signifies the relationships of causes. The significations of the word "according to itself" or "per se" are clear in the text. Note however that certain modes per se seem to be omitted here which are posited in book 1 of the Posterior Analytics. For the mode per se in the second way, namely when a passion is predicated of a subject, is not posited here,

unless it is reduced to the third one posited here, which is more universal and is said of everything which primarily belongs to or agrees with something, which can be attributed to a proper passion with respect to its proper subject. The fourth mode also of saying per se, by reason of causality, is here omitted. Other significations of these words can also be noted which are not touched here, as that the expression "according to which" sometimes diminishes the signification, as when it is said "white according to teeth"; and the expression "per se" sometimes excludes union per accidens, as we noted above around the third chapter of the third book. It is therefore sufficient that Aristotle touched upon the principal significations, to which others can either be reduced or understood from them. Nor does any question worthy of disputation occur here.

Chapter XIX. On Disposition

This chapter we expound ex professo in Disputation 42, section 2, explaining the first species of quality.

Chapter XX. On Habit

The prior part of this chapter pertains to the special predicament of habit, and therefore we expound it in Disputation 52, which is concerning this matter. The posterior part however looks to that signification by which it constitutes a certain species of proper quality and is transferred also to signify other qualities, and therefore we treat this part in the said Disputation 42, and more broadly in Disputation 44, which is proper concerning habits.

Chapter XXI. On Passion

The significations of this word treated by Aristotle, and much more the things signified themselves, we treat in Disputation 42,

section 2, explaining the third species of quality, which is passion and passible quality, and in Disputation 49, which is concerning the predicament of passion.

Chapter XXII. On Privation

This chapter, as to the various modes of privations which Aristotle hands down in it, is clear and well-known to those even moderately exercised in dialectics. Certain questions however can be raised in it pertaining to the entity of privation or to privative opposition; as whether privation is something real or a being of reason and in what way; whether in privative opposition some medium is given, either absolutely or with respect to such a subject. Likewise whether privation admits of more and less. Concerning these we discuss partly in Disputation 45, which is on oppositions, and partly in the last Disputation of the whole work, which is on beings of reason.

Chapter XXIII. On Having & Being in Something

Concerning this chapter nothing occurs beyond what has been noted about habit; therefore see what has been said in the disputations which we cited in chapter 20, and concerning the modes of being in, the Philosopher himself can be seen in Physics 4, chapter 3, and we note some things in Disputation 37, which is on the essence of accident.

Chapter XXIV. On Being From Something, in How Many ways it is Said

This chapter also does not contain a new thing or property of being, but the significations of this expression "from" and the various relationships which it can indicate, which are sufficiently clear in the text.

Chapter XXV.

Here Aristotle divides part into integral or quantitative, aliquot or non-aliquot, subjective or potential, essential or metaphysical, all of which are sufficiently evident.

Chapter XXVI. On Whole

Aristotle signifies that "whole" is said in two ways, namely either relatively to parts, because it consists of those, or as it is opposed to mutilated, as namely whole is said of that to which no part is lacking, and this latter signification will be established from the following chapter, where he treats of the mutilated; he pursues the former here. And first he enumerates its various significata, which from those things which have been said about part can be clear, because in as many ways as one of the opposites is said, in so many ways is also said the other. Likewise, since this whole is one by composition, those things which have been said above about the one can be applied here to the whole; for there are almost as many modes of the whole as there are of the one, if the one is taken with composition, and therefore nothing should be added concerning this part.

Then however the Philosopher expounds the use of these terms "all" and "whole," but this consists only in propriety and custom of speaking, which must be observed. For it makes no difference to the thing whether you should say all water or the whole water, the whole house or all house, although the former is said with greater propriety and less ambiguity or equivocation.

Chapter XXVII. On the Mutilated

In this chapter also nothing occurs which is of any moment; for Aristotle only declares what conditions are required, either on the part of the thing which is mutilated or on the part of what is cut off or absent, so that a thing may be called mutilated. And from the prior chapter he says it is required that what becomes mutilated should be some whole consisting of parts, as is evident per se. Then that it should be continuous, for numbers are not mutilated, for through the removal of any unity they cease to be. Whence thirdly it is necessary that it should be a heterogeneous whole; for the homogeneous cannot properly be mutilated, since in any part the nature of the whole remains, nor does the whole require a certain composition of parts. It is also necessary that the thing which remains mutilated should be greater than what is cut off, and should receive the same denomination of substance and essence; otherwise it will not be a mutilated thing but another. From this it is also necessary that the part which is lacking should not be from the principal ones; for without some of these the thing cannot remain, such as head and heart, etc. It is necessary however that it should be from the prominent and dissimilar ones, because not any little particle cut off makes a thing mutilated, as is established from usage of speaking. Finally Aristotle says that such a part ought to be such that it cannot be generated again; for a thing is not said to be mutilated even if hairs are shaved, because they can be born again. But all these things, as is established from themselves, only look to the use of the word; for a thing could be said to be mutilated for that time in which it lacks the part, even if it could restore it through nutrition; but usage does not have this.

Chapter XXVIII. On Genus

Here also the thing is not treated, but only the significations of this word "genus" are numbered, which are sufficiently common and are also handed down by Porphyry in the book on Predicables. On this occasion however Aristotle teaches that in two ways certain

things can differ in genus, namely either physically, that is in subject or matter, or metaphysically or logically, that is in predicament. Concerning this distinction we will note some things below in book 10, around chapter 5, and more in Disputation 13, section 2, and Disputation 35, section 1. Because however one signification of genus is that it signifies the first predicable, therefore some writers here weave a most extensive disputation concerning predicables. But those things which metaphysical treatment of universals demands are handed down by us in Disputations 5, 6, and 7. The remaining things however, which are proper to dialecticians, we leave to them.

Chapter XXIX. On the False

In this chapter the Philosopher declares how falsity and the denomination of false is attributed to things and to speeches and to men. All of which, as pertains to the signification of words, are sufficiently clear in the text. Concerning the thing however there occurs here a disputation whether there is, and what is falsity, and whether it should be numbered among the passions of being, and where it is formally, where however through extrinsic denomination alone. Concerning this matter we institute a proper disputation, which is number 9.

Chapter XXX. On Accident

Accident is said in two ways, either in the nature of effect or in the nature of being which is outside the essence of something and belongs to it in some way, even if it belongs per se in the second or fourth posterioristic way, that is either from intrinsic emanation from essence or from some certain and per se cause. Therefore Aristotle seems to touch upon these two significations of accident in this place, and concerning them grave questions can be treated. For concerning the former occurs a grave disputation about contingent causes and

effects, and about fortune and chance; concerning this matter we discourse copiously in Disputation 19. Concerning the former signification however it would be necessary to speak about the nature of accident in common, and its comparison to substance, and its division. Concerning this matter we treat extensively in Disputations 37, 38, and 39, and therefore nothing further occurs to be noted concerning this book.

Book Six of the Metaphysics on Being, Insofar as it Falls Under the Consideration of This Science, or is to be Excluded Therefrom

The Philosopher still lingers in the preliminaries and (so to speak) in the vestibule of this doctrine; for he does not begin to speak about the thing itself, but returns to constituting its object. And first he establishes that the object of this science is being insofar as it is being (being qua being), as it includes immobile beings and those separable in reality, and on this occasion he teaches many things about the properties of this science and about the division of speculative sciences and their comparison. Then he excludes certain beings from the consideration of this science, namely, accidental being and true being.

Chapter I. That this Science is About Being as Being, & Therefore is the First Speculative Science, & Different From Others

All the things that Aristotle teaches in this chapter about this science and its object are treated by us in our prooemial disputation, and have been treated by the same author almost in the same way in book 1, chapters 1 and 2, and book 4, chapter 1.

Question 1. Whether the object of this science is being insofar as it is being. Disputation 1, section 1.

Q. 2. Whether this science is speculative, and whether it is first in that order. Disputation 1, section 5.

Q. 3. Whether this science is universal and treats of all beings, and in what way. Disputation 1, section 2.

Q. 4. Whether this science constitutes objects for other sciences, and shows in some way what they are. Same disputation 1, section 1.

Q. 5. It is also customarily asked here whether being, insofar as it is being, has principles and causes that are considered in this science, which has been treated in disputation 3, section 3.

Q. 6. Finally, on account of the last words of the Philosopher in this chapter, it is customarily asked whether, if there were no immaterial substance, metaphysical science could be distinguished from physical science; this question and Aristotle's passage I have treated in disputation 1, section 1.

Many other things are customarily asked in this place about practical and speculative habit and act, namely in what way they differ, and in what the proper nature of each consists, and especially discussion usually takes place about that division of speculative science into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; but these things, insofar as they pertain to the prooemium of this science, are sufficiently treated by us in disputation 1, sections 5 and 6. But insofar as they concern the things themselves, they pertain more to the science of the soul, which considers the intellect and its functions; nevertheless, for the completion of this science they are touched upon by us below, in declaring that species of quality which is habit, disputation 44, section 8.

Finally, many dialectical matters are touched upon here, which pertain to the books of the Posterior Analytics, which have therefore been omitted by us, such as whether science presupposes whether something is and what it is concerning its object, or demonstrates it in some way, and similar matters.

Chapter II. That Accidental Being & True Being are Excluded From the Consideration of this Science

Question 1. Concerning the first part of this chapter, in which Aristotle removes accidental being from the consideration of this science, it can first be asked about what accidental being he speaks. For being can be called accidental in two ways: first, in the nature of being, because it is not one per se, but consists of several essences; second, in the nature of effect, because it does not have a per se cause, but happens beyond the intention of the agent, because otherwise it is usually called a contingent effect. Since therefore accidental being is said equivocally in these two ways, the Philosopher seems to proceed improperly; for in the beginning he speaks in the first way, and excludes that accidental being which is not one, but many; afterwards, however, from text 5 he speaks about accidental being in the latter way. For, in order to prove that there are accidental beings of this kind, he proves that there are contingent effects, and that not all things happen by necessity.

It must be said, however, that Aristotle excludes accidental being in both ways, as is clear from the context. Nor has he used equivocation, but from one accidental being according to existence, or by aggregation, he turns to an accidental effect. Because the way in which accidental beings arise in the first way is through accidental causality, and beyond the intention of natural agents. For, although sometimes an accidental composite seems to be made by one action, and per se, nevertheless under that aspect it is not entirely accidental being, but in some way per se, according to what we teach in disputation 5. Since therefore accidental being is not one, properly speaking, nor is it made by one generation, nor is it intended per se by nature, and therefore from the fact that things which happen accidentally and contingently do not fall under science, Aristotle correctly infers that accidental beings as such do not fall under science. Nor does it matter that aggregate being can sometimes be

intended per se by an intellectual agent, because either under that aspect it is in some way per se in relation to some end intended by such an agent, or certainly that same thing is merely contingent and accidental, and thus as such it does not fall under science.

Q. 2. Now the question remains in what sense it is true that accidental being does not fall under science. But because this matter is treated in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, where the subalternation of sciences is discussed, and is sufficiently clear per se, it must be said briefly that for the reason that science exists only of necessary things, accidental being is not a knowable object, insofar as it is such. Likewise, because accidental being, as such, is not a being, but beings, and thus does not fall under one science.

And from the first reason gather that not only those things which happen rarely and accidentally, but also those which happen contingently and per se morally or from the intention of the agent, such as free acts, as such do not fall under science; so that from this it may be understood that those doctrines are vain which divine about future free acts in particular and definitively; concerning which elsewhere.

From the second reason, however, gather that being consisting of many things from different genera, although it is absolutely accidental being, nevertheless if it is considered under some per se unified aspect in relation to certain effects or properties, it can fall under science, especially subalternated science, as is treated more broadly in dialectics.

Finally, it must be considered that it is one thing to speak about accidental being regarding the thing subject to this denomination, another thing about the formal nature itself of accidental being; which is otherwise said, it is one thing to speak about accidental being in the exercised act, and in the signified act: therefore accidental being regarding the subjected or exercised thing does not fall under science, and this is self-evident from what has been said. And in this way we showed in disputation 1, section 1, that

accidental being is not comprehended under the object of this science. But indeed the formal nature of accidental being can be considered scientifically; for it is conceived through the mode of one formal nature per se, which has its own properties, and in this way we have dealt with the division of being into per se being and accidental being, and we have declared the proper nature of accidental being regarding existence in disputation 4, section 3. Similarly, while disputing about efficient causes, we have spoken about accidental beings regarding contingencies, whether they exist, and what causes they have, disputation 19, almost throughout, where also on this occasion we discuss fate and fortune, and other accidental causes. These in a similar way, as they exercise accidental causality, do not fall under science; but the formal nature of that causality, in what it is placed and whence it arises, falls under science. And these things concern the first part of this chapter.

Q. 3. In the latter part, however, the Philosopher excludes from the consideration of this science the being which he calls true, to which false is opposed, as non-being. And he gives the reason, because these things exist only in the composition and division of the mind, and thus are beings of reason. Concerning this part many things can be doubted. First, whether truth exists only in the composition and division of the intellect, or also in the apprehension of simple things. For Aristotle here clearly seems to affirm the first, and deny the second, in those words: "But what is as true being, and non-being as false, since it concerns composition and division," etc. And below: "But the true and false are not in things as good and evil, but in the mind; concerning simple things, however, and concerning those which are what they are, neither in the mind." Where he clearly both affirms that truth exists in composition, and denies that it exists in things, but in the mind, and declares that it does not exist in any operation of the mind, because not in the simple one by which what something is is known, but only in composition. Since the discourse is doctrinal and indefinite, it is equivalent to universal, and whatever

exception or distinction is made, it will be an open contradiction or limitation of Aristotelian doctrine, and outside his mind. Hence the Commentator, Alexander, Aphrodisias, Scotus, and others expound it thus simply without declaration or limitation.

Thomas Aquinas, however, and Alexander of Hales openly limit it, and confess that some truth exists in the simple concept of the mind. This opinion we defend at length in disputation 8, section 3. And the brief resolution is, which Giles touched upon in Quodlibet 4, question 7, that there is a twofold truth: one, which has opposed falsity, another, which does not have opposed falsity, but ignorance. Therefore Aristotle in this place speaks about the former falsity, and concerning it, it is universally true that it is found only in composition and division. But the latter truth has place in simple conception.

That this is the legitimate understanding of Aristotle we gather from Aristotle himself. For first, that distinction of twofold truth is taken from him, book 3 of On the Soul, chapter 6, text 26, and book 6 of the Metaphysics, chapter 12, where expositors, especially Aphrodisias, and Thomas Aquinas, and Alexander have noted, and also Themistius, book 3 of On the Soul, in his chapter 45. In the former place, therefore, Aristotle says thus: "But speech is indeed something about something, just as affirmation; and it is true or false all of it; but not all intellect, but that which is of what something is from what it was to be, and is true, and not something about something, but as sight of the proper is true." Where he clearly distinguishes another mode of truth, besides that which is as something about something, that is, in composition. But that this truth does not have opposed falsity, Aristotle declares in book 9 of the Metaphysics, the last chapter, where when he had said in text 21 that true and false are found in composition and division, he then asks in text 22 how they can be found in simple things, and responds that true and false are found in them also in their own way; but true properly, false however only improperly and through ignorance, or accidentally. For to attain (he says) is to speak the truth (lest anyone think that "to

speak" is here taken for "to compose," as in the cited place On the Soul, he interposes saying) "For affirmation and speech are not the same" (for here "to speak" is taken for what it is to conceive a thing as it is.) But, not to attain, he says, is to be ignorant, as if to say, there is not falsity there, but ignorance, except accidentally, that is, by adding composition and attributing an alien concept to that whose concept it is not.

In this way also he said in book 3 of On the Soul, chapter 3, text 161, that there is sometimes falsity in phantasy and the senses; he understands, however, not properly and per se, but accidentally. For the sense itself, when it is deceived, only fails by not apprehending what is, but something else, which is improper falsity, and rather a certain ignorance; accidentally, however, falsity follows, not so much in the sense as in the intellect, because what appears to the sense, it attributes to a thing to which it does not belong. This difference between the truth and falsity of simple things, that the former is proper, the latter however improper, Aristotle sufficiently explains in the cited place of book 9 of the Metaphysics, while he calls that truth simply truth; the other, however, rather ignorance and falsity accidentally, or rather the occasion of falsity, as we declare more broadly in disputation 9, section 1, from the same Aristotle, book 5 of the Metaphysics, chapter 29.

Finally, that in this place of book 6 of the Metaphysics, the Philosopher speaks only about that truth which has proper opposed falsity, is clear, both because in other places he posits the distinction of twofold truth, and admits the other outside composition; and also, because in this place he has not without consideration always joined true and false, to signify that he speaks about that true being, to which false non-being is opposed. And moreover, because above, in book 5, chapter 7, text 14, among the acceptations of being he placed that by which to be signifies the truth of composition, and he alludes to that true being here, when he says that true being is found only in composition. For in the beginning of this chapter Aristotle resumed

three divisions of being, which he had placed in book 5, chapter 7 of the Metaphysics, namely, into per se being and accidental being, into true being and false non-being, and into actual and potential being. And he first excluded accidental being, then immediately true being; therefore he speaks here about the same thing about which he had spoken in book 5.

Q. 4. From these things another question is easily resolved, whether true and false are found in things; for Aristotle here seems to deny this. But it has the same interpretation; for in things also there is not truth which has proper opposed falsity; nevertheless there is its own proper truth, concerning which much has been said in disputation 8, section 7. And it is established that this truth was known to Aristotle, since he says in book 2 of the Metaphysics, chapter 1, that as each thing is, so it is also true; and that those beings are most true which are most perfect.

Q. 5. Again, it could be asked in this place whether good and evil exist in things; concerning which matter it has been said in disputations 10 and 11. But the distinction posited here by Aristotle is that goodness which has proper opposed malice is found in things; but truth which has properly opposed falsity is not found in things, but in the mind, and thus the matter is clear.

Q. 6. Finally, there can be a question whether beings of reason pertain to the consideration of metaphysics. Because for the same reason that Aristotle excludes true being, he also excludes every being of reason. This is true speaking about the direct and proper object, as I said in disputation 1, section 1. But this does not prevent being of reason from being considered in this science by occasion and to distinguish it from real being, as we note in the last disputation of this work; for thus Aristotle, when he has excluded true being here, promises a treatment of the other, and gives it in book 9, the last chapter.

Book Seven of the Metaphysics on the Principal Signification, Which is Substance

In this book the Philosopher begins to deal with the principal subject, and in a certain way the unique (as he himself said in the first chapter) object of this science, which is substance; and first he proposes his intention: then he declares what substance is, and especially deals with what it is; and finally in examining the opinions of philosophers about various modes of substances he lingers greatly.

Chapter I. That Substance is the First Being, & the First Object of This Science

Question 1. The question about the analogy of being between substance and accidents could first be treated in this place, since Aristotle clearly teaches it here. See disputation 32, section 3.

Q. 2. Second, it is customarily asked whether accidents in the abstract are beings, since Aristotle here seems to raise this question. But besides those things which we said there about the division of being between substance and accident, nothing occurs to be added. Because when accidents are said to be in the abstract, nothing is added to or taken away from the accidents themselves; for that "in the abstract" only states an extrinsic denomination taken from our mode of conceiving or signifying. Therefore there can only be a question about the forms or accidental modes themselves, not as they are signified in this or that way, but according to themselves, or as such forms are; for thus they are properly called accidents in the abstract: because as they are forms, they cannot be signified otherwise. Therefore, concerning these forms no question remains whether they are beings, diminished indeed and imperfect, nevertheless true beings, and which can simply and without addition be so called, as I said in the cited place.

There is, however, a difference between concrete and abstract accident in the mode of signifying, because the former includes the subject in its signification, the latter however does not, but signifies only the form itself. And from this part the concrete seems to be more absolutely being, as that which is, than the abstract alone; for Aristotle proposes this argument here. It must be said, however, that abstract and concrete accident are the same, and import the same being, if they are taken formally and per se as they ought to be taken; for materially it is certain that the concrete, by reason of the subject which it connotes, is more being, because it is subsistent, or composite from subsistent and accidental form; nevertheless, although under that aspect it has more entity, it has less per se unity; for it is accidental being. But concerning this distinction of accident into abstract and concrete I have said more things in disputation 39, section 2.

Q. 3. Where I have also touched upon the common question which is customarily treated here, namely, whether the concrete forms of accidents signify the subject formally, as Avicenna wants; or whether they formally signify quality, as the Commentator, Thomas Aquinas and more frequently the Doctors teach from Aristotle, in the Categories, chapter on substance, saying: "White signifies only quality." But neither opinion is sufficiently taken from Aristotle; for here he only says argumentatively that the concrete seems to be more being than the abstract because of the inclusion of the subject, which is true, even if the subject is included as connoted. In the chapter on substance, however, he does not say: "White signifies only quality," but "only quale," in which the subject is also included, although Aristotle's mind there was only to say that it does not signify quale quid, like second substances, but accidental quale, which he called "only quale." Nevertheless the latter opinion, as it is more common, so it is also more true, as is sufficiently clear from the very use of words, and has been sufficiently proven in the said place; Cajetan can also be seen, in the chapter on being and essence.

Q. 4. Again, it is customarily asked here whether inherence is of the essence of accident, because Aristotle here says that accident is being of being. This is treated in disputation 37, section 1.

Moreover, how what Aristotle says here is true, that substance is prior to accident by nature, knowledge, reason and time, is treated in disputation 38, throughout, where the text of the Philosopher is broadly expounded.

Chapters II. & III. What Substance is, & How Manifold

Questions 1 and 2. These two questions, namely what substance is, and how manifold, are broadly treated in disputation 33, where especially that division of substance into first and second is disputed, to which Thomas Aquinas here reduces the four-membered division, which the Philosopher here posits, dividing substance into what it was to be, that is, the essence and quiddity of the thing, the universal itself, that is, the supreme genus of substance, and genus, understand that contained under it, add also species, and the first subject, that is, first substance. For the first member is not properly substance, indeed not even proper to the category of substance, but analogous to every quiddity of a thing; and therefore it has been omitted in the category of substance. But the second and third are contained under second substance; the fourth, however, is the same as first substance. Concerning which also, how it is said to be substance in the highest degree, has been declared in the same place.

Q. 3. Third, the division of substance into matter, form and composite could be treated here, which Aristotle also gives below, chapter 10 of this book, and chapters 13 and 15, and book 8, chapters 2 and 3, and book 12, chapter 3, text 14, and in the beginning of the second book On the Soul; but it is treated by us in disputation 33, section 1. Only this seems to be noted here, that Aristotle in this place has divided first substance into those three members, which must be

taken in the same proportion; he could have nevertheless in the same way divided either second substance, or substance in common, as he seems to have done in the book On the Soul. But this matters little; for Aristotle understood that from one division given in particular, others can easily be understood.

Q. 4. Fourth, it is customarily asked here concerning text 7, at the end, whether form is prior and more principal substance than matter and composite; for the text of Aristotle here is customarily so understood, as is clear from the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, Alexander, Scotus, and the Commentator. But the occasion of error was that the ancient translator translated unfaithfully; for where the Greek text has "and itself," he translated "and by itself." Hence Aphrodisias expounds otherwise, namely, that not only form, but also the composite is more perfect than matter; which Aristotle immediately teaches in text 8. Or certainly the sense is, if form is more perfect than matter, the composite is more perfect than either. This is treated ex professo in disputation 15, section 7, where also form is compared with matter, and the reason of Aristotle is explained, by which he proves that form is more perfect than matter, because it is separable; it is understood permissively, but concerning form and matter as such; for in the whole latitude of form there is some separable one, not however in the whole latitude of matter; for this sufficiently indicates the excellence of form with respect to matter from its genus, and from the common nature of act and potency of the same genus.

Q. 5. The fifth question most proper to this place is what kind of substance matter is, and whether it is pure potency, or has something of actuality, concerning which matter is treated broadly in disputation 13, section 4 and following. With this question is necessarily connected the question about substantial form, whether it is given, which Aristotle has also touched upon here, and we have discussed it broadly in disputation 16. Therefore what Aristotle defines in this place is only that matter alone is not that first substance

which we call substance in the highest degree, but is a certain potency toward it; nevertheless Aristotle does not deny that matter has its own substantial entity, although potential, for receiving form. Since therefore Aristotle there signifies that matter is most known, either he speaks only argumentatively, or certainly he understands that matter is most known under the common notion of matter, or of subject of transmutations, not however under the proper notion of pure matter.

Q. 6. Sixth, it can be asked whether quantity is substance, which Aristotle here denies, and rightly; concerning which matter we have dealt in disputation 43, section 2.

Chapter IV. On Definition or the Quiddity of a Thing

Aristotle at the end of the preceding chapter promised that he would deal with substantial form; but because substantial form is that which completes the quiddity of substance, or what it was to be, as he himself speaks, therefore he begins his disputation from what it was to be itself. And he tacitly begins a disputation against Plato, to show that separate forms or ideas are not necessary, neither on account of definitions, nor on account of the being of individuals, nor on account of the generations of things. In this chapter, therefore, he treats of quiddity, or what it is (for this name is more proper and concrete than quiddity), he deals (I say) logically, as he himself says, or in relation to definitions. But because what it is extends more broadly than substantial form rigorously taken, therefore he here disputes about it more generally. And on this occasion he prefaces many things about the order of doctrine in proceeding from things more known to less known; concerning which to linger or raise a question is superfluous, since that method is repeated everywhere by Aristotle, and it is proper to the dialectician to declare it.

Question 1. First, therefore, it can be asked whether what Aristotle says at the beginning of this chapter is true, that what it was

to be of a thing is that which is predicated per se primarily of the thing, that is, so that in the definition of the predicate the subject is not posited, as he himself declares. And the reason for doubt can be that genus is predicated per se primarily of species, as animal of man, and nevertheless it is not what it was to be of man. Again, difference, as rational, does not say what it is, because it is not predicated in quid, but in quale, and nevertheless it is predicated per se primarily. Nevertheless this question must be relegated to the books of the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle disputes broadly about the modes per se. And it must be said briefly that what it was to be, taken logically, is nothing other than the essential and quidditative definition of a thing, which, as it is formally in mind or voice, is the work of dialectics; but as the essence of a thing presented to the mind, or explained by definition, is metaphysical essence, which, while it is explained in relation to definition, is said to be declared logically, and thus the Philosopher speaks here.

This definition can either be predicated as a whole distinctly of the defined, and then it is the proper and adequate predication of quiddity; it can also be predicated by parts by enunciating either only the genus, or only the difference; and then, although absolutely the whole what it is is not predicated, nevertheless something of it is explicitly predicated, and the whole implicitly, because neither genus nor difference is predicated as parts, but as in some way expressing the whole. And therefore under what it was to be, not only definition, but also genus and difference, insofar as they are predicated of the defined, are comprehended. And in this way animal is said to be what it was to be of man, not integrally formally, but confusedly the whole. Nor does it matter that difference is said to be predicated in quale, because it is predicated in quale quid, that is, essential, and constituting the essence of the thing. Hence it is established that all accidental predicates, whatever they may be, are excluded from what it was to be, because they are not predicated per se primarily of the thing.

Q. 2. Second, it can be asked here whether accidents have what it was to be, that is, whether they can be defined, and how. This matter Aristotle treats most broadly here, text 12 and following, and throughout the next chapter. But there can scarcely be a question here about the thing, but only about the name. Therefore the sum of those things which Aristotle teaches is contained in this. That if we speak metaphysically about what it was to be, that is, about essence, it is established that accidents have some real essence, just as they are real beings, for being is constituted in the nature of being through essence. But just as accidental things are beings analogically and in a qualified sense, so they have essence only in a qualified sense, and with the same proportional analogy.

And hence further, speaking logically about what it was to be, that is, about definition, it is established that the same proportion must be said about accidents being able to have some definition, for they have real essence and one not entirely simple metaphysically; but every real and composite essence can be declared by some speech and expressed conception of mind; and this is to be defined. This imperfection can consist either in the fact that its genus and difference in the latitude of being are very incomplete and imperfect, much more so than is the genus of soul, or of matter; or certainly in the fact that accidents cannot be defined except by positing something added in the definition, so that such essence is declared through relation to that. In this way it was said above that substance is prior in definition to accident, because accident cannot be defined except through substance. For in order that its definition truly and properly declare its essence, it is necessary that it explain it through some relation to substance, concerning which matter we have said in disputation 37, section 1.

But note this, that in this text Aristotle seems sometimes to speak about accidental being, sometimes however about accident: concerning which nevertheless there is not entirely the same account in relation to definition. For accidental being as such indeed does not

have definition, but must be explained through several definitions or an aggregate of definitions, because just as it is not a being, but beings, so it does not have essence, but essences, and the same proportionally concerns definition. But accident properly taken is per se being (I say), not as it is distinguished against in another, but as it is distinguished against accidental; or it is per se not in the nature of being, but in the nature of one, and thus it can also be defined by one definition, not however entirely perfectly one, because something added must be posited in it, and in this respect it is compared in some way to accidental being.

Chapter V. On Resolving Doubts Concerning the Definitions of Accidents

Sole Question. Here nothing occurs worthy of notation except a certain rule which is commonly gathered from this chapter, namely that redundancy is not committed when an accident in concrete form is adjectively joined to the subject which it connotes, as when it is said "snub nose," or "curly hair," or even "white body." For this rule has place not only in proper accidents, as some indicate, but also in common ones with respect to the adequate subject which they connote. For all of these have the same reason for apparent redundancy, because one term seems to signify the same thing as both together; for "white" signifies a body that disperses vision, and "snub" signifies a curved nose. Hence the argument arises that the definition can be put in place of the name, and thus it is the same to say "curly hair" as "hair of such a figure."

Nevertheless, it is certain that what Aristotle teaches is true, that in these cases redundancy is not committed, which is sufficiently clear from the common manner of speaking, which is considered proper and not abusive. The reason is that these concrete terms do not signify the formal subjects, but only connote them, and when they are placed adjectively or on the part of the predicate, they are properly not

placed by reason of what they formally signify, but by reason of the formal aspect only which they apply to the material, and therefore no repetition or redundancy occurs. Nor is it permitted in these cases to put the entire definition of the concrete accident in place of the concrete adjective itself, because in its definition it includes (as St. Thomas says here) something that is outside its essence. Or more clearly, because in the definition the subject itself or the material is placed in the position of genus, and yet in predication or composition with the material itself, it is only joined by reason of the formal aspect.

Chapter VI. Whether the What-It-Is is the Same as that of Which It Is

In this chapter Aristotle tacitly proves that separate quiddities are not necessary for the being of individuals, because the what-it-is is not separated from that of which it is. Concerning this matter we say much in the exposition of this chapter in disputation 34, section 3, where we treat of nature and supposit and their distinction. Only let it be carefully noted what Aristotle understands by "what-it-is," and what is that with which he compares it; for upon the understanding of these things depends the sense of Aristotle and the explanation of the question. Therefore, by "what it was to be" Aristotle understands the essential definition of a thing: for he takes "what-it-is" here in the same way as in the preceding chapters, as is manifestly clear from the connection of the context, and in the above he had always treated of the "what-it-is" in this sense, and regarding this part all expositors agree.

Some indeed say that Aristotle compares the what-it-is with the defined. But this is opposed, because according to this manner not only in substances, but also in accidents, the what-it-is would be the same as that of which it is; which Aristotle denies. And the consequence is clear, because in all things the defined would be the same as its definition, and conversely. They respond that Aristotle

does not deny this in accidents, but in beings per accidens, which do not have a what-it-is. But this is opposed, because Aristotle here does not say that those things which are said accidentally do not have that, although less perfectly, as he had taught in the superior chapter, and he denies that it is the same as that of which it is.

Therefore the exposition of Alexander of Hales greatly pleases me, which he took from the Commentator, that here the what-it-is is compared to the first substance, or to the subject to which it is attributed, for all things that have in some way a what-it-is belong to the first substance itself. And in this way the doctrine of the Philosopher is most clear, that the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is, that is, with that subject to which it is attributed in that which is essential and per se, but not with that of which it is said per accidens. Thus the Philosopher compares the what-it-is to every subject of which it is said, and establishes two general rules. The first is that with respect to that of which it is said per se, it is the same as that; the other, that with respect to that of which it is said ex accidenti, it is not the same. And because the substantial what-it-is, insofar as it is such, is said of nothing per accidens, but only per se, therefore it is simply the same as that of which it is. But the accidental what-it-is, if it is formally compared to a thing of its own genus and per se subjected to it in predication, is also the same as that of which it is, as the what-it-is of whiteness with whiteness, or with this whiteness. But because such an accidental what-it-is can also be said per accidens of substance, therefore with respect to that of which it is in this way, it is not the same as it, because it is not of it as its what-it-is, but as its accident.

And with the opinion of Aristotle explained in this way, the way is most aptly prepared through it to show that ideas are not separate from things and particular substances, which Aristotle intends. Thus also the questions here about the distinction of nature from supposit, and about the distinction of abstract from concrete in

substances, even universally conceived, such as man and humanity, cease, which have been treated by us in the said disputation 34.

Question 1. The question of the identity of definition with the defined properly pertains here; but because it is dialectical and has no difficulty, I pass it over.

Q. 2. The question could also be treated here of how the defined in common, or the species, is the same as the individual of which it is said per se, which is treated in disputation 4 on individual unity. From this however gather that when Aristotle says the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is, he does not exclude every distinction of reason, whether founded in the mode of conceiving, as between definition and defined, or in the thing conceived, as between species and individual; he therefore excludes distinction of thing, and from the nature of the thing, and all that which impedes formal and per se predication, and thus the text of the Philosopher will be easy regarding the rest.

Chapter VII. On How & By What the Forms of Things are Made

Here he begins to complete the third part of the disputation against Plato, that ideas are not necessary for generation, and on this occasion in this and the following chapter he distinguishes various principles and modes of generations, namely from art, or nature, or chance, and others, which are most extensively disputed by us in disputation 18 on efficient cause.

Question 1. Here however it is usually disputed specially on the occasion of Aristotle's text, first, whether all things that are made are made from some matter, which touches upon that question whether Aristotle knew creation. But here Aristotle speaks of natural actions, and in these the general proposition which affirms all things are made from other matter holds true. And in the same way must be

taken some proposition which he has in text 24: "Therefore, as it is said, it is impossible for anything to be made if nothing pre-exists."

Q. 2. Second, it is usually asked whether all things that have matter can be and not be, because of the Philosopher's words in text 22: "All things that are made by nature have matter; for it is possible for each of them to be and not be, and this is matter." But in this text that question has no foundation, because here it is only said that everything that can be and not be has this from matter; but this affirmative proposition cannot be converted simply, nor did Aristotle say this. That question is however treated in disputation 13, section 8 and following.

Q. 3. Third, it can be asked whether all things that are generated from seed can be generated from putrefaction and without seed. For Aristotle here, in text 22, clearly affirms that the same things that are made from seed happen to be made without seed. On account of which Averroes, in Physics 8, comment 46, affirms this of all animals without distinction. Avicenna, however, in book 2 of the Sufficientia, universally denies that this can happen; for he thinks that animals that are made without seed from putrefaction are distinguished in species from others that seem similar to those generated from seed. But both opinions are sufficiently repugnant to experience. For we see some animals generated from putrefaction entirely similar to those that are made through seminal propagation, and the same is evident in plants. And conversely, it is beyond all natural occurrence that perfect animals, such as horses, lions, etc., should be generated except through their proper and per se generation.

Therefore St. Thomas in this place rightly distinguishes, carefully weighing the words of the Philosopher saying: "For some of the same things are made from seed and without seed." For he said "some," because this is not common to all. The distinction therefore is concerning perfect and imperfect living things; for the latter can be caused without seed by the power of celestial bodies, because they are

so imperfect that the dispositions necessary for their forms can by chance arise in the subject from the contingent concurrence of other agents; but the former living things are so perfect and require such exact and wonderful organization that they can by no means be made except by a proper and per se cause. And thus experience itself teaches this of both orders of living things, as I said. And in this resolution the followers of both schools of St. Thomas and Scotus agree here against Avicenna and the Commentator; Alexander of Hales and others.

Q. 4. From this however arises another question, what cause induces substantial forms in these living things, and whether heaven has sufficient power for this, concerning which I spoke in disputation 15, section 1.

Q. 5. It can also be asked whether the generation of such things should be called causal. This however has an easy resolution; for with respect to particular agents it is causal, but with respect to the sun not so. So St. Thomas, whose opinion is defended against the attacks of Landun by Lavello, question 10. But it is an easy matter. It can be said otherwise that that generation as regards the concurrence of causes disposing matter is per accidens and from chance; but with that disposition posited, such a substantial form is induced per se and from the intention of the universal agent, which we touched upon in the last disputation, last section.

Q. 6. Moreover, here it can be asked how the exemplars of arts concur to their effects: because Aristotle here says that health in matter arises from health in the mind or without matter. This question and place we expound in disputation 25, section 3.

Finally it can be asked whether immanent actions are truly actions; for the Philosopher seems to affirm this expressly when he says: "Of generations and motions, this indeed is called intellection, that however effectuation or making." Concerning this matter it has been extensively disputed in disputation 48, section 2, and disputation 49, section 4.

Chapter VIII. On the Same Matter, & That Form is Not Made Per Se, But the Composite

Question 1. First, the Philosopher himself treats whether form is generated per se, which question we expedited briefly in disputation 15, section 4.

Q. 2. Whether this is true not only in substantial forms, but also in accidental ones, there in number 6, where we briefly resolved the affirmative part.

Q. 3. Whether substantial forms are introduced into matter by some universal agent, or by particular ones: concerning this question extensively in disputation 15, section 2, and disputation 18, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 4. Whether each thing generates something similar to itself. This question has been expedited from the same places, and from the division of efficient cause into univocal and equivocal, which is taught and explained in disputation 17, section 2. Only two things must be noted. One is that Aristotle speaks properly of generation, comprehending under it alteration which disposes to it; not however of every effectuation; for thus one who moves locally does not properly act something similar; nor through all immanent actions do agents intend the production of things similar to themselves, but each power is said to act that which is proportioned and accommodated to its own perfection. For these do not so much act in order to communicate themselves as to perfect themselves; and therefore they do not properly act things similar to themselves. Although if similarity is extended broadly to equivocal cause, these also can be said to act things similar to themselves. Second therefore it must be noted that Aristotle here did not say all things are generated by things similar to themselves, but indefinitely says: "In some it is manifest that the generator is such as that which is generated." It is therefore generally and in every property true in univocal causes; but in equivocal ones according to eminence and virtual similarity; in artificial or intellectual

causes according to ideal or intentional representation; and thus the things that are usually treated concerning this matter have no difficulty; see Soncinas, in this book, question 14; Lavello question 12, and others.

Chapter IX. On the Same Matter, Some Doubts With Their Solutions

Question 1. First it is usually asked here about the eduction of form from the potency of matter, what and of what kind it is, and whether something of form actually precedes in matter. Concerning which matter extensively in disputation 15, sections 2 and 3, where in the second text 29 of this chapter is expounded ex professo.

Q. 2. How the power of seed or accidental powers effect substantial generation; concerning which extensively in disputation 18, section 2.

All questions also noted in the superior chapter have place in this one, because almost the same doctrine is repeated by Aristotle.

Chapter X. On Quiddity in Relation to Definitions

Question 1. At the beginning here it could be asked whether it pertains to the first philosopher to dispute about definition; but concerning this in disputation 1 prooemial, section 4, where we showed that the form of defining both in mind and consequently in word belongs to the dialectician; but the metaphysician explains the foundation of definition, which is the essence of the thing; nevertheless, because this very essence and quiddity, as it is in itself, is known with difficulty, therefore Aristotle teaches many things about the definition itself as it is made by us, or ought to be made, so that in relation to us he might declare the nature of essence, and especially so that he might show that matter pertains to the essential nature of some

things, so that by this reason also against Plato he might show that ideas of such things separated from matter cannot be given. For this reason therefore in these chapters he treats of definition, in the treatment of which we will briefly touch upon all those things which are merely dialectical.

Q. 2. Second therefore it is inquired whether it is of the nature of definition that it consist of parts. But in this the opinion of Aristotle affirming here is sufficiently express; and if the name itself and the function of definition is explained, it has no doubt. For we cannot distinctly know and explain the essences of things through simple concepts; and therefore in order to distinctly conceive or explain the nature of a thing, we divide it into several concepts, so that we may know what is proper to it, what common, what essential, what accidental, and thus finally by aptly joining the essential concepts of the thing, I may conceive it distinctly; and we call this distinct conception an essential definition, either conceived in mind or expressed in voice; and in a proportional way we make definitions which they call descriptive. Thus therefore it is established that it is of the nature of definition that it be speech, and consequently that it have parts, whence the proper mode of hunting for definition is through division of common concepts down to proper ones, rejecting alien ones, as Aristotle more broadly in Posterior Analytics book 2, chapter 14.

Q. 3. Third, whether the parts of definition correspond to the parts of the thing defined; for the Philosopher seems to affirm this at the beginning of this chapter saying: "As the account relates to the thing, similarly the part of the account relates to the part of the thing." For since it distinctly declares the whole essence of the thing, and for this function uses (so to speak) partial concepts, it seems necessary that proportioned parts in the defined correspond to them. On the contrary, because often the defined is a simple thing and does not have true parts. Also, although it may have them, parts of definition do not always correspond to them, but rather any part of definition speaks of

the whole essence of the thing, although less distinctly than the definition itself; for genus and difference, although they are parts of definition, do not signify parts of the defined, but the whole in a confused and incomplete manner. Some think Aristotle speaks only of natural and composite things, and that in them his proposition is true in general, because to the genus corresponds the generic form, and to the difference the specific form, which are distinct. But this response first supposes the false opinion about plurality of forms according to the order of essential predicates, which we disprove in disputation 15. Then it is against the absolute and general words of Aristotle.

Therefore the Philosopher can be expounded in two ways. First, that his locution is only through proportional comparison, and is not absolute, but with suitable distribution. For he wants the parts of definition to observe that proportion among themselves and to the defined which the parts of the thing observe among themselves and with the whole. Not that it is necessary that every defined thing have parts, but that the comparison be made to that which has them. The proportion consists in this, that the parts of definition are compared as potency and act, just as the parts of the thing. The other exposition is that the parts of the thing are called either physical parts, if the thing is physically and properly composite, to which parts of definition correspond, either according to the thing, if definition is given in a physical mode, or according to proportion and imitation, if the definition is proper and metaphysical through proper genus and difference. Or more broadly also the parts of the thing are called the metaphysical grades themselves precisely conceived, which are indicated through genus and difference, as they are parts of definition.

Q. 4. The fourth and principal question concerning this chapter is whether matter is part of the quiddity of material substance, and consequently whether matter is placed in the definition of such things. But the prior question is treated ex professo in disputation 36, section 2, where with Aristotle and St. Thomas we embrace the affirmative part. From which it follows that in the quidditative

definition of material substances matter is placed, not as something added, for this is beyond the perfection and nature of complete substance, but as existing from the intrinsic essence of such things. Matter is however placed in such definition either expressly, if definition is given in a physical mode, as when it is said man consists of body and soul; or implicitly, as included in the metaphysical genus, as when it is said man is a rational animal. Finally matter is placed in definition according to some universal notion, not however signate matter, for this is proper to individuals, as the Philosopher teaches here, and St. Thomas and others expound at length.

Q. 5. From this arises the fifth question, whether the singular as singular is definable, and consequently whether signate matter can be placed in its definition. The question is about the singular not in act signate (so to speak), that is, about the common notion of singularity; for in this way something common is already taken, which can be defined in its own way, just as person, supposit, and other such things; but the question is about the singular (so to speak) exercised. And in this way Aristotle here denies, text 35, that the singular is defined; for he therefore denies that signate matter is placed in definition: he has the same below, chapter 15, text 53; and above, chapter 4, text 13, he had said that only species can be properly defined; and in Posterior Analytics 1, chapter 7, he says there is neither science nor definition of individuals. In which place this matter must be treated ex professo.

For it is not without difficulty why the individual cannot be defined, since it can be resolved into two concepts, namely into the concept of species and of proper individual difference. For what some say, that the individual does not have a proper individual difference, but only an individual accident, is false, as is clear from what we have said in disputation 5. Moreover, there is true science of perpetual individuals, as of God and Angel (for Aristotle denies this only of material individuals); why therefore can there not be proper definition of the same? And if there can be of those, there will also be of others, insofar as they are abstracted from time and from actual existence. On

account of which there are not lacking those who think the singular is definable from itself and by its nature, but is not defined by us because we do not attain its proper difference.

I think however that the question is about the name, and Aristotle's locution is more proper, just as it is more received. Because definition properly so called explains the essence of the thing; whence, just as the individual does not have another essence besides the essence of the species, so neither is it considered to have another proper definition. Also the contraction of species to individual is quasi-material by reason of such entity; and therefore that which the individual adds beyond the species is not so much explained by proper definition as by application of essential definition to this entity. Therefore the species is properly defined, which consists of genus and essential difference. But supreme genera and individuals do not so have proper definition, although they can be described and explained in some way. But that there is no science or demonstration of singulars must be understood in almost the same way, because of them as such, only contingent and mutable things are known. And if some necessary things seem to be demonstrated, this is always by virtue of some universal middle, and thus it is rather application of universal science to particular than proper science of particulars. Which is perhaps true in every created thing, because no thing is essentially singular except God, of whom there can be most perfect science. And this is especially understood of human science, for angelic is of another nature through intuition of singular things as they are in themselves.

Q. 6. Again it can be asked here whether the parts of the defined are prior to the defined itself; also whether in place of a part of definition it is always permitted to put its definition.

Q. 7. Which questions Aristotle seems to propose here. And the former indeed he treats more ex professo, and in sum responds that formal parts are prior, but material parts by no means. By formal parts however he understands those which are taken from form as such, or which formally correspond to it, or finally which are taken as

equally universally as the defined itself. Whence by material parts he understands individual ones, or all those which contract the notion of the defined to particular matter, which it does not require from the force of its formal notion, as it is with respect to sphere that it be bronze. Formal parts are however said to be prior to the defined by a certain priority of nature, or of causality, sometimes also of subsisting consequently, although not always, because sometimes just as the whole cannot be without these parts, so neither conversely can the parts be outside the whole, as Aristotle also noted here.

Concerning the other question Aristotle says almost nothing, and the resolution can be taken from what was noted above, chapter 4. For if that which is placed in definition is truly essential and has proper definition, nothing prevents its definition from being put in its place, for thus, since man is defined to be rational animal, he is rightly said to be rational sensible living thing; indeed thus the definition is more distinct. But if a part of definition is so simple that it does not have definition, it is not necessary to put its description in its place, as is clear in supreme genera and differences, and for this reason transcendentals are not placed in definitions. Similarly, if that which is placed in definition is not essential, but something added, it is not put in place of the defined itself, because often redundancy would be committed, or vicious circle, as was touched upon in chapter 4. And according to these things the same Aristotle must be understood, Topics 2, chapter 2.

Chapter XI. Which are Formal Parts, Which Truly Material

Question 1. In this chapter nothing new to be asked occurs, for almost nothing is added in it, but the question about matter is again inculcated, whether it is part of specific essence or not, and the affirmative part is concluded, and for this reason it is said that formal parts, or those which are of the definition of species, do not exclude

sensible matter in natural things, nor intelligible matter in mathematical things; but in the former they exclude individual matter, in the latter however sensible matter. Whence formal parts are said to be those which are required according to specific notion and for some function suitable by reason of that, even if they include matter in universal, or in a proportioned mode; but material parts are said to be those which are quasi per accidens to the common notion of species. All of which tend to this, that against Plato he might conclude that common and specific notions of these things cannot be abstracted from all matter.

Q. 2. Again he inculcates the question whether the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is, which we already touched upon above; and this place in particular, and also the words of the Philosopher have been explained ex professo in disputation 34, section 5, at the end.

Chapter XII. From the Parts of a Definition, or From Genus & Difference, There Arises a Per Se Unity

Question 1. The first question here can be: whence do the defined thing and the definition have per se unity? The meaning is not whence they have unity when the defined thing and definition are compared with each other; for this has already been accomplished, since they have that unity from identity. Rather, the meaning is: since a definition says or contains several things, whence does the defined thing, about which all those things are predicated, have the property of being one and not many? The same must consequently be understood about the definition itself. The resolution is sufficiently clear in itself. For a definition is one because it consists of genus and difference, which are compared as proper potency and act, and in a similar way the defined thing is one, because its essence consists of genus and difference as proper metaphysical act and potency that are per se ordered. From such act and potency there always arises a per se

unity, even in physical things, as is taught below in book 8 concerning matter and form, and this is taken from book 2 of On the Soul, text 7. Therefore, much more so from metaphysical principles. This is proven by another reason of the Philosopher in the present passage, namely because genus is not apart from the species themselves, or outside of them. Hence it is only the very essence of the species conceived confusedly. And (as St. Thomas correctly explains) therefore genus cannot exist without species, because the forms of species are not other than the form of the genus. Therefore in reality they express the same essence, and they differ only as the determinable and the determining according to reason. They therefore compose a per se unity. For this reason, therefore, both the defined thing and the definition have proper unity.

But it should be noted that definition and the defined thing can be considered either as they are formally in the mind, or as they are objectively. In the former way, a definition is properly and according to the thing composed of concepts of the mind that are really diverse in themselves; nevertheless it is said to have unity after the manner of a certain artificial whole, on account of the subordination and some conjunction of such concepts. Objectively, however, it does not have real composition by virtue of genus and difference, but only rational composition, through denomination from the composition of mental concepts. But the defined thing in neither way has composition of the thing, but only of reason, even by virtue of genus and difference. However, this name "defined thing" seems to be said more properly of the objective concept than of the formal one, although conversely "definition" seems to be said more properly of the formal concept than of the objective one. And therefore this unity is perceived more per se in the defined thing than in the definition. And thus Aristotle in this chapter speaks chiefly about the per se unity of the defined thing itself or essence, insofar as it is composed from genus and difference. Concerning this composition and the

distinction of the extremes, and their comparison, what is treated at length in disputation 6, sections 9, 10, and 11 should be consulted.

Q. 2. It can be asked further whether genus can be found outside all species. The reason for doubt is that Aristotle says disjunctively: "Genus is not apart from those things which are as species of the genus, or if it is indeed, but it is as matter." Hence he seems to suggest that genus can sometimes be found outside species, at least in the manner of formless matter. On the contrary, genus can in no way be found outside all species, since in reality it is not distinguished from them, nor does it express another essence from them.

Genus can be understood to be outside all species in two ways: in one way really through separation in the thing itself; and in this way it is simply impossible for genus to be outside species, as the reasons given conclude, and Aristotle taught this everywhere when arguing against Plato's Ideas and inferring this inconvenience, that if Ideas of species abstracted from individuals were granted, Ideas of genera separated from species would have to be granted. If therefore this text is understood concerning this separation, as it is commonly understood by St. Thomas and others, the disjunction is added only to remove the equivocation of certain words, which seem to signify genera that are separated from species, but in truth they do not as such signify genera, but the material part of the whole composite, as is evident in the example of voice which Aristotle uses: for voice can signify articulate sound in general, and as such it is genus; but insofar as it can signify only sound as capable of such formation, it is matter. The same is true of body, as St. Thomas notes here; for insofar as it signifies a composite of matter and substantial form in general, it is genus, and as such it is in no way separable from all species; but insofar as it signifies the first subject apt to be substantially informed, it expresses matter. In another way, genus can be said to be separable from species according to reason, so that it is not predicable of them, and in this way also Aristotle's statement is true, either that it is not

separable, or that it is not taken as genus, but as matter. And from both members the intended conclusion follows, namely that genus is not separable on account of identity and unity, and insofar as it is separated in some way, it is signified or conceived as matter, and therefore apt to compose a per se unity with difference.

Q. 3. The third question can be how it is true that a superior difference is divided by inferior ones; for thus the Philosopher says: "It is necessary that difference be divided by difference." But the reason for doubt is that difference seems indivisible, otherwise if difference is divisible through differences, there will be an infinite regress, and it will not constitute an indivisible species. It is answered that Aristotle clearly speaks of subaltern differences, which he says are divided, not because they as differences are divided, but because what is constituted from them, as such, is further divisible through other formal differences. Nor does it proceed to infinity, because it stops at some ultimate difference, as the same Aristotle says. Nor does it happen that such difference does not constitute a species, but that it does not constitute an ultimate species.

The Philosopher notes, however, that this division ought to be formal, so that the posterior difference per se determines the prior one, and is its mode or act. Understand, however, that sometimes the posterior difference is of the same order as the prior one, and then it is only as it were a determination of it in the same latitude, as the sensible is determined by such a mode of sensing; sometimes, however, the posterior difference belongs to a superior order, and carries the prior difference up with itself, in the way that rational is compared to sensible. And then it not only determines it as if modifying it within its own grade, but also by adding a superior grade; nevertheless because that addition is the formal actuation of the prior grade, and at the same time is the perfection of that within its own grade, not only is it the proper and formal difference, but it is also the most perfect.

Q. 4. The fourth question is whether an inferior difference includes the superior one. For the Philosopher seems to affirm this when he says: "If therefore these things are thus, it is manifest that the ultimate difference will be the substance of the thing, and the definition"; and below: "If therefore difference is made of difference, the one which is ultimate will be the species and substance." And he applies an example in these: animal having feet, biped; for this second includes the first, as is evident per se, and hence he concludes that in definition only the ultimate difference should be posited; for if the prior ones are posited simultaneously, nugation will be committed, as if in the said example one says animal having feet, biped. On the contrary, however, the superior difference is included in the genus, as sensible in animal; therefore it cannot be included in the inferior difference. The consequence is evident, both because genus is entirely outside the nature of difference, as was said in book 3, and also because otherwise nugation would always be committed by adjoining difference to genus, which is plainly false. Likewise, whenever a remote genus is posited in definition, it is not sufficient to posit the ultimate difference, but it is necessary to add intermediate ones, as is also said here; therefore they are not included in the ultimate one; otherwise it would be nugation.

Some explain, and St. Thomas signifies, that Aristotle speaks of difference, not according to its precise concept, as it is part of definition, but as it is a certain whole including confusedly, not only superior differences, but also the genus itself. For only in this sense can it be true that the ultimate difference is the substance of the thing and the definition, namely equivalently and implicitly. Otherwise Alensis indicates, and Scotus also says, that the ultimate difference is called the substance of the thing and definition, because it completes it, not because it includes all superior things, but because it per se presupposes them, and by necessary consequence, to whatever the ultimate difference belongs, it is necessary that all superior ones belong. But although these things are true, nevertheless they do not

suffice to explain Aristotle's argumentation, namely that nugation is committed if superior differences are posited in definition simultaneously with the ultimate one. For this, speaking per se, does not follow; for by saying living sensible rational, nugation is not committed, even if rational taken confusedly and by way of a whole includes all superior things, because in that definition it is not so adjoined, but according to its precise nature. Nor is nugation committed because rational per se presupposes superior things, and implicitly and illatively indicates them; for it is sufficient that it does not include them formally. Therefore Aristotle seems to think that the ultimate difference formally includes superior ones, and therefore nugation is committed. And this seems clear in Aristotle's example; for this difference biped formally includes this superior one, namely, having feet.

Nevertheless it must be said that, speaking per se, the ultimate difference does not formally include superior ones, but presuppositively or confusedly, as the cited authors truly said. From which it also follows that nugation is not committed, speaking per se and generally, by positing in definition several per se subordinated differences, when definition is not given through proximate genus, but through remote genus. And this is also most certain, and is taken from the same Aristotle in this chapter. Sometimes, however, the division of differences can be such that in the concept of one another is formally included, and repetition occurs by positing both, as in Aristotle's said example. By this particular indication Aristotle shows that the ultimate difference is the per se act of the superior one, and completive of one essence of the defined thing, which was the intention in this discourse. For from this indication the same can be taken to be in other ultimate differences, even if they do not so formally include superior ones. It can also be added, to respond to a tacit objection, that the ultimate difference taken precisely never formally includes superior ones; sometimes, however, it is so conjoined that it is neither conceived nor signified except by including superior ones, as is evident in Aristotle's

example, and this is sufficient for Aristotle's discourse. Perhaps also Aristotle does not speak of ultimate and subaltern difference, but of ultimate, which he wants to show is only one, nor can two ultimate ones be posited in definition without nugation, as we shall immediately explain.

Q. 5. Another question is determined in this chapter, namely what conditions an essential definition requires in order to be correctly given; for many conditions are gathered in this chapter. First, that it be given through those things which belong to the definition per se primarily and according to what it itself is, because they ought to explain the what-it-is of it. Second, that it be given through proper potency and act per se ordered, and, if several differences are posited, one per se divides another. Third, that the ultimate difference be only one, for, if there are several, either one will include another, and thus there will be nugation, or neither will include the other, and then either they are accidentally ordered, and thus they will not compose one per se essence, or if they are per se ordered, one is potency, and the other act, and this alone will be ultimate, but the other will be more general. Alensis gathers a fourth conclusion, namely that, in order for definition to be constituted in right order, the more common things should precede, and if several differences are posited, the subaltern should be posited first, then the ultimate. But Aristotle did not posit this; rather he signifies at the end of the chapter that this order does not pertain to substance; which is indeed true, if it is taken materially; formally, however, as regards the nature of act and potency, it is necessary that potency be presupposed, and thus be taken as prior, although perhaps it is not uttered first, and in this sense this condition coincides with the preceding one. The ultimate condition which is gathered is that definition ought to be proper and reciprocal with the defined thing. Which also Aristotle does not expressly posit; nevertheless it is included in it, that definition ought to have unity from the ultimate difference, which declares the proper substance and essence of the thing.

Q. 6. The sixth question is customarily treated here, whether per se unity of composite substance requires one form. For St. Thomas frequently presses this question here, gathering unity of form from the reasons which Aristotle here uses. Scotus, however, refutes this in the same place, and attempts to solve the reasons. But St. Thomas's opinion is to be preferred, which we treat at length in disputation 15, section 10.

Chapter XIII. Concerning Second or Universal Substance

From this chapter Aristotle begins to speak more pressingly and clearly about second substance, especially to conclude the disputation about Ideas against Plato.

Question 1. Hence the first question occurring here is whether universals are substances, which Aristotle chiefly treats in this chapter. And it can first be understood concerning all universals, and thus it is established that not all are substances, which we touched upon in disputation 6, section 7. Second, it can be understood specifically concerning universals of the category of substance, which in the categories are called second substances. Hence it is established that such universals are substances, about which we dispute at length in disputation 33, section 2. But Aristotle in this chapter contends that they are not substances simply, that is, per se subsisting in themselves, and this his reasons prove, about which the commentators can be read.

Q. 2. Then on this occasion it can be disputed here concerning the universal, whether it is correctly defined as being that "which is by nature apt to belong to many"; for thus the Philosopher defines it here, text 45. But this matter is disputed at length in disputation 6, throughout, where we treat what that aptitude is, and how it is in things, and is distinguished from them.

Q. 3. For here it can be treated in what sense that common proposition is true: "From two beings in act there does not arise one

in act, but from two in potency, for act separates"; for these are Aristotle's words here, text 46. But we speak of this axiom at length when treating the existence of created things, disputation 21, section 11. As regards Aristotle's mind, however, it is established that he speaks of beings in act that are complete, and insofar as they are such. For he brings forward that proposition to demonstrate that universals cannot be integral substances and per se subsistent, and so inhere in individual substances that they compose with them one per se and in act. And thus no difficulty remains.

Chapter XIV. Universals are Not Substances Separated from Individuals

In this chapter nothing worthy of note occurs; for I consider it superfluous to examine Aristotle's individual reasons in so clear a matter, since in them there is no peculiar principle or metaphysical doctrine that needs new exposition; therefore let the commentators be read.

Chapter XV. Concerning the Same Matter

Here Aristotle touches in passing on some propositions to be noted, and which could be brought into question.

Question 1. The first is this: "Of a singular thing there is no definition nor demonstration, because it has matter," in which proposition both the inherent and causal aspects have difficulty. But this matter has been touched upon sufficiently around chapter 10.

Q. 2. The second is: "What has matter, it is contingent for it to be and not to be, and it is corruptible."

But it is to be understood according to the subject matter; for here he only deals with sublunary things composed of matter and form.

Q. 3. The third is that form is not made, but the composite, and consequently neither the Idea, but the singular thing. Concerning which, partly in book 1, chapter 2, partly in this book, chapter 8, it has been said.

Q. 4. The fourth is that definition ought to consist of several parts or names, which has been treated in chapter 10.

Q. 5. Whether, however, Aristotle efficaciously concludes from this that the singular is not definable, is not easy to explain. For the sum of the reasoning, as is gathered from the interpretation of St. Thomas and others, is that either both terms of the definition are common, or both are singular or one of them is. If the first, the definition will not be adequate to the singular thing, but will also belong to others of itself. If the second, it will not be a definition, but they will be synonymous names, as regards the singular term of the definition, and not of the defined thing. But this reasoning seems ineffective as regards this latter member, for individual difference, even if it is convertible with the singular thing, is not a synonymous word, because it signifies that thing in another way and through another concept, just as specific difference is not synonymous with the species, although it is convertible with it.

Therefore Aristotle's discourse seems maximally to conclude against those positing that Ideas are subsistent things, and consequently particular, and yet separated from all individual contraction; for thus they cannot be defined by individual difference, and consequently they cannot have a definition consisting of common terms, from which cannot be made a definition so proper to the Idea as Idea, that it cannot belong to other things; and thus Aristotle's other reasons proceed, which do not lack their difficulties, but I consider it useless to linger in explaining them. How likewise that reasoning can have some force regarding true individuals, even material ones, has been touched upon above, chapter 10.

Chapter XVI. How Substances can be Composed from Several Parts

Aristotle says little here about the proposed intention; for immediately he returns to attacking Plato's Ideas; around which part nothing new occurs. Concerning the former part, however, various questions can be moved here about the plurality of forms, but two are principal. The first is whether elements are formally in the mixture. The latter, however, is whether in the heterogeneous parts of animals there are partial forms of diverse natures. We touch upon these questions briefly in disputation 15, section 10.

Chapter XVII. That What-It-Is is the Principle & Cause of Those Things Which Belong to a Thing

Concerning the first part of this chapter, logical questions can be treated, such as whether it is necessarily presupposed of a thing whether it is, and what it is; whether, however, these can be demonstrated. Likewise whether the question on account of which has place concerning the what itself. But these and similar things are treated in book 2 of the Posterior Analytics, and they have no difficulty. For the integral quiddity of a thing cannot have an intrinsic cause, except insofar as form or matter are assigned as cause of the whole, or one part is assigned in some way as cause of another; that, however, the essence of the thing is such, or that from such principles, for example, rational soul and body, such quiddity of man arises, cannot have another intrinsic cause besides the nature of such form and such matter. And in this sense it is true that no cause is given of the what-it-is itself, but it itself is the cause of other things which belong to the thing. But truly speaking of extrinsic final or efficient cause, or also exemplar cause, sometimes a cause of the very on-account-of-which can be given, in which way one quidditative definition is sometimes demonstrated through another also a priori, as

is discussed at the beginning of book 2 On the Soul, and in book 2 of Posterior Analytics, chapter 8 and following. And we have touched upon something of this matter in disputation 1, section 4.

Q. 2. Concerning the other part of this chapter, the question is customarily treated whether the whole is distinguished from its parts taken simultaneously. We treat this in disputation 36, final section. And the resolution given there is consonant with Aristotle here, who openly teaches that the whole, which is in some way per se one, is distinguished from the parts as adding something beyond them, not however from them taken simultaneously with that addition. What, however, that addition is, Aristotle never sufficiently explains; but we have briefly said that it is the union of parts.

Book Eight of Metaphysics on Sensible Substance & Its Principles

This book may seem to pertain more to physical doctrine than to metaphysics; nevertheless, although the things treated in it are common to physical consideration, the mode and method of discussing them is proper to metaphysics, as we explain more extensively in the prooemial first disputation. Hence the matter of the present book is discussed extensively by us in disputations 12, 13, 14, and 15.

Chapter I. That Sensible Substance Consists of Matter, & What That Matter Is

In this chapter, that proposition in text 3 is especially to be noted: "Sensible substances indeed have matter." He had enumerated a little before, in text 2, among sensible or natural substances the heavens or parts of the heavens, and he speaks openly in the said text 3 about substantial matter, which he immediately defines saying: "But I

call matter that which, although it is not actually a 'what,' is potentially a 'what.'" From these things, therefore, various questions arise.

Question 1. Whether substantial matter exists in things, which is some true substance.

Q. 2. Whether it is a being in pure potency, and in what sense this should be understood.

Q. 3. Whether it exists in all corporeal things, even in the heavens.

Q. 4. Whether it is one in all things, or diverse. For which those words of Aristotle at the end of the chapter should be noted: "For it is not necessary, if something has local matter, that it also have generable and corruptible matter." Where he clearly holds that in generable and ingenerable things there are diverse matters. All these questions, however, along with others that can be desired concerning matter, are treated extensively in disputation 12.

Q. 5. Another question is whether substantial form is separable from matter. For Aristotle, in text 3, says it is separable in reason. The resolution, however, is that material form sometimes can in no way be separated in reality from matter, as in incorruptible bodies; sometimes, however, it can be separated, yet in such a way that when separated it does not remain, but is destroyed. But truly immaterial form can be really separated, so that when separated it is preserved, concerning which matter Aristotle seems to have touched nothing here. Although Alexander of Aphrodisias indicates that Aristotle said this on account of the rational soul, and the sense is that form is separable in reason, because it does not repugn the notion of form as such to be separated; for some form is separable. But matter from the absolute notion of matter is not separable. Another exposition is that form is separable in reason, that is, knowable precisely as an entity distinct from matter, although without relation to matter it cannot be fully understood and defined. And therefore when Aristotle says it is separable in reason, it is not to be understood, that is by definition, so that it can be defined without matter, but by

understanding and precision, as has been said. Others explain that it is separable by definition from signate and individual matter; but Aristotle does not speak of this matter here, as is evident.

Q. 6. Sixth, one can ask concerning composite substance what it is and how it is compared to its parts, concerning which matter we shall speak in disputation 36. But what Aristotle says in text 3, that the composite is separable simply, is not to be understood as separable from its parts, so that it can exist without them, for that clearly repugns; but it is called separable because it can be per se subsistent, distinct and separated from any other substance. And thus can consequently be explained the reason which he subjoins in these words: "For of those substances which are according to reason," supply "of form," that is, which are constituted through form, "some are separable," that is, subsistent in themselves, like first substances, "some however are not," namely second substances. Others explain these latter words differently, but they do not clarify the context, nor the force of that causal conjunction "for."

Q. 7. Finally, there is also place here for the question whether only the composite is generated per se, which is treated in disputation 15, section 4.

Chapter II. On Substantial Form

One question occurs here, whether substantial form is given, which Aristotle here proves to exist only from proportion to accidental acts. But concerning this matter, and others that pertain to this form, it has been said more extensively in disputation 15.

Chapter III. On the Formal Principle through Comparison to the Positions of Plato & Pythagoras

This chapter contains two parts: in the first Aristotle treats of the forms and species of things through comparison to ideas whose

refutation he always emphasizes; in the latter he compares forms to numbers.

Question 1. To pursue the first part, he first raises the question whether a composite name signifies substance, or act and form. And although he does not declare what name he speaks of, without doubt however he treats of absolute names signifying species of substances, like man, horse; for he raises this question in order to gather from the signification of the name that the significata of these names are not some things separated from matter. He does not seem, however, to respond to the question clearly and distinctly. Hence Alexander of Aphrodisias says that Aristotle did not respond to this question, because its resolution was clear, namely that these names signify form. But he is mistaken, as will be evident. Others think Aristotle responds to the question in those words: "But there will be in both cases animal, not as spoken with one reason, but as one." From which Alexander of Hales gathers that the resolution is that the name signifies both, namely the composite and form, not however with univocal reason, but one primarily, the other however in order to the other. Nevertheless this also cannot be true, because neither does the name of the whole, properly speaking, signify form without matter, as is evident per se, nor is there true analogy in these names. And therefore Bl. Scotus says that Aristotle only responds to the Platonic question, and not from his own opinion.

Thomas Aquinas, however, says that Aristotle in those words does not respond to the question, unless perhaps indirectly and implicitly. For he rather infers that as an inconvenience which follows from the opinion of Plato, who posited the idea of man as separated, to be per se man; but individuals by participation of that. Hence therefore it happens, if man signifies both, both form without matter, which is the idea, and the composite, that it signifies those things analogically, which is absurd. For who would say that Peter is analogically man? Thus therefore Aristotle tacitly concludes that all these things signify the thing itself only, and not form alone. And this

seems to be what Aristotle very obscurely adds, namely that that resolution of Plato, that is, that all these things signify forms alone, is perhaps useful for something else, for instance in substances abstracting from matter, but in sensible things it contributes nothing, because sensible substance does not mean only what it was to be, unless man is said to be soul, which is absurd, and therefore a name signifying sensible substance cannot signify form separated from matter.

Q. 2. From this interpretation, however, arise two other questions, namely, whether in sensible substance form alone is its quiddity, or also matter, or consisting of both. For Aristotle seems to hold in the aforesaid words that form alone is what it is; but the composite is that of which it is.

Q. 3. Whence again springs another question, whether in separated forms what it is is not other than that of which it is, but in sensible things these are distinguished. For Aristotle seems to teach both in the cited words. I think, however, that there is great equivocation in these words and questions as they are now treated in the schools, and as Aristotle poses them, as has been touched upon in the above, and will become manifest from this place.

Form therefore in common usage is taken either for the form of a part, or for the form of the whole, which is, for example, humanity. Aristotle, however, almost never makes express mention of the form of the whole, although it can be comprehended under the name of quiddity. Aristotle therefore, besides the form of a part, which is the proper act of matter, frequently understands by forms in book 7 and in this book 8, those Platonic forms, which (according to the sense in which Aristotle treats that opinion) had to be posited as separated and distinct not only from matter, but also from singular forms actuating matter. Because, however, Plato asserted that those forms are the quidditites of the singulars themselves, he seems to have posited the same forms as abstract and separated according to themselves, but by some participation intrinsic to the individuals themselves and

exercising in them the office of form, by actuating matter and constituting the individual; therefore Aristotle also speaks thus in that opinion, as if in sensible substance there were no other form besides the idea; and therefore he often makes transition from one to the other. Hence also it is that by the name of quiddity, or what it was to be, he often signifies not the whole essence of the thing, but form alone, agreeing in this mode of speaking with Plato, not so as to consent with him in the matter, but rather so as to conclude that the what-it-is of material things cannot consist in form alone. And he speaks in this manner almost throughout the present work.

Hence in the first question, his mind is that these names signify in sensible things substance composed of matter and form. Which, that it may be explained more fully, we can distinguish the adequate significate of a name, and the formal or quasi-formal. As in this word "man," the adequate significate is the whole man, but the formal is humanity; more formally, however, the rational soul could seem to be such. These names therefore adequately signify composite substances, as is evident per se, for that signifies a name which is explained through definition, as is evident above, book 4, text 28; but the definitions of these things do not include forms alone, but the composite of matter and form, as is established from what was said in book 7, text 18 and following; therefore the names signify that. The same also is sufficiently established from the mode of conceiving of all; for no one through the name "man" conceives soul alone, nor would anyone say that the soul is man; therefore "man" signifies the composite itself adequately. Indeed, even formally it signifies the composite of matter and form, namely, the integral nature of man, which is not the form alone physical, although it is called metaphysical form, or of the whole, which is humanity. But it does not properly signify the soul in either mode, but includes it in its significate, just as it also includes matter, although in a diverse genus; for it includes the soul as form constituting the quiddity of the thing, but matter as beginning that quiddity.

From which is gathered the resolution of the second question and the interpretation of Aristotle in this place concerning it. For it is simply true, and according to the opinion of the Philosopher, that not form alone, but also matter is of the quiddity of sensible substance, as we treat extensively in disputation 36, section 1. Nevertheless form in a special way is said to be the what-it-is of any thing, because it gives the ultimate species and constitution. And in this sense Aristotle says here that sensible substance does not only include the what-it-is, that is, the form constituting the what-it-is, but also matter, as Alexander of Hales rightly says.

And in the same sense (to respond to the third question) he says that in form itself the what-it-is is not distinguished from that of which it is, because every form is such through itself, nor does it have a form constituting the specific being of that form; but in a material thing, that which formally constitutes the quiddity is distinguished from that which has the form itself; for the having is the whole composite, but the form is part of it. Hence Aristotle in this place did not compare the integral nature to the suppositum, in which sense that question is usually treated now, as we discuss extensively in disputation 34. Nor did he here compare the specific nature to individuals, because that is usually another sense of that question, as we treat in disputation 5, section 1, and disputation 6, sections 1 and 2. Hence the Philosopher also distinguished nothing in this place between matter commonly taken, and signate or individual matter, because Plato (as he attributes to him) separated ideas and essences of sensible things not only from signate matter, but absolutely from matter. And finally Aristotle does not declare whether these names signify substantial composite in common only, or also in the individual, concerning which matter we have also spoken in treating of universals, disputation 6, section 5.

Q. 4. Other questions besides can occur concerning the same part, which Aristotle touched, such as whether only individuals are generated per se, as Aristotle here holds, or also species.

Q. 5. Likewise whether the whole includes something else besides matter and form, as the Philosopher clearly intends here.

Q. 6. And finally, whether simple things are definable, or only composite things, as Aristotle here signifies; and it is to be understood concerning things composite either in reality, or in reason from genus and difference. Concerning which matter and concerning the other questions enough has been touched in the above.

Q. 7. Concerning the other part of the chapter, it is also usually asked whether number is one per se.

Q. 8. Likewise whether ultimate unity is the form of number, which two questions are treated extensively in disputation 41, on discrete quantity.

Q. 9. Again it can be disputed whether the essences of things are like numbers; for this axiom is usually taken from this place; and to perceive the true sense of it, it is necessary to have before one's eyes that that particle "like" does not express adequate, indeed not even true likeness, but proportion. Which consists in this, that just as numbers are composed of several units, so the essences of material things (for these are treated here, although the same reasoning applies to all created things) are composed of several quiditative predicates, although in a diverse mode; for units are really several, but predicates only in reason. Likewise, just as the units in any number are finite, so also are the quiditative predicates, as was touched upon above concerning book 2. Whence also it happens that, just as the division of number does not proceed to infinity, so neither does the resolution of species into quiditative predicates, but finally it stops at some simple and first ones. Again, just as the ultimate unit determines the nature of such a number, so also the ultimate difference determines the specific nature. Wherefore, just as when a unit is added the number is changed, so also when a difference is added the species is changed. And as to this especially it is said that the essence of each thing is like a number, and consists in some way in the indivisible, just as that number consists.

Q. 10. From this, however, arose another question, how some forms can receive more or less, and whether then the species itself is changed, increased or diminished, or only the individual form, and whether this has place in accidents only, or also in substantial forms. But we treat this matter of the intension of forms extensively in disputation 46, concerning the category of Quality.

Chapter IV. On the Material Principle of Substances

In this chapter Aristotle teaches almost nothing new. Hence almost all questions concerning matter, indeed also concerning causes, could be treated here.

Question 1. Whether the prime matter of all generable things is one.

Q. 2. Second, whether proximate matter is diverse, and how this should be understood concerning proximate matter, and how concerning remote matter, and what kind of distinction this is.

These have been treated in disputation 13, in the prior sections.

Q. 3. Again, whether there are four causes of natural things, extensively in disputation 12.

Q. 4 and 5. Whether the final and efficient causes coincide in the same thing, in disputation 27. Moreover, whether in natural incorruptible substances there is matter, and of what kind, in disputation 13, section 9 and following.

Q. 6. And finally there can be treated here concerning the material cause of accidents, which Aristotle touched at the end of the chapter, and concerning that matter we have completed disputation 14. Nor does anything else worthy of notation occur.

Chapter V. How the Material Principle Serves Transmutations

Question 1. In this chapter that opinion of the Philosopher is usually celebrated: "Whatever things are or are not without being transmuted, these have no matter"; on the occasion of which the question concerning the matter of the heavens is usually treated here, because from that proposition it is usually said that the heavens, according to the Philosopher's opinion, do not have matter, because they cannot be transmuted. But first of all, Aristotle's opinion is foreign to this purpose. For when at the beginning of this chapter he had said that certain things are and are not without generation and corruption, he does not speak in the said words about incorruptible things; for those are not among the things that can be and not be, but they necessarily are: here therefore he speaks of those things which can be and not be without generation and corruption, namely, those to which that belongs per se primarily, of which kind are forms themselves. Concerning these therefore he says in the said proposition that they do not have matter, but are acts of matter. But the composites themselves, which consist of matter, are properly transmutable through generation and corruption. Then, if that proposition taken nakedly were also taken concerning the heavens, it should be understood according to the above, namely, that in those things there is no matter subject to transmutation, but proportioned matter, as was said above.

Q. 2. Near the end of this chapter Aristotle touches the question whether there is regress from privation to habit. Which can be understood either concerning regress to the same habit in number, or to the same form in number, and thus it touches the matter of resurrection, which is quite foreign to this place; we have treated that extensively in the second volume of the third part, and in this work we touch upon it incidentally quite often, especially disputation 5, section 3 and following, where we treat of the principle of individuation.

Or the question can be understood concerning return to the same form in species, and thus there is no doubt that there can be regress, not however immediately in all cases; for wine is not made

immediately from vinegar, nor an animal from a corpse, although air is made from water, and water from air. And the reason which Aristotle suggests, and Thomas Aquinas better declares, is that there are some forms which matter regards with equal order and immediately, others however which require a certain order, so that thus one is introduced in matter after another, or so that one thing is generated from another, as from a terminus from which. For the form of vinegar, or of a corpse, cannot naturally be introduced except after the form of wine or of an animal, and at the recession of that form, and this natural order of generation cannot be changed, so that wine is made from vinegar, just as semen is made from blood, but not conversely, and therefore in these cases it is necessary that matter first return to an element, or to other forms, so that it can again finally be disposed to a form of the same species as that which it lost.

Chapter VI. Why From Genus & Difference, Matter & Form, One Per Se is Made

Question 1. Aristotle consumes this whole chapter in explaining this question, which he also touched above in book 7, chapter 12, where we noted some things, and more in the disputations on matter and form, especially disputation 15, section 1. Nor in its discussion does Aristotle teach anything else worthy of note. It is only observed that when Aristotle at the end of the chapter seems to exclude every medium, so that one is made from matter and form, he does not exclude the mode of union; for that is impossible, as we show in the same disputation 15, section 6; but he excludes another distinct entity, from which that unity would be, and thus the matter is clear.

Q. 2. It should also be observed how Aristotle here says that simple things and those abstracting from matter have unity through themselves and are one something, clearly confirming the exposition given by us above, chapter 3.

Q. 3. From the doctrine also of this chapter can be confirmed what we deliver concerning the mode of determination of being to the most universal genera in disputation 3, section 6.

Book Nine of Metaphysics on the Division of Being Into Potency & Act

Famous is the division of being into being in act and being in potency, or into potency and act, from which Aristotle is accustomed to resolve various questions, such as whether what comes to be existed beforehand; for he says it pre-existed in potency, and not in act; and recently at the end of the previous book he had defined the question about the unity of composite substance from this same division. For this reason, therefore, after the Philosopher had treated substance in this book, he declares the aforesaid division. For the understanding of this entire book, however, it must be noted that it is one thing to divide being into being in potency or in act, but another thing to divide being into being which is potency or which is act; for the former is not a division into essentially different beings, but into different states of the same being according to the manner of existing; and in this sense the Philosopher says few things in this entire book; we apply that division in disputation 31, section 3. The latter division, however, is according to different essential natures of beings, whether existing in act or only in potency: for either state has place in either member, and in this sense it is treated by the Philosopher in the course of this book. But the division taken in this way has place most especially in substance and quality, and therefore according to the former understanding it is treated by us while discussing matter and form in disputations 13 and 15. In the latter way, however, while treating the species of quality, in disputation 43.

Chapter I. On the Various Significations of Potency

Question 1. In this chapter Aristotle almost repeats what he had delivered in book 5, chapter 12, whence the questions touched upon there also have place here. Other questions can be added, however, such as whether potency is said univocally of active and passive potency; for here Aristotle seems to teach that it is said analogically, and that passive potency is said through relation to active potency. The resolution, however, is that if the name of potency is taken transcendentally, it is said analogically of those; but if it is taken as it is a species of quality, it is said univocally; concerning which matter we treat more broadly in the cited place. Here, however, observe that Aristotle in this place does not treat potency as it is the second species of quality, but broadly, as it comprehends all principles of acting; whence he often calls art and other habits potencies.

Q. 2. Again it can be inquired whether active and passive potency are always distinct potencies, as Aristotle here suggests, or sometimes coincide in the same thing, as seems to happen in the powers of the soul. Concerning which matter we speak in the aforesaid disputation 44, section 1.

Q. 3. Connected with this is another question, whether the same thing can be acted upon by itself; for Aristotle here denies this with these words: "On account of which nothing, insofar as it is made by nature, is acted upon by itself." These words can be explained first of passion properly and rigorously said, that is, physical, and in some way corruptive, so that they do not comprehend perfective passions, such as are immanent ones. Second and better, I think those words should be weighed, "insofar as made by nature"; for they seem to include two things. One is that nothing existing in its natural and perfect state is acted upon by itself; the other is that nothing is acted upon by itself insofar as it is made by nature, that is, according to precisely what it has from nature, but needs something else, such as species, or another similar thing, but this matter is disputed most broadly by us in disputation 18.

Chapter II. On Rational & Irrational Potencies

Question 1. In this chapter Aristotle speaks only of active potency which he had said above to be potency primarily and per se, and this is easily evident from the course of the text, and from the divisions which he delivers, and from the declaration or difference which he subjoins. It can be asked first, therefore, what is vital potency and what is not vital; for this division is suggested by the Philosopher, when he says that some are potencies of the soul, others of inanimate things. This division pertains more to the science of the soul. And therefore it must be said briefly that all those potencies are called vital which follow upon the soul, as the soul is, or some degree of life. And because the degree of life is not conceived or discerned by us except through order to proper operation, by which the living thing acts upon itself, so that it actualizes or perfects itself, therefore that potency is vital which is the proximate and intrinsic principle of vital operation, through which the living thing itself perfects itself, not however according to the same potency; another which according to the same potency is the proximate principle of actualizing itself; and this is properly the potency for immanent act, which is vital in a more perfect way. And this is again distinguished into rational and irrational, which division Aristotle has placed here more expressly.

Q. 2. Concerning this it can be further asked whether the said division is suitable, and what is rational potency, and how manifold it is. These questions also pertain to the science of the soul. And therefore it must be said briefly that rational potency is called every one which follows the intellectual degree as such, but every inferior potency can be called irrational. Whence rational potency can be distinguished as twofold: one eliciting or commanding, another executing with subordination to the former potency, and can be called in one word imperatively rational, according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, book 1 of the Ethics, chapter 13. In the former way that potency is called rational which is rational in itself and elicits an act in

a rational manner. This can again be subdivided, for some is reason formally or through essence, as is the intellect; another is rational participatively, or through concomitance and governance, as is the will, and Aristotle speaks here of both, because both follow the rational degree. Or rather the Philosopher seems to speak of them by way of one, because from both is completed as it were one adequate principle of human actions, insofar as one moves as to exercise, the other as to specification. Imperatively rational potency is called that which, though it is not rational in itself, can by its nature obey reason, in the way that Aristotle in the cited place of Ethics 1 calls the sensitive appetite of man rational by participation, although it is irrational simply; and to this order can be reduced the executive potency toward the outside, insofar as it is subject to the motion of will and reason, such as is the motive potency according to place, concerning which the Philosopher treats in book 3 of On the Soul, chapter 9 and following.

From that place, however, especially texts 41 and 42, arises a special doubt, because there Aristotle seems to reject as insufficient this division of potencies into rational and irrational. It can be answered first that that division can be given in two ways. First, as adequate to the potencies of the soul, and in this sense it is not approved by Aristotle in the cited place; in another way as a proper and special division of the potencies of man or of the rational soul, and in this way it is delivered by Aristotle both here and in book 1 of the Ethics, chapter 13. The reason for the difference is that the potencies of man have in some way an order to reason, insofar as they are all rooted in the same rational soul, and therefore they can be suitably divided by order to reason, or participation or lack of act. But the potencies of brutes or of other natural things do not have order to reason; and therefore they are not properly called either rational or irrational. But this response is not rightly accommodated to this place of Aristotle, for he openly includes under irrational potencies all those which act naturally and without reason. Whence he expressly gives the

example of an irrational potency in heat. Also, because through that quasi-privative difference, namely irrational, the mode of acting of all natural and vital potencies which do not attain the degree of reason can be circumscribed. It does not seem doubtful, therefore, that this can be an adequate division of potencies not only in man, nor only in the soul, but absolutely in every agent. Aristotle therefore, in On the Soul 3, proceeds not by defining, but only by disputing, as St. Thomas notes, or certainly disapproves that division as insufficient, not absolutely, but because it was not sufficient to explain the number and variety of the potencies of the soul.

Q. 3. The third principal question here is whether Aristotle rightly assigns the difference between these potencies from the fact that rational potencies alone are principles of contraries; concerning which matter it has been said at length in disputation 10, in which we discuss broadly free and necessary causes, and we explain which potencies are free, and how they are principles of contrary actions. Also in disputation 26, section 6, we treat whether the same cause can effect contrary effects, and in both places we explain this place of Aristotle.

Chapter III. That Potency is Separable from Act

Question 1. In this chapter Aristotle refutes the opinion of certain people who said that potency does not exist except while it actually operates, which is so absurd that it immediately appears false per se. Whence the arguments of Aristotle are perspicuous. And from this is taken this principle: Potency precedes its act. If this is understood of precedence according to the order of nature, it is universally true, because since potency is the cause of its act, it precedes it in the order of nature. For we speak of potency compared to act, because it properly flows from that. Which I note, so that I may exclude the potency of generating or spirating, which is in the divine persons, concerning which there is another reason and consideration.

But truly if it is understood of precedence of duration, thus that principle must be understood as possible, or indefinitely, not of necessity, or universally. For potency, both active and also passive, can precede its act in time; it is not necessary, however, nor in any potency whatsoever, nor with respect to all acts; for the potency of illuminating does not precede in time every illumination, nor does the potency of matter precede every form.

Q. 2. From the same chapter, at the end, is taken that common axiom containing the definition of the possible, namely: The possible is that which, when posited in being, nothing impossible follows. This is evident, if possibility and reduction to act are taken with proportion. For something is possible according to successive and not simultaneous act, as the continuum to be divided into infinity is possible, not so that the whole possible division be posited simultaneously, but that it be posited successively, and never be finished. Thus also something is possible separately, not however compositely, as white to become black. If therefore reduction to act is made with proportion, that proposition is manifest, whose reason we will declare more in the following chapter.

Chapter IV. Not Everything that Does not Happen is Possible to Happen

So that Aristotle may confirm the description of the possible, which he delivered at the end of the previous chapter, here he refutes the opinion of those who said that each thing is possible, even if it is not going to be future, which is so openly false that it needs no refutation or declaration.

Question 1. It must only be noted that some people gather from this letter of Aristotle, not only that not everything which is never future is possible, but also that everything which is never future is impossible, or (which is the same) that everything which is possible is at some time future, because everything which is always not, is

impossible to be. And this seems to be the exposition of the Commentator here, texts 8 and 9, which Iandun defends here, question 5, as Iavellus reports and attacks at length, question 10. Nevertheless it not only repugnates the mind and words of Aristotle, both here and also in other places, but is also evidently false, and repugnant also to the principles of the Catholic faith. The first is evident, for the Philosopher here, as St. Thomas and others rightly expound, expressly teaches that some things are indeed possible which are never future, although not all things which are never future are possible to be or happen. And in Generation 1.2, chapter 11, text 64, he says: "One who is just about to walk, easily will not walk." Where he not only says something possible, but also what is already in purpose, or quasi in the vestibule to happen, sometimes does not happen. And the reason is evident from the principle posited in the preceding chapter, because potency can be prior in time than its act; whence it can happen that it never exercises some act, even if it can. Then in divine effects this is not only evident, but also certain by faith; for God can do many things which he never does; for thus Christ said, Matthew 26: "Can I not ask my Father, etc.?" Finally from the contingency and freedom of some effects or causes, this follows by necessary consequence. Concerning which matter we treat at length in disputation 19, section 2 and following. Nor is it true that everything which never is, is impossible, but what is never per se and intrinsically, so that it lacks the capacity of being.

Q. 2. Finally it must be considered what Aristotle infers in text nine, namely, when in propositions de inesse one thing is necessarily inferred from another, in the same way it follows in propositions de possibili, so that if the antecedent is possible, the consequent is also possible. As if it is rightly inferred: He runs, therefore he moves, it is also rightly inferred: He can run; therefore he can move; because otherwise if it were possible to run, but impossible to move, either running could be posited without motion, contrary to the former inference, or motion being posited in the thing, which is

supposed possible, something impossible would follow, namely that running which was said to be impossible. That doctrine is therefore evident, and falls into almost the same thing which dialecticians say, that in a good consequence there cannot be a true antecedent and a false consequent, because, just as the impossible does not follow from the possible, so neither does the false from the true. And the reason a priori is that the consequent is virtually contained in the antecedent; but it is impossible that the possible should virtually contain what is impossible, or the true something false, because by this very fact that would no longer be possible, since the possible regards act, and cannot regard impossible act, because there is no potency to the impossible; and for the same reason that would not be true, since it is of the nature of the true that it contains nothing false. There is also another reason, because to be in act necessarily infers to be possible, since act supposes potency, and therefore if there is necessary consequence between acts, a fortiori also between potencies. St. Thomas rightly notes that here there is discourse about the possible in common, as it abstracts from the necessary or contingent, because it can happen that in a good inference de inesse, the antecedent is only contingently possible, but the consequent necessary; as, if he laughs, he is risible, or he is a man; and the reason is that the act itself also abstracts from being necessary or contingent, and because from a necessary property follows a contingent act, which act necessarily includes or supposes potency, not however under the same condition of necessary or contingent.

Chapter V. On the Order Between Potency & Act

Question 1. Here it can first be inquired whether in one and the same subject act sometimes precedes potency, which Aristotle here seems to affirm. But this question will be easily resolved, if it is noted what was noted above, that Aristotle here calls potency every principle of acting, even if it be art or habit. In this sense, therefore, it

is established that some potencies, that is, principles of acting, suppose their acts by which they are generated, for thus art and habit are acquired by custom. But truly proper natural active or passive potency is always supposed to its act either in time, or at least in nature, nor can it happen that in the same thing act precedes such potency, as Aristotle openly teaches here. And the reason is that such potency is the cause of its act, and is not the effect of it, except perhaps in the genus of final cause, which cause does not precede in being, but perhaps in apprehension and intention, and thus the matter is clear, which Aristotle again touches upon in chapter 8.

Q. 2. Second, it can be inquired here in what way potency is reduced to act, and what difference there is in this between rational and irrational potencies. But this matter has been treated at length in disputation 19. Here let it only be noted from this place of Aristotle that the definition of free potency is plainly gathered, which we have treated at length in the said place, namely, that it is that which, all things required for acting being posited, can act and not act. For this is what the Philosopher says here: "Since however it can, something can, at some time, and in some way, and whatever other things it is necessary to be present in the definition"; for these words are equivalent to that particle of the aforesaid definition, "all things required for acting being posited"; for Aristotle says all those things must be taken or supposed, so that something is said to be able or to be possible simply. Concerning potency taken in this way, Aristotle adds that this is the difference between natural and free potencies, or (which is the same) irrational and rational, as he himself speaks, that in the former it is necessary that when the passive and active can approximate, this one indeed acts, but that one is acted upon. Concerning the others, however, he says: "But those others it is not necessary." Which is the same as if he said that free potency is such that, approximated to acting with all requisites, it does not act necessarily, but can act and not act, and he adds the best reason. Because since free potency is per se and from itself potent to

contraries, if approximated to generating, it acted from necessity, it would simultaneously act contraries, which is impossible.

Q. 3. Third, it can be asked what determines rational or free potency to act, for Aristotle investigates this at the end of this chapter. And he answers nothing else except that this potency is determined by choice and purpose or desire, which being posited (supply efficacious and absolute) it operates from necessity what it can. Which is sufficiently clear per se. But it remained to be inquired further what determines this potency to choice itself; but the Philosopher inquired nothing about this, because he believed nothing more should be inquired, because this potency by its natural force, as first act (I speak in natural and moral choices, and speaking per se), and by volition or choice itself, as second act, determines itself to willing and choosing; for by willing it chooses, and by choosing it wills; not however by itself alone or without the concourse and aid of a superior required cause; for this is always supposed. Soncinas touched upon this opinion, book 9 of Metaphysics, question 14, and does not disapprove it, but defends it; and thinks it is consonant with the doctrine of the Philosopher in this place. Later, however, he himself adds that at least as to specification the judgment of intellect concurs to this determination; but in what sense this is true, and whether this determination of itself should be attributed to free potency itself, we have treated most broadly in the said disputation 19, both in comparison with the judgment of intellect in section 6, and in comparison with divine concourse in section 4, and disputations 27, sections 2, 3, and 4.

Chapter VI. What Is Act

In this chapter no question of any moment occurs. It is only noted that Aristotle here does not so much explain what is the act which properly corresponds to active and passive potency, as absolutely what it is to be in act, as it is distinguished from being in potency. And in this way being in act extends most broadly, and is like

a certain transcendental, and therefore it is not declared by Aristotle by definition, but by examples, and by a certain induction, because this can scarcely be explained by definition, unless using act itself to explain it; for to be in act is nothing other than actually or in fact to have what was in potency. And so if being in act is distinguished from being in potency, it is nothing other than to actually exist, concerning which what it is, we say at length in disputation 31. But if "in act" is said of active potency, it is the same as to actually operate. If of passive potency, it will be the same as to actually receive or be informed. All of which are expounded by us partly in disputation 43, where we treat active and passive potency and their acts, partly in disputations 48 and 49, where we treat action and passion, which are the more immediate acts of these potencies.

Chapter VII. When a Thing is Said Properly to Be In Potency

In this chapter also nothing occurs worthy of notation; for the Philosopher only teaches that then a thing is said properly and absolutely to be in potency, when it is in proximate potency, so that through the action of one agent it can be reduced to act. When however it is only in remote potency, it is not said properly and absolutely to be in potency, as water is not in potency man or horse, speaking simply, indeed not even sperm (says Aristotle), because it needs many transmutations so that from it man may come to be. All of which pertain only to the mode of speaking; for the matter is sufficiently established per se. Then he declares in what way matter is predicated of a thing, and teaches that it is predicated denominatively, not abstractly or essentially, for wood is called bronze, not bronze, and a chest wooden, not wood. And the reason is clear, because a part is not predicated of the whole, except denominatively, because it is not predicated by way of the whole, because what is affected by such

denomination is the whole itself. Therefore here no question remains which is of any moment.

Chapter VIII. What Act is Prior to Potency

Question 1. First it can be inquired whether act is prior to potency in definition, or by reason, and in knowledge, as Aristotle teaches here. Concerning which matter we treat ex professo in disputation 43, final section.

Q. 2. Second, whether act precedes natural potency in time, at least according to species, or in different subjects. This question is also treated in the same place.

Q. 3. Finally, whether potency which is acquired by use, that is habit, is posterior in time to its act, and how it is generated through it, which was also touched upon in chapter 5, concerning which matter we have spoken in disputation 44, which is about habits.

Chapter IX. That Act is Prior in Substance or Perfection to Potency

Question 1. The first question, and directly intended in this chapter, is whether act is more perfect than potency. This is treated in disputation 43, final section.

Q. 2. Whether things posterior in generation are more perfect. Aristotle assumes this proposition in this place as a principle, from which he infers that act is more perfect than potency. The true sense of this principle is: when something is so prior in generation that it is ordered to the posterior as way to term, or as what is inchoate to what is consummated, then what is posterior is more perfect; and the examples of Aristotle about man and boy, and about seed and man, declare this sense. And the reason which he also adds, saying: "For that (namely, what is posterior in generation) already has form, but this does not"; that is, that has been led to term and consummation in

comparison to the other. But truly when something is posterior in generation as something consequent and flowing from another, as passion or property with respect to form, then it is not necessary that it be more perfect, as is evident per se, unless perhaps the comparison is made so that what is posterior includes what is prior and adds something; for thus the soul affected by its potencies is more perfect than in its naked substance; and thus the matter is clear.

Q. 3. A question could be treated here about the distinction of twofold end, into that which is only operation, or which is something made. But we sufficiently touch upon this division in disputation 23, section 2.

Q. 4. Fourth, here occurs a question about the difference which Aristotle here touches between immanent and transient action, that the former remains in the agent, but the latter is received in the patient: concerning which matter we treat at length in disputation 48, section 2, while explaining the predicament of action.

Q. 5. Fifth, from this chapter is taken a certain common proposition: Every potency is simultaneously of contradiction, or, as it is commonly circulated, is a potency of contradiction. To which it is difficult to attribute a true and doctrinal sense. For first, as St. Thomas notes, it seems it cannot be understood of active potency, because it was said above by the same Philosopher that not every active potency is of opposites, but only the rational. Concerning passive potency also it cannot be universally true, especially in the doctrine of that Philosopher, because the matter of heaven is potency to form, and yet it is not potency of contradiction, because it is not subject to privation, nor is it in potency to a repugnant form. And heaven itself has potency to motion, and yet according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, it is not in potency of contradiction, because it cannot rest. But if someone should say that Aristotle speaks of potency which is conjoined or subject to privation, in this sense it will be plainly inept and quasi-identical proposition, and serving nothing for doctrine. For it is the

same as if it were said that potency to habit and privation is potency of contradiction.

But it must be said that Aristotle openly speaks of potency which simultaneously includes being in potency, which does not say only receptive potency, as to its positive entity and capacity, but also includes the state in which it is said to be in potency and to lack act. That this is Aristotle's mind is perspicuous; for in this sense he says nothing is eternal in potency; which otherwise would not be true (according to his opinion) of the matter or quantity of heaven, or the intellect, or will of an Angel. Again he says that in heaven there is no potency to being moved absolutely, which also would be plainly false, if the discourse were about receptive potency only, as to its positive nature; he speaks therefore of potency, as it includes being in potency. And in this way it can be understood not only of passive potency, but also of active. Which he himself seems to declare below, when he says that rational potencies are per se potencies of contradiction, that is, which can act and not act, but irrational potencies, only because they are present and absent, that is, only because they can be and not be applied; for thus they can sometimes act, sometimes not act, which place we expound in disputation 26, section 4, number 14.

That this exposition is too clear in this sense does not prevent, both because in rigor it is not identical; and also because in that it serves the intention, or discourse of Aristotle, by which he wants to conclude that a thing in act is more perfect than potency; for on account of this cause eternal things are in act, and not in potency. It can also be said, explaining this further, that potency which is not only for receiving form, but also for proper action or passion, is potency of contradiction, either simply with respect to the whole mutation or form, as in potency to generation, or at least according to different parts, as in potency to local motion of heaven, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, and thus the proposition suffers no exception. And the reason is that no receptive potency, which through proper action can receive its act, according to Aristotle has that act

congenital and immutable from eternity; for potency which is of this kind is not actualized through proper action, but is concreated conjoined to its act, and by its nature is determined always to be under that. Which indeed Aristotle thus thought to be true in incorruptible things, that he therefore believed them to be eternal; and in this sense he denies that there is potency in them, that is, which can be in potency and lack act, speaking simply.

According to true doctrine, however, it must be said that all created things, considered per se and absolutely, are potential or only in potency, not passive, but active of the Creator, with non-repugnance on their part; but incorruptible things have this special property, that after they are created, they do not have from themselves intrinsic potency to non-being, and in this way it is true that they do not have potency of contradiction, as to that being in which they are incorruptible. From this, however, it does not follow that they are eternal a parte ante, because, that they may be absolutely, they depend on the free will of God.

Q. 6. Finally, it could be disputed here whether according to Aristotle there are several per se necessary beings, and pure acts without any potency; for he seems to signify this in this place, when he says that necessary things are not in potency, because they are first beings; for if they themselves were not, nothing would be indeed. But concerning this matter we discuss at length in disputation 30, section 2, and disputation 35, section 1. What pertains to this place, however, St. Thomas and others expound it concerning necessary complexions from connection alone essential or intrinsic of predicate with subject, which are also found in corruptible beings. And insofar as they are necessary, they are not in potency, but always in act, as to truth or essential connection. But if someone wants Aristotle to understand concerning substances and things necessarily existing, about which he certainly seems to speak, let him say either that he spoke doctrinally in plural number, not defining whether such beings are several or only one, as if he said that whatever they are, they are in act and not in

potency. Or certainly just as he posited several eternal beings, so also he posited several necessary ones, not however equally, but one necessary per se, others from the necessary influx of another, or through necessary emanation from another.

Chapter X. That Act is Better than Potency in Good Things, Otherwise in Bad Things

Here Aristotle seems to limit the conclusion of the previous chapter, namely that act is more perfect than potency, and says it must be understood when the act is good to the potency, but not if it should be bad.

Question 1. Concerning this assertion no small difficulty occurred, whether this should be understood only of good and bad act in morals or also in natural things; and if this latter is true, whether this should be understood with respect to passive potency, or only with respect to active. But all these things are treated in the said disputation 43, final section.

Q. 2. Incidentally also here Aristotle touches the question about evil, whether it is some proper nature, or what it is in things. Concerning which matter we institute a proper disputation, which is the eleventh.

Q. 3. He also touches the question whether evil can be in incorruptible things. For Aristotle here absolutely denies this, because every evil is a certain corruption, and corruption is a certain evil. But St. Thomas expedites this very well in one word, that this is true of incorruptibles formally, insofar as they are incorruptible; for as such they cannot be deprived; but to be evil is only with some privation. Nevertheless those things which are incorruptible in substance can be mutable in accidents, motions, or acts, and as such some mode of physical corruption, or secundum quid, can have place in them. Similarly, things which are indefectible in natural matters can have defect in moral matters, and as such moral evil can have place in

incorruptibles, which matter is disputed more copiously by Theologians, but we touch upon something in disputation 35, section 5.

Chapter XI. That Act is Prior in Knowledge to Potency

The Philosopher here declares this conclusion by the example of geometry, in which, by reducing to act, through division, what is contained in potency in continuous lines, one arrives at knowing the truths of geometry; and concerning the text indeed nothing worthy of note occurs: but the conclusion itself is declared in the said disputation 43, final section.

Chapter XII. On Truth & Falsity, How they Are in the Knowledge of Simple Things

Question 1. So that this chapter may have connection with the preceding ones, St. Thomas says here that in it the Philosopher shows truth to be found in act rather than in potency. Concerning which matter almost nothing is read in the text. Whence it is probable that Aristotle makes a digression, and returns to treating something about true being. For he uses three divisions of being especially in this whole work, namely, of being per se (omitting being per accidens) into ten predicaments; of being into act or potency; and of true being, and of non-being false. Since therefore he had spoken about the first two in these three books 7, 8 and 9, although he had excluded true being together with being per accidens from the consideration of this science in book 6, nevertheless in this chapter he briefly returns to it, especially to declare how truth is found in the knowledge of simple things: for he had completely omitted this in the sixth book. And first he repeats what he had said in book 6, namely that truth and falsity are found in composition. Concerning this opinion many things can be

doubted, which have been treated in disputation 8, sections 1 through 6.

Q. 2. Furthermore, it is asked whether the truth of composition is taken from the composition of things, as Aristotle signifies. But the matter is clear, for the sense is not that a composition in reality must correspond to the composition of the mind in order for it to be true, but rather the union and conjunction of the extremes, which is signified through the composition of the mind. For although our mind does not enunciate being or non-being except by really composing its simple concepts, nevertheless it does not attribute that mode of composition to the conceived thing, but understands a thing simple in itself through the mode of something composite. Therefore the truth of mental composition is founded in the union or identity which the extremes of the composition have in reality, whether that be absolute and simple identity, or union with some composition. Unless perhaps in the very composition of the mind the mode of identity or union is expressed, as if you should say: "The goodness of God is His wisdom," or something of this kind; for then it is necessary that such a mode of identity correspond in the thing itself between the extremes as is signified through the copula.

Q. 3. Whether the same proposition can be true and false, not indeed simultaneously; for in this way it is certain that absolute truth, while it inheres, excludes all falsity; which has been touched upon in disputation 9, section 1; but successively; for Aristotle here affirms this, and it is not without some difficulty; nevertheless we defend Aristotle's opinion in disputation 8, section 2.

Q. 4. Whether there is any truth in the understanding of simple things has been stated in disputation 8, section 3, and above, at the end of book 6, some things have been noted for the exposition of this chapter.

Q. 5. Whether there is any proper falsity in the understanding of simple things, and how it intervenes accidentally, disputation 9, section 1.

Q. 6. Whether the human intellect can know the quiddities of immaterial substances. For Aristotle says that we have ignorance of them not as negation, but as privation; signifying that the human intellect has the power to attain that cognition, and thus St. Thomas here notes that Aristotle in this place has determined the affirmative part of this question, which he had left undecided in book 3 of On the Soul, text 36. But if anyone rightly considers, Aristotle, in book 3 of On the Soul, speaks about the conjoined intellect; but for the opinion of this place to be true, that the ignorance which we now have of the essence of immaterial substances is in the manner of privation, it suffices that in our intellect according to itself there be a natural capacity for that cognition, even if on account of the impediment of the senses they cannot be fulfilled in this life. Therefore from the present opinion the resolution of that question proposed in book 3 of On the Soul is not entirely obtained. Hence St. Thomas there affirms that it has been determined by Aristotle nowhere. But concerning this we speak extensively in disputation 35, section 1.

Q. 7. Incidentally also here it can be asked whether according to Aristotle's opinion all immaterial substances are necessarily beings in act, and whether he correctly inferred that if they are in potency, they are generable and corruptible; for in this Aristotle seems to profess that he does not acknowledge another mode of production, and to indicate that all incorruptible things are necessarily beings in act. But concerning this matter we dispute extensively in disputation 20, section 1, disputation 30, section 2, and disputation 35, section 3.

Book Ten of Metaphysics on Unity & Multitude, Their Opposition & Differences

Although Aristotle said some things about the one in books 4 and 5, nevertheless because he always counted it among being as its principal property, he returns to its consideration in this place, and he delivers a more extensive and more elaborate treatment of it in this

entire book. Nevertheless, all things that pertain to it are treated by us in disputations 4 through 9, and in disputations 40 and 41. For in the former we treat transcendental unity and multitude, in the latter the number of quantity and the one proportioned to them, and therefore we shall note few things concerning the text.

Chapter I. On the Nature of the One in General

In this chapter Aristotle repeats what he had said in book 5, chapter 5; let the things noted there be seen; for nothing occurs that needs to be added.

Chapter II. The Nature Of Measure Belongs to Unity of Quantity First & Per Se

Question 1. It is customarily asked in this place whether the first in each genus is the measure of the others; for it is supposed that Aristotle affirms this at the beginning of the chapter, whose words are these: "but especially the measure of each genus is, first and most properly of quantity; for from this it comes also to others." These words can be read and explained in two ways. First, as they are noted here, so that the word "first" is not a noun but an adverb; whence the plain sense is that being a measure in any genus belongs first and properly to quantity; and the proof that follows supports this, namely, because other things neither measure nor are measured except through a certain proportion to quantity; for these words have this force: "For from this it comes also to others," and the whole discourse of the chapter tends toward this. Second, those words can be read so that "first" is a noun, and there a division is made, namely, "but especially the measure of each genus is first," supply "we have said," and then it is added "and most properly of quantity." And thus from the former words that axiom is taken: "The first in each genus is the

measure of the others," which is easy and true, if it is correctly understood.

For some explain it so that through it is signified that all things that are in some genus participate their perfection from that which is principal and first in that genus; and therefore they are measured by their nature through it as through an extrinsic measure most suitably adapted. But although this is sometimes so, as for example, when that first is such by essence, and the rest by participation; for then that first is in the said manner a measure quasi a priori (so to speak) of the others; nevertheless this is not universally necessary, nor asserted by Aristotle anywhere, as was noted in book 2, text 4. Wherefore, so that it may be a general pronouncement, it must be understood of extrinsic measure, accommodated to our mode of knowing, and whether it is a cause or not, and whether it is a priori or only from a certain due and necessary proportion. For thus we correctly gather that what more approaches to that which is most perfect in some genus is also more perfect; it must be understood however, other things being equal and simply and not only in some respect, so that the measure may be legitimately adapted; and thus the matter is easy, nor does it need greater discussion.

Q. 2. The proper questions of this place therefore pertain to the treatise on quantity, namely whether the nature of measure is delivered by Aristotle, which we explain in disputation 40, section 3.

Q. 3. Again whether the nature of measure is found first and properly in quantity, but in others quasi secondarily and by analogy; for this is what Aristotle seems to think here; but it was said about this matter in disputation 5, section 6, and more broadly in disputation 4, section 3.

Q. 4. Another question is whether the nature of measure belongs per se first to unity or the one, as Aristotle also signifies, and in what way this saying agrees with the former, since the one is not quantity, but the principle of number, as is said immediately here; concerning which see disputation 40, section 3.

Q. 5. How it is true that the one is the principle of number, and of what this should be understood, disputation 41, section 4.

Chapter III. The Philosopher Continues the Same Matter

In this chapter it is customarily asked whether a measure ought to be homogeneous, of the same genus as the thing measured; for Aristotle adds this in this chapter. Nevertheless it has an easy solution; for the sense of Aristotle is not that measure and measured ought always to be of the same genus properly taken. For the first being is the measure of the others, and it does not agree with them in genus. The sense is therefore that there ought to be formal agreement between measure and measured; for if they are entirely equivocal and agree only in name, one cannot be measured by access to the other; for they will be entirely diverse; but this agreement is sometimes only analogous, as between God and other beings, sometimes generic, as between whiteness and the remaining colors. And Alensis adds here that it cannot be specific, because individuals are of the same nature, and therefore there is no greater reason why one should be a measure than others. Nevertheless this only proceeds concerning individuals insofar as they are equal; but insofar as they can be unequal, that which was most perfect, or most one, can be the measure of the others, either in intention, or in duration, or even in singular perfection; since in this there can be inequality among individuals of the same species. It also proceeds concerning measure from the nature of the thing; for according to human accommodation the quantity of one individual can be taken to measure another similar one.

Another question, or proposition to be noted here is whether knowledge is measured by things, or things by knowledge. For Aristotle seems to affirm the latter in those words: "But we also say that knowledge and sense are the measure of things"; but he does not understand it to be the measure of objects, but of things which we know through measures; for by applying the measure itself to sense or

intellect, measurement is made. This is clear from the reason he adds, saying, because through them we know something. Just as therefore in Physics 4, chapter 14, Aristotle called the soul the number numbering the parts of motion, so here he called knowledge and sense the measure of the measured. But by comparison of objects the Philosopher immediately adds: "But they are measured rather than they measure." For these words St. Thomas and all refer to the measurement of knowledge from the object. Although Aristotle only wanted to explain that in the very act of measuring one quantity by another, knowledge and sense themselves are also measured, because in measuring the quantity of a thing, simultaneously the cognition that is had of that quantity is measured, insofar as it represents it. Concerning that question, namely, concerning the measure of truth, the things said in disputation 8 on Truth can be seen, where we said that the truth of our knowledge is measured by things, and not conversely; but the knowledge of God is the measure of things, and is not measured by them; and we declared what difference there is in this between natural and artificial things with respect to human intellect; and between things according to essential being and according to existential being with respect to the divine.

Chapter IV. The One is Not a Substance Separated from Individual Things

Principally here it is customarily asked whether there is given one first being, which is the measure of the others, or one substance, which is the measure of others. Nevertheless as far as the mind of Aristotle is concerned, it should be known that he in this chapter does not directly treat whether there is given one substance which is the measure of the others, or one first being which is the measure of all; for scarcely anything about this question is found in the whole text, and St. Thomas, who explains it best, makes almost no mention of this matter. But the Philosopher treats the question with Plato, whether

the one itself is some abstract substance, which has no other nature except unity, and he proves ex professo that such a substance is not given, which is the one itself, which is more evident than it needs proof; nor do I think such a one was ever conceived by Plato. From this therefore Aristotle concludes that, just as in quantity, quality and other things, unity is nothing other than the undivided entity of each thing, so also in substances. From which finally he infers in passing that, just as in colors there is given one first color, so in substances one substance, which will not be something separated, but some singular substance.

From this the expositors took occasion to ask what this one substance is. And Scotus here, whom Antonius Andreas transcribes, question 1, book 10, says it is not God, but the first intelligence, because this is in the genus of substance, but not God. But truly the Commentator, and more broadly Alexander of Hales, declare it to be God. But the dispute is almost about the name and of little moment.

For there is no doubt that God is the extrinsic measure of all things in a much higher way than an intelligence could be. First by reason of His supreme perfection, most simply and most eminently containing all perfections. Second, by reason of the ideas of all things, which He has in Himself. Third, because all beings are beings by analogy to this being, and by participation of it, and all created substances similarly are participations of this substance and not of another. Fourth, because, if there is talk of measure according to itself, thus it is established that it belongs maximally to God, because He is maximally indivisible, immutable and perfect; if as regards us, He is also better known to us than the first intelligence. Nor is it necessary that God be properly in a genus, but it suffices that He have some formal agreement, as was said in the preceding chapter.

But if anyone should wish to assign an intrinsic measure of substances contained in the category of substance, there is no doubt that the first intelligence can undergo that role. For it has perfection accommodated to such an office, namely, so that by comparison to it,

the perfection of the others may be measured and known. Likewise the supreme species in the whole genus of animals, or of living things, or of bodies, can be the measure of all species contained under such a genus, proportion being preserved; therefore also the first species of the whole genus of substance will be able to be the measure of the remaining ones. You will say: measure, according to Aristotle, ought to be minimal; but the perfection of God or of an Angel is not minimal, but great, or infinite, from which part the nature of measure rather conflicts with God, because infinitely and thus equally it surpasses all things. It is answered: quantitative measure ought to be reduced to some minimal quantity, so that it may be indivisible in some way; nevertheless the measure of perfection ought not to be minimal, but supreme, and maximally indivisible and simple. But infinity does not hinder, because it is unequally participated by creatures, and thus on their part there is unequal access to that magnitude of God, and in this way they are measured through it.

Chapter V. On the Opposition Between One & Many

Question. 1. The first question here is how one and many are opposed, which we treat briefly in disputation 5, section 6.

Q. 2. Whether the one is prior to multitude, and division to indivision, ibid., section 7.

Q. 3. Whether same and diverse adequately divide being, and how they are opposed, disputation 7, section 3; and from this it is established what should be said about similar and dissimilar, equal and unequal; for all these preserve the same proportion.

Q. 4. In what way that proposition should be understood: "Those things differ in genus which do not have one matter," disputation 35, section 2.

Q. 5. Whether the genera of diverse categories should be said to differ properly, or to be diverse. For Aristotle here first suggests this,

and they are commonly judged to be first diverse. But concerning this matter it is sufficiently disputed in disputation 32, final section, disputation 39, final section, somewhat in disputation 4, sections 1 and 2. The other things which are said here by the Philosopher about diversity and difference are sufficiently treated, and were also suggested above, book 5, chapters 9 and 10.

Chapter VI. On Contrariety

From here to the end of the book Aristotle treats of opposites, and especially of contrariety, which is a matter of little difficulty, and almost proper to dialecticians, and therefore we dispute few things about opposites in this work. But those things which seemed necessary, while disputing about quality, in which genus alone proper contrariety is found, were said in disputation 45, throughout. But relative opposition has its proper place in the disputation on relatives, which is 47. Concerning negation and privation, we speak in the final disputation on beings of reason.

Question. 1. In this chapter therefore could first be disputed that proposition, which is supposed at the beginning: "Where greater and lesser distance is given, the greatest or supreme is also given." For it seems not to be universally true, for in numbers there is greater and lesser distance; for the binary is more distant from the quinary than from the ternary; and yet no maximum is given. The same is true in figures and in species of substantial things; for man and lion are more distant from each other than lion and horse, and yet no maximum distance is given, because given any perfect species, a more perfect one can be given. Likewise it does not follow: Greater and lesser distance is given; therefore minimum can be given. Therefore neither does it follow that maximum is given. The antecedent is clear, because between extremes maximally distant, media more and less distant can be multiplied to infinity, so that one never arrives at the ultimate, which could be minimally distant from the extremes; as supreme and

minimal heat in intention (supposing they are given) are maximally distant, and there are given between these some more, others less distant, and yet no heat is given distant from the supreme which is minimally distant. Finally in quantity greater and lesser part is given, and yet no maximum or minimum is given, and therefore greater or lesser inequality can be given, but not maximum.

I respond that the arguments prove the consequence is not formal, but only holds in those things in which process to infinity is not given. But the Philosopher supposes that in fact this process is not given in species of things or qualities, and therefore he does not prove the inference specially; but he takes as certain, just as greater and lesser distance is given in qualities, for example, so also maximum is given. Which he confirms by induction and experience from the proximate terms of changes, which are made between some ultimate terms, and maximally distant. Finally, setting aside process to infinity, which is only given either in possible things, of which there is no discussion, or in division of the continuous, or some proportion which results from this, as happens almost in all the examples adduced, setting aside (I say) this process, the inference is excellent. Whence St. Thomas in the Commentary proves it no other way, except because process to infinity is not given. And in the same way it can be inferred that minimum distance is given, if toward the other extreme that process is not given.

And moreover from the force of the inference, maximum distance is not inferred to be given positively, but only negatively, that is some distance than which there is none greater; but this is evidently inferred from the fact that one does not proceed to infinity. But that it is only that which is greater than the others, and that under the same genus there cannot be given two distances of species repugnant to each other or equally distant opposites, cannot be sufficiently gathered from that antecedent, nor from the negation of process to infinity, as is clear per se. But perhaps for contrariety maximum distance in that way suffices; for justice seems to be distant from injustice only as much as

temperance from intemperance, and each distance is under the genus of moral habit. And under the genus of vice prodigality is only as distant from avarice as temerity from pusillanimity. And so, although in one line and latitude, as it were, the extremes differ maximally, not only negatively, but also positively by comparison of the media, nevertheless according to diverse lines and considerations there can be several maximum distances even under the same genus as far as suffices for contrariety, as has been declared.

Q. 2. Second, it can be inquired whether the definition of contrariety which is taken from this chapter is good, namely: "Maximum distance of those things which differ maximally under the same genus, and expel each other from the same subject." For thus almost all expositors gather the definition, and thus Aristotle should be judged to prove other definitions, which he reports here, so that they are equivalent to this; concerning which it was said disputation 45.

Q. 3. Where we also treat that question, whether contrariety is found in qualities alone, since the definition seems to agree also with others, unless something is understood.

Q. 4. Likewise whether only one contrary belongs to one, and how media are opposed to extremes and among themselves.

Q. 5. Moreover, how extremely contrary things are in media, or can be simultaneously in the same subject.

Q. 6. And on that occasion the mixture of contraries is treated there. Concerning their intension and remission we treat in disputation 46.

Chapter VII. On the Difference Within Contrariety & Other Oppositions

In this chapter almost nothing occurs worthy of notation. For what Aristotle says, that the first contrariety is habit and privation, has this sense, that all contraries are in some way privatively opposed, and

that is quasi the root of their opposition. But in two ways privative opposition can be understood to be included in contrariety, namely, either because one contrary entails the privation of the other, or because one is imperfect and deficient with respect to the other, and therefore is compared to it by way of privation; and both are true, but the Philosopher intends the latter.

What is also said here, that between privatively opposed things there is given a medium, should be understood so that in the medium itself one recedes from the property of privation; for a medium is given both of form and also of aptitude for form: concerning which matter more broadly in the aforesaid place.

Chapter VIII. How One Thing is Contrary to One

This matter is treated by us in the said disputation 45. But what Aristotle here treats concerning the equal, how it is opposed to two things, namely, to greater and lesser, has no difficulty; for it is opposed quasi relatively, or rather through the lack of a certain relation, which it could have, and therefore Aristotle says it is opposed quasi privatively. He also says that opposition can be reduced to that which is between one and many: because equality is founded in unity, but great and small in the lack of that unity, or in the variety of magnitude or quantity.

Chapter IX. How One is Opposed to Multitude & Number

Question. 1. In this chapter there is doubt about what Aristotle says, that multitude is compared as genus to number, and number adds to multitude the nature of the measured or measurable by unity; and therefore multitude is opposed to one quasi contrarily or privatively, but number is opposed relatively. And the reason for the difficulty is that, just as every number is multitude, so every multitude

is number; in what way therefore does multitude relate as genus to number? Likewise every multitude consists of units, therefore it can be measured by unity; therefore it does not differ from number in this. This place can be explained in two ways: first, so that Aristotle here thinks that only multitude, consisting of quantitative things, is number, and measurable by quantitative unity, and only this is the principle of number; and therefore multitude is called genus or quasi genus, which comprehends quantitative number, and every transcendental multitude. The second interpretation is that number signifies definite and terminated multitude: but multitude abstracts, and of itself comprehends even infinite multitude; and therefore number is said to be multitude measurable by unity; but multitude abstracts, because multitude from the force of this common notion can be immeasurable. Which of these is more according to the mind of Aristotle does not seem sufficiently declared by him. Nevertheless the former exposition is that of St. Thomas and common. According to which here there is discussion of quantitative and sensible measure. But what is true in the matter is treated in disputation 41, section 1.

Chapter X. The Medium Between Contraries is of The Same Genus & Consists Of Them

Question. 1. First, it can be asked about what genus of contraries Aristotle speaks here. And it ish not a question about the mode through abnegation of extremes, both because it is certain this medium does not consist in that way from extremes, and from that the other things which Aristotle teaches here about the medium cannot be verified; and also because between privatively and relatively opposed things this medium is found; which Aristotle here denies. It is certain therefore that Aristotle here speaks of positive medium, which is some positive form mediate between extremely contraries. But this medium seems to be found threefold: one, through formal mixture of contraries in remitted degrees, as is tepidity; another, through virtual

containment or participation of extremes, as are middle colors between extreme ones; another finally through recession from both extremes, as virtue between two extreme vices.

It can therefore be asked whether what Aristotle here teaches about the medium is true absolutely and universally of formal or positive medium, or of some of these in particular. For Aristotle distinguishes nothing, and speaks doctrinally; whence his discourse seems to be universal. But it seems to stand in the way that medium of the third kind cannot truly be said to consist of extremes, nor to be in the same genus with them, nor to be quasi the proximate term of transmutation from one vice to another extreme; but Aristotle attributes these three conditions especially to media between contraries in this chapter.

But it should be said that the discourse is universal, as is expressly established especially from the end of the chapter. But the doctrine is verified most properly of medium taken in the first way (although it is a special question whether such medium is given, concerning which in the said disputation 45). But in medium in the second way the first two conditions also have place quite properly; but the third is not so to be understood, that it is necessary that the medium, through which one proceeds from extreme to extreme, always be of the same nature, but in some contraries it will happen to pass through formal medium or formally containing the refracted extremes, in others truly through virtual medium; but this latter happens only when extreme qualities cannot be formally conjoined; concerning which also it was said in the cited place.

But truly concerning medium in the third way the said conditions are not verified so properly, but through a certain proportion. But it should be considered that the habit of virtue, which is medium between extreme vices, can be considered, either only in the nature of habit inclining to such a mode of operating, or in the nature of virtue and honest good. In the former way it properly has the nature of medium, and thus agrees in genus with extremes, but in the

second way minimally; whence it is not opposed to them as medium under the same genus, but as extremely opposed by reason of contrary genus; in which way Aristotle says in the chapter on Opposition, in the Postpredicaments, that good and bad are opposed. Whence under this second consideration this medium in no way consists of extremes. But in the former way although it does not properly consist, it nevertheless tastes in some way the nature of extremes, for it has something of the work or inclination of each extreme. For liberality inclines to giving, in which it agrees in some way with prodigality; but simultaneously it inclines to retaining sometimes, in which it seems to approach the other extreme. And for this cause also, although it is not necessary to pass from vice to vice through virtue, it is nevertheless necessary to pass through a certain quasi material participation or imitation of virtue; for no one becomes prodigal from being avaricious, unless he first begins to spend, which he could often studiously do, if he wished.

Although that principle: "One does not pass from extreme to extreme except through medium," should be understood of transmutation which is made through physical and proper medium; for that which is made through immanent acts or instantaneous changes, need not be made thus, as is clear per se.

Chapter XI. Contraries are Specifically Diverse, & Specific Diversity Includes the Contrariety of Differences

Question. 1. The principal and proper question of this place is whether differences dividing genus into various species are contrary, and conversely whether contraries differ specifically. For Aristotle seems to affirm both. And the latter part has no difficulty, because it is clear that things which are contrary under the same genus are necessarily specifically diverse, for things which are of the same species, as such, cannot be contrary, since they are similar.

Q. 2. But the other part seems either improper or false, namely, that all differences, dividing genus into distinct species, are contrary. Otherwise also in substance and in every genus there would be proper contrariety; which is false, as is established from Aristotle, in the Categories, and from those things which we have delivered in disputation 45. But it should be said briefly that contrariety among physical forms is proper to qualities; but contrariety among metaphysical forms extends to other genera. Add also that this contrariety, which can be called metaphysical, is less proper, because genus is not compared to differences properly as subject from which differences mutually expel each other; but it is called contrariety, because it is repugnance between positive forms, and thus is maximally assimilated to proper contrariety.

Q. 3. Again it could be asked here in passing whether genus is so contracted through differences, that it itself is divided in diverse species, and essentially diversified. For the Philosopher expressly affirms this, as St. Thomas, Alensis and others noted. Nevertheless it seems to have difficulty because of the unity of genus, and univocation founded in the thing itself. Nevertheless the opinion of Aristotle is most true; from which you have that genus in reality does not differ from that species in which it is contracted; for this is the mind of Aristotle here, which I have treated more broadly in disputation 6, section 9. You also have from this the principle or form from which genus is taken is not of the same essence in things differing specifically, and therefore there were not in reality distinct forms, from which generic and specific difference are taken, as broadly in disputation 15, section 10.

Q. 4. Finally here it can be asked whether genus and species differ specifically among themselves, or are of the same species. Aristotle here judges that both should be denied; which I explained in disputation 7, section 3.

Chapter XII. Some Contrariety Exists Without Specific Diversity

Question. 1. Here immediately occurs the question about the very assertion intended by the Philosopher; since it seems to conflict that contraries are not essentially diverse, as is gathered from the definition delivered above, and from what was said in the preceding chapter, that contrariety cannot exist between similars as such; but things which are of the same species are similar. But the matter is easy; for contraries can be formally compared among themselves, as they are under the genus under which they are per se constituted, or with respect to the subject to which they are denominatively attributed. In the former way they differ specifically, as white and black insofar as they are such, and are placed per se under the colored, and thus proceeds the reason for doubting that was touched on. In the latter way they do not always cause specific diversity in the subject, and in this sense proceeds the doubt, and the resolution of Aristotle in this chapter. For it is just as if he had asked, why certain differences opposed among themselves are per se with respect to subjects, and indicate essential difference between them; but certain ones are per accidens, and show only individual distinction. Indeed sometimes they demonstrate neither this, but accidental change of the same individual. In this sense therefore it is true that some contrariety does not constitute specific diversity in the subject.

But Aristotle gives the reason, that certain contrariety follows form, and that is per se, and pertains to essential difference; another follows matter, and this is either individual or accidental. Where it should only be noted that something can follow matter as per se necessarily connected with the essence of such matter according to itself, and contrariety, which thus follows matter, also makes essential diversity, as will be said about corruptible and incorruptible in the following chapter. And the reason is that matter also pertains to the essence of the thing. But something is said to follow matter, because it

follows from dispositions or changes of matter; for because matter is passive potency, it is the principle and root of all extrinsic changes. Contrariety therefore which follows from matter in this way, is either entirely accidental, if it happens merely per accidens from the extrinsic, or at most individual, if it follows from peculiar and individual disposition of matter, as is the condition of feminine or masculine sex, concerning which in particular Aristotle proposed the question in this chapter.

Chapter XIII. Contrariety is Sometimes Between those Things Which Differ in Genus

Here only occurs the question about that proposition: "Corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus," in what sense it is true; which was treated in disputation 35, and was often noted in the above.

Book Eleven of the Metaphysics

In this entire book Aristotle teaches nothing new, but reduces to a certain summary what he had delivered in the preceding books, adding many things from what he had taught in the books of the Physics. For this reason, almost all interpreters and writers raise no question concerning this whole book, nor do they note anything except those things which contribute to the understanding of the text. These things St. Thomas, among others, teaches with sufficient clarity.

In the first two chapters, therefore, the Philosopher again proposes almost all the questions which he had proposed in the third book, defining nothing; therefore I judge it superfluous to repeat them again here.

In chapters 3, 4, and 5, he resumes those things which he delivers most extensively in the whole of book 4; namely, in the third chapter he proposes the object of this science and the analogy of being, according to which he says one object of this science can be

constituted, to which therefore it pertains to consider the first principles and first causes of things, their properties and oppositions. Where he touches incidentally upon how there can be a middle term between privatively opposed things, which has already been noted in book 10, around chapter 7. In the fourth and fifth chapters, however, Aristotle defends the truth of that principle: "It is impossible for the same thing to be affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time"; and he adds nothing to what he had said in book 4. Incidentally, however, in chapter 3 he touches upon the question concerning the continuity of alteration and augmentation. Concerning this matter we treat some things in disputation 46.

Again in the sixth chapter he repeats what is the function and object of this science, and he touches upon that division of science into speculative and practical, and of this latter into productive or mechanical and active or moral, and of the former into physical, mathematical and metaphysical; which he had also delivered in book 6. And on this occasion he declares the diverse modes of defining physically and metaphysically through matter and without matter, concerning which he had spoken most extensively in book 7. Here also he repeats the proposition which we noted around book 6, chapter 2, namely, that if there is no substance separated from matter, natural and physical science is first of all, which we also explain in the place noted there. Finally in that chapter he has this proposition: "If there is in things some nature and substance separable and immobile, in that order there is divinity, and this (he says) will be the first and principal principle." This should be noted for those things which we dispute concerning Aristotle's mind about the first principle in disputation 29, section 2; to which can be joined that proposition which he proposes in chapter 2 (though disputatiously), where he says that by the more experienced philosophers there has been posited some such principle and such substance: "For in what way," he says, "will there be order if there does not exist something perpetual, separate and permanent?"

Then in chapter 7 Aristotle repeats what he had taught in book 6 of the Metaphysics, namely, that being by accident and true being do not fall under this science, and on this occasion he also recollects what he had taught about contingent effects, fortune and chance, both there and also in book 2 of the Physics; concerning which the places of disputations have already been indicated in the preceding; for we speak of true being in disputation 8, and of contingency in disputation 19.

In the remaining chapters, from 8 up to 11, Aristotle recapitulates many things from what he had taught in the Physics, from book 3 up to book 6. For in the eighth chapter he investigates the definition of motion, and how it is compared to the movable thing, to the mover, to action and to passion, and he has the same doctrine as in book 3 of the Physics, which we treat, insofar as it can pertain to the metaphysician, in disputations 48 and 49, which are concerning action and passion. On this occasion, the Philosopher touches upon some things concerning act and potency, which are treated extensively in disputation 43.

In the ninth chapter, however, he repeats what he teaches concerning the infinite in book 3 of the Physics and in the book On the Heavens. I only note that here the Philosopher extends his discourse somewhat, and proves that there cannot be an infinite, not only in sensible bodies, but simply in beings even when separated. Nevertheless he always supposes that infinity is a property of a quantified thing, and thus he brings forward nothing that could obstruct the infinity of God.

In the tenth chapter, he pursues the matter concerning motion, distinguishing various species of motions and changes. In which observe only that with an induction of all the categories he shows that there is change only with respect to quality, quantity, and place, and when he runs through the others, he omits only when, habit, and position; perhaps because he thought that concerning when and concerning motion or passion there is the same account, since

Book Twelve of The Metaphysics

Chapters I., II., III., IV., & V.

In these first five chapters Aristotle repeats and reduces to a summary those things which he had treated above in book 7 concerning substance and its principles, and many things which he had taught in the first book of the Physics. For in the first chapter he only proposes that metaphysical science disputes first and principally concerning substances, which is a matter evident per se, and repeated very often by him, which we declare more fully in the first or prooemial disputation.

In the second chapter, after the division of substance into sensible, and separable, or insensible and incorruptible and eternal, he proposes three principles of natural things and sensible substance, and he proves ex professo that matter is given; and he adds that it is common to all bodies, though not the same, all of which he had said in the aforementioned places; and we treat these things in disputation 13.

Question 1. Here it could be disputed whether according to Aristotle creation is possible, because here he signifies that nothing comes to be from non-being simply, concerning which it is said in disputation 21.

Q. 2. Likewise it could be disputed whether according to Aristotle all immaterial substances are immobile; for thus he calls them here; concerning which in disputation 35.

Q. 3. Then in the third chapter he shows that besides matter, forms are necessary, not separate as Plato posited, but informing matter, which although they are not properly generated, but rather the composites from them and matter, nevertheless they do not exist before generation takes place; which things had also been said in book 7, and are treated in disputation 15. Aristotle proposes here, however,

a grave question, namely, granted that the form is not before generation, whether after the corruption of the whole it remains; and he responds absolutely that in some cases nothing prevents this from being so, namely, in the intellective soul, for in the others (he says) perhaps this is impossible. But we remit this consideration to the books On the Soul.

Q. 4. Afterwards in chapter 4, he teaches that the three principles posited are the same according to analogy and proportion in all genera of accidents; because in all of them can be considered potency or subject, form or the accident itself, and the privation of it. Where it can be asked whether accidents consist of proper potency and proper physical act, whether taken in the abstract or in the concrete. These questions are sufficiently outside the intention of the present book, in which all these things are premised cursorily for the disputation concerning the higher substances. Nor would Aristotle's mind have been to attribute to individual accidents their proper and distinct receptive potencies of their genera; but only to explain proportionally in them those three principles of things; those questions, however, are treated by us in disputation 14, question 3. Further, however, the Philosopher extends his discourse to all causes, saying that the same according to proportion or analogy have the same account in accidents as they do in substances. And incidentally he recollects here some things concerning principle, cause and element, which he had said more fully in book 5, and are there expounded; and treated more broadly in the disputations concerning causes, from 12 up to 27. He adds here, however, a proposition worth noting; namely, that besides all particular causes there is a cause moving all things as the first of all; concerning which we institute disputations 20, 21 and 22 in the aforementioned place, besides other things which we have said scattered in the other disputations, especially in 24 and 25. Finally in the fifth chapter, he pursues this same thing, showing in various ways that the principles of all things are the same, either because substances are the causes of all accidents,

and thus the principles of substances are the principles of the remaining beings; or because among substances some are first, and causes of the others, such as celestial bodies, and their souls, that is, as St. Thomas expounds, the motive intelligences (whether they are properly called souls, or by metaphor), and therefore he adds, "or intellect, appetite, and body," that is, intelligent and loving substances, and the bodies which they use proximately, or which they move, and through these they cause. And finally he repeats that act and potency are the principles of all things, not however the same, but by analogy; all of which things are established from the cited disputations, nor does anything occur here to be added.

Chapter VI. That Besides Natural Substances there is Given Some Perpetual & Immobile Substance

Question 1. The first question which occurs here is whether to demonstrate that substances of this kind exist is the function of the physicist or of the metaphysician; it is treated in disputation 29, section 3, and disputation 35, section 1.

Q. 2. Whether Aristotle correctly demonstrated this in the present passage. The sum of his reasoning is this. It is impossible that all substances be corruptible; therefore some eternal substance is necessary. The antecedent is clear, because if all substances were corruptible, nothing would be sempiternal, since substances are the first beings, without which others cannot exist. The consequent, however, is false, because it is necessary that at least motion be sempiternal; therefore. He proves the minor, because time could not begin anew, such that it had not existed before; because without time there cannot be before and after; but time is not without motion, because either they are the same, or time is a certain property of motion; therefore it is equally necessary that motion be sempiternal and continuous, just as time also is, which (he says) can be said of nothing except circular and local motion. And so this whole discourse

is reduced to that proposition, that without time there is no before and after, and therefore no beginning of time can be given.

This reasoning as to this last point is very frivolous, because, if we speak according to our mode of conceiving, besides real before and after, an imaginary one is conceived, and thus real time was able to have a beginning, before which it had not existed; that "before which," however, does not signify a prior time, but only an imaginary one. If however we speak according to the thing, before this time there preceded infinite eternity, to which this time did not always coexist, and thus that "before" does not denote a prior time, but eternity, which preexisted in God, when time was not. Therefore Aristotle's procedure is neither firm nor necessary. It can however be made efficacious through a dilemma: because either corruptible substances always existed, or not: if the first, some eternal substance more perfect than them is necessary, from which they would have emanated; if however they did not always exist, no less necessary is that substance, so that they might have drawn their origin from it. Concerning this matter we discourse extensively in disputation 29, section 1.

Q. 3. Whether Aristotle sufficiently shows that that substance is not potency, but act, because it moves perpetually. It is answered that it is already established from what has been said that this reasoning proceeds from a false principle, and one insufficiently proven. Nevertheless, even with that posited, it cannot be gathered from that alone that that substance is pure act; for a created substance could effect that perpetual motion, if it were possible. Therefore it is only gathered from that motion that the substance of that mover is always in the act of moving. Add that for this it is also to be supposed that that substance is always the same, which has not been proven; for several movers can move in turn, and cease individually. Finally, even if the same mover is always in the act of moving, it does not follow that it cannot cease; because it can move perpetually not from necessity, but from freedom. Concerning this matter more broadly in disputation 30, section 8, and disputation 35, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 4. Whether it is sufficiently proven by the Philosopher that these substances are immaterial, because they are perpetual. It is certainly difficult to attribute efficacy to this reasoning, since the defect of the inference immediately appears in the very heavens, which are eternal and are not immaterial. See disputation 30, section 4, and disputation 35, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 5. Whether Aristotle thought the same concerning all intelligences as concerning the first with regard to the necessity of being, and the simplicity and actuality of nature; it is treated in disputation 39, section 2, and disputation 25, and this place is expounded, in which Aristotle seems to speak confusedly and indifferently concerning that supreme order of substances, although sometimes he speaks in the singular, sometimes in the plural. The other things which Aristotle treats here concerning act and potency, are noted around book 9.

Chapter VII. Concerning the Attributes of the First Mover

Question 1. Whether from the motion of the heaven one first immobile mover is sufficiently gathered; concerning this extensively in disputation 30, sections 1 and 8.

Q. 2. Whether according to Aristotle's opinion the first mover moves the heaven only as an end, or also as an efficient cause; for here he seems to attribute only the former mode of causing to it; but he does this only in order to declare its immobility, otherwise he acknowledges its efficiency, as we treat more broadly in disputation 23, and disputation 30, section 17.

Q. 3. Whether according to Aristotle the first mover moves the first orb through another intelligence, or through itself. For here he insinuates the former part, unless it is expounded that it moves as moved not by another, but by itself; for thus the immobility of the first mover is better explained, because it moves not only in the genus of

efficient cause, but also in the genus of final cause, as not moved by another, but because it operates for its own sake without motion. For just as in the genus of efficient cause, so in the genus of final cause it is first and supreme. But truly in all the other aforementioned things Aristotle thinks that there is no other mover of that heaven besides the first and immobile one; but concerning this matter more broadly in the books On the Heavens.

Q. 4. Whether the first mover is the first intelligible in act, as the most simple and most actual substance. For thus the Philosopher thinks concerning it here. It is treated in disputation 38, section 11.

Q. 5. Whether the first mover is the first appetible, which is the same as asking whether it is the ultimate end; concerning which we discourse in disputation 24. From this place, however, you have from Aristotle the distinction of a twofold end. One is preexisting, the other non-preexisting. The former is to be acquired through means, the latter also to be effected, and therefore he says the former notion of end has place in the first mover, but not the latter.

Q. 6. Whether the first mover is a perpetual substance entirely simple, and according to act, or pure act, disputation 30, section 3.

Q. 7. Whether the first mover is a being simply necessary by its nature, which can in no way be otherwise, disputation 29, section 1.

Q. 8. Whether according to Aristotle the first mover moves from necessity of nature, or rather from a preconceived end and its necessity, disputation 30, section 16.

Q. 9. Whether the heaven and nature depend on the first mover according to Aristotle, not only as to motion, but also as to substance; disputation 29, section 1, and disputation 29, section 2.

Q. 10. Whether the first mover has the best and perpetual, and actual life, affected with the highest and most perfect delight, which arises from the contemplation of itself. We treat this extensively in disputation 30, section 14. There is no doubt, however, that Aristotle in this place thinks and speaks excellently concerning God.

Those words of his are worthy of notation: "If God is always in as good a state as we sometimes are, this is wonderful; but if in a better state, this is even more wonderful; and such is the case." The Philosopher seems indeed to have experienced at some time some great delight in his own contemplation, such as it was, of separated substances, and especially of the first, in which therefore he elsewhere constitutes human happiness; hence therefore he ascends, and comes into admiration of the divine perfection. And thus he truly reasons. The intellect understands through a certain conjunction to the thing understood, and having it in itself contemplates it, and this operation is its best disposition, and in that order speculation is the best and most delightful; if therefore God is the supreme intelligible, and most conjoined to himself, and contemplates himself through himself perpetually, wonderful is his life and delight.

Q. 11. Whether God is not only sempiternal and the best living being, but also is his own life, because he is his own operation, and pure act; for thus Aristotle thinks concerning God here, and excellently, as we treat in disputation 30, sections 3 and 14.

Q. 12. How true is that which Aristotle asserts here, namely that continuous and eternal aevum belongs to God, disputation 30, section 8, and disputation 50, section 1.

Q. 13. Whether God, just as he is the principle of all beings, so also is the best and most beautiful of them. It is treated by us in the aforesaid disputation. And this has place concerning this text, for Aristotle clearly signifies all these things, while he reproves the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, because they denied that God is the best and most beautiful, although he is the principle; for principles are not always equally perfect as that which is made from them, as is clear in seed. But he himself responds that the proximate and instrumental principle is not always equally perfect; but the principal and especially the first, is necessarily most perfect.

Q. 14. Whether Aristotle thought God to be simply infinite, and correctly proved this from the fact that he moves for infinite time; disputation 30, section 2.

Q. 15. Whether the first mover is immaterial and simply impassible, and whether this is sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason, disputation 40, sections 1 and 8.

Chapter VIII. Concerning the Number of Separated Substances

Aristotle in this chapter proves the number of immaterial moving substances from the number of movable heavens, and gathers their order and properties from the order of the movable heavens. Concerning this discourse various questions arise.

Question 1. Whether it can be sufficiently proven that the heavens are moved by some separated substance besides the first. This pertains to the books On the Heavens, but we will touch upon it in disputation 35, section 1.

Q. 2. Granted that they are so moved, whether it is necessary that the heavens be moved by as many separated substances as there are celestial bodies themselves, ibid.

Q. 3. Whether it can be proven that the number of separated substances is not greater than that of the heavens, or conversely that this number is greater than that, or that neither can be sufficiently shown, ibid.

Q. 4. Whether a higher heaven is moved by a higher and more perfect intelligence, and whether this should be understood concerning individual or specific perfection. At which place the question is usually touched upon, whether the heaven of the sun is more perfect than the higher heavens of the planets. But this is not of this place, nor does it bear upon the present matter, for whatever may be the case concerning substantial perfection, in the nature of the movable, it is certain that the higher a heaven is, the more it has the

nature of a more perfect movable, both because of magnitude, and because it is higher, and contains the lower ones.

Q. 5. Whether from the incorruptibility of heaven, or the eternity of its motion, it is correctly gathered that the separated substances are incorruptible and perpetual, disputation 35, sections 1 and 2.

Q. 6. Whether from the eternal motion of heaven it can be gathered that those substances are without magnitude, and consequently are infinite, according to Aristotle, ibid., and disputation 30, section 4.

Q. 7. Whether Aristotle thought such are the motive substances of the lower heavens as of the first, and in what sense he understood this to be first, that one to be second. All these questions are touched upon by us in disputation 29, section 2, and in disputation 35, section 2. And those things which pertain per se to the metaphysician are treated extensively; those which are properly physical, and pertain to the books On the Heavens, are only briefly dispatched.

Q. 8. And for the same reason we omit the remaining part of the chapter, in which Aristotle extensively treats the number of celestial orbs. He also treats the unity of heaven, that is, of the whole celestial sphere, and consequently of the whole universe, showing that it is one. His reasoning, however, is frivolous, namely, because if there were several heavens, they would have several principles diverse in number alone; which he proves impossible, because such principles would need to have matter. But that first consequence is frivolous, because there can be several worlds from the same principle, as we treat more broadly in disputation 29, section 1.

Q. 9. The refutation also of that consequent touches upon the question concerning the principle of individuation, concerning which extensively in disputation 5, section 2 and following. In this whole discourse, however, those rather modest words of Aristotle should be kept before our eyes: "Thus it is reasonable to think, for what is

necessary should be left to more powerful men to say." For he correctly understood that these are not demonstrations, but probable discourses.

Chapter IX. Containing Certain Doubts Concerning the Divine Intelligence

Question 1. The first question posited by Aristotle is whether the divine mind always understands in act. And he proposes the reason for doubting, because if it does not always understand in act, what will be excellent about it? For it will be like one sleeping. If however it always understands in act, therefore it has its nobility from the act of understanding; it is therefore not itself the most noble substance. The response, however, is that it always understands in act, not by an intellection added to its substance, but through its own most noble substance. And thus satisfaction is given to both reasons for doubting. This matter we treat ex professo in disputation 30, section 15. The Philosopher adds here, however, another proof of the said response, namely, because if God were not his own intellection, the continuation of understanding would be laborious for him. But the reasoning is not convincing, otherwise the same thing would prove concerning all other intelligences. Although therefore action is not substance, the continuation of it can be non-laborious; because it has no repugnance with nature, nor does it cause any contrary alteration or change.

Q. 2. What does the divine mind understand, whether itself or something else; and whether always something different, or always the same. The response is: "It is manifest that it understands that which is most divine and most honorable," whereby it comes about that it understands itself. By virtue therefore he completes this discourse. The divine mind is the supreme and most noble intelligence or intellection itself; but the nobility of the thing understood contributes much to the nobility of intellection; on account of which

it is better not to see certain things than to see them, if they are most vile; therefore not just any intelligence is best, but that which is of the best thing understood; therefore the divine mind understands that which is best; therefore it understands itself, otherwise there would be something else more worthy than itself.

Q. 3. Hence, however, arises the third question, whether according to the Philosopher God understands nothing outside himself, but only himself. For at first sight Aristotle seems to think thus concerning God. But it can be expounded with St. Thomas, that he does not know another thing from himself per se primo, or in such a way that he would be perfected by it, or in such a way that he would be impeded or distracted from knowing the most noble object. But concerning this matter more broadly in the aforementioned disputation 30, section 15.

Q. 4. Another question arises from the resolution of a certain doubt, which the Philosopher proposes here, namely, whether in all things which lack matter, and consequently in all intelligences, intellection and the thing understood are the same, and consequently whether an Angel is his own intellection. For Aristotle seems to insinuate this part. For when he had proposed the doubt, how the divine mind can be the intelligence of itself, since intellection is usually distinguished from the object, he responds that intellection is not distinguished from the object, except as form without matter from form which is in matter. Whence since the divine mind lacks matter, it is not necessary that in it the thing understood be distinguished from intellection, which reasoning, if it is efficacious, has place in all intelligences. But it can be said that this was only a certain accommodated proportion, to explain how in divine science, because of its supreme immateriality and subtlety, it is not necessary that the proper object be distinguished from the science itself: It is not necessary, however, that this be true in any intelligence whatsoever, nor is there reason why we should say this was Aristotle's mind, concerning which matter extensively in disputation 34, section 4.

Q. 5. The fifth question is whether God always and necessarily remains in actual cognition of himself, as the Philosopher defines here. Which he proves excellently, because he would be changed for the worse, whether he would so cease that he would remain in first act alone as if sleeping, as was said in the first question, or (which pertains to this question) he would pass from contemplation of himself to other things: because he would always pass to something else less noble; concerning this question we treat in disputation 30, section 15.

Q. 6. Whether God understands through simple intelligence, or by composing, and he defines the former part; and the matter is clear. See disputation 30, section 15.

Chapter X. That there is One Prince & Governor of the Universe

This assertion is intended by Aristotle in this chapter, which he also wanted to be the conclusion of the whole work, and as it were a peroration worthy of so great a Philosopher. He demonstrates it, however, by a discourse of this kind. The good of the universe consists in the due order of its parts, such that this good is as it were an intrinsic good and inhering in the universe itself; but it cannot have a good of this kind, unless there is in it some one supreme governor of it, who is at the same time the extrinsic and ultimate end of it, from which emanates and toward which tends the extrinsic good of the universe; therefore one supreme prince and governor is necessary in the universe. The Philosopher first declares this discourse by the example of an army, whose intrinsic good consists in due order; but for that it requires a leader, who is the greater good of the whole army, because the order of the army is from him and for his sake. Then he declares the prior proposition assumed, explaining briefly the order of the parts of the universe by comparison to a house and well-ordered family; and the matter is sufficiently clear per se.

He does not expressly assume the minor proposition, however, but truly intends it, and on that occasion he digresses here again to touch upon lightly and reject the opinions of the ancients concerning principles, so that he might gather from this that in none of the aforementioned ways can it be correctly understood how the wonderful order of this universe subsists and is conserved from those principles, without any supreme governor.

And incidentally he touches upon the best reasons, although very briefly and rather obscurely, such as that one, that it is not sufficient to say that all things come to be from contraries, unless some higher principle is posited which so disposes them, and orders their vicissitudes, that neither of them completely consumes the other, but the succession of generations endures perpetually. There is also another reason, that without this principle no cause can be assigned why this individual now participates in the species and not before, and another earlier, another later. Both reasons, however, as St. Thomas excellently noted, he has in those words: "But both to those who make two principles, another more principal principle is necessary" (namely, because of the first reason), "and to those who posit forms" (that is, ideas), "because another more principal principle exists; for why did it participate or does it participate?" Behold the second reason. Finally, however, at the end of the chapter he adds this proof of that minor: "A plurality of principalities or first principles is not good, nor does it contribute to good government: but beings do not wish to be badly governed; therefore one prince."

Question 1. Concerning this conclusion of the Philosopher and its proofs various questions arise. The first, whether by this discourse or by other natural ones it is sufficiently demonstrated that there is only one God; which we treat extensively in disputation 29, section 1, and disputation 30, section 10.

Q. 2. Whether God has providence of this universe and of what kind, and what Aristotle thought concerning this, disputation 30, sections 16 and 17, besides what was said in disputation 22.

Q. 3. Whether God is called the supreme good of the universe only as its ultimate end, or also as efficient cause. This has often been touched upon in the preceding, and the places of disputations have been designated. Here only let it be noted that Aristotle in this chapter often concludes and conjoins both, and reproves the ancients, who omitted one account. He specially approves Anaxagoras, because he posited mind as the first mover, that is, efficient cause. And he adds immediately: "But he moves for the sake of something, therefore for another, unless it be as we say," namely, that he moves for his own sake.

The other things which can be desired concerning natural cognition of God or the first cause, and of intelligences, we dispute extensively in our disputations, and concerning God indeed under the aspect of first cause, in disputations 20, 21 and 22, under the aspect of ultimate end in 25, under the aspect of first exemplar in 26, under the proper aspect of God in 29 and 30; concerning created intelligences, however, in disputation 35, as the following index will show more specifically.

Prologue

Divine and supernatural theology, although it relies upon divine light and principles revealed by God, nevertheless, because it is perfected through human discourse and reasoning, is also aided by truths known by the light of nature, and employs these as ministers and, as it were, instruments for perfecting its discourses and for illuminating divine truths. Among all the natural sciences, however, that which is first of all and has obtained the name of first philosophy serves sacred and supernatural theology in a preeminent way. This is both because it approaches most closely among all sciences to the knowledge of divine things, and also because it explains and confirms those natural principles which comprehend all things universal and in some manner support and sustain all doctrine. For this reason, therefore, although I am occupied with treating and bringing to light more weighty commentaries and disputations of sacred theology, I have been compelled to interrupt the course of these somewhat, or rather to relax it, so that those things which I had labored upon concerning this natural wisdom many years ago as a young man and had publicly taught, I might at least in successive periods review and enrich, so that they could be communicated to all for public utility.

For when, in the course of disputing about divine mysteries, these metaphysical doctrines occurred, without the knowledge and understanding of which those loftier mysteries can scarcely, or indeed hardly at all, be treated with proper dignity, I was often compelled

either to intermingle inferior questions with divine and supernatural matters, which is disagreeable to readers and of little utility; or certainly, to avoid this inconvenience, to propose my opinion briefly in such matters and to demand, as it were, naked faith from readers in these things. This could justly seem both troublesome to me and also importunate to them. For these metaphysical principles and truths cohere so closely with theological conclusions and discourses that if the science and perfect knowledge of the former is taken away, the science of the latter must necessarily be too greatly weakened.

Induced therefore by these reasons and by the request of many, I have decided to undertake this work, in which I would embrace all metaphysical disputations with that method of doctrine which is more suited both to the comprehension of the things themselves and to brevity, and which serves revealed wisdom more effectively. For this reason it will not be necessary to distribute or divide this work into many books; for in a brief number of disputations, all those things which are proper to this doctrine, or which belong to its subject under that aspect by which it is considered in the discipline itself, can be comprehended and exhaustively treated; but those things which pertain to pure philosophy or dialectic (upon which other metaphysical writers dwell at great length), as foreign to the present doctrine, we shall cut away insofar as it can be done.

But before I begin to speak about the matter subjected to this doctrine, I shall undertake, with God as my guide, to discourse about wisdom itself or metaphysics and its object, utility, necessity, and its attributes and functions.

DISPUTATION I

ON THE NATURE OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY OR METAPHYSICS

Various names of metaphysics. As it is fitting to begin with the name, there are various names imposed upon this doctrine, some by Aristotle, others by different authors. First, it was called wisdom, as in Metaphysics I, chapter 2, since it disputes concerning the first causes of things, the highest and most difficult matters, and in a certain way concerning all beings. Nor does it matter that in Metaphysics I it is called prudence, for this designation was not properly but through a certain analogy accommodated to it; because just as prudence is most to be sought in practical matters, so this wisdom is most to be sought in speculative matters. Next, it is called philosophy absolutely and as if by antonomasia, in Metaphysics IV, text 5, where also in text 4, and in book VI, text 3, it is named first philosophy; for philosophy is the study of wisdom; but this study is most applied within the order of nature in acquiring this science, since it is wisdom itself and is concerned with the knowledge of divine things. Hence it is again called natural theology from Metaphysics VI, chapter 1, and book XI, chapter 6, since it has discourse concerning God and divine things insofar as can be had from natural light; from which it has also been named metaphysics, which name it received not so much from Aristotle as from his interpreters; it was taken from the inscription

which Aristotle prefixed to his books of Metaphysics, namely: τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, that is, concerning those things which follow the sciences or natural things. For this science abstracts from sensible or material things (which are called physical, since natural philosophy is concerned with them), and contemplates divine things and things separated from matter, and common notions of being, which can exist without matter, and therefore it was called metaphysics, as if constituted after physics, or beyond physics; after (I say) not in dignity, or order of nature, but of acquisition, generation, or discovery; or, if we understand this from the part of the object, the things concerning which this science treats are said to be after physical or natural beings, because they surpass their order, and are constituted in a higher grade of things. From which finally this science has been called the prince and mistress of others, Metaphysics VI, chapter 1, and book XI, chapter 6, because it excels in dignity, and in some way establishes and confirms the principles of all. But all these names have been taken from the object or matter about which this doctrine is concerned, as can easily be established from their reasons and interpretations. For the wise are accustomed to impose names upon each thing, having first considered the nature and dignity of each, as Plato taught in the Cratylus; but the nature and dignity of each science depend chiefly upon the object, and therefore first of all we must inquire into the object or subject of this doctrine, which being known, it will easily be established what are the functions of this wisdom, what necessity or utility, and how great dignity.

SECTION I

WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

1. There are various opinions concerning this matter, which must be noted and examined individually and briefly, so that we may understand exactly concerning what things we must discourse in the

course of this doctrine, so that we neither transgress its boundaries nor leave anything contained within them untouched.

The First & Second Opinions are set Forth

2. The first opinion therefore is that being taken most abstractly, insofar as it embraces under itself not only all real beings, both per se and per accidens, but also beings of reason, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is persuaded first, because being thus taken can be the adequate object of some science; therefore especially of this one which is the most abstract of all. The antecedent is clear, both because being in that entire amplitude is presented to the intellect; therefore it can also be presented to one science, for the reason is the same; and also because just as the intellect understands all those things, so this science discourses concerning all of them, namely concerning beings of reason and real beings, and concerning beings per se and per accidens; therefore, if on account of that cause they are contained under the object of the intellect, on account of a similar cause they ought to be contained under the adequate object of this science; therefore being as it is presented to this science, must be taken under that abstraction and breadth by which it directly comprehends all these things; and in the same way the common attributes must be taken, concerning which this science treats, such as unity, multitude, truth, and similar things. Whence I argue secondly, because it pertains to the perfection and amplitude of this science that it separate and distinguish all these things, and teach concerning all whatever can be known about these by certain knowledge, for this most pertains to the notion of wisdom; therefore all these beings according to their common notions are directly contained under the adequate object of this science. Thirdly, for if anything prevented being thus taken from being able to be an object, it would be chiefly because it is not univocal; but this does not matter, for it is sufficient that it be analogous; otherwise it could not even be common to real

accidents and created and uncreated substances, but being insofar as it is analogous, also embraces beings of reason, as can be taken from Metaphysics IV, text 2; where Aristotle subjects privations, negations or non-beings, to the analogy of being, insofar as they are intelligible; therefore being thus analogous can be the adequate object of this science, especially because all those things are comprehended under the adequate abstraction of this science, which is from all sensible and intelligible matter; for all those notions of beings can be found without such matter. Finally in the very properties, which are demonstrated concerning being in general in this science, beings of reason are so included that without these those properties cannot be understood, as we shall see later; therefore it is necessary that this science dispute concerning them.

3. Nor is it sufficient if someone should say that this science indeed discourses concerning these beings, but not per se and ex instituto as concerning an object, but incidentally and while doing something else, or for better explaining its objects, or because knowledge of these is easily acquired from knowledge of the object; this (I say) is not sufficient, because the reasons given seem to prove more; otherwise the same could be said concerning accidents, indeed even concerning created substances. Especially because such beings of reason and similar things, are per se knowable, and many things concerning them are naturally known and demonstrated, but there is no other science to which this pertains per se. For although some attribute this to dialectic, nevertheless this cannot be said universally concerning all beings of reason but at most concerning certain relations which follow the operations of the intellect, nor does the dialectician inquire per se concerning these how they participate in the notion of being and its properties but only touches upon them incidentally, insofar as it is necessary for explaining the conceptions of the intellect and denominations arising from them.

4. The second opinion can be that the object of this science is real being in its entire breadth so that it does not directly comprehend

beings of reason because they do not have entity and reality, but embraces not only beings per se, but also beings per accidens, because these also are real and truly participate in the notion of being and its properties; and concerning these the reasons made in confirmation of the superior opinion proceed more urgently. And it can be confirmed because some particular sciences have beings per accidens as objects; but the object of this science directly embraces all objects of particular sciences; therefore.

The First Two Opinions are Refuted

5. But these two opinions manifestly oppose Aristotle, Metaphysics VI. For first, as regards beings per accidens, insofar as they are such, they cannot fall under science, as Aristotle proves there, text 4; for here being per accidens is called not in the notion of effect, but in the notion of being, that is, not what is produced by accident or contingently and beyond the intention of the agent, but what in itself is not truly one, but a certain aggregate of many things; concerning which distinction we shall say more below when treating of unity. Since therefore this being per accidens is not one but an aggregation of many, it cannot have a proper definition, nor real properties which are demonstrated concerning it and therefore it does not fall under science. But if such being is considered insofar as it is in some way one and its unity is in some way in the thing, now such being is not considered as entirely per accidens, but as in some way comprehended under the breadth of being per se, although perhaps it holds some imperfect grade in that; for there are various modes of being per se and per accidens, as we shall declare in its place when treating of unity. Therefore I said that the discourse concerns being per accidens insofar as it is such, for that, as such, is not being, but beings, and therefore is not directly comprehended under the object of one science, but of many, to which can pertain the beings per se from which such being per accidens consists, as St. Thomas noted in the said Metaphysics VI,

lecture 4. But if that unity is not in the thing, but only in apprehension or conception, such being as such will not truly be called real; whence there will be the same reason concerning it as concerning other beings of reason. But these are excluded from the direct consideration of this science by the same Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, as all interpreters have noted there. And the reason is, because such things are neither truly beings, but almost only in name, nor do they agree with real beings in the same concept of being, but only through a certain imperfect analogy of proportionality, as we shall see below; but the adequate object of science requires some objective unity.

6. Why beings of reason are excluded from the object of this science. Whence it does not matter that sometimes Aristotle declared the analogy of being as it extends to these beings, because there he was not assigning the object of this science but explaining the signification of the word to remove equivocation. But later in the proper place he taught that being is not an object according to that entire analogy, which consists more in unity of word than of object. And on account of this also there is no similar reason concerning real accidents, for those are truly beings and are in some way comprehended under the unity of the objective concept of being, as we shall see later. Nor is it necessary that all things which are in some way considered in science, be directly contained under its adequate object, for many things are considered incidentally through a certain analogy or reduction, or so that by knowledge of them the object itself may be more illustrated, or because, the object being known, through analogy to it other things are known, and perhaps cannot be known otherwise. Likewise the properties of the subject, which are demonstrated concerning it, it is not necessary to be directly contained under the object itself, at least according to all that they include. Thus therefore, although this science considers many things concerning beings of reason, nevertheless they are rightly excluded from the object per se and directly intended (unless someone wishes to contend about the name), on account of both causes mentioned. For first beings of reason are considered in

some way in this science, but not per se, but on account of a certain proportionality which they have with real beings, and so that they may be distinguished from them, and so that it may be better and more clearly conceived what has entity and reality in beings, and what indeed does not have this but only the appearance of it. Whence (so to speak) these beings of reason are considered more so that they may be known not to be beings, than so that science or knowledge of them may be acquired. Next they are considered for declaring the properties of real being and of the object of this science, which are not sufficiently conceived and explained by us, unless through such beings of reason; for thus this science treats in some way concerning genus and species for explaining the unities of things, and thus concerning others, as is taken from Metaphysics IV, chapters 1 and 2, and from books VI and VII, and from the course of the matter this will be more established. Next often there is treatment concerning these beings by reason of some real foundation which they have in things, or certainly because the foundation itself cannot be sufficiently known, nor can its reality be declared by us, unless we first explain what denominations of reason are mixed in there.

7. The foundations of the preceding opinions are resolved. The arguments therefore of the preceding opinions prove indeed that such beings are considered in this science, but not that they are parts directly contained under its object. Indeed, as I judge, they pertain to no science per se and primarily, because, since they are not beings, but rather defects of beings, they are not per se knowable, but insofar as they fall short of the true notion of beings, which is per se considered, or insofar as they seem in some way to accompany it. In the former way the Philosopher treats concerning blindness, and concerning darkness and void, insofar as they are defects and privations of sight, light and real place. In the latter way many treat concerning relations or denominations of reason. The dialectician, insofar as it pertains to him to direct and order the real concepts of the mind, from which denominations of reason are taken, and in which these relations of

reason are founded; but by the Philosopher also they are considered, or can be considered, insofar as he also per se properly speculates upon the operations of the intellect, not only direct, but also reflex, and their objects. But in this science they are considered for the reasons already mentioned.

The Third Opinion is set Forth

8. Having omitted therefore these opinions, which too much amplified the object of this science, there are several others which too much restrict it. The third opinion therefore, and opposed by the opposite extreme, makes only the supreme real being (namely God) the adequate object of this science. Albert reports this opinion at the beginning of the Metaphysics from Alpharabius, in the book On the Division of Sciences, and it can be attributed to Averroes, Physics I, final commentary; for he reproves Avicenna because he said that it pertains to the first philosopher to demonstrate that the first principle exists; but (Averroes objects) no science demonstrates that its object exists; but God or the first principle is the object of all philosophy. Aristotle also, Metaphysics I, at the beginning, says that this science contemplates the first cause of things, and therefore is most divine, wherefore, as we have seen, he calls it theology; but theology is nothing other than science concerning God; therefore God will be the object of this science, for science receives its dignity and excellence from its object, and those attributes or names by which such dignity is indicated, but the most excellent object is God; therefore this ought to be the object of the most excellent and most worthy science.

9. An objection is met. Nor will he satisfy who responds that God is the principal object of this science, and that this is sufficient for that dignity and appellation of science, although it may not be the adequate object. For against this the argument is urged. First, because it is more noble and excellent to have God as adequate object than only as principal; but this science is the most noble of all that can be

acquired by natural light of intellect; therefore God is its adequate object. The first antecedent is proved, because God according to his proper notion is something more noble than any common notion of God and creatures can be, as is evident per se, because God according to his proper notion is an infinitely perfect being; but every other more abstract notion of itself neither states nor requires infinite perfection; but that science which has God as adequate object, immediately and per se primarily tends toward him according to his proper notion; but that science which only regards God as principal object, can at most per se primarily be concerned with some notion of being common to God and creatures; therefore that former science will be far more noble, because the nobility of science is taken from that object toward which it tends per se primarily. Which also can be declared and confirmed by examples, because the divine intellect is the most noble of all, and therefore has only God as adequate object, and attains nothing else, except insofar as it is manifested in God himself, or through him. Similarly the beatific vision is more noble having God as adequate object than if it immediately attained God and something else under some common notion. And finally on account of this cause supernatural theology is judged to have as adequate object only God as supernaturally revealed; therefore by the same reason God, as knowable by natural light of our intellect, will be the adequate object of this natural theology. Indeed rather we can argue that God cannot be the principal object of this science, if he is not adequate, because God and creature cannot agree under some common notion of knowable object; therefore, either God must be said to be the adequate object of this science, or entirely excluded from its object. The antecedent is clear, first, because God is an intelligible object of a far different and more eminent nature, than any created object is, and God is more distant from any created object, in abstraction and immateriality, than all created beings are distant according to their proper notions; but not all created objects can agree according to their proper notions under one adequate object of this

science; therefore much less will God and other created beings be able to agree. Next, because a common object is prior by nature to those things which are contained under it, because it is superior to them and does not convert with them in consequence of subsisting; but nothing can be prior by nature to God; therefore he cannot be a principal object contained under something common; therefore he will be adequate.

10. The objection is resolved. But if you should object that this science discourses not concerning God alone, but concerning many other things, they respond that other things are not treated in this science per se or for their own sake, but insofar as they can contribute to knowledge of God. And thus Aristotle in Metaphysics XII concludes the science concerning God, but all the things which he delivers in the superior books, are referred to that ultimate conclusion as to what is chiefly intended. Whence St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, and Cajetan there say that this science is concerned with that which is ultimate with respect to all knowledge, and judges concerning all principles through resolution to first causes, which Cajetan interprets concerning the first or highest cause, which eminently contains the first reasons of causing, which are both universal and pertain to perfection simply, such as end, efficient cause, exemplar; for universal matter and form are not universal, and include imperfection.

The Third Opinion is Rejected

11. Nevertheless, this opinion is not to be accepted; for it conflicts with Aristotle and almost all other philosophers and his interpreters, as we shall see; it also conflicts with experience itself (so to speak) and with the doctrine which is customarily handed down in this science, and which is considered necessary for its perfection and completion. For many things are contained and taught in it which are necessary in themselves for knowing other things besides God, and for the perfection of the human intellect, insofar as it can be occupied in

knowing such things or in knowing common principles and concepts, and which contribute nothing or little to knowing God, nor are they referred to this end by the mode or nature of such a science, whatever may be said about the intention of the one who knows. Finally, the reason a priori is this: because this science, since it proceeds by natural reasoning, does not attain God as he is in himself, but only insofar as he can be manifested from creatures by the natural light of the human intellect; and therefore there can be no natural science which attains and regards him as its adequate object, because the formal aspect under which he is attained is always common to other created things. Whence it is clear that it was correctly said, when treating the foundation of the preceding opinion, that God is contained under the object of this science as the first and principal object, but not as the adequate object.

12. To the objections or replies, we respond. To the first indeed, we confess that it is a great excellence for a science to have God as its object, toward which alone it tends primarily and essentially and through which it tends toward other things; we say nevertheless that this perfection exceeds the natural powers of human genius and of the science which can be acquired through them; and therefore, although this science is most noble within its own order, such great perfection should not on that account be attributed to it. Nor in this respect is it to be compared with the divine intellect and beatific vision; indeed, not even with supernatural theology, which proceeds under a higher light and from higher principles. Although it is not even certain that God alone is the adequate object of supernatural theology; for many think that not God, but revealed being is the adequate object of that doctrine; because divine revelation, which is the formal aspect under which that object is considered, can equally fall upon God and other things, as regards the power and nature of knowing, although in the aspect of end and in the excellence of the thing revealed God surpasses all things, and therefore he is customarily called either the principal object, or simply the object,

considering things practically and in relation to morals. But of this elsewhere.

13. God can agree with creatures in the aspect of object. To the last point it is replied that it is not repugnant for God, as known through creatures, to agree with them in some common aspect of object, for although in his being and according to himself he is more distant from any creature than they are among themselves, nevertheless according to those things which can be manifested about him by natural science, and according to the nature and mode by which they can be manifested from creatures, a greater proportion and agreement can be found between God and creatures than between some creatures among themselves. Nor is it necessary for constituting such an adequate object, which comprehends God under itself, that there be given something or some notion of being which is prior in nature to God, but it suffices that it be given according to abstraction or consideration of the intellect, which is not repugnant, as we shall show below when treating the concept of being. For just as some agreement or imperfect similarity between God and creatures can be understood in the notion of being, substance, or spirit, so there can be given some concepts which are prior to God according to reason in universality of predication; but this is not a priority of nature nor by reason of causality, as is evident per se, nor by reason of independence or priority in subsisting, for every notion, however much it may be abstracted as common to God and creatures, is so related to God that it cannot exist in the nature of things except in God himself or dependently upon God, and therefore it cannot be prior in nature to God himself.

The Fourth Opinion is Refuted

14. Two testimonies of Aristotle are brought forward for this opinion. And from what has been said against the preceding opinion, two other opinions which are hardly probable are easily excluded. Let

the fourth opinion therefore be that substance or immaterial being, insofar as it includes in itself only God and the intelligences, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is usually attributed to the Commentator, I Phys., last comment. But there he only says that the intelligences pertain per se to the object of this science, not that they are the adequate object. But this opinion can be supported from the discourse or division of the sciences; for omitting the rational sciences, which are rather certain arts and treat of words or concepts, and the mathematical sciences, which do not deal with substance but with quantity alone, among the sciences which deal with substances, philosophy treats of all generable and corruptible substances, and also of incorruptible corporeal substances, and also of substance composed of matter and immaterial[1] form, such as man, and of the immaterial form itself, namely the rational soul, and finally of the five grades or orders of material substances, namely simple bodies, inanimate mixtures, things that are only vegetative, things that are only sentient, and rational things, and of all their properties. Nothing therefore remains to be known in things beyond immaterial substances; these therefore complete the adequate object of this science. This entire argument can first be confirmed by a double testimony of Aristotle. One is IV Metaph., text 4, where he says there are as many parts of philosophy as there are substances. Whence, just as substance is twofold, namely material and immaterial, so the science which philosophizes about substances is twofold; whence he concludes that that is first philosophy which contemplates the first substance, that is, the immaterial. The other testimony is VI Metaph., text 3, where Aristotle says that if there were not substances existing separately from matter according to being, natural philosophy would be first, nor would there be need of any other science besides it; therefore the entire objective nature of this science, which constitutes it in its own way and distinguishes it from others, is immaterial

[1] immateriali, Salamanca 1597, Madrid 1960; immortali, Venice 1751, Paris 1861. Cf. Madrid 1960, vol. I, p. 219, footnote.

substance; this therefore is its adequate object. Secondly it is confirmed, because natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics are commonly distinguished by the abstraction of their objects; for physics considers things consisting of sensible matter; mathematics abstracts from that matter according to reason, but not according to being, and therefore is said not to abstract from intelligible matter; but metaphysics abstracts from both sensible and intelligible matter, not only according to reason, but also according to being; but only immaterial substance abstracts from matter according to being; therefore that is the adequate object of this science.

15. But this opinion, as I said, has no greater probability than the preceding one; whence there is no serious author who defends it, for in the entire argument made it proceeds defectively. That argument indeed correctly proves that immaterial substances pertain maximally to the object of this science. It also proves that among things subsisting in the nature of things, no others fall per se and according to their proper natures under the object of this science besides immaterial substances, as we shall say a little below against Aegidius. Nevertheless it does not prove nor correctly conclude that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science, because in immaterial substance itself there can be considered other notions or objective concepts which are more universal and common, concerning which according to an adequate notion some science can be handed down, for to these notions correspond proper principles and properties; but no other science besides metaphysics contemplates these notions; therefore the adequate object of metaphysics must be designated under some more universal notion. Although therefore we concede to the argument and induction made that all material things, according to those aspects in which they do not agree with immaterial things, are sufficiently known through other sciences distinct from metaphysics, it is not correctly concluded that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science,

because there still remain notions common to both kinds of things or substances, in which proper demonstrations can be made.

16. The testimonies of Aristotle brought forward for the preceding opinion are explained. What it is to abstract from matter according to being. And therefore nothing contrary can be gathered even from the testimonies of Aristotle; for he himself, as we shall immediately see, often assigns to this science a more universal object than immaterial substance. But in the earlier place cited he only says that material and immaterial substances according to their proper natures pertain to diverse sciences, and that the science which contemplates immaterial substances is prior by nature and dignity; both of which are most true, even if immaterial substance as such is not the adequate object of such a science, but is in some way proper, insofar as it is considered by this science alone, both according to its immediate nature, and according to every superior nature included in it, and also according to every inferior nature or subjective part, which can be considered under such a nature. But in the later place that conditional: "If there were no other substance superior to material ones, natural philosophy would be first, nor would another science be necessary," is most true, not because immaterial substance is the adequate object of first philosophy, but because, with this substance removed, both the proper and adequate object of first philosophy would be taken away, because not only would immaterial substance be removed, but also all notions of being or substance common to immaterial and material things, and given that hypothesis, just as there would be no immaterial beings, so also there would be no notions of beings abstracting from matter according to being, and therefore no other distinct science would be necessary. From which it is also clear that the second confirmation does not conclude correctly, because not only immaterial substance as such, but also every more abstract or superior notion of being, abstracts from sensible and intelligible matter according to being; for to abstract from matter according to being is nothing other than that it can truly and really exist in the

nature of things without matter; but this is true not only of immaterial substance as such, but also of any superior notion, which, since it can sufficiently exist in immaterial substance itself, clearly can also exist in things without matter.

17. You will say: granted that this is true, this kind of abstraction nevertheless belongs to immaterial substance as such, and to superior notions, in different ways, for it belongs to immaterial substance or being per se, positively and necessarily, because neither the common notion of immaterial substance, nor anything contained under it can exist in matter; but the more common notions, such as the notion of being, substance, accident, and the like, only participate in that abstraction permissively (so to speak) and as it were through another; for they can exist without matter by reason of one part subject to them, but it is not repugnant to them to be in matter by reason of another part. It is replied that this is no obstacle to those notions being contained under the object of this science and sufficiently participating in its abstraction, because, by the very fact that those notions can exist without matter, they cannot pertain to an inferior philosophy or science, as is evident per se. Nor do they require another science besides this one; for it would either be prior to metaphysics, which is not to be asserted, since metaphysics is first philosophy, as we have seen from Aristotle, and since there is no more noble knowable object than immaterial substance, as it comprehends God; or it would be some posterior and inferior science, and this also cannot be said, both because the science which contemplates immaterial substances according to their proper natures can much more contemplate other notions which are in them, although they are common to other inferior things; and also because human and natural science can scarcely attain immaterial substances, except by beginning from notions which are common to those substances and other things. Therefore it suffices for the object of this science that in its objective concept it does not include matter, neither sensible nor intelligible. But that it also includes something repugnant to matter, this can

pertain to a certain greater excellence or property of the object, but does not constitute the adequate object. And to this and the preceding opinion can be reduced that which Avicenna touches upon in the beginning of his Metaphysics, namely of those who say that the first or primary causes of things are the adequate object of this science. This opinion taken so absolutely is improbable per se; but in what way the knowledge of causes pertains to this science will be said in the following section.

The Fifth Opinion is Proposed & Refuted

18. The fifth opinion, which also remains disproved a fortiori from what has been said, is entirely different from the two preceding ones, according to different senses of it; for it says that being divided into ten categories is the adequate object of this science; but this being can be conceived in two ways according to different opinions. First, supposing that finite immaterial substances and their accidents are placed in the categories, and in this way the object will be finite being, and only God will be excluded from the notion of object, although he is not entirely excluded from the consideration of this science, at least insofar as he is the first cause of its object, and in this way Flandria defends this opinion, I Metaph., q. 1. The other sense can be, if we suppose, according to the opinion of others, that all immaterial substances are placed in no category; for given this supposition, all of them will be excluded from such an object, if we establish that it is only being divided into ten categories. This the authors thus gather from Aristotle; for after he, in book IV of the Metaphysics, constituted being as the object of this science, he immediately divided it in book V into ten categories. They also add the testimony of St. Thomas, who sometimes teaches that God and the intelligences are considered by the metaphysician as principles and causes of his subject, not as parts of it. They also bring forward certain conjectures, which have been partly solved in treating the third opinion; for those reasons by which

it seemed to be proved that God cannot be the principal object of this science unless he is the adequate object, are employed by these authors to prove that he cannot in any way be an object; but these have already been answered. But the other part of them will be solved by examining the true opinion.

19. God pertains to this science not only as cause of the object of metaphysics, but also as its principal part. This opinion therefore is false and improbable in both senses, and first I omit the later sense, which supposes an opinion plainly false and very impertinent to the present matter, namely, that finite immaterial substances and their properties are not placed in the categories; for this is said without foundation, since in those things there are true genera and differences, and univocal agreements with inferior things, as we shall show in the following proper places. Nor does this matter at all for assigning the object of science; for what does it matter whether a thing is or is not in a category, that it be placed under the object of science or not? Then for this reason also God is excluded from this object without cause, according to the former sense, because he is not placed in the categories; for this is impertinent. And it is subsequently false that this science does not deal with God as with its primary and principal object, but only as with an extrinsic principle. The same must be said of the other intelligences, as is clearly gathered from Aristotle, IV Metaph., text 7, where he says that metaphysics surpasses natural philosophy, because it considers the first substance, namely, as its principal object, for as an extrinsic principle it is also considered in some way by philosophy, as is clear from VIII Phys. Moreover, in book VI, c. 1, Aristotle says that since besides natural substances there is given another superior one, there is also given a superior science than natural philosophy, which considers it. He understands therefore to consider it as a principal object. The same thing all the arguments brought forward in favor of the third and fourth opinions sufficiently prove. For God is a naturally knowable object in some way (and let the same always be understood of the

other intelligences); therefore he can fall under some natural science, not only as an extrinsic principle, but also as the principal object; therefore this dignity pertains to this science. The consequence is proved, both because this is the first and most worthy of all natural sciences, which is not to be deprived of this excellence without cause; and also because God cannot be naturally investigated in a higher way and mode than is done in this science. Whence it is confirmed, because this science does not only consider God under the precise respect of principle, but, after it arrives at God and finds him under the said aspect of principle, it inquires into his nature and attributes absolutely, as much as it can by natural light, as is clear from book XII of the Metaphysics; therefore God falls absolutely under the object of this science. It is confirmed secondly, because this science is the most perfect natural wisdom; therefore it considers the first and most universal things and causes, and the most general first principles, which comprehend God himself, such as: "Everything either is or is not," and the like; therefore it is necessary that it embrace God under its object.

20. Nor did St. Thomas ever teach the opposite, but only that this science arrives at knowledge of God under the aspect of principle; nevertheless he does not deny that the same science treats of God as of its principal object, as can easily be seen from the same places, and from those things which we shall say below. But that Aristotle divided being into ten categories is no obstacle, for if that division is understood of those things which are directly placed in a category, thus it is clear that what is divided is not being insofar as it is the adequate object of this science, for that embraces not only beings which are directly placed in categories, but also other transcendental and analogous notions, such as accident, form, and the like, and also the differences of beings. But if under that division are understood those things which are reduced to those headings, thus also God can be said to be reduced to substance; therefore being, or substance,

insofar as it is the object of this science, does not exclude God or the intelligences.

The Sixth Opinion is Proposed, & Judgment is made Concerning it

21. The sixth opinion, which is said to be Buridan's, is that the adequate object of this science is substance, insofar as it is substance, that is, as it abstracts from material and immaterial, finite and infinite. For that this object cannot be more contracted is sufficiently proved by those things which have been said against the three immediately preceding opinions. But that it cannot be more abstract can be taken from Aristotle, VII Metaph., text 5, where after the division of being into substance and accidents, when he had said that substance alone is being simply, he thus concludes: "Therefore we must speculate chiefly and primarily, and alone (so to speak) concerning being in this way, what it is." By these words he seems to constitute substance alone as the subject of this doctrine. Whence in book XII, at the beginning, he again writes thus: "The speculation is about substance, since the principles and causes of substances are sought." From these places the reason is also taken, for substance and accident are so related that substance exists for itself, but accident is a property of substance; therefore this science treats of substance as of a subject, and of accident as of a property of the subject; therefore the adequate subject of this science is not to be constituted more abstractly than substance as such. The consequence is clear, because nothing can be more abstract, unless something common directly or in recto to substance and accident; but this is not to be assigned, because the adequate subject of a science is not common to that subject of which properties are demonstrated, and to the properties themselves; but the adequate object is that subject of which properties are demonstrated, otherwise the subject and the properties which are said of it would equally fall under the science; but of the common notion to both (which would

be assigned as the adequate object), nothing could be demonstrated, which is very absurd. Therefore, since substance and accident are related as subject and property, an object of this science is not to be assigned which is more abstract than both, and directly and per se common to them; therefore it will be substance alone as such; for it cannot be accident, as is evident per se; but it will be considered by this science as the adequate affection of substance.

22. And this can be declared and confirmed by examples, for the science which considers man and demonstrates his properties does not have as its adequate object something common to man and his properties, but only man himself. Similarly natural philosophy has as its adequate object natural substance, of which it demonstrates properties, and not something common to it and its properties. Therefore the same is to be said in the present case about substance and accident as such. But if you object against this opinion that this science considers the notion of being as such, which extends more widely than substance, and demonstrates of it properties which also extend more widely and are common to accidents, it can be replied that all these things are analogous and are converted primarily and simply with substance, and therefore it is the same to demonstrate these things of being as of substance, because being taken simply is nothing other than substance, especially if it is true that not one, but several objective concepts correspond to being as such.

23. This opinion has some verisimilitude and appearance; and indeed those who deny the objective concept of being would speak quite consistently in this way, because if there is no common objective concept of substance and accident, nothing more abstract is really conceived, which could be the adequate object of this science. Nevertheless this opinion is simply false and alien to the mind of Aristotle, because, as will be shown below, it is simply more true that there is given an objective concept of being according to reason abstractible from substance and accident, about which per se and as such some science can be occupied, explaining its nature and unity,

and demonstrating certain attributes of it; but this is done in this science, as is clear from its discourse, nor can it pertain to another, because no science is prior to this one, and none besides it considers the notions of beings which abstract from matter according to being; but the objective notion of being as such abstracts from matter according to being; indeed it is the first and most abstract of all, and therefore it ought to pertain to the first science or philosophy. Therefore the notion of substance as such cannot be the adequate notion of the object of this science, because it does not contain under itself the notion of being as such, but is rather contained under it, and just as that notion is conceptually and objectively diverse from the notion of substance, and extends more widely than it, so it has more universal and abstract principles and attributes; and therefore it cannot conveniently be reduced to it in the aspect of a knowable object, because, although it is analogous, it is nevertheless one and common, not only in unity of word, but also of objective concept and its abstraction.

24. From which it is also understood that the discourse or foundation of this opinion does not proceed correctly. First indeed, because it is supposed that accident is the adequate attribute which this science demonstrates of its subject, which is nevertheless false, both because it first demonstrates of its subject other more universal attributes than accident as such, such as one, true, good; and also because accident is not demonstrated of substance as such as an adequate property; for there is given some substance which can have no accident; whence, if that were the adequate object of this science which is as it were the adequate subject of accident, not substance as such, but finite substance, would have to be posited as the adequate object of this science, which is nevertheless false, as we have shown. Whence conversely, if substance as such is posited as the adequate object, properties must be assigned which can be adequately demonstrated of it and agree with all substances; but perhaps there are none of these except those which are common to being, as being is,

and belong to it per se primarily; for finite and infinite substance seem to have no common and adequate property besides the notion of subsisting and the negation of inhering, which intrinsically accompanies it. It is added that, although every accident is called a property of substance, insofar as it is an affection of it, nevertheless it is not always such a property which per se follows the notion of substance; and therefore it is not always considered as a property which is demonstrated of substance as an adequate subject, because only those properties which per se follow the notion of the subject are demonstrated in this way. And finally although accident itself is something of substance, nevertheless in it as such something can sometimes be considered as it were absolutely; and therefore sometimes some science can be occupied in accidents alone, as mathematics in quantity.

25. Accident can be the subject of some science. This science therefore, which is most universal, does not consider accident only as a property demonstrable of substance, but as it itself participates in the notion and properties of being, although it always participates in them in relation to substance. Therefore the examples which are brought forward there are not similar. Nor do the words of Aristotle conflict with those things which he taught in other places, as we shall immediately see; for he does not intend to exclude accident, but to prefer substance to it and to attribute the first and principal place to substance, as St. Thomas correctly explained, and is taken from the same Aristotle, book IV Metaph., text 20, and from the words of the same in the aforesaid place, book VII, if they are correctly weighed, for he says that speculation must be chiefly and primarily about substance; but when he adds "and alone," he subjoins that limitation: "So to speak," as if signifying that this was said by way of exaggeration, because simply it is not only about that that speculation must be made; nevertheless in some way it can be said that it alone is to be contemplated, because it alone exists for itself, but accidents are inquired into almost only for its sake.

Section I

It is Determined what is the Adequate Object of Metaphysics

26. It must therefore be said that being insofar as it is real being is the adequate object of this science. This is the opinion of Aristotle, IV Metaph., nearly at the beginning, which St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, Albert, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and almost all others follow there, and the Commentator there, and book III, comm. 14, and book XII, comm. 1; Avicenna, book I of his Metaph., c. 1; Soncinas, IV Metaph., q. 10; Aegidius, book 1, q. 5, and almost all other writers. And this assertion has been proved from what has been said thus far against the remaining opinions. For it has been shown that the adequate object of this science ought to comprehend God and other immaterial substances, but not these alone. Also it ought to comprehend not only substances, but also real accidents, but not beings of reason and things entirely per accidens; but such an object can be none other than being as such; therefore that is the adequate object.

27. An objection against the assertion is resolved. But that this assertion may be more fully declared, we must meet an objection which immediately presents itself, for to constitute some object of science, it is necessary that it have properties which can be demonstrated of it and principles and causes through which they can be demonstrated; but being, insofar as it is being, cannot have such properties, principles and causes; therefore. The major is clear, because this is the function of science, namely to demonstrate properties of its subject, which it ought to demonstrate through causes in order to be perfect science, as is clear from I Posterior. But the minor as to the first part is evident, because being insofar as it is being, thus abstracted, is included per se and essentially in every being and in every mode or property of any being; therefore it cannot have a property so adequate and proper, because the subject cannot be of the

essence of its property. As to the latter part it is proved, because being insofar as it is being embraces God, who is without principle and without cause; therefore being insofar as it is being cannot have principles and causes, because otherwise such principles and causes would have to agree with every being, because what agrees with the superior insofar as it is such, ought to agree with everything contained under it. And it is confirmed, because this science is most noble; therefore it ought to have the most noble object; but being insofar as it is being is the most imperfect object, because it is most common, and is included even in the lowest beings, and much more perfect would be substance, or spiritual substance or God.

28. What properties metaphysics demonstrates of its object. It is replied by denying the first part of the minor, for indeed being has its properties, if not really, at least rationally distinct, such as one, true, good, which we shall show immediately in the third disputation where we shall declare whether being is included intrinsically and per se in such properties; and whether that principle that the subject is not of the essence of the property, is to be limited either to really distinct properties, or to subjects which do not express transcendental notions, or rather it is to be said that these properties are not entirely real as regards what they add beyond being, and it suffices that being is not included in them as regards what they add beyond being, which is more probable, as we shall see. Whence the argument made to the contrary can be retorted, because several properties, which this science demonstrates, immediately agree only with being insofar as it is being, and it is largely occupied in explaining them, therefore that is the adequate object of this science, because that is the subject of science of which the most common properties in the science are demonstrated immediately and per se.

29. What principles likewise. To the latter part it is replied first that twofold principles can be required in science: some are called complex or composite, such as those from which demonstration is constructed; others are simple, which are signified by terms which are

taken as middle terms in a priori demonstration. The former are called principles of knowing; the latter, principles of being. In this science therefore complex principles are not lacking; indeed, as we shall see below, it pertains to it to explain and confirm principles, and to constitute the first of all principles, through which others are in some way demonstrated. But simple principles can be understood in two ways: first, that they are true causes according to reality in some way distinct from the effects, or properties, which are demonstrated through them; and such principles or causes are not simply necessary for the notion of object, because they are not necessary for making true demonstrations, as is clear from I Posterior. For God is a knowable object, and attributes are demonstrated of him, not only a posteriori, and from effects, but also a priori, inferring one from another, as immortality from immateriality, and being a free agent, because he is intelligent. In another way that is called a principle or cause, which is the reason of another, according as they are objectively conceived and distinguished, and this kind of principle suffices for being the middle term of demonstration, for it suffices for rendering as it were the formal reason, on account of which such a property belongs to a thing. Although therefore we grant that being insofar as it is being does not have causes properly and strictly taken in the first way, it nevertheless has some reason for its properties; and in this way such reasons can also be found in God, for from God's infinite perfection we give the reason why he is only one, and so concerning others. Therefore we can also retort this part of the argument, for being insofar as it is being is of itself a knowable object, having sufficient formal reason and sufficient principles, so that properties may be demonstrated of it; therefore some science can be occupied about it, which is none other than metaphysics. But whether being insofar as it is being has in some way true and real causes, we shall say below, in the disputation on causes.

30. How the notion of being is more perfect and imperfect with respect to inferior things. To the confirmation it is replied from

St. Thomas, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, that although being, as precisely taken and rationally distinct, is less perfect than inferior grades, which include being itself and something else, nevertheless being simply or existence itself, according as it is found in reality with as much perfection as it can have in the aspect of being, is something most perfect. This science therefore, although in one way it considers the notion of being as precise and abstract, nevertheless it does not stop in it, but considers all the perfections of being, which being can have in reality itself, at least without concretion to sensible matter, and thus it includes the most perfect beings from which the greatest perfection of this science is to be taken, if it is considered in relation to the things which it contemplates. For if we look also to the mode of speculating, and to the subtlety and certainty of the science, it is largely taken from the abstraction of the object, from which it can sometimes have greater perfection in the aspect of the knowable, although perhaps it is not more perfect in its being.

SECTION II

WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS CONCERNED WITH ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPER NATURES

1. The reason for doubt on both sides. From what has been said in the preceding section, it seems to follow that it pertains to this science to discuss every being and according to every aspect of being, because a science that treats of some genus as its adequate object also treats of all the species contained under that genus, as is evident from philosophy. And the reason is that otherwise there will not be adequation between such an object and such a science; for more things will be contained under one extreme than under the other. Therefore, by the same reasoning, a science that contemplates being as its adequate object considers all things that are contained under it. On

the contrary, however, if this were so, all other sciences would be superfluous, especially those that inquire into the proper natures of things, since metaphysics alone would sufficiently accomplish all of this.

2. The first opinion. To clarify this difficulty and to reveal more clearly and distinctly the matter with which metaphysics is concerned and its limits and boundaries, the present question has been proposed to us. In this question, Aegidius, in I Metaphysics, question 22, and at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, affirms that metaphysics considers all things and their properties down to their ultimate species or differences. This opinion is defended by Antonius Mirandula, book XIII On the Eversion of Singular Certainties, sections 6 and 7. He consequently affirms that the other sciences are not totally different from metaphysics, but are parts of it, or rather that all are parts of one science. They are distinguished and numbered as many by common usage for the sake of convenience and utility in learning, because they are taught and learned as if they were distinct, and this is due to the variety of things.

3. This opinion can be further founded, first, on the authority of Aristotle, I Metaphysics, chapter 2, who says that metaphysics is a universal science because it discusses all things. And in book IV, at the beginning, he says that this science disputes universally about being; and at the end of text 2 he adds that just as there is one sense of one object and of those things contained under it, so this one science contemplates being insofar as it is being, and its species, and the species of species. And in book I of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 23, he says that it belongs to the same science to consider the whole and the parts, that is, the genus and species, or universal and special predicates. And in book VI of the Metaphysics, chapter 1, he says that metaphysics considers what each thing is of all things.

4. The foundation. Second, I argue in this manner: because it is not repugnant to grant one science that considers all things in this way; therefore such a science must be granted, both because sciences

are not to be distinguished and multiplied without cause, and also because the intellect acquires sciences in the most perfect way it can. But it is more perfect to acquire a unified science of all things than a divided one; therefore. But such a science cannot be other than metaphysics, which is the most dignified and most universal of all that can naturally exist. The first antecedent is proved because there is one faculty of understanding that is concerned with being insofar as it is being in this way, descending to all the proper and specific natures of beings; therefore it can acquire one habit of science by which it is rendered easy and prompt to know the whole of being in the same way. For this habit must be as universal as the power itself, otherwise that power cannot be perfectly well disposed for all its acts necessary for perfect science. For example, for perfect science it is not enough to know what each thing is, but it is necessary to distinguish it from others—for example, man from lion and from angel, and so forth with the rest—which, however, no science can accomplish unless it universally considers all things according to their proper natures by which they are distinguished, because the distinction between extremes cannot be known unless both are known according to the proper natures in which they are distinguished, as is self-evident and as Aristotle teaches in III On the Soul, chapter 2.

5. Hence I argue third, because if anything were to obstruct this universality of metaphysics, it would be especially that not all natures of beings abstract from matter according to being; but this does not obstruct, because it must necessarily be said that metaphysics descends to consider many natures or quiddities of beings that cannot exist without matter. For metaphysics distinguishes finite being into the ten first genera of the categories; and again it distinguishes substance into material and immaterial. For it could not descend to the immaterial unless it discerned it from the material, nor could it accomplish this unless it first delivered the proper nature and quiddity of material substance as such; therefore this pertains to the office of metaphysics. Indeed, since we know immaterial things only in the

manner of privations, it is first necessary to know what material substance or matter is, so that through the lack of it we may apprehend immaterial substance. And thus Aristotle, in VII and VIII of the Metaphysics, explicitly disputes about material substance and about its intrinsic principles, which are matter and form.

6. Again, the same argument can be made regarding accidents, such as qualities, relations, and the like. But certain first genera, which entirely concern matter, bring a peculiar difficulty, such as quantity, habit, and position, whose proper natures metaphysics delivers so that it may complete an adequate division of being, which can pertain to no other science. Fourth, either we suppose metaphysics to be one simple habit, or a collection of many quasi-partial ones. If the first is said, it is necessary consequently to say that metaphysics precisely considers the nature of being as such, and does not descend to any particular or less universal nature of being, which is plainly false, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section and will be more evident from what is to be said. The consequence is proved because the same simple habit cannot attain the common nature according to itself and as precise, and descend to particulars, as we will make clear in the following section. But if we say the latter, namely, that it is only one habit by collection of many partial ones, there will be no greater reason for making one science that is concerned with being as such and with certain beings, than with all in particular, because both can be done equally conveniently by collection of many.

7. The preceding opinion is refuted, especially by the testimony of Aristotle. This opinion, however, is rejected by almost all writers as alien to the mind of Aristotle and to the truth. For Aristotle himself expressly, in book I, chapter 2, when he had said that the wise man knows all things, adds "as it is possible to know without having particular knowledge of them"; and below, explaining this, he says that he who has universal science somehow knows all things that are subject to universals. But he says "somehow" because he does not

know them simply and according to their proper natures by virtue of such science, but insofar as they are contained under the universal. More clearly in book IV, at the beginning, he distinguishes this science from others, because it contemplates being as being and what belongs to it per se; but none of the others universally consider being insofar as it is being, but cutting off some part of it, they contemplate what befalls it (that is, what belongs to it), like the mathematical sciences. Therefore he distinguishes this science from others that are concerned with particular beings; therefore this science does not consider that part of being which others cut off. He repeats the same in book VI, from the beginning, where he distinguishes three speculative sciences: philosophy, mathematics, and natural theology, which he distinguishes both from the abstraction of objects, and consequently from the things about which they treat, and finally from the mode by which they proceed and demonstrate, as we will make clear below. And this division of speculative sciences has been followed by all interpreters of Aristotle and almost all philosophers, as is more extensively delivered in I of the Posterior Analytics.[2]

8. Metaphysics is not the only science. Other sciences have complete evidence from their own principles distinct from metaphysics. This is proved regarding mathematics. Therefore, the second opinion received by all these is that metaphysics does not consider all beings according to all their special degrees or natures, as they are considered by the philosopher or mathematician. Hence Averroes, II Physics, commentary 22, says that metaphysics only considers matter as it is a certain being; but physics considers it as it is the subject of form, and he repeats almost the same in IV Metaphysics, commentary 9, and concerning other places of Aristotle cited. And St. Thomas in the same places, and on Boethius, On the Trinity, in the question on the division of sciences, article 4, ad 6. The reason also against the prior opinion can be explained thus: because in three ways it can be understood that this science contemplates all things

[2] This book is missing

according to their proper natures. First, that not only it alone, but other sciences distinct from metaphysics speculate about them, yet in such a way that the knowledge of them that is had through other sciences is not truly and properly scientific, but of some inferior order, and is only called science in the vulgar way, because it has some certainty, either from sense or from some human faith, in the manner in which a subalternated science, when it is without its subalternating science, is called science. And this way of explaining this opinion is false; for first it supposes a false opinion about the subalternation of other sciences by metaphysics, about which we will speak a little later. Second, it supposes that other sciences, setting aside metaphysics, do not have proper evidence from their own principles, which is plainly false. The consequence is evident, because if they have this evidence, nothing is lacking to them for the true and proper nature of science; therefore it is falsely denied that their knowledge is truly and properly scientific. But the minor is evident, because it is against experience, for mathematics has proper principles that are evident and known per se, from which it proceeds through evident demonstrations, and it does not rely on any testimony or human faith, as is self-evident, but on evidence compelling the intellect. Nor does it rely on sense, for, speaking per se, it abstracts from sensible matter, and consequently from sensible effects. But if it sometimes uses visible figures, it is only so that the mind may perfectly apprehend the terms of principles, so that it may perceive their intrinsic connection.

9. Concerning philosophy. Philosophy, however, although it does not have as much evidence as mathematics, nevertheless has evidence proper and accommodated to it, because it is also not founded per se on human authority; but if in some part it proceeds thus, with respect to that part it is not science, but mere faith and opinion, nor will it change its nature or become more evident because of connection with metaphysics. Therefore it is founded per se on the evidence of its principles, which evidence it also does not have primarily from metaphysics, but from the habit of principles. But if

someone says that this evidence in philosophy is only a posteriori and from effects known through sense, it is answered by acknowledging that this happens with us for the most part because of our imperfection; nevertheless this is irrelevant to what we are treating. For those physical things that are so imperfectly known by us through philosophy are not known more perfectly or more evidently through metaphysics. But if some natural things can be known in a more perfect way by the human intellect joined to body, as they truly can, in these[3] a greater evidence is not expected from metaphysics, but in philosophy itself it can be had per se. For although it begins through sense, it is not always founded on it, but uses it as a minister for perceiving through the intellect the natures of things, which being known, it makes an a priori demonstration through principles evident per se and from terms evident to the intellect. Nor can any other mode be imagined by which through metaphysics there might be had a more perfect or more evident science of such natural things; therefore such a mode of speaking is gratuitously fabricated.

10. Otherwise, therefore, it can be understood that metaphysics treats of all beings according to all their natures, namely, because metaphysics, as the most universal science, embraces all these things by its power and efficacy (so to speak), even if other particular sciences can attain some part of this object in their own and particular way, although scientific and perfect in their genus. Thus, just as a particular and universal cause, a particular and universal sense, are distinct, and the universal attains whatever the particular does,

[3] non, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; Venice 1751, Paris 1861. om (discovered by Shane Duarte). The question in this paragraph seems to be whether there is some genuinely philosophical evidence, situated between evidence from the senses and metaphysical evidence. And Suárez argues that within philosophy, there are two kinds of evidence a posteriori evidence, which is based upon sensory cognition, and some deeper, a priori kind of evidence. Since "a higher evidence... is not expected (to come) from metaphysics" (nun expectatur... a metaphysica), the deeper kind o the deeper kind of evidence must be based upon philosophy's own principles.

although not conversely, so it could be thought of this science and of the others. Nevertheless, this mode also has nothing probable about it, first, because, as can be gathered from the immediately preceding discourse, there is no possible natural mode of demonstrating proper physical or mathematical things higher and more perfect than that which the particular sciences themselves preserve; therefore particular sciences distinct are posited superfluously and without cause, if there is one universal science that descends to all those things. Then, because these sciences are not to be devised as distinct faculties or powers, but as habits of the same faculty, to be acquired by the proper acts of that faculty, so as to render it easy for eliciting similar acts. Therefore, if metaphysics speculated about things, for example natural ones, according to their proper natures as such, it would not be acquired through acts more noble than those which philosophy could exercise about the same things, because neither would they have greater evidence with respect to that part nor higher principles. Therefore there could be no reason for multiplying these habits about the same things, nor would the power need a habit facilitating those acts about which it already had philosophical science.

11. Third, therefore, that opinion can be understood by confounding all sciences into one metaphysics, so that we understand these denominations or concepts of mathematics, philosophy, and metaphysics to be only inadequate denominations or concepts of the same science. And this sense pertains more to the question about the distinction of sciences, as they are certain habits or qualities, than to the question about the object, which we now treat. For it is certain from what has been said that metaphysics according to that objective concept that corresponds to this word does not deal with all things in particular, because by the very fact that the mind is understood to deal with natural or mathematical things as such, it is already understood to transgress the boundaries of metaphysics and to use philosophy or mathematics. Just as although memory is not distinguished from intellect in reality itself, but by formal objective reason, it will not be

said properly and formally to deal with things as present, but only with past things as such. I add then (whatever may be the case about those three sciences—philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics—in what way each of them is per se one, which we will touch upon briefly a little later), that it is per se incredible that they are all properly one human science. First, indeed, because this has seemed self-evident to almost all philosophers. Second, because they treat of entirely different things, and have almost no connection among themselves with respect to what is proper to each one. Third, because they differ much in their mode of proceeding; for the philosopher scarcely departs from sense; but the metaphysician proceeds through most universal and most abstract principles; but the mathematician proceeds in a middle way. These modes of proceeding arise from that commonly accepted triple abstraction from matter. But if these sciences are distinct, metaphysics is no less distinguished from the other two than the other two are from each other, because things separated from matter, about which it treats, are no less, indeed more distant from the others than all the rest are from each other, both in perfection of being, and in abstraction, and also in the mode of reasoning and the difficulty and subtlety of the science itself. Since, therefore, mathematics is distinct from philosophy by the consensus of all, because of diverse abstraction and an entirely different mode of proceeding, the same should be judged with greater reason about metaphysics with respect to those sciences. Therefore it does not deal with all the things that other sciences consider, according to the proper natures by which they are considered by them.

The Opinion to be held, & the First Conclusion in its Favor

12. Being can be conceived both as an actual whole and as a potential whole. This latter opinion is true and to be held. To propose and confirm it more distinctly, and so that it may be clearer what

things we must treat in the course of this doctrine, some propositions must be set forth. I say therefore first: although this science considers being insofar as it is being, and the properties that belong to it per se as such, nevertheless it does not stop at the precise and quasi-actual nature of being as such, but descends to consider some inferior things according to their proper natures. This whole assertion is evident from what was said in the preceding section; and as to the prior part about being insofar as it is being, it can be confirmed from what was adduced among those holding the second opinion. As to the other part, however, it can be confirmed from what was said about the first opinion, and will soon be more fully explained. It is only to be noted that dialecticians say a genus can be considered either as an actual whole or as a potential one, or (which is the same thing) it can be considered as abstracted by precisive abstraction, that is, according only to what it actually includes in its formal nature in its objective concept thus made precise, or by total abstraction, as it is abstracted as a potential whole including inferiors in potency. This (I say) which is said about genus can be applied in its own way to being insofar as it is being, for it both has its own formal nature, quasi-actual, which can be considered as precise according to nature, and it has inferiors which it includes in potency according to nature in its own way. When therefore some common nature is assigned as the adequate object of some power or habit, it is not always assigned as it is something actual and entirely made precise by formal abstraction, but as it includes inferiors in some way; just as natural being or material substance is said to be the adequate subject of philosophy, not only according to the precise nature of material substance as such, but also according to the proper natures of inferior material substances, corruptible or incorruptible, etc. Thus therefore, when metaphysics is said to deal with being insofar as it is being, it is not to be thought that being is taken entirely and formally as precise, so that inferiors are entirely excluded according to their proper natures, because this science does not stop at the sole consideration of that actual formal nature;

therefore that nature must be taken as it includes inferiors in some way.

13. What natures metaphysics speculates in particular, and what it does not. I say second: this science does not consider all proper natures or quiddities of beings in particular, or as such, but only those that are contained under its proper abstraction, or insofar as they are necessarily connected with it. This is the mind of Aristotle and of the authors I cited in the second opinion, and of others who have written about this science. All of these distinguish a triple abstraction in speculative and real sciences, such as are the three numbered above: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. For concerning other sciences, either moral or practical, there is another account and mode of considering the unity of object, either from the end of the science or from the mode of proceeding, about which elsewhere. Those three sciences therefore agree in some abstraction, for all consider things in universal; they differ however in abstraction quasi-formal and precisive from matter, for philosophy, although it abstracts from singulars, nevertheless not from sensible matter, that is, matter subject to sensible accidents, but rather uses it in its mode of reasoning. But mathematics indeed abstracts according to reason from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter, because quantity, however much it is abstracted, cannot be conceived except as corporeal and material. But metaphysics is said to abstract from sensible and intelligible matter, and not only according to reason, but also according to being, because the natures of being that it considers are found in reality itself without matter, and therefore in their proper and objective concept they do not per se include matter. About this triple abstraction and partition of these three sciences through these abstractions, there is explicit discussion in the books of the Posterior Analytics. Now it suffices for us that no more suitable account of distinguishing these sciences has been found thus far, and that this seems sufficiently fitting from elsewhere. For when these sciences are about things themselves and are maximally speculative, and therefore

use abstraction to constitute a knowable object about which demonstrations can be made, it is rightly understood that the knowable object as such varies from the diverse mode of abstraction; and therefore this abstraction is customarily said, insofar as it has foundation in the object itself, to be the formal ratio under which such an object exists in the nature of the knowable. Likewise, because things are more perfectly intelligible the more they abstract from matter; and similarly cognition, the more it is about a more immaterial and consequently more abstract object, the more certain it is, and therefore from the diverse degree of abstraction or immateriality the variety of knowable objects and sciences is rightly considered. From this received doctrine, however, the assertion posited is easily understood and proved, because a science does not transgress the limits of its formal object, or formal ratio under which its subject exists; but it considers whatever is contained under that ratio; therefore this science considers all beings or natures of beings that are contained under the aforesaid abstraction, and it does not progress beyond, for the rest pertain to physics or mathematics.

14. Metaphysics considers the nature of substance as such and of accident as such. What it means to abstract from matter according to being. But to understand this more clearly, I say third: this science under the nature of being considers the nature of substance as such, and also the nature of accident. No one doubts this assertion; and it is easily evident from the principle posited, because those two natures abstract from matter according to being. For as we said above, and as St. Thomas rightly noted in the prologue to the Metaphysics, not only are those natures of beings said to abstract from matter according to being which are never in matter, but also those which can exist in things without matter, because this is sufficient for them not to include matter in their formal nature, nor to require it per se. It is also added that these natures are knowable and can have attributes, as it were adequate and proper, and they do not pertain to another science; therefore they pertain to this one. For the human

intellect, if it is perfectly disposed, cannot lack such knowledge. Hence, just as philosophy considering various species of material substances, considers incidentally the common nature of material substance and the adequate principles and properties of it; and again, treating of various species of living things, it considers the common nature of the living as such and the proper principles and properties of it; so human science (so to speak) considering various degrees and natures of beings, it is necessary that it consider the common nature of being. Likewise, when it speculates on various substances and various accidents, it is necessary that it consider the common natures of substance and accident; but this it does not accomplish except through this universal and principal science.

15. What other natures under being pertain to metaphysical consideration. And from this it is evident (lest we repeat the same things) that the same must be said about all common natures that under being, substance, and accident can be so abstracted that they exist in things without matter; of this kind are the nature of created or uncreated being, of finite or infinite substance, and similarly of absolute or respective accident, of quality, action, operation or dependence and the like. Concerning these it should be observed that many common natures can be abstracted from material and immaterial things, whose consideration according to the principle posited should rigorously pertain to this science, such as the common nature of the living, which can be abstracted from material and immaterial things; likewise the common nature of the knowing and intelligent, just as also the common nature of necessary being, or incorruptible, are considered by this science. Nevertheless, because many of the aforesaid natures, as known by us, could not be known except from diverse degrees of souls, therefore nothing about them can be conveniently said here, beyond what is said in the science of the soul; and therefore we relegate to that place those predicates that are taken from the operations of life and are common.

16. Predicates common to immaterial things alone belong to this consideration. Second, it is further inferred a fortiori that it pertains to this science to treat in particular about all beings or natures of beings that can be found only in immaterial things, such as the common nature of immaterial substance, the nature of the first or uncreated substance, and also of created spirit, and of all species or intelligences that are contained under it. It is only to be noted that these substances, especially created ones, can be known very imperfectly by nature, at most according to certain common natures and negative concepts, not however according to proper and specific differences. Nevertheless, in that mode by which they can be known, their contemplation pertains most especially to this science, as was said above. For it does not pertain properly and per se to physics, except perhaps according to some common extrinsic account, and not sufficiently certain, namely insofar as angels are movers of celestial orbs. But per se and with respect to knowledge of the essence and properties of intelligences, which can be had naturally, they exceed the physical faculty, because they are most remote from the senses, and therefore their knowledge is more difficult and higher. Therefore it pertains to this science, which perfects man according to what is most excellent in him, and in which his natural happiness consists for the most part, that is, in the contemplation of the highest things, as Aristotle said, X Ethics, chapter 7.

17. The common nature of cause and of the four genera of causes, and their most powerful causalities pertain to metaphysics. Third, it is gathered from what has been said that it pertains to this science to treat of the common nature of cause, and of the individual genera of causes as such, and of the first and most powerful causes or reasons of causing of the whole universe. I explain each point, because first the nature of cause and effect, as such, is from itself common to material and immaterial things, for in God, who is supremely immaterial, the nature of cause is found, and in angels the nature of effect, and to all created beings, insofar as they are finite beings, it is

common and essential that they emanate from some cause, and to created beings themselves, whether material or immaterial, according to the common nature some genus of operation or causality pertains. Again, this nature of cause not only according to the common nature of cause, but also according to special and distinct modes of causing abstracts from matter according to being per se, for the nature of efficient cause, as such, does not per se require matter, and much less the nature of end. Likewise this nature of free agent and from purpose. Likewise the nature of exemplar cause, or the nature of cause acting through its own exemplar or idea. Again, material and formal cause, although as they are found in substances they do not seem to abstract from matter, nevertheless insofar as according to their common natures they abstract from substances and accidents, they are also separated from matter. Therefore it pertains to metaphysics to distinguish these genera of causes and to explain the natures of each. And because it is wisdom itself and the supreme natural science, it pertains to it to consider the first causes of things, or rather the first reasons of causing in the first cause; but of this kind are the nature of efficient and final cause. For these according to their supreme perfection neither require matter, nor suppose it or another genus of cause, nor require imperfection, but are joined per se and primarily in the first cause, which is God. But it is otherwise with the nature of matter and form; for these necessarily suppose another prior cause from which they arise at least efficiently and finally, and therefore they are not computed among causes or reasons of causing simply first, and therefore their exact knowledge does not pertain to the metaphysician, except according to the common natures of such causes, not however according to those things in which such reasons of causing are found, which are matter and substantial form. For although these are touched upon by metaphysics, nevertheless their complete science is delivered by the philosopher.

18. Finally, this must be considered about this matter, that the consideration of causes pertains to the metaphysician under various

titles or reasons. For if the power of causing, or causality itself, or the relation resulting from it, are considered as they are certain beings, they pertain to this science as its object, not indeed as adequate (as some falsely said, which we touched upon above), but as part of the object, because these are only certain beings or modes of beings, but do not in themselves conclude the whole latitude of being. But if the nature or power of cause is considered in order to the cause itself, namely, insofar as it is a property or attribute of that thing which is called cause, thus it pertains to this science to consider about cause, not as about an object or part of object, but as about some attribute of the object or its part; and in this way, because this science considers about God, consequently in him it considers the nature of first final, efficient, and exemplar cause, and considering about angels, it inquires what power of causing they have over remaining beings, and treating of substance as such, it speculates what causality it has concerning accidents, and so concerning others. Finally, if the nature of cause is considered in order to the effect, that is, insofar as its knowledge is necessary for exact knowledge of the effect, thus also the knowledge of causes pertains to this science, not as object, nor as property of object, but as principle or cause of the object or its part.

19. Whether the consideration of the rational soul is the office of the metaphysician. Two difficulties remain concerning what has been said. One is about the rational soul, whether its consideration pertains to the metaphysician, whether it is considered in the nature of being or in the nature of cause. For this soul is a certain immaterial substance, and consequently abstracts from matter according to being, whence it also abstracts in its proper natures. For this reason, therefore, the proper and specific consideration of this soul seems to pertain to this science. This seems to be confirmed by Aristotle I On the Parts, chapter 1, signifying that the physicist does not consider every soul. On the contrary, however, the rational soul, even as rational, is a natural form having essential order to matter, and as such it is the principle of its operations, even of those that it

exercises through the body, even according to that peculiar mode by which they are exercised by man. But this controversy is usually treated ex professo at the beginning of the book On the Soul, where Cardinal Toletus can be seen, prooemial question 2.

20. Now it is briefly said that the consideration of this soul is to be remitted to the last and most perfect part of natural philosophy. First, because the science of man, as man is, is physical; but it belongs to the same artificer to consider the whole and its essential parts. Then, because although the soul has subsistent being and is separable from matter as to actual conjunction, nevertheless not as to aptitude, nor as to order to matter, and consequently nor as to perfect knowledge both of essence and of properties and operations of it; but all knowledge through matter is physical. There is therefore no doubt that knowledge of the soul, as to its substance and the properties belonging to it per se, and the mode or state of existing or operating that it has in the body, pertains to the physicist. But concerning the state of the separated soul and the mode of operating that it has in that state, some think it pertains per se to the metaphysician; which is probable, because according to that account abstraction from matter seems to be made entirely, and nothing about the soul, as it is in that state, seems to be able to be known except through some analogy and proportion to remaining immaterial substances. Nevertheless, because it pertains to the perfection of science to consider its subject integrally and completely, all these things are more conveniently treated in philosophy, especially because this consideration of the soul and its states, as if divided into parts and delivered in diverse sciences, produces prolixity and confusion; and therefore in the course of this work we will abstain from consideration of the rational soul, both conjoined and separated. Especially because we are also going to say very little about angels for the same reason, because their complete consideration and contemplation has already been rightly usurped by theologians, and to translate all of that here would be alien to natural science, and consequently to our undertaking. But to touch upon

things in passing or to treat them imperfectly would be of no utility or little. And almost the same reason applies to knowledge of God, although, because more things can be known naturally about God than about intelligences, and because his natural knowledge is more necessary for the perfection of this science, we will say some things about him, insofar as they have been touched upon by philosophers or can be found by natural reason.

21. The second difficulty concerned the common accounts of material substance and other things that either include matter or cannot exist without matter; this matter is touched upon in the arguments and will be resolved in their solutions.

22. The arguments of the opposing position are satisfied. The solution to the first argument for doubt posed at the beginning is clear from what has been said. For it is not necessary that a science which considers a universal account should descend in particular to all things that are contained under such an account, but only to those things that participate in the same account of the knowable, or the same abstraction. Therefore, although when considering real agreement in the common account of being, there does not seem to be a greater reason for certain particular beings than for others to fall under this science according to their proper accounts, nevertheless, when considering the agreement in abstraction from matter according to being, which exists between certain special accounts of beings and the most common and most abstract account of being itself, a sufficient reason is given why this science descends to certain particular beings and not to others.

23. A difficult passage of Aristotle is explained. The response to the first foundation of the first opinion taken from Aristotle's testimonies is clear from what has been said; for this science is said to consider being universally because it considers the most abstract account of being insofar as it is being, and concerning all things that agree with it in the same abstraction and knowable account. And in the same way it is said to treat all things, namely, insofar as they are

beings, and because it teaches general principles common to all things. However, those words in Book IV, text 2, seem to have special difficulty, where it is said that it belongs to this science to consider being and its species, and the species of species. Some respond that this distribution should be understood accommodatingly, namely, concerning the proximate and remote species of being contained under the same abstraction of the knowable. But St. Thomas and other ancients, whom Fonseca follows, respond better to this by construing Aristotle's text differently, which reads thus according to the ancient version: "It belongs to one science by genus to speculate upon whatever species of being insofar as being, and the species of species." In these words those two phrases, "and the species of species," are equivocal; for they can be joined so that one determines the other, and they refer to being and to the species of the species of being, and this sense is clearly signified by Argyropylus's version, and the given exposition proceeds in this way. But those two words can be separated differently and referred to different things, namely, to the species of knowable things and to the species of sciences, and Fonseca rightly signified this by translating in this way: "However many species of being there are, it belongs to one science by genus, and to contemplate the species of species"; and thus the sense will be that it belongs to one science by genus to contemplate the species of being in common and in general; but it belongs to various species of sciences to contemplate various species of being according to their proper and specific accounts of the knowable. And from this sense our position is confirmed; for if by one science we understand in the strict sense the common genus of science, from this passage it is established that it does not pertain to any science in species to contemplate all beings according to all their specific accounts, but this pertains to the genus of speculative science in common. But it pertains to specific sciences to consider particular knowable objects according to their proper accounts. If, however, by one science in genus we understand a general science by reason of its object, such as metaphysics is, thus also from

this passage it is established that such a science only considers all species of being under the common account of being or substance; but special sciences consider species of being under their proper and specific accounts.

24. One human acquired science cannot embrace all knowable things according to their proper accounts. To the second it is responded that there cannot be given one human science, acquired by the proper acts of human intelligence, that would universally perfect it with regard to all knowable things according to all their accounts, otherwise not only those speculative sciences—philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics—but also moral and rational sciences, and finally all would coalesce into one, which would be the adequate perfection of the human intellect, which is incredible, because, since the acts and discourses of human intelligence are so varied and so particular and distinct, and independent among themselves, it is not probable that it could happen that all would concur to generate the same science. Nor is this necessary for the effect mentioned in the argument, namely, for judging about the diversity of distinct things that are said to pertain to diverse sciences, because each science, providing knowledge of its object, sufficiently renders the intellect capable of distinguishing that object from the rest, if nevertheless the rest are known, whence two sciences can help each other and concur for judgments of this kind, especially if one provides as it were the formal medium, while the other quasi supplies the matter to which that medium is applied. For thus it happens almost in the present case; for in order that the intellect may judge and demonstrate that one thing is diverse from another, for example, a horse from a lion, it takes from metaphysics the formal medium, which is the account of diversity, or what it is to be diverse, and it applies or attributes this to the horse and lion, whose concepts or accounts it takes from philosophy; nevertheless, because the medium is quasi formal of the demonstration, therefore such a demonstration is considered metaphysical, and in this way it is said to be the function of

metaphysics to show diversity in things; and in the same way it is said to demonstrate the quiddities of things, because the medium of demonstrating quiddity in the account of quiddity is metaphysical, because to know the account of quiddity as such is proper to metaphysics.

25. To the third, some respond that a twofold account must be distinguished in metaphysics. One is that of a particular science, under which account they deny that it attains material things as such. The other is insofar as it is a common art and presides over other sciences or arts; for Aristotle attributes this function to it in this proem, and in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 17, text 23, where by the science that is mistress of all he understands metaphysics, as all expound; therefore under this account they say that metaphysics knows material things as they are material, indeed even this matter insofar as it is pure passive potency; but if you object because a science cannot transgress its object, under the same distinction they respond that this is true of science as it is a particular science, but not as it is a common art. Nevertheless, the distinction and response need greater clarification. For those two accounts are not distinguished from the nature of the thing in the habit of metaphysics, as two parts of it distinct in the thing itself, but only by consideration and by our precisive abstraction through inadequate concepts; for metaphysics is said to be a universal science and to provide universal principles only by reason of its most abstract and most universal object, and therefore to be able to help other sciences, therefore it cannot perform those two functions divisively, so to speak, or through diverse parts of itself, but simultaneously, while it perfectly treats its own proper object, it achieves whatever perfection it has over other sciences, and confers all the utility that it can provide to them; therefore that partition is only according to our account. Therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics transcends the formal account of its object, whether according to one account or according to the other. And this is confirmed, for if metaphysics, as it is said to be universal, transcends

its abstraction and is engaged in material things insofar as they are such, therefore in this it has no term or limit, but it will descend to all objects of other sciences according to all their accounts, and thus it falls into all the inconveniences that we have brought against other positions. The consequence is clear, both because if such a term is not assigned from the formal account of the object, there is no source from which it can be assigned; and because if the metaphysician attains the proper object of philosophy, for example, so as to constitute it, he would also attain the objects of all sciences, and in philosophy itself it would be necessary to contemplate all species of natural beings, so that, if perhaps there are several philosophies, he might separate their objects; but if there is one, he should declare how from so many things one object of it is formed.

26. I think, therefore, that metaphysics considered under no account properly transgresses the formal account of its object, nor does it attain material things except by concerning its abstraction in some way, nor finally is it universal or serve other sciences except under that account by which it perfectly exhausts its object. But to clarify this, I say first that metaphysics does not attain the account of material substance and other similar things that are not found without matter, except insofar as their proper knowledge is necessary for providing the general divisions of being into ten supreme genera, and other similar things, up to prescribing the proper objects of other sciences; for this function is proper to this science, as is taken from Metaphysics VI, VII, and VIII, and because this cannot pertain to any other science, as is easily evident per se, likewise, because without these divisions metaphysics could not know its object exactly, neither according to the common account of being, which since it is analogous is not sufficiently distinctly known without distinguishing the modes by which it can be contracted, nor according to those proper and special accounts that are to be contemplated by metaphysics per se and exactly, because it cannot perfectly attain these accounts unless it separates and distinguishes them from others.

27. Second, it is said that since the universal accounts that metaphysics considers are transcendental, so that they are absorbed in the proper accounts of beings, hence it happens that while the metaphysician attains certain grades of beings that include matter, so that he may separate the other grades from them, which pertain to him directly and per se, he considers abstractly about them the accounts and properties that are common to beings abstracting from matter, and also belong specifically to material beings, even as they are such; as, for example, he distinguishes metaphysical substance into material and immaterial, either so that he may assume the proper account and consideration of immaterial substance, or because it pertains to science to consider the proper parts of its object in some way, as is said in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 23. But having provided such a division, he considers immaterial substance per se and directly, treating universally all things that can be known about it; but he does not contemplate material substance in this way, but only insofar as it is necessary to distinguish it from immaterial substance, and to know about it all the metaphysical predicates that belong to it as it is material, as, for example, that it is composed of act and potency, and the mode of this composition, and that it is a certain being that is per se one, and similar things.

28. Third, in form to the argument, it is responded that metaphysics does not consider all beings in particular because it does not transcend the proper abstraction of its object; but that it considers certain generic grades that attain matter, not omitting its abstraction, both because it abstracts those very things from matter insofar as it is subject to motion and sense, and only considers them according to the common accounts of act or form and potency, and similar things; and also because it only indirectly attains their proper accounts in order to its proper abstraction, namely, so that it may declare how common and transcendental predicates are found in them, and how other grades or genera that truly and according to reality abstract from all matter are distinguished from them. And this is what Aristotle

signified in Metaphysics IV, text 5, when he said: "It belongs to the philosopher to be able to speculate about all things; for if not the philosopher, who will be the one who will consider whether the same Socrates and Socrates sitting, or whether one is contrary to one?" etc. For he calls metaphysics philosophy by antonomasia, to which he says it pertains to consider the diversity of things in common, because the same and diverse are passions of being; and he clarifies this by the aforementioned example, which perhaps for the sake of affecting obscurity he placed in a certain individual, although it is established that science does not descend to individuals, from Posterior Analytics I, chapter 7, and Metaphysics III, chapter 13.

29. The fourth argument is truly difficult; for it touches upon the difficulty about the unity of science, what kind it is, which cannot be treated exactly in this place; nevertheless we will touch upon it briefly in the following section.

SECTION III
WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS ONLY ONE SCIENCE

1. Metaphysics is truly and properly a science. The definition of metaphysics. Having explained the object of metaphysics, it will be easy to expound its essential nature; since, however, the essence and unity of a thing are either the same or intrinsically connected, its unity must be explained at the same time, especially because the discussion concerns specific unity, for there is no question about numerical unity, since it is established that this science is multiplied numerically in different persons, just like other accidents. But it is certain that in the same person it is not multiplied in relation to the same things; whether, however, it is also distinguished with respect to different things, and consequently can be multiplied in the same subject, depends on the prior question concerning its specific or essential

unity. Since this unity is correctly declared through genus and difference, because a species consists of genus and difference, we therefore presuppose what is certain and self-evident, that metaphysics is truly and properly a science, as Aristotle taught in the beginning of the Metaphysics and in countless other places, and this is established from the definition of science, which is taken from Posterior Analytics I and Nicomachean Ethics VI, chapter 3, namely, that it is cognition or a habit providing certain and evident knowledge of necessary things through their proper principles and causes, if it is perfect science and a priori. All these things are found in this doctrine, insofar as they derive from the force and nature of its object, and therefore there is no doubt that this is a science in itself, although perhaps in us it does not always or in all respects attain the state or perfection of science. It is established, therefore, that this science is contained under the genus of science. Indeed, from what has been said it can easily be established that it is contained under the genus of speculative science, as Aristotle said in Metaphysics I, chapter 2, and book II, chapter 1, because it deals with the most speculative things, which are not ordered to action, as we shall more conveniently declare below when explaining the attributes of this science. Then it is established from what has been said that this science is essentially distinct from the other speculative and real sciences, such as natural philosophy and mathematics; whence it also follows that it has, as such, some unity by reason of the object we have explained. Under this aspect it can be defined that metaphysics is the science which contemplates being insofar as it is being, or insofar as it abstracts from matter according to existence.

2. Whether metaphysics is one in subalternate species, or rather in the lowest species. The difficulty therefore to be treated in the present discussion remains whether this unity is generic or specific, and consequently whether that difference, which is taken from the relation to the adequate object we have expounded, is subalternate so that several specific differences can be designated under it, or rather is

one indivisible and ultimate. For many think of it in the former way; their opinion can be persuaded, first, because in the object we have established, various abstractions can be assigned; for there is especially that twofold abstraction from matter according to existence, either necessarily or only permissively, which seems sufficient to vary the knowable object according to species, as such, and consequently the science. Again, among things that necessarily exist without matter, there seems to be, at minimum, a very different abstraction of God, who is entirely pure act and abstracts from all even metaphysical composition, from the abstraction of other intelligences, which although they lack matter, are nevertheless composite, and very different attributes belong to them. Therefore, at least three sciences specifically distinct can be constituted under the general unity of metaphysics. One which deals with being insofar as it is being, and at most descends to the common notions of substance and accident, and to the nine genera which are contained under it; a second, which considers created intelligences; a third, however, which contemplates God alone. For just as natural beatitude consists in him alone, so it seems that a natural science should be given which according to its ultimate and specific nature attains God alone. Nor perhaps will there be lacking one who divides this science into more parts, according to the diverse degrees of abstraction in the very common notions of being insofar as it is being, or of substance insofar as it is substance, and so on with others.

3. Second, I argue principally in this way, because if this science is one, it is maximally so with regard to the judicative habit, which is left in the mind from its acts. For it is certain that the intelligible species which this science uses are very many, and not only one; likewise it is established that its acts are various and multiple, differing not only in number but also in species. For who would doubt that the act by which we judge that every being is one, or that unity is a property of being, is different from that by which we judge that intelligences are immortal, or something similar? If therefore specific

unity can be conceived in metaphysics, it is only with regard to the judicative habit. But it cannot be established even in this. Therefore it can exist in nothing. The minor is proved, because if that habit is one in species, it is either entirely simple in its entity according to the order to the object (omitting for now any composition, if there is any, through intensity alone, or rooting in the subject), or it is a composite quality. But neither seems able to be said. The first is proved, because since the habit of metaphysics inclines to various judgments, and about most distinct things, so that it is as it were commensurate with those very acts, it does not seem able to incline to all those through one and the same simple quality, or to effect them all.

4. This is declared secondly in this way, because the habit of metaphysics is first acquired through one act concerning one object, for example, concerning this conclusion: Every being is true, or another similar one; then through other acts it is increased and extended to other very different conclusions, in which increase it is necessary that something of reality or entity be added to it, because it is impossible to understand real increase without real addition. But this addition cannot be sufficient through the mode of intensity alone, because this increase is not only from different participation of the subject according to greater and greater rooting of the form itself in it, but is from the part of the very habit through greater extension to the object; therefore addition is required from the part of the very habit, insofar as something is added to it by which it regards a new object or new conclusion, as St. Thomas clearly taught when treating of habits in general, I-II, q. 52, a. 1 and 2. Therefore such a habit cannot be entirely simple, as it regards the whole breadth of its object. That it cannot be composite and yet be truly one in species is proved first, because what is first acquired in the habit through acts of one species, and what is added through an act specifically distinct, are also specifically distinct among themselves; therefore they do not compose one habit according to species. The antecedent is clear, both because the acts by which they are generated are specifically distinct, and also because

they incline to similar specifically distinct acts; and moreover because there is no greater reason for distinction between the second acts themselves than between the inclinations, which remain by way of first act, inclining to similar acts to those by which they were generated, and consequently commensurate and proportioned to them; and finally because, if there were no specific distinction between those two, neither would numerical distinction be necessary, but increase through the mode of intensity would suffice. But the prior consequence is proved, because from two specifically distinct qualities one quality of one species cannot be composed.

5. It can be responded that those two are not distinguished by total species, but by partial species, and therefore an integral quality, simply one, can be composed from them as from heterogeneous parts. But against this, for I ask what kind of mode of composition this is, for either it is through true and real union of those qualities (which are called partial) not only in the same subject, but also among themselves, or it is only through combination in the same subject. Neither can be said, for the first does not seem to be able to be sufficiently understood or explained; for I ask what kind of union that is. For either it is through immediate conjunction of one with the other, and this is not so, because such union does not intervene except between those things which are related as potency and act, or as form and matter, accident and subject, term and terminable thing; but those two are not compared among themselves in any of these ways, as is evident per se, because each regards per se its own object, and does not require the other to be terminated or actuated by it. Or they are united through a mode of certain continuation in some common term, as degrees of intensity are believed to be united, and this mode of union is also most difficult to understand. First indeed, because there is no sufficient reason for imagining it. Second,[4] because it is necessary

[4] ...quia nulla est sufficiens ratio ad fingendum illum. Secundo..., Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Cologne 1614, Madrid 1960; Venice 1751, Paris 1861, om. (discovered by Shane Duarte).

to assign some indivisible term in which those two are united. This, however, does not seem to be able to be done, because that term also must regard some object; but there is none to which it can tend, because it neither simultaneously tends to both objects of those partial habits, or acts through which they were generated, nor is there any reason why it should tend more to one than to the other; nor can a new object be imagined to which it tends, since no other has been known or judged through acts. Third, because in acts such union cannot be required, nor such an indivisible term in which they are united; otherwise all acts of the science of metaphysics could coalesce into one, and be really united, which is unintelligible; therefore neither is there such union in the habit, because there cannot be anything in the habit which was not in the acts. But if the acts do not have union among themselves, they do not have whence or whereby they might effect it. And these reasons proceed, even if those two particular habits are imagined to be of the same nature and species. But if they differ in species, a fourth reason can be added, namely, because things that differ in species cannot per se be continuous, nor have a proper common term.

6. Finally, if on account of these reasons it is said that those qualities only compose one habit through combination in the same subject, it follows first that there is no true unity in this science, but only accidentally by reason of the subject, especially if (as seems more probable) those qualities are distinguished in species. It follows second that by the same reasoning, from all the habits of the sciences one science is composed through combination in the same subject.

7. Two difficulties or questions are touched upon in the proposed arguments. The first is proper and special to this place, whether metaphysics is one science in species or not. The second is general and of the same nature in all sciences and almost in all acquired habits, whether they are simple qualities, or composite according to extension to objects.

8. Various opinions on this matter. Concerning the former part, which is proper to this place, some think that metaphysics is not one science in species, but in genus, and contains under itself at least those three aforesaid species, namely, concerning God, who abstracts entirely both from matter and from every trace of matter, as every composition can be thought, and also from all change and vicissitude; and concerning created intelligences, which neither abstract from all composition, nor from all change, both local and of intellect and will, but abstract intrinsically and essentially from matter and physical motion; and concerning being, which only permissively abstracts from matter according to existence. Nor is this against the division of speculative science given by Aristotle into physics, mathematics and metaphysics, because that is not a division into ultimate species, but subalternate ones, as is established concerning mathematics, which contains several sciences under itself.

9. Metaphysics is one science in species. Nevertheless it must be asserted with the common opinion that metaphysics is simply one science in species. For this seems to be the clear mind of Aristotle in the whole proem, or chapters 1 and 2 of book I of the Metaphysics, where he always speaks of this science as of one species, and attributes to it as to one and the same the names and attributes, which partly belong to it according as it deals with God and intelligences; for thus it is called theology, or divine science, and first philosophy; partly as it deals with being insofar as it is being, and the first attributes and principles of it, for which reason it is called universal science and metaphysics. But it is called wisdom insofar as it embraces all these things, and contemplates the first principles and first causes of things. Also in book IV, where he seems to treat ex professo of the object of this science, he says that it is one, and considers all things that are separated from matter. Whence in the discourse and manner of handing down this doctrine, he sufficiently indicates that it is one science in species, and often indifferently says that being insofar as it is being is the adequate object of this science, and that its principal part

is substance, either simply, or immaterial and first, as is clear from book IV, chapters 2 and 3, and book VII, chapter 1, and book XII, in which he hands down knowledge of God and of intelligences, and says that this is the principal part of this doctrine, to which the others are in some way ordered. And finally in book VI, chapter 1, and book XI, chapter 6, he constitutes abstraction from matter according to existence as the adequate formal reason under which the object of this science falls. But if the science which treats of being, as being is, were distinct from that which treats of immaterial being, and really separated from matter, that former would not properly and perfectly participate in such abstraction, nor would it treat of the first causes of things, nor would it have other things which Aristotle attributes to metaphysics, and St. Thomas concludes by almost this argument, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, that natural wisdom is only one, although the habits of other sciences are many, where it is necessary to speak of specific unity; for according to genus, other sciences also have unity; but this wisdom is nothing but metaphysics; nor can it be said that only that part or ultimate science of metaphysics which treats of God is called wisdom, because that precisely taken does not consider the first principles common to all sciences, nor does it corroborate and confirm them, which pertains to wisdom; just as conversely that prior part of metaphysics, which treats of being as such, by itself alone does not consider all the highest causes, and therefore that also precisely taken does not have the proper nature of wisdom; it is therefore necessary that one and the same science embrace all these things. And St. Thomas himself taught this same thing on the above-cited places of Aristotle, and especially in the prologue to the Metaphysics, and the other ancient and modern expositors think the same.

10. The reason for this opinion is that there is no sufficient foundation for this multiplication of sciences; and otherwise all those things which are treated in this science are so connected among themselves that they cannot conveniently be attributed to different sciences. Especially because by reason of the same abstraction all

things agree in the same notion of the knowable. For although God and intelligences considered according to themselves seem to be constituted in some higher degree and order, nevertheless as they fall under our consideration, they cannot be separated from the consideration of transcendental attributes. Whence it is also confirmed, for perfect science concerning God and other separated substances hands down knowledge of all predicates which are in them; therefore also of common and transcendental predicates. Nor is there the same reason concerning inferior sciences, for example, natural philosophy, which, although it considers material substance, nevertheless does not on that account contemplate the common and transcendental predicates which also belong to it, because since it is an inferior science, it cannot ascend to knowing more abstract and difficult predicates, but supposes them known through a higher science. But truly the science concerning God and intelligences is supreme among all natural sciences; and therefore it supposes nothing known through a higher science, but includes in itself whatever is necessary for perfect knowledge of its object, insofar as it can be had through natural light; therefore the same science which treats of these special objects simultaneously considers all predicates which are common to them with other things, and this is the whole metaphysical doctrine; it is therefore one science.

11. Response to the first reason for doubt. And from these things satisfaction has been given to the first reason for doubting posited at the beginning; for it has been declared in what way that abstraction from matter according to existence, which is called permissive or necessary, does not vary the specific nature of the knowable object, both because of the necessary connection of such things and predicates among themselves, especially in the order of knowledge, and also because of the same order of doctrine and certitude. Finally because that diversity of abstraction is only according to diverse concepts of reason, which diversity alone per se is not sufficient to constitute a different science, unless some other

greater reason for distinction occurs. Otherwise, as many as are the common predicates abstractible from inferiors, so many sciences would have to be multiplied, and as many as are the species of things, so many would also be sciences differing in species, which is not commonly admitted.

12. Whether metaphysics is one habit. To the second reason for doubting we cannot satisfy ex professo in this place, because, as I said, the question which is touched upon there is common to all sciences and perhaps we shall examine it below when treating of quality. Now I say briefly that it seems most difficult to me to want to defend that the habit of metaphysics is either one simple quality, or so composite that it arises from various partial entities, united among themselves by true and real union, which difficulty is sufficiently shown by what was proposed in that argument. Wherefore it seems easier to say that such a science includes partial qualities, or habits, which are said to compose one science not by accidental aggregation alone in the same subject in which they inhere, but by some subordination and dependence, which they have among themselves through order to the same subject about which they are concerned; for it is not necessary that the same order of unity be found in all things. But if anyone should ask what this order of subordination and dependence is, it can be responded that it consists in the relation to the same object, which, although it embraces various things and has different properties which are demonstrated of it, nevertheless these are so connected among themselves that knowledge of some depends on others, and they mutually aid each other in knowledge under the same notion and mode of science and doctrine. But this matter, as I said, demands more accurate inquiry and disputation to be handed down in its proper place.

SECTION IV

ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THIS SCIENCE, ITS END, AND ITS UTILITY

1. What is the material cause of metaphysics. What is the formal. What is the efficient. Having explained the object and essence of this science, it was appropriate to say something about its causes; but since nothing proper and peculiar needs to be said about the material, formal, and efficient causes, we shall therefore speak only of the final cause. For the material cause of this science is nothing other than its subject, which is established to be the intellect, unless someone wishes to refer the matter about which it treats to the material cause; but that matter is nothing other than the object of the science, about which enough has been said. Again, since the science itself is a certain form, it does not have another proper formal cause, but it has its own essence, or formal principle; it also has an object which, insofar as it provides specification, is said to have a certain nature of form, at least extrinsic. Finally, since this science is acquired, it comes about through its own acts as through a proximate efficient cause, in which it has nothing special beyond those things that are common to other acquired habits. Therefore, only the end and function of this science remain to be explained; for these two are so joined together in the present case that they seem rather to be one, but this science exists as a habit for the sake of its operation, which it proximately elicits; for this is common to every habit, nor does the habit of this science have anything particular that would require new explanation. But concerning the very operation or act of this science, it must be explained what kind it is, and what end it has, and from this it will be established what was the necessity or utility of this science.

2. What is the end of metaphysics. I say therefore first, that the end of this science is the contemplation of truth for its own sake. Thus Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics XII, ch. 2, and book II, ch. 1, where he proves this first a priori, because that science is most especially for the cognition of truth and for its own sake, which considers the first causes and principles of things, and the most worthy things; for such things are most apt to be known, and their

cognition is most desirable; but this science is occupied with the cognition of the highest things and causes, as is established from what we have said about its object; therefore this science is most especially for its own sake, and for the cognition of truth. Second, because this science does not seek the cognition of truth for the sake of operation; therefore for its own sake; for there is no middle term between these. But the antecedent is proved by Aristotle with a double sign: one is that men began to discover this science because of wonder and ignorance of causes; therefore they sought it for the sake of cognition, and not for the sake of some other work. The second sign is that when all things necessary for this life were available to them, men investigated this science; therefore not for some other use, but to dispel ignorance, and thus for the very cognition of truth, they sought it. Third, we can prove this, because a science that orders cognition to operation proximately discusses things operable by man; but this science does not treat such things, but the noblest beings, and the most universal principles of being, and the most abstract.

3. But if anyone rightly considers, both the assertion put forward and those things which we have added from Aristotle in its confirmation, are common to all speculative sciences, and especially to natural philosophy, and thus from the stated reasons Aristotle rightly infers that this science is speculative, and not practical, because it is not proximately ordered to work, but stops at the cognition of truth, which (as I said) is common to all natural philosophy; therefore, so that the proper end of this science may be declared in the assertion put forward, it must be understood to be for the cognition of those truths which can be demonstrated about being itself as such, and about things which abstract from matter according to being. And thus its proper end is to declare the nature, properties, and causes of being insofar as it is being, and of its parts, insofar as they abstract from matter according to being.

4. And from this is gathered the first necessity or utility of this doctrine, namely, that it perfects the intellect according to itself (so to

speak) and for the sake of knowing the most perfect things and principles of things. For the human intellect, although it is in the body, and therefore needs the ministry of the senses and phantasms, nevertheless according to itself is spiritual, and has the power of perceiving all things, even spiritual and divine, on account of which it was called in some way divine by Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 82. Natural philosophy therefore seems to perfect the intellect insofar as it uses the senses, and is occupied with sensible things. But the mathematical sciences seem to perfect it insofar as it somehow abstracts from the experience of external senses with dependence nevertheless on imagination, or phantasy. But this doctrine illuminates the intellect according to itself, abstracting, as much as can be done in the body, from senses and phantasy, and contemplating spiritual and divine things, and the principles and reasons common to all things, and the general attributes of beings, which are considered by no inferior science.

5. Second, however, it must be added that the science of metaphysics is not only fitting for its own sake, but is also very useful for perfectly acquiring other sciences. This assertion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 2, and book III, ch. 2, where among other conditions of wisdom he places that the remaining sciences minister to it, but it presides over others, and (Aristotle says) commands them not with practical command, which pertains rather to prudence or moral sciences, but with speculative direction, and he adds that metaphysics is of this kind with respect to other sciences because it discusses the most excellent things, and the first causes of things, and the ultimate end and highest good. He also adds, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 7, that metaphysics alone is occupied with the first principles of the remaining sciences. For there are two kinds of principles of sciences, as he teaches in the same book, ch. 8: Some are proper, which are declared in each science; others are common to many, or rather to all sciences, because all use them, as the subject matter requires, and insofar as the other particular principles depend on

them, as the Philosopher says there, and Metaphysics IV, text 7. Since therefore all sciences depend most on these principles, it is necessary that they be most perfected through this science; because, as was said above, the cognition and contemplation of these principles can pertain to no special science, since it consists of the most abstract and most universal terms. Thus therefore this science is very useful for the attainment and perfection of others. Whence St. Thomas, in the beginning of Metaphysics, and In II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 2, says that metaphysics is ordinative of other sciences, because it considers the notion of being absolutely, but others according to a determinate notion of being; and In II, dist. 24, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4, he says that metaphysics directs other sciences. Finally, from those things we have said about the object and matter about which it is occupied, this can easily be proved, because this science considers the supreme principles of beings and most universal properties, and the proper notion of essence and being, and all modes of distinction which are in things; but without distinct cognition of all these, perfect cognition of particular things cannot be had. This can also be known by experience; for all other sciences often use the principles of metaphysics, or suppose them, so that they can proceed in their demonstrations or reasonings, whence it often happens that error occurs in other sciences from ignorance of metaphysics.

6. How something is useful to another in multiple ways. You will say: since this science of metaphysics is sought most especially for its own sake, how can it be useful to others? For what is useful to others, is for the sake of those others. It is answered: it happens in two ways that something is said to be useful to another: in one way as a medium ordered to another; in another way something is said to be useful to another as a superior and more eminent cause, influencing in its own way upon another. Therefore in this latter way metaphysics is useful to inferior sciences, and therefore it does not conflict but is rather very consonant and consequent, that it should be most especially for its own sake, and very useful or profitable to others. But

in the former way other sciences are ordered to metaphysics, insofar as all other cognition, both speculative and practical, is ordered to supreme contemplation, in which the natural happiness of man consists. Thus approximately St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles[5] ch. 25, reason 6, where he says thus: But first philosophy is related to other speculative sciences in this way: for all others depend on it, as receiving their principles from it, and direction against those who deny the principles, and first philosophy itself is wholly ordered to the cognition of God, as to its ultimate end.[6]

7. But so that these functions of metaphysics may be more exactly understood, it is necessary to declare specifically what are the duties which it exercises concerning other sciences, and how it carries them out. How metaphysics is occupied with the objects of other sciences, and demonstrates them.[7]

8. The first thing therefore that is usually attributed to metaphysics is that it prescribes the object to each science, and, if necessary, demonstrates that it exists, which Averroes signified, On the Heavens III, comm. 4, saying that it belongs to metaphysics to defend and verify (for thus he speaks) the subjects of particular sciences. But the reason can be, because, as Aristotle teaches, Posterior Analytics I, a science does not prove, but supposes that its object exists, and what it is; therefore it must take this from elsewhere; therefore since this is not always known per se, and often needs some declaration and proof, it must take this from some superior science, which can be none other than metaphysics, to which it pertains to consider essence, quiddity, and the very notion of being.

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[5] 3 Contra Gentes, Salamanca 1597; 2 Contra Gentes, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

[6] https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg3001.html#25767

[7] eave demonstret, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; ea ut demonstret, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

9. Objection. You will say: how can metaphysics demonstrate concerning the objects of other sciences that they exist? For, if the discourse concerns actual existence, this is not required for things to be made objects of science, but it is related accidentally; whence it cannot be demonstrated, especially concerning created beings, since it does not necessarily belong to them; but if in some way it can be proved from effects, this seems rather to pertain to the natural philosopher, who philosophizes from sensible effects; if however the discourse concerns being in aptitude, or in potency, this cannot be demonstrated concerning one subject, because there is no medium by which it can be demonstrated; just as also it cannot be demonstrated concerning the subject of a science what it is, because there is no medium by which the proper essence belongs to each thing, but it belongs to it immediately and per se. Add, that this science cannot descend to the particular objects of individual sciences, because it cannot transcend its own proper abstraction; therefore just as for this reason it cannot demonstrate their properties, so neither can it show whether they are, or what they are. Moreover if other sciences needed this help so as to take their objects from it, they could not be learned before this science; which is false, as experience establishes; for, although this science is first in dignity, it is not however first in generation. Finally, if it is necessary that this science demonstrate the objects of others, another science will be necessary, which serves this one to show its proper object, because it cannot demonstrate that its own object exists, but must suppose it, nor is that so known per se that it does not need some demonstration.

10. Response. It is answered to the first difficulty, that this science thus helps others to show that their objects exist, or what they are, just as they themselves suppose this about their objects. But sciences, properly speaking, do not suppose that their object actually exists; for this, as the argument made proves, is accidental to the notion of science; I except that science which is about God, whose being is of his quiddity; but in other things, for science and

demonstration the existence of those things is not necessary, except perhaps sometimes on our part for seeking and finding science, because we receive science from the things themselves. Therefore this science does not demonstrate that other objects actually exist, but it can only be said to demonstrate that other objects exist, because it provides principles for showing in what grade of beings such objects are placed, and what quiddity they have. But this doctrine provides this, by declaring first the very notion of being and essence or quiddity, and in what it consists, and then by distinguishing the various grades of beings, under which all objects of sciences are contained. Wherefore, although a priori and in itself it cannot be demonstrated through a proper intrinsic medium that the object of a science exists, and what it is, nevertheless it can be shown as regards us from signs or effects, by declaring first what is required for the notion of being, and in what the notion of essence consists, and what connection it can have with such signs, or effects, all of which are shown exactly only through the principles of this doctrine.

11. It is also added, that through extrinsic causes, such as final and efficient, it can sometimes be shown that some object exists, which is done especially through first and universal causes, about which this science considers, as we can show that angels exist, because they are both necessary for the perfection of the universe, and are of such a nature that it would not be repugnant for them to be made by God.

12. And thus it is also established how this science can exercise such a function concerning the objects of particular sciences, even if they seem to be below its abstraction. For first, as we touched upon above, in the second section, although metaphysics per se is not occupied with all things according to their proper notions, nevertheless it somehow attains them, namely, insofar as it is necessary for explaining proper notions, or for giving divisions, and for distinguishing proper metaphysical grades from others, which metaphysical divisions serve much to other sciences for prescribing

their subjects, and for distinguishing them from others. And then it is not always necessary that metaphysics by itself immediately show the objects of individual sciences, but it suffices that it provide principles, and declare terms which other sciences can use for supposing or showing, as much as will be necessary, their objects.

13. Metaphysics is prior to all sciences in the order of doctrine. Why it is learned last. Whence it follows consequently that it must be confessed, if the order of doctrine is considered according to itself, that metaphysics is prior to others, which can be gathered not only from this function, but also from another, which we shall immediately explain; for it confirms in some way the principles of all sciences. Then it declares the transcendental notions of being, without cognition of which hardly anything can be exactly treated in any science. And finally it has a certain singular connection with dialectic, which I shall declare below, by reason of which it has perhaps resulted that a great part of this doctrine is confusedly treated by modern dialecticians. Nevertheless however by reason of our mode of knowing, this science has claimed the last place for itself, as is established from the usage of all, and from Aristotle's very inscription; for on this account he called this science transphysical or postphysical. And the reason is, which St. Thomas touched upon, In I Metaph., ch. 1, lect. 2, and Avicenna, book I of his Metaphysics, ch. 3, because things which abstract from matter according to being, although according to themselves they are most intelligible, are nevertheless not discovered by us except through motion, as is established from Metaphysics XII. And similarly the most universal and abstract notions of being, although according to themselves they are better known, especially as to the question whether they are, nevertheless what they are, and what properties they have, is difficultly known by us; and often it is necessary to begin from particulars and sensibles, so that we may attain to those; and in this way Aristotle said, Metaphysics I, ch. 2, that the most universal things are most difficult to know. Whence, speaking of the order as regards us, it is not always necessary

that this science be premised to others; nevertheless some principles of this science, or metaphysical terms, are always supposed, insofar as they can be known in some way by virtue of the natural light of the intellect, and insofar as it suffices for discoursing and proceeding in other sciences, although not so exactly and perfectly, as happens when this science is acquired.

14. How a science supposes its object. To the ultimate confirmation it is said that this science surpasses the rest in this, that it not only supposes that its object exists, but also, if necessary, shows that it exists, using its own principles, properly speaking; for accidentally it sometimes uses alien and foreign ones because of the excellence of its object, and the defect of our intellect, which cannot attain it perfectly, as it is in itself, but from inferior things. But when it is said that a science supposes that its object exists, this is understood properly speaking, as Cajetan noted, I p., q. 2, a. 3; but accidentally it is not unfitting for some science to demonstrate its object as regards us. But if that science is supreme, it does not need the help of another, but can provide this by its own power, and metaphysics is of this kind in the order of natural sciences, just as theology also has this in the supernatural order.

How Metaphysics Confirms & Protects First Principles

15. First reason of the difficulty. Second. Third. The second principal function that is attributed to this science is to confirm and defend first principles. Aristotle attributes this function to this science, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 7, and Physics I, ch. 1, and he hands down and exercises it ex professo, Metaphysics IV, ch. 3, where all commentators hand down the same; and Proclus, book I Commentary on Euclid, ch. 4, where he also says that metaphysics supplies principles to mathematical sciences. But what kind of function this is, and why, or in what way it pertains to this science, is

not easy to explain. And the reason for the difficulty is first, because first principles are known per se, naturally, and without discourse; but this science, since it is essentially science in all its parts, can in no part of them be occupied except through discourse and consequently concerning conclusions, and mediate propositions; therefore it can exercise no proper function concerning first principles. Second, because otherwise the habit of metaphysics would be confused with the habit of first principles, because metaphysics would usurp the proper function of that habit; whence it would not be necessary to distinguish them, against Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, ch. 3, where he distinguishes five virtues of the intellect, and among them places intellect, that is, the habit of principles, and wisdom, which is established to be metaphysics from the same, in the prooemium of this work. The first consequent is clear, because it pertains to the habit of principles to give assent to first principles with greater evidence and certainty than any science, since all evidence of sciences depends on that habit; therefore metaphysics cannot confirm first principles, or add any strength to the assent of those, unless it usurps the function of the habit of first principles. Third, because either this science exercises this function, by only explaining the terms from which first principles consist, and this is not the function of a science, nor is any judicative habit necessary for it, but only fitting apprehension and explanation of terms. Or it exercises this function, by demonstrating in some way the principles themselves, and again I ask whether this is understood of demonstration a priori or a posteriori. And the first cannot be said, because first principles as such are immediate, whence they cannot be demonstrated a priori. But if they are taken as they are not immediate as regards us, such as is that principle by which the first passion is predicated of the defined, thus it is not the function of one science to demonstrate such principles, but each science in its matter demonstrates those things which pertain to it, nor can metaphysics descend to singulars in species, as is established from what was said in the preceding sections. Therefore nothing proper can be attributed to

metaphysics in this part. But the second concerning demonstration a posteriori cannot be said more fittingly, because this genus of demonstration and science does not pertain to wisdom, such as metaphysics is, but pertains either to experience, or to science a posteriori, which they call science "that," which without doubt is inferior, and a distinct habit from perfect science, because perhaps there is not one concerning first principles common, and proper to individual sciences. Whence just as to perfect wisdom or metaphysics there can be added in us some imperfect habit demonstrating a posteriori the first principles common, pertaining to metaphysics, so to individual particular sciences there can be added a similar proportioned habit, demonstrating a posteriori the principles of each; what therefore is there that metaphysics has proper and singular in this function?

16. The proposed reasons for doubting are resolved individually. We cannot more conveniently respond to this question, and declare this function, than by briefly running through the difficulties proposed. And the first indeed is easy; for we concede that the function of this science concerning first principles is not to elicit that evident and certain assent, which the intellect led by natural light gives to first principles without any discourse when they are sufficiently proposed; for the argument proves this rightly, and the second also confirms it. Therefore it will pertain to this science to use some discourse concerning the first principles themselves, by which it confirms them in some way and defends them; but in what way it provides this, will be declared in the second and third difficulty.

17. Concerning the second, some are accustomed to treat in this place, whether the habit of principles, which Aristotle called intellect, is a quality distinct in reality from the intellective power, and whether it is a quality congenital by nature, or rather acquired. For those who deny that this habit is some quality beyond the very natural light of the intellect, which, insofar as by its nature it is sufficiently inclined to the assent of first principles, is called the habit of those, and

is not distinguished really, nor from the nature of the thing, but by reason alone from the faculty of understanding, those (I say) who think thus, will easily expedite the difficulty proposed, saying that metaphysics is distinguished from the natural light of the intellect, but is not distinguished from another habit, which can confer some facility to the intellect concerning the assent of first principles. But to others (and indeed more probably) it seems that this question does not depend on that, for whether the habit of principles is a distinct quality, and acquired through acts, or not, it is necessary that metaphysics be a habit distinct from that, because, as I was saying in the prior difficulty[8] the function of metaphysics cannot be to give simple assent or assent without discourse to first principles. But those who posit that habit as a distinct quality, say that its function and utility is to elicit more promptly and easily with the intellect the very simple and immediate assent of first principles; therefore, even if we posit that the habit of principles is acquired by proper acts, we should not on that account confuse it with the habit of metaphysics.

18. Therefore these questions are not connected, nor does one depend on the other. And (as I think) Aristotle posited both, namely, both that the habit of principles is a virtue distinct from wisdom, as is established from the cited place Nicomachean Ethics VI, ch. 3,[9] and that it is a habit which we acquire by our acts, as can easily be taken from the same place and from Posterior Analytics II, final chapter. For in the prior place he manifestly places it among the habits or virtues of the intellect; but if it were not a thing distinct from the very faculty of understanding, it would be most improperly, indeed

[8] Dicebam, Madrid 1960, Salamanca 1597; dicebant, Paris 1861. Obviously, Suárez refers here to his answer to the first difficulty, given in the previous paragraph (n. 16).

[9] All previous editions have "3 Ethic", but NE III doesn't discuss the intellectual virtues, and Suárez has no other reference to it in disputation 1. So he must be referring to VI Ethic., c. 3, like in DM 1,3,1 and DM 1,4,15 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

even falsely said to be a habit of the intellect. But in the latter place he more openly thinks it to be a habit, not implanted by nature, but acquired, not through discourse, but through simple acts acquired from the sole proposition and understanding of terms. And truly this latter follows from that former. For if this habit were not some facility acquired by use for more promptly eliciting similar acts, there would be no reason or foundation, why it should be thought to be some quality distinct from the nature of the thing from the natural light of the intellect, or from the very faculty of understanding, both because, as Aristotle said, On the Soul III, ch. 4, the intellect by its nature is pure potency in the order of intelligibles, and like a blank tablet; and also because if nature itself had given the whole power which is necessary from the part of the potency for eliciting these acts, not only as to substance, but also as to promptness and facility, it would have been superfluous to multiply entities in the very faculty of understanding, but it could and should be constituted stronger and more efficacious in its own intrinsic entity, nor would there be any indication for gathering that distinction of entities. Just as if the will by its nature is so ready and easy for loving good in general, that it cannot be made more ready and easy through acts, it is an excellent argument that it does not have that promptness through an innate habit, but through its own entity. And similarly the sight, because from its nature it has the whole inclination and efficacy which it can have from its part for eliciting the act of seeing, we rightly gather that it has that whole power and inclination through its intrinsic faculty and its indivisible entity, and not through some other implanted by nature. Whence St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1, thought that this habit is not natural according to itself, but as to a certain beginning, because, namely, the acts through which it is acquired, are not had through discourse, but immediately flow from the very light of nature, although in the beginning and before the habit they do not emanate with so much promptness and facility, as after the habit is acquired; about which

matter we have disputed at length in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, and perhaps in the following we shall add something.

19. In what way metaphysics is occupied with first principles, in what way with the habit of principles. Therefore, with this opinion supposed, to the second difficulty the consequent is denied. For metaphysics is occupied with first principles in a different way than the habit of principles. For first metaphysics is not occupied with first principles formally, as they are principles, but as they are in some way conclusions. But truly the habit is occupied formally with principles, as they are such, and immediate truths; and therefore this habit attains without discourse, but metaphysics through some discourse. Hence again the habit of principles does not properly add any evidence or certainty to the assent of principles, which can be had from nature alone, but adds facility and promptness in exercising that evidence and certainty; but metaphysics adds certainty and evidence, because in a new way and through a new medium it makes one assent to the same truth. But it must be attentively considered that this increase is not intensive, but extensive. First indeed because metaphysics does not augment the evidence or certainty, indeed nor even the intension of the very assent, which the habit of principles elicits, because, as I said, metaphysics in no way operates concerning that assent, but concerning the object or matter of it provides a new mode of assenting, through an act certainly distinct. Second, because if we compare these acts among themselves, truly the assent of metaphysics is not more certain or evident than the assent of the habit of principles, as the argument made proves, because it is always necessary that the assent of metaphysics rest on some first principles, as known per se. And for this reason we say that metaphysics does not augment intensively the evidence or certainty concerning first principles, but only extensively, by providing new evidence and certainty of them.

20. Cognition of terms contributes most to knowing complex principles. Concerning the third difficulty another question is touched

upon, namely, in what ways metaphysics is occupied with first principles, helping and confirming the intellect in their assent. In which it must be said briefly that this doctrine provides this function in two ways insinuated in the third difficulty. For first it hands down and declares the notion of the very terms, from which first principles consist. This is almost clear from experience itself in the discourse of this doctrine, both in Aristotle, especially books V, VII, VIII and IX, and also in other authors, and from those things which we shall say in the following disputations, it will be established. For it is handed down in this science what being is, what substance, what accident; what whole, what part, what act, what potency, from which terms, and from others similar, first principles consist. For since these principles in reality do not have an intrinsic and quasi formal medium, by which their extremes are connected, they are known per se from cognition of terms; whence nothing can help more for their cognition, than scientific and evident knowledge of terms, or of their notions, such as is that which is handed down in this science. Nor is it true what was assumed in the aforesaid third difficulty, namely, that this function does not pertain to science, which proceeds by discoursing and judging, but to simple apprehension of terms; for although, properly speaking, on the part of simple things and terms demonstration is not required, indeed nor even composition for understanding what each is or signifies, nevertheless as regards us this can often be demonstrated, especially using division consisting of opposite members, and demonstrating what a thing is not (which is often better known to us), and thence concluding what it is. Often also this is done, by handing down some descriptions of simple notions, which are better known as regards us, and using them as media for making demonstrations, which sometimes suffice for acquiring human science. And from this finally it is understood that this mode of illustrating first principles is exercised principally and immediately in this science concerning those first principles, which are most universal, and consist of more abstract terms, that is, signifying things, or notions of things which can exist

without matter; for, as we have said, these are those which, properly speaking, are contained under the object of metaphysics, and since it is the supreme science, it is per se sufficient for handing down and explaining the notions of all things and terms which are enclosed under its object. But truly it does not so proximately and immediately descend to proximate and particular principles of individual sciences, and to the terms from which they consist, but only attains those in the other of the two ways explained above, namely, either insofar as it is necessary for handing down proper definitions, and explaining proper terms, or insofar as general notions, and especially transcendental ones, are included in them, without cognition and aid of which no notion or quiddity of any thing in particular can be explained.

21. The most universal principles cannot be demonstrated through causes. Another mode by which this science deals with first principles is by demonstrating them, or rather their truth and certitude, which it can accomplish in various ways. First, some say that metaphysics demonstrates principles a priori, not indeed through an intrinsic formal or material cause, because (as the argument correctly proves) in these immediate principles such a kind of demonstration has no place, but through an extrinsic final cause,[10] efficient cause, and exemplar cause; for since metaphysics considers the first causes, including God himself, who just as he is the first truth, so he is the cause of all truth, at least extrinsically in all the aforementioned modes, it can at least through this cause demonstrate the truth, not only of first principles, but also of conclusions. However, this mode of demonstrating is very rarely or never exercised in this doctrine, and if it is considered more attentively, it can scarcely have a place. For first of all, as regards the efficient cause, this has no place in the most universal principles consisting of terms common to God and creatures; for just as no efficient cause can be given with respect to

[10] finalem, Salamanca 1597, Madrid 1960; formalem, Paris 1861. Cf. Madrid 1960, vol. 1, p. 280, footnote: "Creemos que la palabra formalem que sustituye a finalem en algunas ediciones, no puede admitirse en el presente caso,

God, so neither with respect to those principles which have their truth in God himself, such as this: Whatever is, either is or is not, and: It is impossible to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing. And from this it is also established that these principles cannot be demonstrated through a final cause, because the final cause is in relation to effection and operation, and therefore those things which abstract from the efficient also abstract from the end. Again from this it seems to follow that even those principles which are common to creatures alone, insofar as they fall under science, cannot be demonstrated through an efficient or final cause, because, as such, they abstract from actual existence, and consequently from efficiency; for all efficiency concerns an existing thing, or one which is brought to existence, as, for example, that every whole is greater than its part is true, with all efficiency set aside, and so with the rest. And from this it further does not seem possible here to have proof through an exemplar cause, both because what abstracts from efficient cause also abstracts from exemplar; for the exemplar is that to whose likeness the efficient operates, and is compared as art, or the reason of operating with respect to an intellectual efficient; if therefore the truth of these principles abstracts from the efficient, it also abstracts from the exemplar cause, and also because the essence of things as such does not depend on an exemplar cause, therefore neither does the truth of first principles. The antecedent is evident, because man, for example, is not therefore a rational animal because God knows him as such, or because he is represented as such in the divine exemplar, but rather he is known as such because he demands such an essence from himself.

22. An objection is met. But to these things it can be said that these principles do indeed abstract from actual efficiency, but not from possible efficiency, and consequently do not entirely abstract from efficient, exemplar, and final cause; for as we shall say below, although the essences of creatures can be abstracted from being, not however from the order to being, without which true and real essence cannot be understood; therefore by the same reasoning, first

principles common to created beings that are true and real, even if according to necessary connection they abstract from time and actual existence, nevertheless do not abstract from the order to being, namely, because with such connection they could exist, and not otherwise, and in this way they can also have respect to the aforesaid causes, and be demonstrated through them. As, if someone proves that every whole is greater than its part, because it can thus be made by God, and not otherwise, or that the essence of man is rational animal, because it can be established by God in this and not in another. And similarly from the final cause it can be shown that man is a rational animal, because he can be instituted for knowing and loving God. Or from the exemplar cause, because he is represented as such in the divine idea. For man would not have such a real essence unless he had such an exemplar in God, nor is it repugnant that under different aspects both should be true, namely, both that God knows man to be of such essence because he is really such, and that man has such essence because he has such an idea in God.

23. This response indeed declares that this mode of demonstrating is not always impossible nor useless. Although these modes of demonstrating do not all have place in individual first principles; for that three and four are seven, it is not necessary that it have a final cause, and so with other principles in which there is truth from the connection of extremes, not indeed ordered to some end, because the predicate does not declare some property or essence of the subject, but rather identity, or the repugnance of opposites, as is evident in this: Whatever is, either is or is not, and similar ones, in which the said modes of demonstrating through extrinsic causes have no place; nevertheless they can be applied to many principles, especially that demonstration which is through final cause; for the essences of things and properties have a final cause through which they can be demonstrated, if such a cause is otherwise known per se, or can be shown through another more known principle; for this is necessary in every demonstration.

24. The natural light cannot demonstrate through the first efficient, end, and exemplar. But I add further that often this kind of proof exceeds the power of the natural light of the human intellect, and pertains rather to divine metaphysics (so to speak) or supernatural rather than natural. For divine exemplars, unless they are seen in themselves, cannot be the reason or medium of knowing any truth; but they cannot be seen in themselves through natural metaphysics, indeed this science cannot show that God has these or those exemplars of things, except a posteriori from the things themselves, just as from artifice in an effected thing[11] we know what kind of idea the artificer had. And the same reasoning applies to the first efficient cause; for as long as we do not recognize the power of God in itself, we cannot from it know what kinds of things can be made by it, but rather from things made we investigate the power of God, although, with the power of God known from certain effects, it can through that power be demonstrated what it can do in others. And similarly from his perfection and efficiency we can investigate the end and perfection of his works, as that it pertains to him to establish all things for himself, or to make the universe perfect. From which we can further collect what natures he has attributed to known things, which mode of philosophizing Aristotle touches upon in Book XII of the Metaphysics, at the end.

25. Demonstration through reduction to the impossible is the task of metaphysics. Besides these modes of demonstrating, which are little used, there is another through reduction to the impossible, and in this way all principles are shown through reduction to that: It is impossible to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing simultaneously. And because this is the most general principle proper to this doctrine, therefore this kind of demonstrating pertains to this wisdom; but concerning that principle and its use we shall say more below, disputation III. Finally, to increase this certitude concerning

[11] artificio in re effecto, Salamanca 1597; artificio in re effecta, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

first principles, the consideration of the intellectual light itself by which the first principles themselves are manifested can contribute very much, and reflection concerning it, and reduction to the source from which it flows, namely, the divine light itself. For thus we correctly collect that first principles are true, because they are shown to be true immediately and per se by the natural light itself, because in this kind of mode of assenting this light cannot be deceived or incline to the false, because it is a participation of the divine light perfect in its kind and order. Whence is that of Psalm 4: Who shows us good things? The light of your countenance is signed upon us, O Lord. Whence Aristotle, in the beginning of the science of the soul, judged that science to be very certain, because it contemplates the intellectual light itself, in which this wisdom surpasses that science; for it considers in a higher way the power and perfection of this light according to itself, insofar as according to being it abstracts from matter, and insofar as it participates in the certitude and infallibility of the divine light.

26. How reduction to the impossible is demonstration a priori, how a posteriori. You will say that such demonstration of first principles is not a priori, but only a posteriori; for these principles are not true because they are known through infallible light, but rather because they are true and immediate, therefore they are manifested through such light. I respond by conceding that this proof is not a priori, if the truth of principles in the being of the thing (so to speak) is considered, yet it can in some way be called a priori in the aspect of the knowable, or evident and certain; for it is correctly shown a priori that some proposition is certain, because it is revealed by God, or is evident, because it is proved by demonstration. Thus therefore it can be shown that these principles are most evident, because they are immediately manifested by the natural light itself. And this proof and reflection contributes maximally to confirming the intellect and increasing its certitude, at least on the part of the subject, in the assent to principles.

27. Conclusion. From these things therefore it has been sufficiently declared how first principles are contained under the object or matter about which this science is concerned, and what task it exercises concerning them. And incidentally it can also be collected that this is indeed true of first and most universal principles, not of those alone, as Soncinas and Javellus and some others wished, because although this doctrine is concerned more immediately with prior principles, properly speaking, and demonstrates them in more ways, as is evident from what has been said, nevertheless it also extends to others, because some of the aforesaid modes are general and common to all. And therefore Aristotle spoke absolutely of all, saying that metaphysics demonstrates the principles of all sciences, as is evident from the Proem, chapters 1 and 2, and from Book IV of the Metaphysics, text 7, and from Posterior Analytics I, chapter 7, and from Topics I, chapter 2, and Physics I, chapter 2, where he says that if anyone denies the first principles of geometry, it does not pertain to geometry[12] to prove them, but to the first philosopher. And this is the open opinion of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, especially in the first and second responses. And it can easily be shown by reason from what has been said, for the modes of showing first principles also have place in the particular and proper principles of other sciences. Indeed St. Thomas adds, in the cited place, that it pertains to this science not only to confirm the intellect in the assent to principles, but also of conclusions, which can be understood remotely and mediately, because by confirming principles, it also confirms conclusions by virtue; or only materially (so to speak), because sometimes through higher causes wisdom can show conclusions which are demonstrated through other inferior media in other sciences.

[12] geometriam, Salamanca 1597, Paris 1861, Madrid 1960; geometram, Mainz 1600 (probably to harmonize it with "primum philosophum" at the end of the sentence) (discovered by Shane Duarte).

It is Not the Task of Metaphysics to Provide Instruments of Knowing

28. The opinion of some. There are those who think that this task also pertains to metaphysics. For although the dialectician teaches how to define, divide, etc., nevertheless he cannot declare such instruments from proper principles, and give their reason, but only as to the question whether they are, to hand down and expound such instruments; but it pertains to the metaphysician to discourse about them, declaring their first roots and causes. This can be explained thus concerning individuals; for definition declares the essence of a thing; but to declare the nature of essence pertains to metaphysics. Therefore also to hand down the perfect nature of definition is the task of metaphysics. Again, division declares distinction, but to treat of the distinctions of things is the task of metaphysics; therefore to explain the nature of division also pertains to it. Besides these, all force of argumentation, if we look at its form, consists in one or other of these principles: Things that are the same as a third thing are the same among themselves. The same thing cannot simultaneously be affirmed and denied of the same thing. But these principles are proper to the science of metaphysics, to which it pertains to treat of the same and different, and of being and non-being, which are explained through affirmation and negation, therefore from this title also it pertains to the metaphysician to hand down the instrument of knowing. Finally, science is a spiritual quality; therefore as such it is comprehended under the object of metaphysics; therefore by the same reasoning it pertains to metaphysics to hand down the method of acquiring science, and to declare by what modes or instruments it is acquired; for to treat of the end and means belongs to the same doctrine; but all these things are ordered to science as to an end.

29. This is refuted. But this opinion, unless it is further declared, confuses metaphysics with dialectic, for it is the proper task

of dialectic to hand down the mode of knowing, which it does in no other way than by teaching the instruments of knowing, and demonstrating their force and properties. Wherefore, that we may set forth what the truth of the matter contains, and assign to each science its proper task, it must be noted that these instruments of knowing are found properly and formally in the thoughts of the mind, or internal acts of the intellect, but are founded in things, and explained by words. For science consists in some act of the intellect, or in a habit, according to different acceptations of science, namely actual and habitual, and therefore it is necessary that the proper instruments of knowing be placed in the intellect itself and in its acts; for because man acquires science through discourse, and for perfecting discourse he needs other prior operations or conceptions of things, therefore such conceptions of the mind so disposed and ordered that they contribute per se and directly to acquiring science, are called instruments of knowing; therefore such instruments are formally in the operations of the mind. Because therefore the operations of the mind, that they may be right and true, must be proportioned and commensurate to the things themselves, therefore it is necessary that such instruments be founded in some way in the things themselves, but they are explained by words which are given by nature to express the feelings of the soul, according to that of Aristotle in Peri Hermeneias I: But those things which are in voice are signs of those passions which are in the soul; and that of Cicero, De Oratore I: In this one thing we excel the beasts, that we speak among ourselves, and that we can express our feelings by speaking.

30. The true opinion in this matter. It is the task of dialectic to treat whether and what the instruments of knowing are. Thus therefore it must be said that it does not pertain to the metaphysician to directly hand down the instruments of knowing, and to teach their mode and disposition which they ought to have in the concepts of the mind, so that they may be apt for generating science. This is proved by the argument suggested above, because this pertains to the task of

dialectic; for which reason Aristotle said, in Metaphysics II, chapter 3, that it is absurd to seek science and the mode of science simultaneously. By these words he wished to teach (as all expositors hand down) that dialectic is to be acquired before other sciences, especially before metaphysics, because it pertains to dialectic to hand down the mode of knowing; which is nothing other than to teach the instruments of knowing, and to open the mode of treating and proving things accommodated to science. Nor is it true that dialectic explains these things only perfunctorily, and as to whether it is (as they call it), both because experience establishes that dialectic not only hands down the laws of correctly defining, arguing or demonstrating, but also the reasons of these things; for it also demonstrates a priori why correct definition and argumentation require such conditions and properties, and similar things; and also because otherwise dialectic would not be sufficient for acquiring science, but it would be necessary also to premise metaphysics, which is plainly false, and against the sense and usage of all. The consequence is evident, because true science is never acquired unless one knows that he knows; for science ought to be perfect intellectual light, which manifests itself, otherwise it will not be entirely evident; but he cannot know that his cognition is true science unless he knows that his reasoning is true demonstration, which he cannot know unless he knows what true demonstration is, and why it ought to consist in such principles and such a form of reasoning. If therefore dialectic did not give the reason of all these things, but rather demanded some faith in them, it could not serve for acquiring true science or be sufficient. And this is confirmed, because demonstration is not an apt instrument of knowing unless it is known as demonstration, that is, as reasoning necessarily concluding from certain and evident principles. For if someone constructs a reason which is in itself demonstration, but is not known by him as such, but is thought to be probable reasoning, or proceeding only from certain but not evident principles, it will not generate true science in him, because such demonstration so proposed

is either an inept instrument, or not sufficiently applied to such an effect. Whence dialectic so hands down the mode of knowing that it teaches it scientifically; on account of which, those who think correctly about it consider it not only a mode of knowing, but also true science; this task therefore pertains properly and per se to dialectic, and not to metaphysics.

31. Corollary. And from this it also follows that it belongs to the same dialectic, and not to metaphysics, to hand down or direct such instruments, insofar as they can be expressed or constructed by words (under words we include writings, because in this respect they differ only materially); indeed dialectic itself does not directly and by design deal with these as with its proper object and matter, but consequently, and as if from a certain concomitance it provides this. For since words arise from concepts, while dialectic directs and orders concepts, it consequently teaches by what words or what form of words they are to be expressed so that they may have the force of persuading and demonstrating, which is entirely clear per se, and evident from the very use of dialectic.

32. Metaphysics greatly illuminates the instruments of knowing. But it must be added that, insofar as these instruments of knowing are founded in things themselves, their science and cognition is greatly perfected through metaphysical science, so that what we said metaphysics accomplishes concerning all sciences and their principles, has place with a peculiar reason concerning dialectic and its tasks. The reason for doubting placed in the beginning proves this, and it is declared in this way. For it pertains peculiarly to metaphysics to know essence and quiddity as such; but definition, whose nature and form dialectic hands down, if it is perfect, explains the essence and quiddity of a thing, and therefore while metaphysics hands down what the essence and quiddity of each thing is, it contributes very much to the perfect mode of defining. Especially because metaphysics not only hands down the nature of essence in common, but also within its own abstraction declares various grades and modes of essences; from

which it greatly depends to know of what parts definitions of things ought to consist, or what mode of defining ought to be held in distinct things (for example, in substance or accident, and in a simple or composite thing). Thus therefore metaphysics greatly perfects the art of defining, although it does not directly and by design hand it down. In a similar way it happens concerning another instrument of knowing, which is division, whose laws and conditions dialectic hands down; but all those are founded in the distinction or opposition of things; but to treat of various distinctions of things pertains to metaphysics; for the same and different are reduced to properties of being, just as one and many; and therefore, while metaphysics exactly declares various distinctions of things, it also illuminates the art of dividing. But concerning argumentation or demonstration there does not seem to be a similar reason, because it is not founded proximately in essence, or some property of being, as definition and division are; nevertheless in another way, metaphysics also helps dialectic in this task, both on the part of matter and on the part of form. On the part of matter indeed, because while metaphysics distinguishes and separates the natures of almost all beings, and generally declares what a thing is in essence, what also are properties, what is a thing, what truly a mode, it supplies matter for demonstrating and arguing, or rather exactly declares what kind both the extremes and media of demonstration ought to be; on the part of form indeed, because this doctrine exactly declares and shows all principles on which every correct form of arguing rests, such as these: Things that are the same as a third thing are the same among themselves. The same thing cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same thing, and similar ones.

33. The reasons for the opposite opinion are solved. The response to the reasons for doubting placed in the beginning is easy from what has been said. To the first about definition it is responded that the metaphysician indeed declares in common what essence is, and what kind it also is, whether simple or composite, within the

latitude of his object and his abstraction; but the dialectician treats of the mode by which the essence and nature of a thing is to be conceived by us and declared distinctly through definition, or from what concepts or words definition is to be composed, and what properties it ought to have that it may be apt; but these tasks are distinct, although they mutually help each other; for dialectic helps metaphysics as the mode of knowing helps science; but metaphysics helps dialectic as a general science, which proximately and exactly discourses about things, which dialectic either supposes, or only remotely touches. And almost the same response is to be applied to the other part about division,[13] for metaphysics treats of distinctions of things, as they are in things themselves; but dialectic treats of the mode of conceiving and explaining partitions of things. Similarly to the third member about argumentation it must be said that, although metaphysics in some way demonstrates those principles, and reduces them to that most universal: Whatever is, either is or is not, or: It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not be, nevertheless dialectic also supposes a similar principle as known per se, that is, that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied of the same thing, to which it reduces almost all force and form of correct argumentation, so that it may demonstrate its properties and conditions.

34. To what science the treatment of science pertains. To the last member about science it is responded that the consideration of science, insofar as it is some spiritual quality of the mind and a habit, or its operation of such condition and nature, can be multiple. One is

[13] de divisione, Salamanca 1597, Madrid 1960; ex divisione, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte). Suárez is refuting here the argument that the aim of metaphysics is to treat the "instrumenta sciendi", i.e. definitio, divisio, and argumentatio (1.4.28). The second part (altera pars) of the argument is "about division" (de divisione). Cf. Bartolomeo Mastri de Meldola, In Logicam, d. 1 (De modis, seu instrumentis sciendi), q. 1 (Quid, et quotuplex sit modus, seu instrumentum sciendi), Venetiis 1678, 1b-2b.

merely speculative by which we contemplate what such a thing is, and what properties it has; and this consideration either pertains to that part of natural philosophy which treats of the rational soul, if there is discussion only of human science, which is not without phantasia; or, if we speak abstractly and absolutely of science, it will pertain to metaphysics, for it is a thing or property abstracting from matter according to being. Another consideration of science is quasi-practical and artificial, which is not about habits, but about acts of science; for art is concerned with operations; and this consideration has place only in human science, which is perfected through composition and discourse, for art is not concerned with simple things, but with composite ones; for the scope of art is to direct some composition, or harmony, whence the artificial form arises from due proportion and composition of parts or simple things; this direction and consideration of science therefore pertains to dialectic, which is the art of knowing, not to metaphysics. But that dialectic may exercise this task, it is not necessary that it exactly speculate on the whole nature and essence of that quality which is science, but it suffices that it suppose it to be an operation of the mind, and hand down some of its properties, which it requires for manifesting truth exactly and without error, such as that it be evident, certain, and similar. And this cognition of science is handed down by the dialectician, as is established from the books of the Posterior Analytics, and it suffices for the dialectician, that he may direct his art and method of knowing to it as to an end. Finally, another consideration of science can be called moral, insofar as the use or exercise of science can be worthy of praise or blame; which task pertains to moral philosophy or prudence.

SECTION V

WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS THE MOST PERFECT SPECULATIVE SCIENCE AND TRUE WISDOM

Section V

1. In explaining the final cause and utility of this science, we have simultaneously declared its effect; for its entire utility is placed in its operation and effect. It remains therefore for us to say a few things about its attributes, which can easily be gathered from its subject matter and from its end.

2. First conclusion. I say first that metaphysical science is the most perfect of all speculative sciences. So teaches Aristotle in book I, chapter 2, and book II, chapter 1, and book III, chapter 2; and all interpreters agree. This assertion is sufficiently proven from what has been said. For in the preceding section we showed that the end of this science is the cognition of truth, and that it rests in itself; but a science is called speculative from this end, as Aristotle teaches in book VI, and will be treated in its proper place below. But in the first section it was shown that the object of this science is most noble, both in the being of the object, on account of its supreme abstraction, and in the being of the thing on account of the most noble entities which it comprehends. But every science has its nobility from its object; therefore this science is the most excellent of all speculative sciences.

3. Small question. But someone will perhaps ask whether this science is purely speculative, or also practical; for as I now suppose, it is not repugnant for the same science or cognition to be simultaneously speculative and practical in an eminent manner; for theologians attribute this to divine science, not only as it is in God himself, but also as it is participated by us, either through clear vision, or through obscure theology and faith; therefore also among acquired and natural sciences there could be some which participates in this eminence, and is simultaneously speculative and practical. And if this belongs to any science, it ought to belong maximally to this doctrine: first, because it is supreme among all sciences, and commands all of them, as Aristotle said in the introduction. Second, because it perfects natural knowledge of God, insofar as this can be done by the light of nature; but from knowledge of God depends right judgment about things to be done; therefore this judgment is also directed through this

science, and thus from that part it is practical. And this is declared in this way, for this science demonstrates the divine attributes which can be demonstrated by the light of nature, among which are: that he is supremely good, that he is the ultimate end of all things, that he is the first truth; therefore this science demonstrates all these things; therefore it will also demonstrate that God is to be loved above all things, because this is owed to him insofar as he is supremely good and the ultimate end. Again, this science demonstrates that God has providence over all things, and that he is most wise and most just; therefore consequently it will also teach that he is to be feared, and that he is to be trusted, and similar things, which all pertain to morals and practice. Finally, infused Theology is rightly considered eminently practical and speculative for no other reason than because under a higher light it considers in God that aspect of the ultimate end to be attained through moral and practical means; therefore the same will be true of natural metaphysics, as it proceeds under a lower light, proportion being maintained.

4. Response. Nevertheless it must be said that this doctrine has nothing of practical science, but is only contemplative. This is taken from Aristotle and other expositors, for although they do not expressly touch upon this question, nevertheless while they simply teach that this science is speculative, and either remain silent about the practical, or certainly deny it, they clearly feel that it is purely speculative. It follows that Aristotle, in the books of the Ethics, disputed ex professo about human happiness as about the first rule of moral actions. But human happiness consists in God as he is the ultimate end of all things, and in a singular way of rational creatures; therefore that consideration does not pertain to metaphysics; therefore no other consideration remains under which this doctrine could be practical. Because if it is practical, it is maximally moral; for it is clear in itself that it is not factive or directive of operations of art, indeed not even of intellectual actions, as was said in the preceding section; but it is not moral, because the consideration of the ultimate

end in relation to morals is not its function, but that of moral philosophy, as has been said.

5. Why theology is speculative and practical, metaphysics only speculative. But the reason can be given a priori from the difference between supernatural Theology and this natural one; which must be taken from the difference of light under which each proceeds. For the former proceeds under the light of divine revelation of faith, insofar as it is applied mediately and through discourse to conclusions contained in the principles of faith; but faith not only reveals God as the ultimate end of all things, but also specially teaches that human happiness consists in him; and therefore faith reveals not only speculative truths about God, but also practical ones; indeed it reveals almost all the first principles of morals; and it deals with the same certainty, and in itself in the same way concerning all these things; from which Theology discourses, considering not only speculatively in God the aspect of the ultimate end, but also morally in relation to the means by which it is to be attained. But truly metaphysics proceeds only under natural light, which does not embrace all its objects in the same way nor with the same certainty; and therefore metaphysics is not a habit adequate to that, but under a special certain aspect and abstraction it perfects natural light concerning those objects which abstract from matter according to being, as we have said. And therefore it considers God only speculatively concerning the aspect of ultimate end and supreme good, namely, insofar as he is such in himself, and can be known as such by the light of nature, rather as to whether he is than as to what he is. But it does not consider practically how this end is to be attained by man; indeed it does not even particularly touch upon or inquire into the mode by which God is the ultimate end of man, or by which man himself can attain God, as he is his ultimate end; because this is already below metaphysical abstraction and contemplation, and pertains to philosophy; indeed it presupposes the physical consideration of man, or natural philosophy, which is merely speculative; and it pertains to moral philosophy,

which in some way, and (so to speak) inchoatively, is practical science; concerning the distinction of which sciences this is not the place to speak. I confess nevertheless that if there could be had a natural science of angels, as they are in themselves, metaphysically, it would pertain to it not only to contemplate their nature, but also how they would be capable of their ultimate end, and in what their happiness would consist, and by what means they could arrive at it; which science would be moral in part, and would simultaneously join some practice with speculation; and it would be entirely metaphysical, because it would entirely abstract from matter according to being. Nevertheless such a science would be angelic rather than human; for we can scarcely investigate anything about the happiness of angels except by analogy to our own; and therefore metaphysics as it is in us is merely speculative in every part, and does not descend to moral or practical matters.

6. Second conclusion. I say second: metaphysics is not only science, but also natural wisdom. Aristotle posits and proves this assertion ex professo in book I, chapters 1 and 2, and book III, chapter 2. He first supposes that there is in us some intellectual virtue which is wisdom; which the same Aristotle also taught in Ethics VI, chapter 2 and following. And this is the common consensus of all wise men; for if no habit of man were wisdom, no man could be called wise, for the wise man is and is called wise from wisdom; for man is not wise by nature, nor from potency or faculty alone, as is clear in itself, otherwise all men would be wise; but man becomes wise by some use, and habit or virtue; therefore wisdom is a habit. Again, from the very word and the understanding of all, it is established that it signifies a habit pertaining to the intellect, not just any, but a perfect one, and one which is an intellectual virtue, and very perfect. Which Aristotle proves by excellent reasoning in the introduction, chapter 1, distinguishing experience from art, and art from science, which is sought for its own sake, and is concerned with knowledge of causes

and principles; and concluding that wisdom ought to be some such science.

7. Multiple meanings of wisdom. But it must be noted here that if we attend to common speech, sometimes this name of wisdom seems to signify not one determinate habit of the intellect, but a certain intellectual rectitude for judging well about all things, arising from perfect attainment of all sciences, in the way that justice in one meaning does not signify one singular habit, but the harmony and rectitude of all virtues of the will. And to this meaning of wisdom those descriptions of Cicero seem best accommodated: "Wisdom is the science of divine and human things and of the causes by which these things are contained."[14] And ancient philosophers seem to have spoken of wisdom in the same sense, who said concerning the nature of wisdom that it belongs to it to have knowledge of all things, even down to the lowest species, and all their properties; for this is not done by one science, but by the collection of all. Indeed, if we speak of man, neither does he attain such exact knowledge of all things through all sciences taken together, and therefore they themselves said that there is not true wisdom in man, but counterfeit; but we more truly say that there is true wisdom in man, even natural, but human, and therefore very limited. But in another way, and more customary among the wise, wisdom is taken for some peculiar habit, and this in two ways, for there is a certain one which is called wisdom simply, another which is only wisdom in a qualified sense; the former is in some way universal, not by predication, or by collection of all things, but by eminence and power, as we shall immediately declare; the latter is particular, not only in habit, but also in matter and power. Concerning this latter wisdom there is a long discourse of Socrates in Plato, dialogue III, or On Wisdom, where he distinguishes the wisdom of craftsmen and governors, and similar ones. And in this same way Paul seems to have spoken in 1 Corinthians 3: "As a wise architect, I laid the foundation." For he is called wise in some genus, or matter,

[14] Cf. Paris 1861, vol. 1, p. 39a, footnote: "IV Tusc., et II Officior...

who perfectly knows the science or art which is concerned with it, and through the supreme causes of that genus, as St. Thomas noted, II-II, q. 45, a. 1. Finally in another way (as St. Thomas says in the same place) a certain particular science, or intellectual virtue is called wisdom simply, and Aristotle used this word in this way, in Ethics book VI, in the cited place, and in the present; and in this sense he attributes this dignity of wisdom to metaphysics.

8. Several properties of wisdom. Second, to prove this Aristotle adds, in chapter 2, the conditions of wisdom, of which some are common to it with other speculative sciences; but others are proper to it; and those which seem to be common are to be understood as belonging to wisdom according to a certain eminence and singular perfection. The first condition therefore is that wisdom be concerned with all things, and be the science of all things, as far as possible. This condition has been sufficiently explained by us in section 2. But its reason will be established from what is to be said.

9. The second condition of wisdom posited by Aristotle is that it be concerned with more difficult things and those more remote from the senses, for to know those things which are obvious to all, or which are perceived by the senses, pertains not to the wise, but to any common men. But this condition seems to be understood concerning knowledge of more difficult things, as much as is possible for man, for it does not pertain to human wisdom to seek things higher than oneself, and which cannot be known by natural light, such as future contingent events, and similar things, which to wish to know through human science is not wisdom, but temerity. Therefore human wisdom is concerned with higher and more difficult things according to the capacity of human genius.

10. The third condition is that it be most certain knowledge; under which condition also evidence and clarity[15] are comprehended, because natural certainty, of which we speak, is born from evidence,

[15] claritas, Salamanca 1597, Madrid 1960; charitas, Paris 1861. Cf. Madrid 1960, vol. 1, p. 298, footnote.

and is commensurated to it. But the clear reason for this condition is that wisdom signifies perfect science, and excellent knowledge; but the greatest perfection of human knowledge is placed in certainty and evidence.

11. The fourth condition is that it be more apt for teaching and delivering the causes of things. Aristotle had signified this same thing in chapter 1, saying that the sign of the wise man is to be able to teach, and that it pertains to the wise man to know and deliver the causes of things. Likewise in each art or science we consider that one wiser who more intimately and more universally comprehends the causes of things. Finally human knowledge is then more perfect when it attains the cause, otherwise it is always imperfect; the sign of which is that the mind of the inquirer does not rest until it finds the cause. Therefore that wisdom will be wisdom simply which attains the higher and more universal causes of things, whence it will also happen that it is more apt for teaching.

12. The fifth is that such wisdom is maximally worthy to be desired for its own sake and for the sake of knowing; for this pertains to dignity, as is clear in itself, since therefore wisdom obtains a certain dignity and excellence among sciences, there is no doubt that it should be placed in that genus of sciences which are sought for the sake of knowing itself; and that in this it has a certain supreme and excellent grade, and thus that it is maximally desirable for its own sake.

13. The sixth property of wisdom is to rule over others, rather than to serve them; which is also consonant with its dignity; but in what sense this should be understood, I shall immediately declare. Only concerning these properties I note that Aristotle in assigning them almost does not speak of wisdom, but of the wise man, nevertheless he understands that science to be wisdom by reason of which these conditions belong to the wise man. But if someone should say that these properties do not belong to the wise man by reason of one science, but by reason of all or several simultaneously, it must be answered that it now remains to be shown, by proving that

these conditions are found in the science of metaphysics, and simultaneously it will be shown that there is one certain science which excels all others in all those attributes, and therefore is wisdom, and that this is metaphysics.

14. It is demonstrated that the said properties of wisdom are found in metaphysics[16]. Third therefore Aristotle proves, in said chapter 2, that all these conditions are found in metaphysics. The first indeed, because he who is endowed with universal science knows all subjects in some way; but metaphysics is the most universal science; therefore it is the science of all things, in the mode which wisdom requires, namely, as much as possible. Concerning this condition enough has been said above, in section 2, and from what was said there it is permitted to gather that metaphysics treats of all things in two or three ways. First confusedly and in common, insofar as it treats of the common aspects of being common to all things, or to all substances, or accidents, and consequently of the first and most universal principles, in which all principles of the remaining sciences are in some way founded. Second in particular concerning all things down to their proper differences and species, which is in some way true, nevertheless not equally nor in the same way in all things; for in things or aspects of things which abstract from matter according to being, this is simply true on the part of the things themselves; nevertheless it is limited from the imperfection of our intellect. And so human metaphysics (of which we treat) demonstrates and discusses concerning these things, as much as human genius can by natural light. But in things which concern sensible or intelligible matter or quantity, this is not simply true, even on the part of the science itself, but insofar as transcendental predicates are found in them, or metaphysical aspects and means abstracting from matter are in some way applied to them, so that something about them is demonstrated through these. Third we can add that this science treats of all things not in

[16] demonstrantur, Salamanca 1597; demonstratur, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte)

themselves, but in their causes, because it disputes concerning the most universal causes of all things, and especially concerning God.

15. Therefore it could be inquired which of these modes suffices for the nature of wisdom, and consequently in what part metaphysics is wisdom, or whether it is wisdom only insofar as it comprehends all these modes. To which it seems briefly to be said that metaphysics requires that entire amplitude and knowledge, in order to be absolutely and simply wisdom. For indeed if someone from metaphysics knows the common nature of being insofar as it is being, and its attributes and principles, he has indeed inchoate wisdom, since he holds universal principles, by which he can confirm and judge other principles. Likewise, because he has a certain science, or part of science very desirable in itself, and most worthy to be known, and most useful and in some way necessary to all other sciences; therefore that would be some sort of wisdom. Nevertheless it could not be called wisdom simply, for what wisdom is wisdom simply without knowledge of God? Likewise, because being insofar as it is being, resting precisely in that, although in the aspect of knowable object it is sufficiently perfect on account of its abstraction, subtlety and transcendence, nevertheless in the being of the thing it has minimal perfection, for it is greater in determinate beings; but for the nature of wisdom an object knowable without dignity of the things which are known is not sufficient. Nevertheless if we force the name, certainly metaphysics, if it rests in that most abstract aspect of being, will not be a sufficiently savory science, so that it can be called wisdom simply. On the contrary indeed if there were imagined a metaphysics which treated of God, and not of being, that indeed would have something more of the nature of wisdom, both on account of the nobility of the object, which in reality is no less abstract than being, although not in predication or universality, and on account of the pleasure, which such contemplation has maximally joined to it, and finally on account of virtual containment and causality, from which it happens that such knowledge of God easily begets knowledge of other things.

Nevertheless such exact and demonstrative knowledge of God cannot be obtained through natural theology, without first knowing the common aspects of being, substance, cause, and similar things, because we do not know God except from effects, and under common aspects, with negations adjoined by which we exclude imperfections. And therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics be wisdom under the last aspect, unless it also includes the first. But if there were imagined a metaphysics which from the first and second mode of knowing all things has whatever is necessary for knowing God, and primarily attains and contemplates him, that indeed could be called wisdom absolutely, even if it knew little or nothing specifically about other things; nevertheless it would be very imperfect and mutilated wisdom, which would be necessary to ignore many things even about God, or to attain them imperfectly; because since God is known from effects, with the principal effects ignored, it would be necessary that knowledge of God himself also be diminished. And for this reason Aristotle rightly called not a part of metaphysics, but that entire science wisdom simply, which he said is only one, Ethics VI, chapter 7, and St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2.

16. Aristotle proves that the second condition of wisdom is found in metaphysics, because it treats of things maximally universal, and most remote from sense; but these are most difficult for us to know; for since our knowledge arises from sense, what is farthest from sense falls with difficulty into our understanding. But taking occasion from this, interpreters are accustomed to dispute whether our intellect in this state directly knows singulars, or only universals; and whether among universals themselves it more easily knows those which are less common, such as ultimate species, and therefore it is true what Aristotle says in this place, that the most universal things are most difficult to know. Nevertheless the former of these questions is entirely foreign to the present undertaking; for what does it matter for declaring the dignity of metaphysical science, or for understanding the aforesaid text of Aristotle, whether the singular is directly known by

the intellect, or not? This question therefore is entirely to be remitted by us to its proper place, that is, to the science of the soul. For we hope that it will come to pass that, with God's help, we shall sometime deliver the disputations of that science also elaborated according to our strength. But if we shall not be able to attain this, what has been delivered by the most serious authors concerning the aforesaid question up to now will suffice: for I have decided to discourse about nothing outside its proper place, or entirely outside method, even if such disputation should be entirely omitted; for I consider it of less inconvenience to be silent about something, than to obscure and confuse lucid and distinct method by inopportunely calling in foreign questions from elsewhere.

17. Whether our intellect more easily knows universals or singulars. And almost the same reason applies to the posterior question, which I shall therefore also omit, touching only what is necessary so that the sense of Aristotle in the cited place may be understood, lest he seem to contradict himself. For indeed in Physics book I, immediately in the beginning he says that in science one must proceed from more universal things to particulars, because one must begin from things better known to us, and more universal things are better known to us; but here he says that this science is about the most difficult things, because it is about the most universal things, which are most difficult for men to know. St. Thomas reconciles this apparent contradiction, I Metaphysics, chapter 2, lecture 2, so that we understand that Aristotle in Physics I spoke only of simple apprehension, and imperfect knowledge of universal things, but here of scientific knowledge and complex, by which we distinctly know the proper aspects of universals, and demonstrate their properties concerning them. For those things which more easily come to mind through simple apprehension are not always also more easily penetrated intimately and known; for what do we more easily apprehend than time, motion, and similar things? But what is more difficult to inquire into as to exact knowledge, both of the formal

aspect or entity, and of the properties of such things? Thus therefore more universal things are said to be better known to us as to simple and imperfect apprehension, as to whether it is (so to speak); for who does not more easily conceive this to be a tree, than whether it is a pear or fig? For we need fewer things for these more universal confused and imperfect concepts, and therefore we more easily form them. But when we inquire into their exact knowledge, we more difficultly attain it, because they are more remote from the senses, as Aristotle said here.

18. But I see only this objection to this explanation, that Aristotle in Physics I does not seem to speak only of that crude and imperfect apprehension of universals, but of scientific knowledge; for from that facility of knowing more universal things he concludes the order to be preserved in science; but science ought not to proceed from things better known as to apprehension, but as to that knowledge which can be had through science; for if scientific knowledge is more difficult, it will contribute almost nothing that simple apprehension is easier, so that according to convenient method one should begin from such things. Add that it is established by experience itself that even in scientific knowledge common aspects are more easily known than proper ones, such as mobile or natural being, than heaven or man and the aspect of being, than the aspect of substance or accident. And reason also persuades this, for in science there is intended per se and directly distinct knowledge both of essence and of properties of each thing, or formal aspect, and universals themselves are not treated or known, properly speaking, as they are total universals or potential, under which aspect their distinct knowledge depends on knowledge of inferior things; for this is as it were reflexive knowledge and dialectical, because that property or aspect of the potential whole belongs rather through the intellect than in reality; for such universals are known in proper and real sciences according to proper actual essences, and properties consonant and adequate to them; but thus more universal things are more easily known, because knowledge of

less universal things entirely depends on them, but not conversely, because more universal things are of the nature of the inferior, and not conversely. And this objection seems not only to conclude that Aristotle in Physics I spoke of scientific knowledge of more universal things, but also that it is false that these more universal things are more difficult to know.

19. Wherefore some wish that Aristotle in this place spoke not of universal aspects, but of universal causes, that is, not of universals which they call in predicating, concerning which he had spoken in Physics I, and concerning which the discourse proceeds, but of universals in causing, as are God and the intelligences. Concerning which the reason of Aristotle also seems to be rightly understood, namely, because universals are most remote from the senses; for this is true of universals in causing, but minimally of the others; for since these are also in material singulars, they do not seem remote from sense; for this being, or this substance is presented to sense, just as this animal or this man, whence more universal predicates are more easily presented to the senses by reason of their proper singulars, than less universal ones, and therefore more easily falls into our intellect, at least on our part, animal than man, and substance than animal and so concerning others; because, speaking regularly, and according to the ordinary mode by which sensible objects are applied to us, they more easily impress on the senses the species or phantasms of their singulars.

20. Nevertheless this explanation is commonly rejected by interpreters of Aristotle; for although they admit that what the Philosopher said is true also of universal causes, nevertheless they teach that he properly spoke of more universal predicates, both because these are properly and simply called universals; and also because truly even from that part by which metaphysics treats of being and substance as such, it is more difficult than other sciences. And into these predicates also falls the reason of Aristotle, namely, that they are farther from the senses according to their abstraction and precise

aspect; for these common aspects do not have proper singulars, but descend to singulars through mediate aspects less universal.

21. The mode of reconciliation drawn from St. Thomas is explained and approved. The commentators bring forward other responses, both concerning this passage in the Metaphysics and that one in the Physics, and concerning book I of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 2, and book II, chapters 15 and 18, where Aristotle also says that universals are better known by nature, particulars by us. Setting these aside, I think we should persist in the former response, provided it is explained somewhat. Therefore, I think it should be said that Aristotle in book I of the Physics spoke concerning the order of teaching, in which he says one must begin from more universal things, because they are better known to us with regard to simple and confused cognition of them, insofar as they are certain wholes that are potential and universal. Nor does it matter that in the sciences confused cognition is not intended, but distinct cognition, because Aristotle does not say that more universal things are better known by that cognition which is sought through science, but rather by that which is presupposed as imperfect, so that it might be perfected through science. But in this passage of the Metaphysics, Aristotle does not treat the order of teaching to be observed by us, but rather the obtaining of perfect science of the objects themselves, and in this way he says that more universal things are more difficult to know. However, he did not assert this simply, but with this limitation almost; because it sometimes happens that more universal things are also better known to us even with regard to perfect cognition; because the difficulty which exists in them on the part of abstraction can be compensated for from elsewhere; in which way natural being as such is better known to us than the heavens, and being than an angel. Nevertheless, despite that limitation, Aristotle concludes that this science concerns the most difficult things, because in it there is such abstraction that it altogether prescrinds from matter, and from sensible actions and properties as such, and therefore nothing can exist in its

object from which the difficulty arising from such great abstraction might be removed, and these things are sufficient concerning that second condition.

22. Doubt. Concerning the third condition of wisdom, one may rightly doubt how it befits this doctrine, namely, to be most certain. And the principal reason for the difficulty arises from the mathematical sciences, which seem much more certain, since they proceed from most evident principles, indeed even from those most known to the senses. Hence the same Aristotle, in book II of the Metaphysics, chapter 3, text 16, indicates that the mode of proceeding in mathematics is most accurate and most certain, because it abstracts from matter and change, from which philosophy does not abstract, and although metaphysics seems to abstract, if the things it treats are considered, nevertheless as it exists in us, it does not seem to abstract, because it does not consider those things except from sensible effects which are involved with matter. Hence the same Aristotle, in book II, text 1, says that things most known by their nature are unknown to us, because our intellect is related to them as the sight of a bat is to the light of the sun. And this is confirmed, for human cognition begins from sense, whence it receives clarity and certainty; therefore, the more remote cognition is from sense concerning things, the less certain it will be; just as Aristotle concludes from this principle above that this science is most difficult, so he could have concluded that it is most uncertain. Indeed, these two things seem always to be joined together, namely difficulty and uncertainty, or lesser certainty; if therefore this science is most difficult, it will consequently be less certain.

23. Response. Two parts of this doctrine seem to be distinguished: one is that which treats of being as being, and its principles and properties. The other is that which treats certain particular accounts of beings, especially of immaterial things. Concerning the former part, there is no doubt that this doctrine is most certain of all, which is sufficient for this property to be attributed

to it absolutely and simply, for whenever comparison is made among habits, it ought to be made according to what is best and greatest in them, as is taken from Topics III, chapter 2; thus therefore Aristotle in the said prologue absolutely says this doctrine is most certain, and he seems to speak of it as it exists in us. And his reasoning is excellent, and proceeds concerning this science with regard to this part, namely, because that science is most certain which is most occupied with first principles, and which accomplishes the matter from fewer things; but this science is such, because such a science is more independent, and has more known principles, from which other principles receive strength and certainty, as has been declared; for in this way those things which the mathematical sciences treat include common and transcendental predicates, concerning which metaphysics treats; mathematical principles also include metaphysical ones, and depend upon them.

24. But concerning the other part of this science, which is occupied with determinate accounts of being, a distinction must be made; for it can be more certain science, either in itself, or with regard to us. Therefore the science of these things in itself is without doubt most certain, and surpasses the mathematical sciences. For the certainty of science must in this way be weighed from the object; but such things and immaterial substances are in themselves apt to generate most certain cognition of themselves, because just as they are more perfect beings and more necessary, simple and abstract, so in them there is greater truth, and greater certainty of principles. But truly on the part of our intellect this science is less certain in us with regard to this part, as experience teaches, and the reasons of the doubt posited in the beginning prove. Especially that one, that since our cognition arises from sense, we attain more obscurely and by the nature of the thing less certainly those things which abstract from all sensible matter.

25. Several doubts are proposed and resolved. First. You will say first: therefore this science as it exists in us is always less certain in

this part than mathematics; therefore it is simply less certain, because the metaphysics of which we treat is none other than human; but this exists only in us; what therefore does it matter for the nobility of metaphysics that according to itself it is more certain? for that will be true of angelic metaphysics, not of ours. Hence in treating our metaphysics, a contradiction seems to be involved in that distinction, according to itself, and as it exists in us; for this distinction accommodated to objects or things known fits very well, and thus Aristotle has often used it in Posterior Analytics I, and in the beginning of the Physics and Metaphysics; but truly accommodated to our acts or habits it seems in no way to be able to have place, on account of the reason given; but here we speak not of objects, but of the thing itself. Some respond that it is sufficient that metaphysics in angels is more certain, because it is of the same account as ours, because it treats of these beings under the same account or abstraction. But this is not correctly said, because that angelic science is of a higher account, first because it is either a priori and perfect, namely, as it is occupied with created things, or if it is a posteriori, as concerning God, it is through perfect cognition of nobler effects. Then because sciences differ in genus from the mode of proceeding; but the mode of understanding of angels is higher, simpler, and essentially more perfect.

26. Comparison between metaphysics and mathematics in certainty. It is therefore responded first, that perhaps in some state human metaphysics can be more perfect and more certain than mathematics are; for, although in acquiring this science by natural powers alone and in the ordinary human way, it cannot be obtained so perfectly, if nevertheless our intellect is aided by some superior cause in the very natural discourse, or if the science itself is made in a supernatural way, although the thing itself is natural, it can perhaps be so clear and evident that it surpasses mathematics. But because this response is more theological than philosophical, I add further, that although metaphysics in us is always inferior to mathematics in

certainty with regard to this part, it is nevertheless simply and essentially nobler; to which it greatly matters that it is more certain according to itself, and on the part of the object; for the dignity of the object especially regards the dignity of science, and that is what per se redounds to science; but the imperfections which are mixed in from our part are more per accidens, and the given distinction tends to this, in which sense it involves no contradiction.

27. Second doubt. Someone will doubt secondly, for hence it follows that this science of metaphysics, insofar as it treats of God, is less certain with regard to us, than as it treats of intelligences, which nevertheless does not seem true. The consequence is thus deduced from the reason given, for if this science is less certain with regard to us, as it is occupied with things abstracted from matter, because our cognition begins from material things, therefore the more the thing which metaphysics treats is elongated and remote from this matter, the less certain will metaphysics be, as it is occupied with that thing; but God is supremely distant from material and sensible things; therefore. It is responded by denying the consequence, speaking absolutely. For in two ways one thing can be understood to be more distant from another, namely, by perfection or entity, and by causality or connection of effect and cause. In the former way God is more distant from material things than created spirits; but in the latter way created spirits are more distant from all created things than God. For all things depend essentially on God, not on other spirits, and, properly speaking, all things imitate God, and bear some likeness or vestige of him; but what results from this, namely some likeness, or agreement with angels, is secondary and accidental. Because therefore we ascend from sensible things not considered in any way whatever, but as effects, to contemplate separate substances, hence it happens that we naturally attain cognition of God more certainly than of angels, which will be more evident from experience itself and from what is to be said.

Section V

28. Third doubt. Thirdly, it can be doubted especially concerning the former part posited, whether this science surpasses others only with regard to the certainty of principles, or also of conclusions. For the reason given seems to proceed only concerning principles; but if this is said, it follows that not this science, but the habit of principles, which is distinct, is more certain than other sciences. Hence in passing it can also be doubted whether this science is more certain than the habit of principles. For if this is said, the posited difficulty is easily resolved, as is evident per se; but this very thing seems most difficult; for this science rests upon the very first principles; how therefore can it be more certain than the habit of those principles, since here also that axiom is true: That on account of which each thing is such, that thing is more so?

29. Beginning from this latter part, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2,[17] indicates that wisdom is nobler and more certain even than the very habit of principles; for he thus says: Science depends upon intellect, as upon something more principal, and both depend upon wisdom, as upon something most principal, which contains under itself both intellect and science; therefore St. Thomas feels that wisdom is more principal and more perfect than intellect or the habit of principles. And he indicates the reason, because wisdom has whatever perfection exists in the habit of principles, and that very thing in a nobler way, and besides this something more; therefore it is more perfect. The antecedent is declared, because intellect is occupied with first principles, bearing judgment concerning them; but wisdom has this very thing, as was shown above, and beyond this it is occupied with many other things, which are inferred from principles, and with most noble things, and the first causes of things, as was shown above. Again, wisdom is occupied with those very first principles in a nobler way, because intellect is occupied in a simple way only, bearing

[17] The passage quoted is from Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2. But the editions Salamanca 1597 and Cologne 1614 both have "Ia-IIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2", while the 1605 Venice edition has "Ia, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2" (discovered by Shane Duarte).

judgment from the natural and immediate efficacy of the natural light of intellect; but wisdom, making reflection upon that very light, and contemplating its origin, from which it has all its certainty, assumes it as a medium for demonstrating the truth and certainty of principles; but this mode of judging seems higher, and more comprehensive; therefore wisdom has more perfection than intellect, and whatever nobility exists in intellect, it has in a more perfect way. Hence also the difficulty insinuated to the contrary seems to be satisfied; for, although wisdom in the beginning and as if by way of generation depends upon intellect, because it is necessary that it presuppose some principles, nevertheless according to itself, if it is perfect, it does not depend upon it essentially, but suffices per se for assenting to principles through proper media and reflection upon the very intellectual light, and perhaps it can arrive at that perfection, that now without any formal discourse it may provide assent to its principles. And Albert holds the same opinion, in the book On Apprehension, part 5, and it has great foundation in Aristotle, book I of Posterior Analytics, chapter 7, text 23, where he indicates that metaphysics is prince of all, because it demonstrates its principles, and book VI of the Ethics, chapter 7, where he thus says: It is fitting that the wise man not only know those things which are cognized from principles, but also speak truly concerning principles. Therefore wisdom is both intellect and science, and (as it were the head) science of those things which are affected with the highest honors. But he could not understand wisdom to be an aggregate from intellect and some science, since he distinguished these individually as diverse virtues; therefore he understands it to be intellect and science according to a certain eminent perfection, as the commentators also understand there; and Buridan disputes this, question 12, who insinuates this opinion in the last question of the same book VI of the Ethics.

30. Whether metaphysics is more certain than the habit of principles. Nevertheless some probably think this opinion should be limited, so that, namely, wisdom is preferred to the intellect of

principles, as it is occupied with principles of other sciences, but not as it is occupied with principles of the same metaphysics. This limitation seems to be taken from the words which St. Thomas adds above, saying that wisdom is most principal and contains under itself intellect and science: As judging (he says) concerning the conclusions of sciences, and concerning the principles of the same; where that relative "of the same" should be noted; for it refers to other sciences distinct from wisdom; therefore wisdom is only compared to intellect, as it is occupied with principles of other sciences, and because it judges concerning them, and therefore it is said to be nobler. But truly otherwise it seems to happen in the same wisdom, compared to intellect, as it is occupied with principles of wisdom itself; for from that as from a proximate source it has all its certainty. Likewise, that habit is occupied with the same things in a nobler way, because that habit does not stop at first most abstract principles, pertaining to being as such, and to other abstract terms, such as this: Whatever is, either is or is not, and similar things, but also is occupied with first principles of substance as such, and of God, and of intelligences as such; hence to it properly pertains to contemplate their quiddities; for the quiddity of a thing is understood through simple cognition, or from it an immediate principle is constituted, if it is cognized by us through composition; but to wisdom it will pertain to demonstrate the properties of these things from the quiddity. And indeed it does not seem to be able to be denied, that cognition of those principles upon which this science rests, is simply more certain than the science itself, since it depends upon that as upon its proper cause, of another and superior account in the mode of assenting. Nor does it matter that metaphysics reflects upon its principles, so as to demonstrate them; for it is always necessary that according to its proper account it proceed through discourse, and rest upon prior principles, which it takes as more known and more certain; for it should not be said that the same acquired habit assents through discourse and without discourse. Therefore absolutely and universally comparing the principles of

metaphysics to the science itself, cognition of those principles is more certain. And experience itself confirms this; for nothing is demonstrated in metaphysics which under that account is as certain as this principle, whatever is, either is or is not, insofar as it is known per se.

31. How wisdom is more excellent than all other intellectual habits. When therefore wisdom is preferred to all other intellectual virtues, even to the intellect of principles, it can be understood first of wisdom as it includes its principles, and is compared to other sciences, as they also include their principles and conclusions; for thus sciences are wont to be considered, is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chapter 2, text 5, where Fonseca notes this. But metaphysics is said to exceed other sciences with regard to the certainty both of conclusions and also of principles, not only comparing principles to principles, and conclusions to conclusions; for thus it would not be a proper comparison of science to intellect, but of science to science, and of intellect to intellect; in which sense also one particular science can be said to be more certain than the intellect of principles, because it can have more certain principles. Therefore it should be understood, even comparing conclusions of metaphysics to proper principles of other sciences, that metaphysics is said to exceed in certainty, because its discourse rests upon principles so well known and certain, that it can generate assent more certain than the simple assent of some principles in other matters; and on account of other reasons made above.

32. A less evident habit can be nobler than a more evident one, and a less certain than a more certain. Or secondly, and perhaps more clearly, it can be said that wisdom is preferred to the intellect of principles in nobility, and excellence simply, but not always in certainty or evidence, especially with respect to us, or as it exists in us; for not always does the nobility of a habit, or its dignity, or of science, convert with certainty or evidence, for Christian faith is simply nobler in its substance or species than natural metaphysics, although it is not so clear and evident: and natural philosophy is nobler than

mathematics, although it is less certain, on account of the nobility of the object, which contributes more to the dignity of intellectual virtue simply, as St. Thomas indicated, book I On the Soul, chapter 1, and I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, where he adduces that saying of Aristotle, book I On the Parts of Animals, chapter 5: Although we can attain superior things only lightly, nevertheless on account of the excellence of that kind of knowing we are delighted more than when we hold all these things joined to us. And he has a nearly similar opinion in book I On the Heavens, chapter 12. Therefore wisdom or metaphysics, even if it is not more certain in us than intellect, at least with regard to its principles, is nevertheless simply nobler and higher, because it attains nobler beings and supreme causes of beings, namely God and intelligences, which the intellect of principles does not attain according to their proper accounts, but only according to the common account of being, and of substance; for, although concerning God and intelligences many things are principles known per se according to themselves, nevertheless with respect to us nothing is known per se; for, if that God exists is not known to us per se, as we will show below, much less other things, which are demonstrated concerning these things in metaphysics. And thus it happens that concerning these things we cognize nothing immediately through the intellect of principles, but only through wisdom, and therefore wisdom is nobler, even if it is not more certain than its principles, as it exists in us; because for greater nobility it is sufficient that it concerns things simpler and more certain according to themselves, with that certainty and evidence, which can be had through the natural light of human genius. Hence the natural beatitude of man (which maximally confirms this) consists not in some act of the intellect of principles, but in the act and contemplation of wisdom, Aristotle saying, Ethics VI, chapter 12, that just as health is a certain happiness of the body, so wisdom is the happiness of the soul; and therefore in the same place he prefers it to prudence; for prudence is referred to wisdom as to an end, for prudence is (as he excellently says) the procurator of wisdom;

for thus it rules the mind, so as to render it peaceful, and free from perturbation, which is maximally necessary for the contemplation of wisdom; and he teaches the same thing in Ethics X, chapters 7 and 8.

33. And from these things the resolution of the third doubt is also evident with regard to the former part of it; for it must be said that this doctrine is more certain than other sciences, not only with regard to principles, but also with regard to conclusions. This indeed, if it is understood proportionately, is indubitable, as I said, namely, that the principles of this science are more certain than the principles of other sciences, and the conclusions of this, than the conclusions of others; for this latter follows from the former; for those conclusions are more certain, which follow from more certain principles by the same kind of inference. But that the principles are more certain is evident, because they are more abstract and more universal, and first of all, as we will see below; hence they can serve to demonstrate in some way the principles of other sciences, as has been declared. But truly if that comparison is understood absolutely, and without the said proportion, that is, that this science according to its whole self, even according to its conclusions, surpasses in certainty other sciences, according to the whole that is in them, even with regard to their principles, thus the comparison is less certain, and not necessary for the nobility and perfection of wisdom. Nevertheless it is probable, if we speak of proper and particular principles of other sciences, as they are cognized by us; for you will scarcely find one, which from cognition of terms alone becomes known to us with as much certainty, as can be manifested from the principles of metaphysics.

How Metaphysics is More apt for Teaching

34. The fourth condition of wisdom, which is to be more apt for teaching, Aristotle thus demonstrates, because that science is more apt for teaching, which is more occupied in cognition of causes; for those teach, who bring forward the cause of each thing. But tacitly he

assumes that this doctrine is maximally occupied in cognition of causes; and thus he concludes that it is most apt for teaching, and therefore is wisdom. Aristotle declared this same condition through nearly the whole of chapter 1 of this prologue or first book. For in order to conclude that it pertains to wisdom to investigate the supreme causes of things, taking a principle from afar, he says that men naturally desire knowledge; for they love the senses especially for this reason; and in other animals there is only cognition of the senses, and some of them also have memory, and a certain innate prudence, or rather natural instinct and sagacity, and some also participate in a certain mode of discipline, yet they never attain perfect experience; but man through the senses cognizes singulars, which he not only retains in memory, but also compares among themselves, and thus gradually acquires experience, which is only occupied with singulars. But through experience he progresses further, and seeks art by which he now cognizes universals, and seeks their reasons and causes, and therefore one who has attained art is judged wiser than one who is only experienced, because he cognizes not only whether the thing is, as the experienced person does, but also why, and the cause of the thing. And therefore (he says) in any art we think architects nobler and wiser than those who are not only active (which in its way is common to inanimate things), but also cognize the causes and reasons of things. And immediately he adds the property, in which we are engaged, saying: And altogether it is a sign of the wise man to be able to teach; which one who knows the causes of things can provide, but not one who has only experienced the effects.

35. Doubt. Concerning this condition it can especially be doubted, why this science is thought more apt for teaching than the rest; for every proper science and a priori (for among these the comparison must be made) demonstrates the thing through its causes; therefore each science is as apt for teaching in its matter, as this one in its own. Nor does it matter to this that this science treats of nobler things; for this would indeed contribute to making it nobler, but not to

making it more apt for teaching, for the proportion of effect to cause contributes more to this, than the nobility of either; for an inferior effect is as appropriately taught through its proper cause, as a superior through its own; therefore this condition either is not special in metaphysics, or is not distinct from the nobility of the object. But if this property can be attributed to any science, certainly it should rather be attributed to dialectic; for it teaches how to learn, and teaches how to teach; therefore it is more apt for teaching than any other. And thus Plato accommodates this function to dialectic in the dialogue On Being, or the Sophist, and therefore in the same place, and in book VII of the Republic, he prefers it to all sciences.

36. Solution of the doubt. To the former difficulty it is responded, that although other sciences demonstrate their properties or effects through proper causes accommodated to them, because nevertheless those causes are not first, nor independent, but subordinated to superior ones, therefore other disciplines are not so apt for teaching as metaphysics, which considers the first causes and principles of things. And so metaphysics excels not only in the nobility of its object, but also in the independence and superiority of causes and principles. From which it happens, that this science per se alone and without the assistance of another fully and exactly teaches all things which fall under its object, but other sciences in many things depend upon this one, so that they can deliver exact cognition of causes, and therefore this science is said to be more apt for teaching.

37. To the confirmation it is responded that there are two things which help for teaching, namely, method and mode of teaching, and comprehension of things and causes. With regard to the former, it pertains to dialectic to have the function of teaching, and in that sense it can be said to be most apt for teaching, or rather for learning, since it delivers the form and method of teaching. But as much as pertains to the latter, metaphysics is most apt for teaching, since it teaches higher and more efficacious media of demonstrating, and maximally a priori. Because therefore this is most important and most difficult in science,

and because dialectic itself, insofar as it is science, and demonstrates through causes, depends in this in some way upon metaphysics, therefore this is simply most apt for teaching. Nor does Plato think otherwise, who often understands metaphysics by the name of dialectic.

38. How metaphysics demonstrates a priori. Secondly, concerning the same condition, or its proof, it can be doubted how this science can demonstrate through causes, since it has the most simple object, which cannot have proper causes. For being insofar as it is being, neither according to itself, nor according to the noblest object contained under that common thing, can have proper causes; therefore metaphysics cannot demonstrate through causes, at least in its supreme part, nor in that which considers the most universal accounts of being. The antecedent is evident, because God does not have causes, and consequently neither does being as being, which comprehends God. It is responded that causes are twofold, some proper, and which really influence the effect, and others said more broadly, which are rather causes of cognizing the thing a priori, than of existing, and are properly called reasons of attributes or properties, which are demonstrated concerning the subject. Speaking therefore of the subject of this science according to its most abstract account, most abstract (I say) either according to our account, as it is being insofar as it is being, or according to the thing itself, as it is the first being or being itself through essence, thus it is true that this science does not have proper causes of the thing, through which it demonstrates something concerning its object; it has nevertheless reasons and media distinct from the extremes according to our mode of conceiving, by which it makes demonstrations a priori; for for such demonstrations, since they are made in the human way, distinction of concepts with some foundation in the thing suffices, and that the property, cognized through one concept, is the reason of another demonstrated attribute; and in this way we demonstrate that God is a perfect being, because he is a being necessary from within, and we

demonstrate one property of being, or of substance, in the same way through another. And Aristotle comprehends this mode of demonstration, when he says this science teaches the causes of things, that is, the principles and roots and reasons of things, whether they are proper physical causes, or metaphysical reasons, which are also wont to be called formal causes in a broad sense. And St. Thomas expounds in this way, Metaphysics VI, text 1, what Aristotle says there, namely that principles and causes of beings insofar as they are beings are inquired in this science. But truly with regard to other parts or beings which metaphysics comprehends under its object, such as created beings, intelligences, etc., thus it has proper real causes or truly influencing in the thing itself, through which it can make demonstrations, as is evident per se.

Through how many Genera of Causes does Metaphysics Demonstrate

39. It demonstrates through the final cause. Through the efficient cause. However, a third question immediately arises: whether this science, as it deals with these beings, demonstrates through all genera of causes, or only through some. And first, it is certain that it most frequently and especially demonstrates through the final cause, as is evident from its very practice, and because this is the first and most noble of causes, and the one that is most wont to contribute to the investigation of the natures and properties of things, indeed to the investigation of the other causes of a thing. Again, it is also certain that this science demonstrates through the efficient cause, for it considers the first being, which is the most powerful efficient cause of all other things, upon which all other things essentially depend. And under that cause it also considers the intelligences which have some causality in these lower things, and finally the other causes of things, insofar as they can be comprehended under its object.

40. An objection is satisfied. You will say: the causality of the efficient cause deals with the existence of things; but science abstracts from existence; therefore it cannot demonstrate anything through the efficient cause. It is replied, first, that although actual dependence on an efficient cause insofar as it is in exercised act (so to speak) does not fall per se under science, because it is not simply necessary, but contingent and free, nevertheless the intrinsic relation to the efficient cause, especially the first one, is necessary and is considered in science, and many properties of things are gathered from it. For, from the fact that a creature has essential dependence on an efficient cause, it is concluded that it is not being through essence, but through participation, and that existence is not of its essence, and that it is a finite being, and similar things. Then it is said that, granted that science does not consider the existence of a thing in exercised act, it nevertheless considers it in signified act, that is, what existence itself is, and how it belongs to each thing, or can belong, and the consideration of the efficient cause contributes maximally to this. Whence it also happens that concerning those things which in some way are necessary beings, science contemplates actual and exercised existence itself, which is especially true concerning God, who is being simply necessary and actually existing, whose necessity of existing is considered not through an efficient cause, but through the negation of an efficient cause. Concerning other things, however, it is also inquired in science whether they are eternal, and how they flow from their efficient cause. Therefore, many things in metaphysics are demonstrated through this cause.

41. Through the exemplar cause. And hence it is also evident that this science can use the exemplar cause in its demonstrations, if however it can attain the truth and property of the exemplar itself in itself, which nevertheless is rare, and in divine exemplars, which they call ideas, naturally impossible, because those divine exemplars cannot be beheld in themselves, unless God is seen in himself. In whatever way, however, the exemplar cause is known, it is an excellent medium

of demonstrating, and most proper to metaphysics, for it abstracts from matter of itself, and is found more properly in spiritual and intellectual things, and is in some way the reason or form through which an agent operates, and thus the same account applies to it as to the efficient cause.

42. How through the material cause. Concerning the material cause finally, Soncinas, IV Metaph., q. 15, absolutely denies that metaphysics demonstrates anything through this cause. His reason is that metaphysics abstracts on the part of its object from matter; therefore the principles of metaphysics also abstract from matter; therefore also its demonstrations. But this opinion needs limitation, for the material cause as such, and taken in its entire breadth, extends more widely than sensible matter, or intelligible or quantitative matter, from which the object of metaphysics abstracts. The assumption is clarified, for in spiritual things there is truly given material causation (so to speak); for a created spiritual substance is truly the material cause of its accidents, and many judge that essence is the material cause of existence, and nature of personality, and the term of the action that tends toward it. Although therefore we grant that metaphysics does not use matter most properly so called in its demonstrations, it nevertheless cannot be denied that it often uses the material cause, either to affirm or to deny something. In the former way it demonstrates, for example, that angelic accidents are immaterial, indivisible, and whole in the whole and whole in any part, because they are in a spiritual subject, etc. In the latter way, however, it demonstrates that those accidents are not created, because they depend on their subject in being made and being conserved, and similarly from the proper definition of material cause it demonstrates that essence cannot be compared to existence as subject. Finally, the causality of passive potency as such is material; but it pertains to the metaphysician to consider passive potency, and to demonstrate through it; therefore also through the material cause. I add further from what was said above concerning the object of this doctrine, that,

although per se and from its primary intention it does not treat of physical matter, it nevertheless treats of it in some way, namely, insofar as it is necessary for completing the treatment and consideration of its object, and for distinguishing act from potency, and complete form from incomplete, and both from matter, and finally for placing matter in that grade of being in which it is truly to be constituted: in this treatment, however, it can gather and demonstrate many things from the common notion of material cause, as seems evident per se, and will be established from its very use. Therefore demonstration through the material cause is not entirely foreign to this science, although others occur more frequently and seem to be more proper to this doctrine.

43. Concerning the fifth property, nothing occurs to be added to those things which were said in the prior conclusion and in the preceding section. For it has been shown that this science is most speculative, and deals with things to be sought and known maximally for their own sake; whence it is most evident that this science is to be sought and pursued for its own sake. Likewise it was said that natural happiness is placed in some act of this science; but happiness is sought maximally for its own sake.

Metaphysics is Easily the Chief of Other Sciences

44. And from this condition the sixth condition of wisdom is also easily understood to belong most perfectly to metaphysics; whence Aristotle demonstrates it in this manner. That science is most chief, and is set over the ministering one, which considers the first causes of things, especially the final and ultimate, for the sake of which things are made; but this is the task of metaphysics; therefore it is the one that will rule over the remaining disciplines; therefore by this title also it is wisdom. But some say that not this, but moral science, especially politics, has this principate, and as it were dominion over the other sciences, as Fonseca learnedly noted at this place of

Aristotle. For to command and rule among intellectual virtues is to be attributed to the practical rather than to the speculative; for to command is a practical act; and moral philosophy is practical, and in it politics is chief, which commands all things in order to the common good of the republic; therefore. And it is confirmed, for according to the due order of reason, not good morals are to be referred to science, but science to good morals; therefore that science which procures good morals ought to command that which rests in the mere speculation of things. But these reasons, if they prove anything, proceed rather concerning prudence than concerning moral philosophy, for commanding pertains to prudence, not to philosophy, and intending good morals properly belongs neither to philosophy nor to prudence, but to the will and its virtues. Then those reasons indeed prove that prudence is more perfect in the notion of moral virtue, and under that notion commands practically, and consequently we can also grant freely that in the order toward good morals, moral philosophy in some way precedes the other speculative sciences; but those reasons do not prove either that prudence is more perfect absolutely and simply than metaphysics, or that moral philosophy has the primacy in the genus of intellectual virtue.

45. Therefore in the sciences two things must be distinguished, namely, the contemplation of truth or judgment and the infallible power or rectitude of attaining it, and the good use of such science and its acts, insofar as they are free, and can be done or not done well or badly, and for an honest end, and with due circumstances. The former aspect is essential to science as such; indeed in general this belongs per se primarily to every intellectual virtue, although practical virtue further orders the very cognition and judgment of truth to work, which does not pertain to the greater perfection of science as such, but rather is an indication of lesser perfection, as Aristotle taught here in the proem of the Metaphysics, and perhaps we shall touch on this below, treating of the qualities and habits of the mind. The latter aspect, namely, the use of science, that it

be honest, or useful to the republic, or toward other ends, is accidental to science as such, although it is most necessary to man. Therefore to command the use of science in this latter way pertains proximately to certain virtues and to prudence, and the moral sciences contribute more to the same dominion than metaphysics, and this is properly called practical dominion, because it regards the work of science, more as it is a work of the will than of the intellect, for use is actively in the will, although sometimes execution is in the intellect. But truly to direct the sciences under the former aspect, namely, to the cognition of truth, pertains per se primarily and maximally to metaphysics, from which they in some way receive principles, and cognition of terms, and objects, or the quiddities of their objects, according to those things which were declared in the above. And by reason of this direction and independence metaphysics can be said to command others, by dominion rather speculative than practical; by reason of which it simply excels in the notion of science and wisdom. I add finally, if metaphysics is considered insofar as the natural beatitude of man consists in its most perfect act, thus not only other sciences, but also moral virtues and prudence are ordered to it as to an end, for all these are ordered to the happiness of man, and all actions are best referred to this end, namely, so that they dispose man and render him apt for divine contemplation, which formally or electively pertains to this science, although it ought to have conjoined love, which is wont to arise from such contemplation. And by this reason also Aristotle concludes that this science commands all, because it contemplates the highest good and the ultimate end simply; for just as in the arts, which are subordinated to some end, that one is architectonic and commands others which considers the supreme end in that order, so metaphysics, which absolutely contemplates the ultimate end of all sciences and arts and of the entire human life, is said to command all and to be the chief of all, not because it properly and practically commands, but as it were virtually and eminently. For metaphysics does not proceed practically, showing in what way that end is to be

obtained, or other things are to be directed to it; and therefore it does not properly and formally command; it nevertheless shows the end to which all things are to be directed, and shows that end to be the ultimate end of all things; and therefore on the part of the thing known, virtually and eminently, as much as is from itself, it commands all and directs all things to that end and highest good.

Resolving a Doubt About Scientific Subalternation to Metaphysics

46. The opinion of some. Here however a doubt occurs concerning this condition, whether this dominion or direction of metaphysics over other sciences is such that all sciences should be said to be subalternated to metaphysics by reason of it. For there were not lacking those who have thought thus concerning this dominion of metaphysics, that by reason of it all sciences are subalternated, but metaphysics alone is simply, or only subalternating. Some attribute this opinion to Aristotle, I Phys., c. 2, and lib. I Post., c. 7; and to Plato, lib. VII de Rep., where he disputes concerning metaphysics under the name of dialectic. And St. Thomas insinuates it, in the opuscule de natura generis, c. 14. Others however simply deny this subalternation; and this is the common and received opinion, as can be seen in Javellus, I Metaph., q. 2; Soncinas, lib. IV, q. 9; Soto, I Phys., q. 11. Others finally use a distinction, and under one notion or use of the word subalternation they teach that metaphysics can be called subalternating, at least in some way, but they simply deny it. Read Fonseca, lib. IV, c. 1, q. 1.

47. What is a subalternated science. Lest we be involved in the ambiguity of names, let us suppose that that science is properly called subalternated to another, which essentially or necessarily depends on it from the nature of the thing in the being of science, so that it cannot be a science unless it is joined to the subalternating science, and takes the evidence of principles from it. The reason for

this is that a subalternated science does not have principles known per se and immediate, but demonstrable conclusions in the superior science; and therefore, just as every science essentially depends on the habit of principles, so the subalternated depends on the subalternating properly so called, because each takes the evidence of principles from the superior by virtue. You will say: whence is it established that a subalternated science cannot have principles known per se, but that conclusions, demonstrable elsewhere, are principles to it? It is replied that this can only pertain to the signification of the word; for in reality it is established that there are some sciences which use principles of this kind, such as medicine, music, etc.; these therefore we say are signified by the name of subalternated. For those which have immediate principles are proximately and per se subordinated to the habit of principles; and therefore there is no reason why they should be said to have subordination with respect to another science, since they do not depend on it per se; this dependence therefore of one science on another is signified by the name of subalternation.

48. What conditions are required for subalternation. From which it happens that true subalternation exists only between diverse sciences; for even if in the same science there is dependence of one conclusion on another up to the principles, nevertheless therefore the science cannot be called either wholly or in part subalternated, since absolutely the whole science is not subordinated to another prior science, but immediately to the habit of principles, but at most one conclusion can be called subordinated or subalternated to the demonstration of another. It is necessary therefore that the sciences be distinct, and that they have the aforesaid dependence and subordination among themselves. It happens however sometimes that some science has the said dependence on a superior science not in all its principles, nor in the demonstrations of all conclusions, but in certain ones; and then it is said to be subalternated to it, not wholly, but in part, or by partial subordination, not total; in which way geometry is said to be subalternated to natural philosophy, because,

although it uses many indemonstrable principles, it nevertheless has some which are demonstrated in philosophy, such as this: From any point to any point a line is drawn, which is demonstrated in physics, because no indivisibles are immediate, because continuous quantity cannot be composed from indivisibles.[18]

49. Whence arises the subalternation of one science to another. This dependence of one science on another is wont to arise from the subordination of objects; for, just as the being of science consists in order to object, so also principles are proportioned to it. Wherefore if the objects of two sciences are not subordinated among themselves, for instance if they are genera or species entirely co-divided, there cannot be subalternation between those sciences. It is necessary therefore that this subalternation be founded in objects, namely in that the object of one is the same as the object of another, with some accidental difference adjoined, which in the being of entity is per accidens, but in the being of the knowable is in some way per se, and constitutes a special knowable object. For when two objects of science are subordinated per se, also in the being of the thing, namely as genus and species, or as superior and inferior essentially, the sciences concerning those objects cannot be subalternated, at least totally, because either they pertain to the same science, if they are in the same abstraction entirely, or certainly if they are diverse sciences, each will be subalternating, because each can have proper principles taken from the proper difference of the object which it considers, or from the first passion, and through those it will be able to demonstrate the remaining conclusions which are made concerning posterior passions. For the science concerning man does not consider those things which belong to man as he is animal, but only as he is rational, and in those it is not subalternated to the science concerning animal, because being rational immediately belongs to man, and from this principle arise other passions of man as man. But if there is something which depends on the sensitive grade as such in some way, or on the

[18] See Aristotle, Physics VI. (Shane Duarte).

special conjunction of the sensible with the rational, as to that the science concerning man will be partially subalternated to the science concerning animal, not however entirely and totally.

50. For absolute and total subalternation therefore, it is necessary that the subject of the subalternated science add an accidental difference to the subject of the subalternating science, as visual line adds to line, sonorous number to number, healable human body to human body; for from this conjunction it comes about, both that the science which specially considers properties flowing from that conjunct as such, is diverse from the science which abstracts from that composition and considers the subject according to itself, and also that the principles of such science are conclusions of the superior science, because namely the properties of such a composite arise from the very components, and from the properties which they have according to themselves, and are demonstrated in the superior science. Concerning all these things it is treated more extensively in lib. I Post., c. 11, but here they are only suggested and as it were sketched, so that we may briefly explain in what way metaphysics is related to other sciences, also as to this property.

51. No properties of subalternating science belong to metaphysics. From what has been said therefore it is not obscurely gathered that no property of a science properly subalternating belongs to metaphysics with respect to other sciences. For first, other sciences do not depend entirely on metaphysics in the being of science, because they do not depend on it in all evidence and certitude of their principles. For they have their immediate and indemonstrable principles ostensively and directly; which is sufficient so that they can have evidence of them immediately from the habit of principles, which suffices for generating science. For although metaphysics can demonstrate those principles in some way, that demonstration is nevertheless not simply necessary for evident judgment of such principles, since they can be evidently known from their terms, and that demonstration is not properly a priori, but through reduction to

the impossible, or at most through some extrinsic cause. Therefore metaphysics is not simply necessary for the evidence of these principles; therefore neither so that the habit generated from them is true science; therefore such habit is not science subalternated to metaphysics. Again the objects of inferior sciences are not accidentally subordinated to being or substance; but per se and essentially, as is evident in natural being, which is the object of philosophy, and concerning quantity, which is the object of mathematics. And the reason is that under being nothing is contained accidentally, but per se; but if there is some science which deals with some being of reason, that is in no way subordinated to metaphysics insofar as it deals with real being, because being of reason as such is not contained under real being, but is primarily diverse; but insofar as metaphysics deals with being of reason, thus any being of reason is contained not accidentally but per se under being of reason as such, which the metaphysician considers; therefore proper and total subalternation does not intervene. Which practice itself also teaches, otherwise metaphysics would have to be acquired before all sciences, since without it no science could exist; but practice holds the opposite for the reasons touched on above, and nonetheless true demonstrations are made from principles known per se without metaphysics, and especially in mathematics; therefore true subalternation does not intervene. But that in one or another conclusion it sometimes intervenes, that is not repugnant, as can be easily understood from the principles set forth.

52. But if someone wishes to call subalternation, with extended vocabulary, that excellence, and as it were dominion, which metaphysics has over other sciences, insofar as it can in some way establish and confirm their principles, and insofar as it brings great light to all, or insofar as it attains the ultimate end or happiness of man, there is no contending with him, since it is a dispute about a name, especially since grave authors sometimes use that kind of speech, as can be seen in Simplicius, lib. I Phys., text. 8; and Themistius, in Paraph. ad I lib. Post., c. 2; but Aristotle never used that manner of

speaking, nor did he require that property for the notion of wisdom, but only that it in some way dominate other sciences, which is far different, as is evident from what has been said.

53. The question is answered. Thus far therefore the second assertion has been sufficiently proven, namely, that metaphysics is true wisdom. But someone will ask in what way the prior and posterior assertion cohere; for Aristotle in the Ethics places science and wisdom as co-distinct species under the genus of intellectual virtue; but we make this doctrine both science and wisdom at the same time. But this is expedited with easy work, if we say with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1, that wisdom is co-distinguished from science, not because it is not science, but because it has a special grade and dignity in the breadth of science. Whence it happens that science is taken in two ways: in one way generically, as it denotes a habit acquired through demonstration, as it is defined in I Post., c. 2, where for this reason no particular mention is made of wisdom, because it only deals with science under that general notion, under which it embraces wisdom, and thus proceeds the prior assertion posited by us. In another way science is taken more strictly, as it denotes a habit which only deals with demonstrable conclusions, and not with the very principles, that is, for a habit which is only science, and in no way intellect, in that sense indeed in which Aristotle said that wisdom is intellect and science, and in this sense science is distinguished from wisdom, and thus we say that metaphysics is not science of this kind, but wisdom.

SECTION VI

WHETHER AMONG ALL THE SCIENCES METAPHYSICS IS THE MOST DESIRED BY MAN WITH NATURAL APPETITE

1. The reason for proposing this question. I propose this question chiefly on account of Aristotle in the introduction to the

Metaphysics, so that on the occasion of that work we may declare certain things which remain to be declared from that introduction, lest we either entirely pass them over or it be necessary for us to return to them again. The exposition of this doubt also contributes to commending more fully the dignity of this doctrine, from the fact that it is most conformable to the nature of man, insofar as he is rational, or rather it is the highest natural perfection of man.

2. Aristotle therefore, in book I of the Metaphysics, chapters 1 and 2, seems to intend directly the affirmative part of this doubt, namely that the natural appetite of man is most attracted to metaphysics. In order to persuade this, he premises that axiom: "All men by nature desire to know." What is the meaning of that pronouncement: "All men by nature desire to know."

3. What is innate appetite. What is elicitive. Concerning this, it is first necessary to explain the meaning of Aristotle, then the truth of the proposition. Therefore three terms in that proposition are to be declared: the first is to desire or to long for. Concerning this, the common distinction of twofold appetite must first be presupposed, innate and elicitive. The former is called appetite improperly and metaphorically; properly it is nothing other than the natural propensity which each thing has toward some good, which inclination in passive powers is nothing other than natural capacity and proportion with its own perfection, but in active powers it is the natural faculty of acting itself. Therefore in all these things appetite adds nothing beyond the very nature of the thing, or the proximate faculty, by reason of which such appetite belongs to the thing. Nor in this appetite can first and second act be distinguished, because to desire in this way is not to do something, but only to have an innate such propensity, such as weight has toward the center, even if it does nothing. Elicitive appetite is properly appetite, because it is carried toward good as good, and can desire that good through its proper act. Hence there are two things in this appetite (we speak of creatures): one is the faculty of desiring, the other is the desire itself. The first has

retained the name appetite, which is divided into sensitive and rational; and this appetite as such is also innate, if we speak generally of the innate, because it is given with nature itself, and has a natural propensity toward its object and toward its act. But because it is so innate that it is also elicitive of actual desire, by which it tends toward good formally and insofar as it is good, and thus it is most properly appetite, therefore it is distinguished from purely innate and metaphorical appetite; for thus the former division is to be taken. The second, that is, the act of desiring, which is properly called desire, or elicited appetite, is nothing other than the act elicited by the eliciting appetite, which loves or desires the good; and this appetite is never innate, at least in us, of whom we treat in the present; but sometimes it is natural, as I shall declare more fully below in its proper place.

4. In how many ways "natural" is said. The other term therefore to be explained was "naturally," for natural appetite is said in many ways. Sometimes natural is said of what is given by nature itself, and is not brought about through the proper action or production of man himself, for example. And in this way every innate appetite is natural, and the elicitive appetite itself as well; but not the appetite or elicited act, as is sufficiently clear from the given exposition of terms. But sometimes natural is said of what necessarily happens from the intrinsic propensity of nature, even if absolutely and in itself it is not given by nature, but made by the one desiring; and in this way the appetite which is hunger or thirst is natural to man, when food or drink is lacking; for which reason elicited appetite can be natural, and in sensitive appetite it is always such of itself; but in the will, although sometimes such appetite is natural, it is not always so, because it is free. I omit that sometimes natural is taken as distinguished from supernatural, in which sense among natural philosophers, or proceeding from the light of nature alone, as we now speak, every appetite is natural, for the supernatural mode of desiring, which happens through grace, cannot be investigated by natural reason. Sometimes also natural is taken as opposed to violent, as is frequent in

philosophy. And in these two ways also elicited appetite, even if it is free, can nevertheless be natural, as is evident per se. Indeed, sometimes elicited appetite is called natural by the very fact that it is consonant with nature, and is opposed to that which is preternatural as dissonant with nature, even if it is not violent; in which way the appetite for virtue is natural, but that of vice not at all. From which it finally happens that much more natural is called that appetite to which the very propensity of nature brings necessity; and therefore necessary appetite, although elicited, can deservedly be called natural.

5. But twofold necessity of this appetite is usually distinguished, namely, with regard to exercise, and with regard to specification. The former is when the vital appetite elicits or exercises the act of desiring from necessity; which necessity is easily found in sensitive appetite; but it is not found in rational appetite in this life, but only in the blessed and supernatural life, which does not pertain to our consideration. The latter consists in this, that although the will does not exercise the act of desiring from necessity, nevertheless, if it does exercise it, it necessarily desires and does not refuse such an object, and such an act is called necessary with regard to species, not with regard to exercise; and according to that necessity it is called natural, and departs from every act that is free on the part of both exercise and specification, in the way that the will desires good in general. From these things therefore the ambiguity of that term remains sufficiently clear.

6. In how many ways science is said. The third term is science or to know, which is taken indefinitely by Aristotle; and it can be taken generally for any cognition or understanding of truth, but especially for that which is perfect, and has the proper nature of science, insofar as to know is said to be to cognize a thing through its cause with evidence and certainty. And we can speak of science taken in this way as well, either indefinitely, or abstractly, or distributively of all sciences, or singularly of some one, which ways of speaking about science differ considerably among themselves.

7. Man desires all sciences. Beginning therefore from this last term, it is certain that Aristotle in that general teaching does not speak of any singular science, as is evident, both from his words, and from the proof, which is general, and finally from his intention; for he assumes this general principle, so that from it he may descend to this science in particular. And this reasoning further concludes that, although Aristotle's words are indefinite, nevertheless since they are doctrinal, they are equivalent to universals, so that the meaning is that all men naturally desire any science whatsoever: both because this appetite does not arise from the peculiar nature of some science as such, but from the nature of science as such; and also because otherwise one would not proceed sufficiently effectively in that discourse from indefinite speech to the singular. This therefore is Aristotle's mind; and that opinion in that sense will easily be shown to be true from what is to be said.

8. By innate appetite. Again, many expositors here, especially Scotus and his followers, think that Aristotle speaks of innate appetite; nor does St. Thomas shrink from that opinion, whence Javellus and Flandria follow it. Nor is there doubt that in that sense the proposition is most true, which St. Thomas confirms by various reasons. The sum of these is that every thing naturally desires its own perfection, operation, and happiness; but science is compared to man in all these ways; for it is a great perfection of his, and his operation, and his happiness consists in it. In which reasoning the first two members are common to all sciences, but the third is proper to this one, as we shall say. Whence I also think that Aristotle did not exclude this sense but rather presupposed it. But that he spoke in that sense alone neither seems necessary nor true. This can be gathered from the propriety of his words; for from the love and affection of the senses he infers the appetite for science; but he speaks openly of the love of the senses through elicited act; for this is what love properly signifies, and below he similarly says that we prefer the sense of sight to the others, namely in elicited love. And although it could be said that it is true that

Aristotle in that reasoning speaks of elicited act, and from that infers natural appetite, certainly that inference would not be good, unless it supposed that elicited love is also in some way natural, because natural appetite cannot be inferred from just any elicited appetite; for sometimes we desire by act of will things which are repugnant to nature itself, such as death for example; therefore, if Aristotle infers natural appetite from elicited appetite, he supposes that the elicited itself is also natural; but if elicited love of the senses is natural, much more is love of science.

9. By elicited appetite as well. It must be said therefore that man also loves science with elicited appetite. This is proved by the reasons hinted at from St. Thomas; for those reasons proceed equally concerning elicited appetite and concerning the weight of nature, because man also desires naturally with this appetite his own perfection, operation, and happiness; but science is the most perfect operation of man, and either is happiness itself, or is most necessary for happiness and the convenience of this life. For if it is contemplative science, happiness consists in its most perfect operation, as is said in book X of the Ethics, chapter 6; but other speculative sciences serve that higher one, and in all there is a certain great pleasantness; for to contemplate is best, Metaphysics XII, text 39. But practical sciences are necessary or very useful for the conveniences of this life as well.

Aristotle's Doctrine on the Love of Sight & Other Senses is Explained

10. Moreover, Aristotle's discourse taken from the love of the senses, and especially of sight, is excellent for confirming the same thing. But Aristotle takes two things in that discourse: the first is that in the love of the senses we prefer sight; the second is that the cause of this is that it serves most for science. From which he infers a third thing, namely that love of science is greater and more natural than that of sight itself and the other senses. This consequence seems evidently

per se, and founded on that principle: "On account of which each thing is such, that thing is more so." But the first proposition assumed must first be understood with precision, so that the comparison may be made correctly; for touch can be found without sight, but not conversely, because touch is the first of all senses, and the foundation of the others. Whence, touch being destroyed, sight cannot naturally remain, because life is not preserved without touch, On the Soul III, chapter 12, and book XIII On Sense and the Sensible, chapter 1. Insofar therefore as sight in some way includes touch, sight will be more desirable than touch alone; and in the contrary sense, insofar as the loss of touch includes the loss of sight, and not conversely, touch is preferred to sight, because man would rather choose the preservation of touch than of sight, if sight must necessarily be lost due to the loss of touch. But this comparison so understood is of no importance, because individual senses are not compared among themselves, but two to one which is included in them; therefore the comparison is to be made precisely in what individual senses contribute per se.

11. Sight and hearing are compared among themselves. Next it is to be observed that Aristotle here indicates a twofold love of the senses. One is on account of utility; the other truly on account of cognition. The former is per se most evident, and under utility can be comprehended every convenience of the body, pertaining either to its preservation, or to pleasure, or to other operations of human life. The latter love is most proper to man, and in relation to this love sight is here chiefly compared with other senses, and is preferred to them. This Aristotle proves by experience, because (he says) even when we are about to do nothing, we prefer sight itself to the others. But he gives the reason a priori, and which most pertains to the present matter, in the other proposition. Concerning which it is thirdly to be noted that there are two modes of acquiring science, namely teaching and discovery. For the former mode hearing is most useful, as is evident per se, because voices are signs of concepts; but hearing alone perceives voices, and although it does not itself perceive their

signification, but the mind does, it suffices that it is the proper organ, through which as medium such a sign reaches the mind. However, this superiority is both accidental and minimal. Accidental indeed, because the mode of acquiring science through teaching is quasi accidental; for it both presupposes another, speaking according to the natures of things, and is only for supplying the imperfection or negligence of men in devoting themselves to discovering sciences. But I call the superiority minimal, because sight also serves very much for teaching; for writings too are signs of concepts, and those are perceived by sight; whence much more seems to be learned by reading, which is done by sight, than by hearing.[19] However, there is a difference, that almost all the utility of writing can also be perceived by hearing, but not conversely; for that energy, force and clarity which is in voice for expressing proper concepts cannot be supplied by writing alone or by sight; whence we read that some lacking sight have been most learned, partly from having heard only the writings of others, partly also from explanations or teachings proposed to them by living voice; but that anyone completely deaf has become most learned, I do not remember having read, and I think this can scarcely happen. Therefore Aristotle does not here compare these senses with regard to this function, but with regard to the mode of acquiring science through discovery. In which there is no doubt that sight and touch surpass both hearing and the other senses, which is so well known that it needs no proof; only something remains to be said briefly about the comparison of sight and touch among themselves.

12. Comparison of sight with touch. It is therefore to be noted fourthly that it is one thing to speak of the sign (so to speak) of better faculty and greater aptitude for acquiring science, another thing of the more apt instrument for discovering science; for touch surpasses sight in the former respect, because touch is a universal sense on the part of the subject, for it is diffused through the whole

[19] Cf. Paris 1861, vol. 1, p. 56a, footnote: "Lege Aristotelem, de sensu et sensibili."

body, and is a sign of the best and most temperate complexion, whence is that saying: "Soft flesh is apt for genius," concerning which more fully in On the Soul II, text 24. But sight per se, and as an instrument for science, surpasses touch in many ways. First in the breadth of object; for it perceives more differences, as Aristotle said here, and it ranges about celestial and terrestrial things, and knows more perspicaciously the motions, actions, and figures of things than any other sense; but these are like the first signs and indications which we use for knowing things. Second, it perceives more quickly than other senses, while nevertheless it extends itself even to most distant things, and the cause is that it completes its operation in a purer and more immaterial way, and without material alteration. Third, it impresses more vehemently on the phantasy what it perceives, which is established by experience; for things adhere more tenaciously to memory, and occur more easily afterwards. But the cause seems to be that, just as its operation is more spiritual, so it happens with greater force of soul and effort, and also with greater cooperation of the phantasy itself. Fourth, the experience of sight seems to be more certain than the experience of touch, speaking per se; for although Aristotle, in book I of the History of Animals, chapter 15, says that touch in man is most exquisite, there nevertheless he does not compare the senses of man among themselves, and with respect to man himself, but with the senses of other animals; and in this way he says that man surpasses other animals in touch and taste, although he is surpassed by many in the other senses, at least in many conditions of sensing, as by the eagle in perspicacity and strength of sight; but he does not say that touch of man surpasses sight in certainty. Rather, in section 31, Problems question 18[20], he says that touch rivals sight. Therefore each of these senses has its own certainty in relation to its own adequate object; but sometimes it fails concerning common sensibles from insufficient application; and perhaps because sight senses from afar and touch does not, therefore it happens more easily

[20] Cf. Problems, XXXI, c. 17, 259a18-19. (Shane Duarte).

that the object of sight is improperly applied, and sight is deceived; but if other things are equal with regard to the application of the object and the disposition of the power, deception does not happen more in sight than in touch. And on the other hand, sight because of its immateriality perceives the object more acutely, and from this part it is more certain; and therefore it is more frequently employed for taking certainty about sensible things. For these reasons therefore sight is simply more useful for sciences, and for that reason it is naturally loved more; it is therefore a sign, as Aristotle concludes, that science itself is also naturally loved by man.

On the Elicited Appetite for Science

13. But in what sense it should be understood that man naturally desires science with elicited appetite, remains to be explained. For this cannot be taken in the sense that man from necessity always exercises love or desire of science, whenever he thinks about it, nor that he cannot spurn it and be unwilling to investigate it; for both are against experience; therefore this elicited appetite cannot be natural as altogether necessary, either with regard to exercise or with regard to specification. First therefore it is certain that this appetite is correctly called natural, because it is very consonant with the nature of man, and with his natural inclination, insofar as he is man. Whence Cicero correctly says in On Ends II: "Nature (he says) has implanted in man the desire for discovering truth." Second, it is called natural, because it is in some way necessary with regard to specification, both because, although man can neglect science, or be unwilling to have it with regard to the efficacious appetite for seeking it, this can only happen on account of extrinsic causes or impediments which are accidentally joined to science, namely on account of the labor and difficulty which the study of science has, or because it impedes the investigation of other things, which man either needs, or is affected by, or on account of other similar causes; whence those

duller in genius seem to desire science less on account of difficulty, which Aristotle also called impossibility, Politics V[21], last chapter. But truly science per se cannot displease, and thus, impediments being excluded, it is loved with a certain necessity, at least with regard to specification. And this indeed is most true of science in general insofar as it is science; nevertheless it is also true in its own way of any science in particular, if in it the cognition of truth in such matter is considered per se; for that perfection is always per se desirable to man. But if it happens that man does not love one science, so that he may attend to another, this also is reduced to the extrinsic impediments of which we spoke; for because man cannot acquire both sciences, and the study of one would impede the perfect investigation of the other, therefore he omits that one, so that he may obtain this one. And in this way certain men from individual and proper complexion are more affected toward one science than toward another; but per se and impediments being excluded, or (which is the same thing) if one did not impede another, we would naturally desire all sciences, nor would we despise one by reason of another.

14. Inference. And hence it is also easily established what this appetite is in man; for if there is discourse about elicited appetite, it is established to be an act of will, either efficacious, or at least inefficacious and through simple complacency, which is most natural, and remains even in those who do not efficaciously intend or choose to devote themselves to science. But if there is discourse about natural weight, that can be considered as immediately terminated to science itself, and thus it is nothing other than the intellect itself and its capacity, by which it regards science as its proper perfection. For just as in prime matter the appetite for form is nothing other than the matter itself, and its natural capacity, and similarly in every other power the appetite for its act is nothing added to the power itself, but natural constitution and aptitude, so in the intellect the appetite for

[21] V, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; VI, Cologne 1614, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

science is related. But if the weight of nature is considered as terminated to science through the medium of elicited appetite, it is nothing other than the will of man, which in this way is naturally inclined toward all perfections of man; for the will does not desire to have science, but it naturally desires to will science for man or for the intellect; and in this way we say this weight of the will is terminated to science through the medium of elicited act.

The Natural Appetite to Know is Greatest Toward Speculative Sciences

15. From these things therefore that general axiom is left sufficiently explained, that the natural appetite for science is innate to man; but under this principle it must be taken that this appetite is greatest toward speculative sciences, which are sought only for the sake of knowing truth. This Aristotle seems to have tacitly intended throughout the discourse of that first chapter of this introduction. For explaining which he distinguishes all these things, and their order among themselves, namely sense, memory, experience, art, science, which he tacitly distinguishes into that which is sought on account of work or utility, and that which is sought for itself, and in the last place he adds wisdom.

16. Some sayings of Aristotle in the introduction are explained. He says therefore first that sense has been given by nature to all living beings; but he does not explain what it is, because this does not pertain to the present; nor does he say that every sense has been communicated to all animals, but sense indefinitely; and he only intends to suppose that this is the most imperfect grade of cognition. Second he adds that brute animals sometimes have memory beyond sense, and a certain quasi natural prudence; and some extend to this, that they are also teachable, but they participate little or nothing of experience. Where note that by the name of sense Aristotle understands also sensitive cognition, which happens only in the

presence of the object, whether it happens through internal senses, or through the interior common sense or phantasy; for whatever is necessary for sensing in the presence of the object, he comprehends under the name of sense; but in all some phantasy or imagination is necessary for sensing even externally; and therefore, just as sensing, so also using imagination is common to all brutes. But memory adds the interior power of conserving species and using them in the absence of objects, so that in this way one can remember those things which he perceived by sense, even when he does not have them present according to the external senses. This faculty therefore Aristotle says certain animals have, but not all; but he does not declare which are these or those.

17. Commonly nevertheless those are judged to have memory which can properly and perfectly be moved from place to distant place, whether by progressive motion through earth, or flying through air, or swimming in water; for memory seems to have been given to animals for this end, that they may be able to move to a distant place, either fleeing harmful things, or seeking useful things, which they have experienced in some way. Nor does it matter that sometimes a brute can move to a distant place not from some memory, as is evident in the recently born; because then either it is moved by some object somewhat distant, or it wanders about, and roams as if by chance.

18. Whether flies have memory. But what Aristotle says here about flies not having memory, even if they move to distant places, is quite uncertain; for the sign by which Aristotle is moved to assert this, namely, because flies when struck and driven from a place immediately return importunately, is insufficient, since this can rather happen from memory of the pleasure which they take there, and from vehement appetite, or because that object is always in some way present through sight or smell, and therefore moves more vehemently. Therefore only of those imperfect animals, which have only the sense

of touch, or also of taste, can it be certainly affirmed that they lack memory, because they have no sign or effect of it, nor utility.

19. What kind of prudence is in brutes. But what Aristotle says, that certain brutes with memory have prudence, is to be understood not properly, but by transference; for they do not use discourse, nor do they acquire a habit by which they judge about things to be done; but because by natural instinct they so often operate, as befits such a nature here and now, and thus they provide for future things, as if they truly reasoned, therefore by metaphor they are called prudence. You will say: therefore this prudence of brutes is nothing other than instinct of nature; but all animals have this instinct accommodated to themselves, even those which lack memory; why therefore does Aristotle attribute this peculiarly to certain brutes? To this Javellus, book I, question 7, seems to distinguish nothing between natural instinct and prudence of brutes, and concedes all that the reasoning made seems to prove, namely, that this prudence is in all brutes, and he ascribes that opinion to St. Thomas. But, although perhaps it is a question about the name, nevertheless that way of speaking is foreign to Aristotle's mind, as the reasoning made shows; and it is beyond the nature of metaphor; for some animals are so stupid that they cannot be called prudence even by metaphor; not only from all those which lack memory, but also from those perhaps which are endowed with memory. Whence Aristotle said not all, but certain ones with memory have prudence. Others, taking this metaphor with too much rigor, say that only those animals are called prudent which operate from memory of the past, either for providing for future things, or as if for choosing some means. Thus Fonseca holds here, reporting others. But this limitation seems too much; for such propriety is not necessary in metaphors. For when Christ said: "Be prudent as serpents," he said this not on account of operation with memory of the past, but on account of natural sagacity, by which the serpent guards its head, as the Saints explain. And the ant is considered prudent when it gathers grains for winter, even if it does

this without memory, as when it first so operates. Therefore this prudence of brutes is a special sagacity of certain ones, which are so governed by instinct of nature, that they seem to imitate the reason and prudence of man, as Aristotle said in general, book I of the History of Animals, chapter 5, and in particular of many, book IX, chapter 6 and following; and in chapter 7 he says this kind of prudence is found more frequently in the smaller kind of animals than in the larger; and there he recalls many things, which he says pertain to this prudence, not because they proceed from memory of past things, but because they proceed from a certain quasi natural genius, by which they imitate the reason of man. And in this way this natural prudence is not found in all, which nevertheless brutes endowed with it always also have memory, not because this prudence is always founded in memory, but because these animals are always so perfect that they participate in memory. We can also add that these very animals, prudent by their nature, become more prudent by memory of things which they have experienced. And in this way it could be said in favor of the second opinion, that natural sagacity itself then most deserves the name of prudence, when it is quasi cultivated and perfected by memory of things; but enough has been said about the use of the term.

20. Which animals are teachable. Whether bees hear. Aristotle adds that certain animals not only have memory, but are also teachable, but others not at all. He says that those of the latter kind are those which, although they have memory, lack hearing, because hearing is the sense of teaching; and although sight also helps for teaching, and sometimes we see certain brutes, like puppies, taught and instructed even by certain external signs, nevertheless this never happens without some cooperation of hearing, by which they are excited and called, so that they may perceive the signs. But Aristotle gives the example of bees, concerning which nevertheless there is great controversy whether they hear, as Aristotle himself teaches, book IX of the History of Animals, chapter 40; and Pliny, book XI, chapter

20, affirms that they hear, which seems absolutely more probable, considering the signs and experiences which the authors themselves report. For they teach that bees are soothed and attracted by certain sounds; likewise they emit certain sounds among themselves, when they either want to take flight, or are aroused from sleep, or are called to sleep. Whence Albert here applies a certain probable distinction of hearing; for there is hearing of sound as such, or of voice as articulated sound; and he says that bees have hearing in the former way, but not in the latter; but that this latter mode is necessary for teaching.

21. Concerning the first type of animals, namely those capable of discipline, nothing particularly noteworthy occurs to mind, except that this discipline must also be understood metaphorically, just as prudence is. For those animals are said to be capable of discipline which through a certain practice become accustomed either to approach when they are called by a certain name, or to gather together when they hear such a sound or voice, or to flee when they perceive another sign. Hence some are taught in human fashion to dance, others to speak, and similar things. All of these things are done by them through natural instinct alone, presupposing memory and experience of such a sign or voice. Aristotle says, however, that all animals which have hearing are capable of discipline. This is perhaps true; nevertheless it would be difficult to believe that this is established by experience in all animals; but without experiment I do not see how this can be affirmed of all animals, both flying and aquatic. It can more easily be said that all animals which are capable of discipline have hearing and perhaps also sight, memory, and metaphorical prudence or sagacity.

22. Aristotle therefore concludes that brute animals live by imagination and memory, and participate little in experience; indicating three degrees, of which the later includes the former, whence the former are understood with the exclusion of the later ones. For imperfect animals live only by imperfect imagination, which they have simultaneously with the sense of touch or even taste; but

others that are more perfect have only memory along with imagination; still others which are more capable of discipline than these are said to participate in a certain imperfect experience, which become accustomed through use and habit, as if by a certain experiment; but why that experience is called imperfect, we shall declare more fully immediately. He says that humans live by art and reason, which he explains in the remaining part of the chapter in order to arrive at his purpose. He rightly joins these two together, because neither seems to suffice without the other, at least for the perfect governance of man; for reason, which is natural, does not suffice unless it is cultivated by art; but art always needs the use of reason and attentive consideration in order to be applied to work.

23. Experience deals only with the particular. Experience properly so-called is peculiar to man. Third, therefore, he says that in humans experience is generated from memory: "For many recollections of the same thing complete the force of one experience." At this point an opportunity presented itself for declaring extensively what experience is, and whether it pertains to sense or to intellect; likewise whether it is a judicative or apprehensive habit, and how it is generated, or to what it inclines. But because these matters pertain more to the science of the soul, and are only touched upon here by Aristotle in passing, it must be briefly noted that Aristotle here clearly teaches that experience does not deal with the universal, but with the particular, for thus he says, that it is held as established that this benefited Callias suffering from this disease, and likewise Socrates, and in the same way many individually, this belongs to experience; but that it benefited all those who suffer from a certain disease, this now belongs to art; and below he proves that experience is more useful for actions than science or art alone, because actions deal with particulars. Therefore the universal collection from particulars does not pertain to experiment; much less universal assent, but only firm and ready judgment concerning particulars. For experience taken broadly can be said of any perception of one particular, in which way it can be said

that someone is experienced that wine intoxicates, even if he has suffered this only once, or has seen it in another; but because, as Hippocrates said, experiment is fallacious, it is not properly taken for the knowledge of only one particular, but of many particulars, as Aristotle said. Indeed, neither is it sufficient for proper and perfect experience to experience the same effect more frequently; for this even brute animals can do, of which Aristotle said they participate little in experience, because they have only simple memory of those particulars which they have perceived by sense; but for perfect experience there is further required a certain comparison of the same particulars among themselves, which is proper to man, and therefore Aristotle said that experience comes to man from memory, because many recollections of the same thing complete experience. "Of the same thing," he says, not individual and singular, so that it would suffice for experience to recall more frequently one and the same singular effect perceived by sense; for this repetition will make the memory of such an effect more ready, but not truly experience. He understands therefore "the same" according to similarity and agreement of circumstances; and for this is required a comparison of particulars through recollection, namely, that such a medicine benefited Peter suffering from this disease, and Paul similarly, for if there is not sufficient similarity, it will often seem to be experience, and in reality it will not be. Hence it comes about that experiment is often fallacious. In this way, therefore, experience is proper to man, which although it begins with sense, is nevertheless perfected by mind and reason, as has been explained. Hence it does not consist in apprehensive knowledge, but in judicative, from which is generated a certain ability, by which man is rendered ready to judge that this effect is accustomed to proceed from such a cause, which ability is perhaps nothing other than memory of such singular effects, not in any way, but as they have been compared among themselves, and found similar, and with those circumstances are recognized to have flowed from the

same or similar cause. And these things now suffice concerning experience for the opportunity of this place.

How much Experience Serves Art & Science

24. Fourth, Aristotle adds that art is generated through experience, and brings more perfect knowledge than experience, even if it is less sufficient for action without experience. Where first it must be noted that Aristotle here uses indifferently the name of science and art, as is clear from the context; and because, although they are otherwise distinct virtues, nevertheless according to a certain aspect art is a certain science, or at least, what pertains to the present matter, the same account applies to it and to science. Next it must be noted that science or art is twofold: one they call "that" (quia), which only demonstrates that this is so; the other "on account of which" (propter quid), which renders the cause. Concerning the former it is easily understood that it is generated through experience, because it only gathers from effects perceived by experiment that such a thing is, or has such a property. But Aristotle here speaks not of this science, but of the perfect, and "on account of which," as is manifestly clear; for when he had said that artificers are wiser than those who are strong in experience of things, he gives the reason, because the former know the cause, the latter do not likewise; therefore by art and science he understands that which attains and teaches the cause of the thing. And when with many words and signs he declares that artificers are preferred to those operating from habit alone or from experience, all these things nevertheless tend to this, that artificers know the "on account of which" and the cause of the thing. When therefore he says that art is generated by experience, he understands architectonic art and "on account of which."

25. This however is difficult, because human experiment is fallacious, as I said from Hippocrates, and although we grant that it is sometimes certain with the certainty of sense, nevertheless that

certainty seems less than that which is required for science; especially because experiment is not universal, or concerning all particulars absolutely, but science is simply universal, and embraces even those particulars which have not fallen under experience. And although sometimes it is permitted to gather the same concerning particulars which have not fallen under experience from those things which we experience, nevertheless this collection seems quite weak, and at most will suffice for science "that," not truly "on account of which." Again there occurred here a difficulty, whether that proposition of Aristotle that art is generated from experience, is only indefinite, as it sounds, or truly should be taken as doctrinal and universal, so that it never happens that science or art is otherwise generated in us.

26. How science "on account of which" is caused by experience. To the former part it is responded that the argument concludes that experience cannot be the proper and per se cause of art, or science a priori, but is an occasion or a certain necessary condition, by which the way is prepared for acquiring science. This will be easily understood by noting that in science two things are required per se, namely, the truth which is known and demonstrated, which is called the conclusion; and the principles through which it is known and demonstrated. The science of the conclusion therefore depends per se only on the principles; for, since it is science a priori, as we have said, the medium from which it is per se deduced is not experience, but the cause itself of the effect which we experience, whence if the principles which contain the cause of the conclusion could be known or understood clearly without experience, in no way would the science of the conclusion depend on experience. But the evident knowledge of principles, which is proper to them, is born not from some medium, but from the natural light itself immediately, once the signification or nature of the extremes is known. But we are dealing with first and immediate principles, for if they are mediate, they will be demonstrated conclusions, concerning which there will be the same account as concerning all other truths, which are known a

priori. Therefore neither are immediate principles known per se through experience as through a proper medium, for in this way they would not be known as principles, but as conclusions demonstrated a posteriori, and known through science "that"; but as such they could not be sufficient for generating science "on account of which" of the conclusion, because a cause cannot produce a more noble effect than it itself is. It remains therefore that experience is only required for science, so that our intellect is led by hand through it to understand exactly the natures of simple terms, which being understood, it itself sees clearly by its natural light the immediate connection of them among themselves, which is the first and only reason for assenting to them.

27. Whether science can be generated without experience. The other part of the difficulty is more extensive, but has its proper place in book I of the Posterior Analytics, chapters 14 and 18, and therefore I shall briefly set forth what I think. For some[22] absolutely and without any restriction or distinction think that experience most properly taken is necessary for science or art on the part of the judgment of principles, so that the experimental knowledge of one or another particular never suffices, but it is necessary to experience many things and compare them among themselves, and find all things uniform and without discrimination. For before the intellect applies all this diligence, it cannot assent with all natural certainty, as is necessary in first principles, because since the light of our intellect itself is weak and imperfect, unless it is helped by experience, it can easily be deceived; just as conversely experience itself is per se fallacious, unless the intellect keeps watch with its light to intuit the natures of things and the connection of terms in themselves. And this opinion is thought to be Aristotle's in various places, namely, book I of the Prior Analytics, chapter 31, and book II, chapter 23, and book I of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 14, and book II of the Posterior Analytics, final chapter, where the ancient interpreters seem to think

[22] Fonseca, lib. 1, c. 1, q. 4. Cf. Madrid 1960, t. 1, p. 350.

thus. Nevertheless if the discussion concerns experience properly so-called, it seems to me that distinction must be used, both in the principles themselves, and in the mode of acquiring science. I said, if the discussion concerns proper experience, because if it is generally treated of any sensible knowledge necessary for the apprehension and understanding of terms, it is clear that this is necessary for the knowledge of principles, because all our knowledge begins from sense; but this is not properly experience, which, as is clear from what has been said, consists in judgment or judicative habit; and Aristotle undoubtedly spoke of this. Speaking therefore of this, distinction must be used: for principles are not all equal. For there is first one or another most general and best known, namely: Whatever is, either is or is not; It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be; and for knowing these no experience is required, but only the apprehension, understanding or explication of terms; indeed these principles can scarcely be reduced to positive experience; for, although we can experience concerning any singular that it is, nevertheless that it then does not lack existence, we cannot positively experience by a distinct experiment from that by which it appears to be, but this is perceived by understanding alone when the terms are explained. And this seems so self-evident that it needs no other proof. We can nevertheless apply an example for greater explanation; for if we wish to induce a rustic man, who because of ignorance of terms does not know how to assent to those principles, to their assent, we would certainly use no new experience, but would only try to explain the terms so that he understands that the thing which he sees to be, cannot absolutely not be.

28. Besides these best known principles, concerning which there can scarcely be (as I think) controversy whether they require proper experience, there are others also very universal, and common to almost all sciences, such as, Whatever things are the same to a third, are the same among themselves, and Every whole is greater than its part, and If you take equals from equals, what remain are equal. And

concerning these it is necessary to distinguish, when the knowledge of such principles is acquired by invention, or by discipline. For in this latter mode I think that experience properly taken is not necessary, but supposing that which is sufficient for distinct knowledge of terms, and the natures of terms being sufficiently explained through teaching, the intellect can assent by its light without other experience with sufficient evidence and certainty. And the reason is, because these things which are required for assent of this kind to be evident, whether it be experience, or any other declaration of terms, are not required as the formal reason of assenting, nor even as the principle per se efficient or eliciting the act of assenting, but as sufficient application of the object, as was explained in the former part of the difficulty. But there is no sufficient reason which persuades that experience rigorously taken, as it includes the intuition of many particulars, and comparison, and induction, is necessary for sufficient application of these principles, through sufficient apprehension of terms, and understanding of their natures and apt composition. For why cannot this be supplied through teaching, applying at most one or another sensible example, which being sufficiently penetrated through the intellect, the self-evident truth of the principle immediately appears? And experience itself confirms this; for in admitting these principles in doctrines, no one awaits the induction of many particulars, or experimental knowledge, but with the easiest business anyone understands the natures of terms, and immediately intuits their truth in mind, with moderate diligence of the teacher applied.

29. For the invention of sciences experience of principles is regularly necessary. But truly those who acquire sciences by invention alone, need experience for the knowledge of these principles, because without it and without external aid of teacher and doctrine, these principles cannot be sufficiently proposed, or the natures of terms sufficiently known, so that evident assent is provided to them. And the testimonies of Aristotle confirm this, and use itself sufficiently teaches the same. The reason however is, because our intellective knowledge is

very limited and imperfect, and depends too much on sense; and therefore without sufficient aid of it it cannot proceed with sufficient certainty and firmness, and hence it often happens that those who trust much in intellect, deserting sense, easily err in natural things, as Aristotle noted, Physics VIII, chapter 3. But here a limitation must be applied, namely that this is to be understood regularly; for someone could so excel in talent, and so attentively and considerately ponder the nature of whole and part, for example, in only one particular, that he would immediately elicit the truth of the whole principle thence; just as theologians say that the soul of Christ from the sole efficacy of natural talent, without special supernatural aid, elicited many truths or principles from one phantasm. Because the medium of experience is not so per se necessary that it cannot be supplied from elsewhere.

30. Finally there are particular principles proper to individual sciences, and concerning these it is probable that experience and comparison of many particulars is necessary, for firm and evident assent to them, not only by way of invention, which is most well-known, but also by way of discipline, because the natures of terms in these principles are not so known and easy that any proposition of them suffices, unless he who learns compares them with the particulars which he knows and sees agree with them, and with all things which he has experienced concerning such matters; never likewise have such principles suffered an instance (as they say). Finally in these there is almost always so much difficulty, that one scarcely arrives at proper assent of principles, or per se known to be had concerning them, but stops at induction and knowledge a posteriori; therefore it is a sign that for obtaining evident assent from the natures of terms properly known much experience is necessary; greater indeed by way of invention, but some by way of discipline; although according to the diversity of talents, greater or less also suffices.

31. Various divisions of sciences. In the fifth place Aristotle tacitly proposes a division of art or science (for we have already noted that these names are taken here indifferently) into practical and

speculative science, which he distinguishes in that practical sciences are referred to the use and convenience of life, speculative only to the knowledge of truth. He also tacitly subdivides practical sciences; for some contribute to the necessities of life, others truly to pleasure (certainly sensible). Of the former kind are either mechanical arts, such as shoemaking, etc., or medicine and similar; but of the latter kind seem to be those arts which are called liberal, such as music, also the art of painting, finally all which pertain to delighting the senses. From all these therefore he separates speculative science which rests in the contemplation of truth, and is only for its sake, so much so that although the greatest pleasure follows upon it, nevertheless according to the right and best order of nature it is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but for its own sake; but pleasure only so that it may help to enjoy the very consideration and contemplation of truth with greater quiet and perseverance. From which he rightly gathers that this kind of science is preferred to the other, and those are held wiser who intend the contemplation of truth for its own sake. For that which is for its own sake is more noble than that which is for the sake of another; likewise because the contemplation of truth is the best thing in man; but this is more excellent the more it concerns higher things and those which are not ordered to operation. Thus far Aristotle.

32. Conclusion from all the things of Aristotle now explained. From which he seems tacitly, as I said, to have concluded that that appetite which nature gave to man for knowing, most tends toward the contemplation of truth for its own sake, because this is the supreme operation of man. And consequently from this it is concluded what was proposed, namely, that this appetite is more inclined toward speculative sciences than toward others, because those are ordered toward contemplating truth for its own sake. Whence it is not excluded that we are carried toward practical sciences by the appetite of knowing, but that more vehemently toward speculative ones.

33. Practical sciences can be desired for the sake of knowledge of truth alone. But you will ask whether practical sciences can also be desired for the sake of knowledge of truth, resting in it, without the utility of use. For some seem generally to deny that men can desire practical sciences only for the sake of knowing, but only for the sake of work. Nevertheless, although practical science differs from speculative in this, that it is per se ordered to work, but the latter not at all, as will be said in its place, this nevertheless does not exclude that practical science proximately and immediately confers knowledge of some truth, indeed this is necessary, otherwise it would not be science. But all knowledge of truth is per se lovable, even if it brings no other utility; for per se it is a great perfection of intellectual nature. Hence angels know these arts, even if they do not serve them for their use. And therefore practical sciences are also desirable for the sake of knowledge of truth, even if one rests in it and it is not ordered to use. And it is confirmed, because otherwise in truth they would not be desired from the force of the appetite of knowing, because they would be desired only as means; but a medium as medium is not desired except from the force of propensity toward the end; and thus music would not be desired except from the force of appetite of pleasure or gain, and so concerning others, but not from the force of appetite of science as such, since they are true and in their kind perfect sciences. Which experience also teaches; for many are recreated in the exercise of these sciences, not for the sake of use or utility, but only so that they may know. But regularly they are sought only for the sake of some human utility, because this is more conformable to the institution and end of such arts, and because sensible conveniences or necessities or pleasures more frequently move more, and because if science were to be sought for the sake of truth alone, it would be sought in other more noble sciences, especially since man cannot be occupied with all simultaneously. If therefore practical sciences are indeed desirable, nevertheless speculative ones much more so, if the appetite of man, as

man, is considered, and is not impeded by other human conveniences or necessities.

Resolution of the Whole Question

34. Finally it is concluded from all things said that the intended assertion, that metaphysics is most desirable by man as man, both by natural appetite and by rational appetite best ordered. It is proved tacitly by Aristotle at the end of the same chapter, because among all speculative sciences this most merits the name of wisdom, since it deals with first causes, and the principles of all things, which has been sufficiently declared by us in the preceding section. If therefore speculative sciences are most desired among all, among which this is supreme, it will certainly be most desirable from itself. Finally the greatest appetite of man is toward his natural happiness; but this is acquired through this science, or rather consists in its perfect attainment. For, as is taught in book X of the Ethics, this happiness is placed in the contemplation of God and separated substances; but this contemplation is the proper act and principal end of this science; therefore natural happiness also consists in the act of this science; therefore this appetite is most agreeable, both to nature and to right reason. It remains therefore that with all diligence and study we should investigate this most perfect science.

DISPUTATION II

ON THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OR CONCEPT OF BEING

The order and method of doctrine to be observed in this work. Having established what we have taught concerning the object or subject of this science, it is necessary first of all to explain its proper and adequate nature, and then its properties and causes, and this will be the first principal part of this work. In the latter part we shall propose its principal division, and thus investigate and explain all things that are contained under being and include its nature, insofar as they fall under the objective consideration of this science and abstract from matter in their being, to the extent that they can be reached by natural reason. For in order that we may use greater brevity and conciseness, and treat all things with a suitable method, we have decided to abstain from the prolix explanation of Aristotelian texts, and to contemplate the very things in which this wisdom is concerned, according to that order of doctrine and manner of speaking which is more consonant with the things themselves. For, as regards the Philosopher's text in these books of the Metaphysics, some parts of it have little utility, either because he proposes various questions and doubts and leaves them unsolved, as in the entire third book, or because he dwells on recounting and refuting the opinions of the ancients, as can easily be established from almost the entire first book

and from a great part of the others, or finally because he either repeats or summarizes the same things that had been said in the previous books, as is evident from book XI and others. But those things which are useful and worthy of knowledge and necessary, various Greek, Arabic and Latin expositors have labored sufficiently in explaining them as they are contained in Aristotle's text, among whom we shall use especially the expositions of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and most of all the blessed Thomas. We shall present the examination of the things themselves in the following disputations, and at the same time we shall take care to declare more accurately Aristotle's mind and meaning, and individual testimonies, on which almost all questions are usually founded. Moreover, in order that we may satisfy students of Aristotle in every respect, at the end[23] of this work we have placed an index of all questions which are usually treated concerning Aristotle's text, maintaining his order, or which have occurred to us, and we have designated the places where we discuss them. But if perhaps some opinions of Aristotle, knowledge of which is useful for other sciences, occur in these books which cannot be treated in our disputations while maintaining the order of doctrine which we have established, we provide brief annotations concerning Aristotle's text in the same index, in which we clarify whatever has not been touched upon in the disputations and has some difficulty or utility. In the present disputation, therefore, we must explain the question of what being qua being is, for that being exists is so self-evident that it needs no explanation. But after the question whether it is, the question what a thing is is the first of all, which it is necessary to presuppose or clarify at the beginning of any science concerning its subject. But this science, since it is the first and supreme of all natural sciences, cannot take from another science the nature and quiddity of its subject either as

[23] In the 1597 Salamanca edition, the "index locupletissimus" to which Suárez refers here, is at the end. However, we have placed it at the beginning, like the editions Paris 1861 and Madrid 1960 (cf. vol. 1, p. 360, Footnote) and the Vives edition.

proven or as explained, and therefore it is fitting to present and clarify it immediately at the beginning.

SECTION I

WHETHER IN OUR MIND BEING AS BEING HAS ONE FORMAL CONCEPT COMMON TO ALL BEINGS

1. What formal and objective concepts are, and how they differ. First of all, the common distinction between formal and objective concept must be presupposed; formal concept is called the act itself, or (which is the same) the word by which the intellect conceives some thing or common nature; this is called a concept because it is like the offspring of the mind; it is called formal either because it is the ultimate form of the mind, or because it formally represents the known thing to the mind, or because it is truly the intrinsic and formal term of mental conception, in which it differs from the objective concept, so to speak. Objective concept is called that thing or nature which is properly and immediately known or represented through the formal concept, as, for example, when we conceive man, that act which we perform in the mind to conceive man is called the formal concept; but man as known and represented by that act is called the objective concept, concept indeed by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept, through which its object is said to be conceived, and therefore it is rightly called objective, because it is not a concept as a form intrinsically terminating conception, but as an object and matter about which formal conception is concerned, and toward which the mind's attention directly tends, on account of which it is called by some, following Averroes, the understood intention; and by others it is called the objective nature. From this is gathered the difference between formal and objective concept: that the formal is always a true and positive

thing and in creatures a quality inhering in the mind, but the objective is not always a true positive thing; for we sometimes conceive privations and other things which are called beings of reason, because they have being only objectively in the intellect. Likewise, the formal concept is always a singular and individual thing, because it is a thing produced by the intellect and inhering in it; but the objective concept can sometimes indeed be a singular and individual thing, insofar as it can be presented to the mind and conceived through a formal act, but often it is a universal or confused and common thing, such as man, substance, and similar things. In this disputation, therefore, we intend principally to explain the objective concept of being as such, according to its total abstraction, according to which we said it is the object of metaphysics; but because this is very difficult and depends greatly on our conception, we begin from the formal concept, which, as it seems to us, can be better known.

Various Opinions are Reported

2. The first opinion absolutely denies that there is given one formal concept of being which is truly one in itself and precise and distinct from other concepts of particular beings. Thus thinks Cajetan, in his work On the Analogy of Names, chapters 4 and 6. Although he speaks obscurely and distinguishes between perfect and imperfect concepts, nevertheless that distinction coincides with another of Fonseca to be treated immediately; hence, if he is read attentively, he truly holds this; and Fonseca said that he had touched the truth, or had approached closer to it, in IV Metaphysics, chapter 2, question 2, section 3. The foundation is that otherwise being would be univocal and not analogous, which we shall see below to be false. The consequence is proved because things are univocal whose name is common and the nature of the substance accommodated to the name is the same, according to Aristotle's testimony at the beginning of the Categories; but the name of being is common to all beings; therefore

either the nature of the name is one and the same, and thus being will be univocal, or it is not one, and thus neither can the formal concept of being be one, because the formal concept has its unity from some one thing or nature conceived, which it adequately regards. Therefore, if that concept is also adequate to the word or name of being, it cannot be more one than the one nature of being signified by that name.

3. The second opinion, which is rather an explanation of the preceding, is that of Ferrara, I Against the Gentiles, chapter 34, who distinguishes a twofold concept: one he calls the what of the name, the other the what of the thing; he says the former can be one in the concept of being, but the latter by no means; and he founds both on the analogy of being. And this is explained in this way from the common nature of analogous terms; for they can be conceived in two ways: in one way, by the proper real concept signified by the name, and in this way, insofar as they are analogous, they do not have one real concept but several, as is evident both in analogues of proportionality and of proportion or attribution; for if, upon hearing this name "laughing," a proper concept of the signified thing is formed, not one but a double concept is formed: one of man, who properly and formally laughs; another of a field, which is so called only through a certain proportionality. But if not both of these concepts but only one is formed, that word is not conceived according to its total analogy or common signification to those things, but either only as it is univocal with respect to men, or only as it is transferred and metaphorically signifies a field. And similar is the case in analogues of attribution, for example, "healthy"; for if a proper concept of the signified thing is formed, it is not one but multiple: one of the animal which is formally and properly healthy; others of other things which through various relations or denominations from the health of the animal are called extrinsically healthy. But in both of these analogues, one very confused concept can be formed, which is more about the signification of the word than about some thing, as if, upon hearing the name "healthy," you should conceive what has an order to health.

Thus therefore in the present case, upon hearing the name "being," a confused concept can be formed, comprehending whatever has being or a relation to being, but this is only a concept of the what of the name; nevertheless, if the things signified by that name are truly conceived, not one concept but several are formed.

4. Fonseca's opinion is close to this. Nor does Fonseca differ much from this opinion, distinguishing above three kinds of concept of being, namely, distinct, confused, and middle, that is, partly confused and partly distinct. The distinct is that which determinately and expressly represents all the simple entities which being immediately signifies, and this is not one but several. The confused is that which represents all things confusedly and indeterminately, and this is one. But the middle, which is partly confused and partly distinct, determinately represents one nature, for example substance, but the others, namely quantity, quality, etc., implicitly and indeterminately, insofar as they all agree with substance in a certain proportion, and this also is said to be one.

5. The diversity of so many distinctions hinders rather than helps clarity. But such distinctions seem to me to be multiplied without cause, and rather to confuse than to explain the matter. For we ought to speak of the formal concept of being, not according to what can be known and comprehended about all things which are comprehended under this word, as they are in themselves, but as they are signified by this word; otherwise the discourse will not be about the concept of being qua being, but about the concept of all things both existing and possible, insofar as they are such and are distinguished among themselves, in which way they cannot be distinctly conceived by one formal concept by anyone except God alone, as the same author rightly noted. But in this sense also the concept of substance or of living thing, if it were explicit and distinct in that way, would be only that by which all substances or all living things, insofar as they exist, are distinctly conceived, in which way

God alone could have their distinct formal concept of substance, living thing, etc.

6. You will say that substance, living thing, and similar names do not immediately signify these or those substantial or living natures, but the nature of substance, of living thing, etc., and therefore to form a distinct concept corresponding to the signification of such a word, it is not necessary to descend to particular natures; but it is otherwise with being, because it immediately signifies entities, at least simple ones, that is, not composed of common nature and contracting difference. But this is truly false, as will be established more fully from the following section, and now it is briefly evident from the common way of conceiving. For who would say that being immediately signifies God as God is, even if God is most simple and not composed of common nature and contracting difference? Finally, the same can be asked about substance, accident, and other genera or simple concepts. Likewise, why would being be said to signify immediately simple entities rather than those composed of common nature and contracting difference, such as animal, habit, etc.? For being as such generally comprehends all things under itself, and just as nothing is included in the concept of substance or quality which is not being, so neither in the concept of animal or habit. But that a composite concept can be resolved into several, neither of which includes the other, while a simple concept cannot, matters little for mediate or immediate signification. For who would believe that being immediately signifies rational, and not man, because rational expresses a simple concept, and man a composite one? Therefore, stopping properly and precisely at the formal concept of being as such, it does not pertain to it that through it particular beings should be distinctly conceived according to their proper and determinate natures; and therefore the concept of being as such, if one stops at it, is always confused with respect to particular beings, as they are such. And therefore Saint Thomas, I, question 14, article 6, says that if God knew other things from himself only insofar as they are beings, he would

know them only in general, confusedly and imperfectly; whence he concludes that he knows them not only according to how they communicate in the nature of being, but also according to how one is distinguished from another. He holds, therefore, that the concept of being as such, precisely stopping at it, is always confused with respect to any determinate nature of being, as it is such in itself and is distinguished from others, whether it be composite or simple.

7. The manner of speaking of others is not approved. Therefore also that member concerning a concept partly confused and partly distinct is superfluous for explaining the present matter. First indeed, because the concept of substance is improperly said to be implicitly or confusedly the concept of accident, and in general the proper concept of the first analogate is most improperly said to be the confused concept of the other analogates which are secondary, although many speak thus, saying that just as the same name, although it immediately signifies the first analogate, secondarily signifies the others, so the formal concept of the first analogate confusedly represents the others, insofar as they are similar or proportional to that first one; for what represents something distinctly consequently seems to represent, at least confusedly, other things similar to it. But this, although it is of little moment and perhaps concerns the manner of speaking, is not approved by me, because such a proper and distinct concept of the first analogate is only one, and formally represents only the first analogate itself; in which it is not rightly compared with a name, because a name signifies only by imposition, and therefore the same name, which primarily and properly signifies one thing, can be imposed by transference to signify others secondarily; but the concept of a thing only naturally represents the thing itself, and therefore if it is the proper and adequate concept of the first analogate according to its proper nature, it cannot represent the rest; whence it does not per se make them known, but at most can be like an origin or occasion for others to be conceived and denominated according to some proportion or relation to the first analogate; which is not sufficient for

the special and proper concept of the first analogate to be called the implicit or confused concept of the rest. Then I ask whether that concept of the first analogate is entirely the same as the concept which corresponds to the proper name of the same thing or nature, for example of substance, or whether it is different. The latter cannot be said, because if both are proper concepts of substance, it cannot be understood in what the diversity consists, so that one is said to represent accidents and not the other. But if the former is said, therefore that concept can no more be said to represent accidents than the proper concept of man can represent other animals; indeed less can this be said, since there is less similarity. Likewise, because otherwise it would have to be said that substance has one formal concept in some way common to substance and accident, which is truly most improper and strictly false, because although accident expresses a relation to substance, nevertheless the concept of substance in no way represents that relation, but only its term, and that not formally under the aspect of a term, but according to its absolute nature; therefore this is not sufficient for that concept to be called the implicit or confused concept of accident. And the same can easily be considered in other analogates or their concepts; for the formal concept of laughing man as such is in no way the confused concept of a field, nor is the proper concept of a healthy animal the concept of medicine, and so on with others. And the reason is that what founds such analogy is either some real agreement or similarity between the analogates, as we shall say below about being, and that is not represented through the proper concept of any analogate; or it is not proper similarity but only a certain proportion or attribution, and this also is not sufficient for the proper concept of one analogate, as such, to represent the others in some way, but only that form through order to which the others are so denominated, which is represented through such a concept absolutely and as it is such in itself, and not with relation to the others.

8. I add further: whatever may be the case about this manner of speaking, that the determinate concept of substance is called the confused concept of the remaining genera of beings or accidents, nevertheless that still cannot be called the formal concept of being as such, both because that is the proper formal concept of substance as substance is, but the proper concept of being ought to be different from the concept of substance, since being is rightly divided into substance and accident; and also because being does not immediately signify substance, as I shall show below; therefore neither does it immediately express the proper formal concept of substance. It remains therefore that the formal concept of being as such, compared to determinate beings as they are such, is always a confused and indistinct concept in representing this or that being. But I say with respect to particular beings as they are such, because with respect to that object which it immediately and properly represents (whatever that may be), it can be called and truly is a proper and distinct concept, just as the same concept of animal, which with respect to man is confused, with respect to animal as such is proper and distinct, although under this same comparison the same simple concept is usually called confused with respect to that composite concept by which animal is conceived through its definition. And in a similar way, either in different men or in the same person at different times, one concept of being can be more distinct than another, and conversely one can be called confused with respect to another more distinct one, insofar as it happens that the very nature or quiddity of being as such is known more or less perfectly, which distinction of formal concepts has nothing to do with the present purpose, because it is more on the part of the one conceiving and from perfect or imperfect light or manner of conceiving, than from relation to the object, which we here principally consider.

The True Opinion

9. Therefore, these distinctions being set aside, it must be said that the proper and adequate formal concept of being as such is one, really and rationally precise and distinct from other formal concepts of other things and objects. This is the common opinion, as Fonseca admits above; Scotus and all his disciples hold it, as we shall see in the following section; Capreolus, In I, distinction 2, question 1, conclusions 1 and 2, and in the responses to arguments against them; and Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 1, question 2, who cites Saint Thomas, question 7 On Power, articles 5 and 6; Soncinas, in IV Metaphysics, question 1; Javellus, question 1; Flandria, question 2, article 6; Hervaeus, Quodlibet II, question 7; Soto, in Categories, chapter 4, question 1; and it is clearly gathered from Saint Thomas, in the places to be cited in the following section. And it is proved first by experience; for upon hearing the name of being, we experience that our mind is not distracted or divided into several concepts, but is rather gathered to one, just as when it conceives man, animal, and similar things. Second, because as Aristotle said, I On Interpretation, through words we express our formal concepts; but the word "being" is not only materially one, but also has one signification from its primary imposition, by virtue of which it does not immediately signify any nature under a determinate and proper aspect under which it is distinguished from others. Hence neither does it signify several things as they are several, because it does not signify them according to how they differ among themselves, but rather as they agree among themselves or are similar; therefore it is a sign that to this word there also corresponds in the mind one formal concept, by which what is signified through this word is immediately and adequately conceived. Or rather conversely, from this sign we gather that from such a way of conceiving things with one concept, the imposition of such a name proceeded. Third, we can argue from the concept of existence; for it seems self-evident that there is given one formal concept of existence as such, because whenever we speak and dispute about existence in this way as about one act, we truly do not form several concepts but

one; therefore also the formal concept of existence as such is one, because just as the abstract is conceived by way of one, so also the concrete as such precisely constituted; therefore similarly to being as such one formal concept corresponds; for being is either the same as existing, or, if it is taken as having the aptitude for existing, its concept has the same reason of unity. Hence also the concept of being is usually called not only one but also most simple, so that to it is made the ultimate resolution of others; for through other concepts we conceive such or such a being; but through this we prescind from every composition and determination, whence this concept is also usually said to be per se the first which is formed by man, because, other things being equal, it can be conceived more easily of any thing, all of which Saint Thomas teaches, question 1 On Truth, article 1, and question 21, article 1; and Avicenna, II Metaphysics. Therefore concerning the unity of this most common and confused concept almost no one doubts; but we have shown that no other can truly and properly be called the concept of being as such which is not confused with respect to particular beings as they are such. Finally, if the formal concept of being is not one, there will therefore be several; how many therefore will there be? There is no greater reason for two than for three, or any other number; because if these concepts are multiplied, it is necessary that they be multiplied according to some diversity of things or entities comprehended under the latitude of being; but these entities can be multiplied infinitely and distinguished according to their proper natures, and if it is once posited that the concept or concepts of being as such represent determinate natures of being, even as distinct, there is no reason why one should stop at two rather than three or four, etc., as will be more evidently established from what we shall say in the following section about the objective concept; for although the formal, insofar as it is made by us and in us, seems to be able to be known by experience, nevertheless exact knowledge of its unity depends greatly on the unity of the object, from which acts usually take their unity and distinction.

10. From this is understood first in what sense or by what reason this formal concept is said to be really precise from other concepts, namely, because on the part of the thing it is really distinct from the concept of substance as such, of accident, of quality, and other similar ones; for we speak in the human intellect, which while it divides even those things which are not distinct in reality by the mind, divides concepts in itself, forming really distinct concepts of the same thing according to diverse precision or abstraction of the conceived thing, in which way the formal concepts of divine justice and mercy in us are really precise or distinct, although mercy and justice in themselves are not distinguished. Thus therefore the concept of being as such, since in representing it prescinds from the proper nature of substance as such, of accident, and of all others, it is necessary that in itself it be really precise and distinct from the proper concepts of such natures or natures as they are such, and this also all easily admit.

11. Second, it is gathered from what has been said that this formal concept of being, just as it is one in itself according to the thing, so also according to its formal aspect, and according to that it is also rationally precise from the formal concepts of particular natures. This is evident first because this concept in itself is most simple, both objectively and formally; therefore in itself it has one simple adequate formal aspect; therefore according to that it is prescinded from other formal concepts. Second, because just as our mind, by prescinding those things which are not distinguished in reality, really distinguishes its formal concepts in itself, so conversely, by confounding and joining those things which are distinguished in reality, insofar as they are similar in themselves, it unites its concept, forming it one in thing and formal aspect; but in this way beings are conceived by this formal concept of being; for the mind takes all those things only as similar among themselves in the aspect of being, and as such forms one image by one formal representation representing what is, which image is the formal concept itself; therefore that concept is simply one in thing and

formal aspect, and according to that precise from those concepts which more distinctly represent particular beings or their natures.

12. The formal concept of being as such is not multiplied according to the multitude of particular objects. Third, it follows that this formal concept of being is not only one, but also cannot be several according to relation to more determinate objects, or more distinctly conceived on the part of objects. These formal concepts can indeed be multiplied either according to number in different subjects, or in the same subject at different times, perhaps also according to species on the part of the one conceiving in a higher way or with greater clarity and more distinct apprehension of the formal aspect of being as such (although perhaps this whole distinction is only according to more and less within the same species, especially stopping at concepts which can be naturally formed by man); but truly from greater or lesser determination of the object the concept of being as such cannot be multiplied; because, as has been shown, by the very fact that one does not stop at the common conception of being as such, but descends to this and that being as they are such, although formal concepts are multiplied, nevertheless not concepts of being as such, but by adding the concept of substance, or accident, etc.

13. This concept is not only of the name, but also of the thing. Fourth, it is gathered from what has been said that this concept is falsely called only of the name and not of the thing signified by the name of being, and according to that aspect by which it is signified through that name. First, because, as I said, this concept is prior to the word and its imposition to signify things in such a way. For although as regards us concepts are often formed by means of words, nevertheless according to itself and simply, the concept is prior, which per se begets the word by which it is expressed, and is the origin of its imposition; therefore such a concept is simply and absolutely a concept of the thing according to itself, and not only in order to the signification of the word, so that by this reason it should be called a concept of the name, or what of the name. Second, because this

concept is by way of a certain simple image naturally representing what is signified through the word by convention, but this alone consists in its being a concept of the thing, although, because that concept is most simple, and therefore its object cannot be clarified by a proper definition, we are accustomed to use descriptions to explain it, which only seem to clarify more distinctly the signification of the name; and in this way that concept can in a good sense be said to be what of the name, provided it is not excluded that it is the proper and adequate concept of the thing immediately signified through that word.

14. Of which analogues one common nature is given. The foundation of the first opinion (for about the second enough has already been said) touches the matter of the analogy of being to be treated below, and also depends on what is to be said about the objective concept, for many think that the unity of formal concept does not conflict with analogy, but the unity of objective concept does, concerning which matter later. Now it is briefly said from Saint Thomas, In I, distinction 19, question 5, article 2, reply to 1, that among analogues of attribution some are those which signify a form which is intrinsically only in the principal analogate, but in others only through relation or extrinsic denomination, such as healthy and similar things, and to these the unity of formal concept is repugnant, because the analogates do not have proper similarity and agreement among themselves. But others are those which signify a form or nature intrinsically found in all analogates; and of this kind is being, as we shall see below, for accidents are not beings through extrinsic[24] denomination, but through intrinsic nature or aspect of being, which they participate; and in such analogues it is not inconvenient to give one formal concept simply and absolutely one in itself in thing and adequate formal aspect; but in what its analogy consists will be explained below.

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[24] extrinsecam, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Cologne 1614, Madrid 1960; intrinsecam, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

SECTION II
WHETHER BEING HAS ONE CONCEPT OR FORMAL OBJECTIVE NATURE

1. The first reason for doubt. The reason for doubt is twofold. The first was touched upon in the preceding section and is founded on the analogy of being, because if its objective concept is one, either by unity of univocation, and thus analogy is removed, or only by analogical unity, and thus either it is truly not one, or there is a contradiction in terms, because analogy intrinsically includes either several natures having only proportion among themselves, or several relations to one form, by reason of which the objective concept of an analogical name cannot be one. This is clarified and confirmed, because for being to have one objective concept, it is necessary that all beings agree in one formal nature of being, which is immediately signified by the name being, because unity of objective concept requires unity of thing, or at least of formal nature; but if all beings agree in one formal nature, therefore as such they have one and the same definition, just as one objective concept; because if the objective concept is one, its definition also can be one; therefore nothing is lacking to being for perfect univocation.

2. The second. The second reason for doubt is that if the objective concept of being is one, therefore according to itself it is precise and abstracted from all inferior or determinate natures of beings; the consequent is impossible; therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is evident, because if the concept of being is one, therefore formally and actually it does not include in itself determinate modes of beings; for these are intrinsically opposed and effect distinction; whence it is impossible that they be actually included in one objective concept; therefore for the concept of being to be one, it is necessary that it prescind from all these; but I show this to be

impossible thus: because if being as such prescinds from determinate natures of beings, therefore for it to be contracted or determined to them, something must necessarily be added to it; therefore either what is added is being or nothing; if nothing, how can it really determine being and constitute some proper nature of being? But if it is being, therefore being as such cannot be prescinded from it, for what is prescinded from another is not included in that. For it cannot be understood that being is prescinded from the modes by which it is contracted, and that nevertheless it is intrinsically included in them; nor conversely, that the mode contracting being includes nothing except being, and yet that it determines it to a special nature of being. For contraction and determination is not understood without addition; but addition cannot be understood unless what is added is such that it does not include that to which it is added either according to thing or according to reason, according to the mode in which it is understood to be added. And this is confirmed, for on account of this cause Aristotle said, III Metaphysics, text 10, that genus is outside the nature of differences, namely because it abstracts and prescinds from them; therefore if the objective concept of being is precise and one, it is necessary that it not be included in the contracting elements.

3. The reason of difficulty to the contrary. To the contrary, however, is the fact that to one formal concept one objective concept necessarily corresponds; but it has been shown that there is given one formal concept of being; therefore one objective concept must necessarily be given. The major is established because the formal concept has its whole nature and unity from the object; therefore for it to be one, it is necessary that it tend toward an object one in some way; but the objective concept is nothing other than the object itself, as known or apprehended through such a formal concept; therefore if the formal concept is one, it is necessary that the objective also be one.

Various Opinions are Reported

4. The first opinion. In this question, those who deny that there is given one formal concept of being consequently also deny that there is given an objective one.[25] And thus Cajetan holds, in the places cited in the preceding section, in his first opinion; and Ferrara, in the place cited. From those, however, who admit one formal concept of being, Soncinas denies one objective concept, IV Metaphysics, questions 2 and 3; and Hispalensis, In I, distinction 3, question 1; Hervaeus and Flandria, in the places cited in the preceding section. This is also attributed to Capreolus, but in reality he does not teach this, as I shall say below. Thomas Aquinas is also cited for this opinion, I, question 13, article 5, question 7 On Power, article 7, question 2 On Truth, article 11, in which places he signifies that to words which are common to God and creatures there does not correspond one conceived or signified notion, but several. The foundations of this opinion have been touched upon at the beginning; for, although many arguments are brought forward by these authors, nevertheless the force of all lies in the two difficulties touched upon. The aforesaid authors do not agree, however, in explaining the concept, or rather the objective concepts which correspond to being. For some say that through the formal concept of being all genera of beings are immediately represented, insofar as they have among themselves some proportion or relation, as Ferrara holds, and Cajetan holds the same. Others, however, say that through the formal concept of being this disjunct is immediately represented: substance or accident, as Soncinas, Hervaeus, and others. Still others say that absolutely all genera or notions, or simple concepts, are represented, not copulatively nor disjunctively but[26] simply, as Fonseca, IV Metaphysics, chapter 2, question 2, sections 4 and 7.

5. The second opinion. The second opinion is entirely contrary, that there is given an objective concept of being that is

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[25] Pereira, II Phys., c. 2, in fine. (Footnote in the Vives edition.)

[26] sed, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605; vel, Cologne 1614, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

simply one. This Scotus holds, In I, distinction 3, question 1, and In III, distinction 8, question 1, and In II, distinction 3, questions 3 and 6; Javellus, IV Metaphysics, question 1; Soto, In Predicaments, chapter 4, question 1; and Capreolus is in the same opinion, In I, distinction 2, question 1. There is, however, diversity among these authors, for Scotus posits this concept as abstracted from the nature of the thing from inferior natures and contracting modes of being. Others, however, only posit this unity of objective concept from our mode of conceiving, without abstraction and distinction which would be in things; concerning this diversity of opinions we shall speak in the following section. Concerning the other difference, which also exists among these authors regarding univocation or analogy, we shall speak below.

6. The third opinion, intermediate between the aforementioned, uses a distinction, and is explained in various ways. For some say that the objective concept of being taken in itself and absolutely without inferiors is one, and abstracted by reason from those, yet compared to inferiors and as included in them it is not one, and thus they reconcile the reasons for doubting adduced at the beginning; for, because through the formal concept of being, being is conceived according to itself and without any comparison to inferiors, it is necessary that under this consideration at least that objective concept should have unity. When, however, this concept is considered as existing in the inferiors themselves, it cannot have unity; for the inferiors themselves differ, for example, substance and accident, through the very thing by which they are beings; therefore they cannot have unity in that as such, because they cannot agree and differ according to the same thing, and the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning also confirm this latter part. Otherwise Fonseca, above, having supposed that distinction concerning confused, distinct, and intermediate concept, or partly confused, partly distinct, says of this third concept that it can indeed be one, not however abstracted from inferiors, but be a concept of substance, for example; concerning the

distinct concept, however, he similarly says it is not one adequate to being, unless perhaps in God, but in us it includes the concept of substance, quality, etc. But, as I said, these are not really concepts of being as such. Finally, concerning the confused concept of being, which pertains to the matter, he says it is in some way one and abstracted, not however simply, but in a qualified sense; it is indeed abstracted in some way, because it does not expressly and determinately contain that which is proper to the inferior members; it is not, however, simply abstracted, even according to reason, lest it should follow that it is univocal. He declares this abstraction to be in a qualified sense, and not simply, because this confused concept of being so excludes those things which are proper to substance and other simple entities, that nevertheless its essence is not other than the essence of such entities.

7. But these distinctions, as I touched upon in the preceding section, do not seem to me to serve to explain the matter; but the more they are multiplied, the more the matter seems to be obscured and confused. Omitting therefore the distinct or particular concepts of substance and other genera or members dividing being in common, here we treat only of that objective concept which immediately and adequately corresponds to that formal concept which we said in the preceding section corresponds in the mind to this word "being" and to the thing immediately signified by it; for the other particular concepts taken according to themselves are not concepts of being insofar as it is being, but as they are such or such beings.

First Assertion

8. There is given one objective notion of being. I say therefore first that to the formal concept of being there corresponds one adequate and immediate objective concept, which expressly says neither substance, nor accident, nor God, nor creature, but all these through the mode of one, namely insofar as they are in some way

similar among themselves and agree in being. In this conclusion the authors of the second opinion agree, and Fonseca does not dissent, and Thomas Aquinas greatly favors this, in the places cited above from On Truth, question 1, article 1, question 21, article 1, insofar as he says the concept of being is most simple and first of all, and is determined to substance, quantity, etc., through a certain determination and expression of such a mode of being, where it is necessary that there be discourse concerning the objective concept; for the formal is not determined nor contracted. Whence more openly in I, question 5, article 3, reply to 1, Thomas Aquinas says: Substance, quantity and quality contract being, applying being to some quiddity or nature; but contraction cannot be understood without some unity and community of objective concept. And in the same way Aristotle favors this opinion, IV Metaphysics, text 7, where he inquires that metaphysics considers being insofar as it is being, under which other genera are contained; where Thomas Aquinas says that first philosophy considers common being, and those things which are its properties insofar as it is such. By reason this opinion can be proved thus. It is necessary that the formal concept of being have some adequate object; but that is not an aggregate from various natures of beings according to some determinate notions of them, however simple; therefore it is fitting that that concept be one according to some agreement and similarity of beings among themselves. The consequence is evident from sufficient enumeration, because we suppose (which is self-evident) that that objective concept is not one with real unity, that is, numerical or entitative; for it is established that this concept is common to many things. The major premise assumed is also evident, because that formal concept is an act of the intellect; but every act of the intellect, just as every act, insofar as it is one, must have some adequate object, from which it has unity. The minor is proved, because, if that adequate object is from the aggregation of several natures of being, I ask what those natures are, and how they are aggregated in that concept; for in no way can this be conceived and

understood. This will also be apparent by excluding all the ways in which this has been asserted, or can be devised.

9. Being does not signify substance and accident immediately. For first, what Soncinas says, that that concept consists of substance and accident as such, is plainly false; for, either those two are included in that concept copulatively, and this he does not say, nor can he say it; otherwise it would be falsely said that substance is being, or that quality is being, because neither substance is substance and accident, nor quality, and so of others. Or those two are included disjunctively, as Soncinas himself says, and this, besides being against experience, as I shall immediately say, it follows from this the univocation of being, which he intends to avoid, for this disjunct, substance or accident, as truly, simply and equally primarily belongs to accident, as to substance, because, just as for the truth of a disjunctive the truth of one part suffices, so that the disjunct predicate be predicated equally primarily and simply, it suffices that one part of it belong equally primarily and simply to the subject; but as truly and as properly accident is accident as substance is substance; therefore that disjunct as truly and properly belongs to accident by reason of one part as to substance by reason of the other. This can be seen in all similar predicates, for to be God or creature, for example, is as truly and properly said of man as of God, and so of others. Or finally those two are included simply, that is, without conjunction or disjunction, namely, substance accident. And this is primarily against experience, because what is conceived is perceived by the mind, and in this way falls under experience; but we, having heard the name of being, and conceiving precisely that which we understand to be signified by this word, do not perceive by mind substance as such nor accident as such, as anyone can experience in himself.

10. Then that formal concept is simple and limited, and in reality abstracted from the proper formal concepts of substance and accident, as such they are; therefore through it substance and accident are not represented properly and distinctly, as they are represented

through two concepts of substance and accident. For it cannot be said that that one concept of being contains in a more eminent way the whole formal representation which is in those two concepts taken together; for this mode of universality in formal concept is alien to the human intellect, of which we treat, and is scarcely found in the angelic; therefore that concept is not universal through eminent representation of several, as several they are, but through confusion of several, as in some way they are one. But if through that concept substance and accident are not represented as properly and distinctly as through two proper concepts of substance and accident, no middle way is understood, how they can be represented according to their proper natures, but only insofar as they are in some way similar among themselves; therefore that concept does not consist of substance and accident represented even in the said way absolutely and simply.

11. It follows moreover that according to such a concept it is scarcely understood what is definitely predicated of something, when it is said to be being; for that which is predicated is the objective concept; if therefore that concept is this whole substance accident, this predication: this is, is equivalent to this: this is substance accident; but such predication cannot be made determinately, or truly, or falsely, unless both parts of the predicate are understood to be predicated copulatively or disjunctively, since those two parts are not joined in the manner of substantive and adjective, so as to be predicated in the manner of one, although, even if this were done in this way, the sense would return copulative, and a false proposition would be made. Again it follows against this whole opinion, because if both of these, substance and accident, are found in that concept, in whichever of the aforesaid ways, I inquire further what concept of substance is included there, for substance is taken there either for created substance, or for uncreated, or for some objective concept common to both. The first and second cannot be said; because being, of which we now speak, is common to created and uncreated being, as we said above to be the object of this science; but if the third is said, thence arises an argument

against the man against the aforesaid authors; both because substance is something analogous to uncreated and created substance; therefore if, notwithstanding analogy, there is given one objective concept common to created and uncreated substance, there can also be given a concept of being. And also because created substance is more distant from uncreated than accident from created substance; it would therefore be necessary, speaking consequently, to add something to that concept, saying it consists of a determinate notion of created substance and accident, which however is incredible in itself, and can be more efficaciously impugned by the arguments made. And still there remains a similar argument from the part of the other member, namely, accident; for this also according to the aforesaid authors is analogous, and at least with respect to some accidents is perhaps true, as I shall say below; I shall therefore inquire similarly whether accident enters the concept of being, according to some common concept, or (so to speak) according to a part of the objective concept common to all accidents; and against both the arguments made can be applied, and finally it can be concluded that this member also is to be divided into several others.

12. The concept of being does not include all first genera. For this reason therefore perhaps others have said that the adequate object of that formal concept of being is or includes all first genera or all simple entities, which proximately divide being. But against this opinion the prior arguments proceed in the same way. First, because such natures can be included in such a concept neither copulatively, nor disjunctively, nor simply and without any copula, as is evident by applying in the same way the discourse made; for it has the same force, as will easily be apparent to anyone considering. Second, from experience, because from the force of the conception of being we do not perceive all these definite natures of being, as such they are, and as they are distinguished among themselves, and it would be much more difficult to perceive so many natures than substance and accident only; and it is much more incredible that there is given one formal concept

in us, which distinctly represents all these natures, than substance and accident alone; but if the formal concept of being does not so distinctly represent these natures as such they are, and as they are distinguished among themselves, it is concluded that it only represents them as they agree among themselves, and are in some way similar, which is what was intended. The consequence is evident, because, as I declared a little before, between these two no middle can be found in the present case. Third, because by almost the same reason by which this objective concept of being is said to include all first genera, or all simple entities, it should be said to include all entities, however composite, man, lion, etc., according to their proper notions, which no one has said so far. The consequence is evident, because, if being includes in its concept all genera, or simple natures, it is either because the notion of being as such, according to the thing does not abstract from them, or it is because those add nothing above being which is not being, or it is because the notion of being according to reason is understood to be immediately determined, or contracted to those natures. But the first and second of these reasons proceed in the same way in any entity, even in the lowest species, for according to the thing the notion of being does not abstract more from the notion of man or horse, etc., than from the notion of substance and accident, nor does man add above being something which is not being, more than substance or quantity, etc. The third reason is not brought forward consequently, because, if being as such does not say one objective notion or concept, there is nothing in being as such as to the thing conceived, which can properly be divided, determined or contracted, either immediately or mediately; therefore that reason presents no obstacle why all entities, whatever they may be, should not be included in the concept of being, if some are said to be determinately included, nor can a sufficient reason be assigned for some rather than for others.

13. The concept of being does not include substance explicitly and others implicitly. For this reason finally it can be said

otherwise that in the adequate object of the formal concept of being there are not included several determinate and distinct natures of being according to their proper natures, nor all under some one common, but only one determinately and expressly, others however implicitly and confusedly, for example, the nature of substance as such, determinately and expressly, but the natures of accidents implicitly. But this mode also can be impugned no less efficaciously than the preceding ones. First, because I showed above that through the formal concept explicitly and determinately representing substance, as substance is, accidents are in no way represented, neither implicitly nor confusedly, if we speak properly, as I declared at length in the preceding section. Second, here also the argument taken from experience can be urged, from Soto, for we experience concerning some thing that we conceive that it is being, and doubt whether it is substance or accident; as, for example, concerning quantity we evidently know it to be reality; but whether it is substance or accident, we either doubt or it is a matter of opinion, therefore in that concept of being substance as substance, that is, expressly and according to its proper notion, is not included. Third, because otherwise the same would be the objective concept of being and the objective concept of substance; because the objective concept of substance is nothing other than the notion of substance determinately and according to its proper mode conceived by the intellect; but in the same way the notion of substance is said to be conceived through the concept of being. Again, if in the notion of substance so conceived the concepts of accidents are included confusedly or implicitly, whether it be signified by the name of being, or by the name of substance, they will be included in the same way; because the conceived notion is the same, and the mode of conceiving it is the same, namely expressly and determinately; therefore the objective concept of substance and of being will be the same; but the consequent is plainly false and against the common mode of conceiving; for this predication: substance is substance, is identical; but this is not at all: substance is being;

therefore they differ not only in names, but also in the objective notions which are predicated. Also otherwise it would be the same to distribute every substance and every being. Also this proposition would be as false: accident is being, as this: accident is substance; all of which are plainly false.

14. A priori proof of the conclusion. Finally, from the thing itself and as it were a priori our opinion is proved against all the aforesaid, because all real beings truly have some similarity and agreement in the notion of being; therefore they can be conceived and represented under that precise notion in which they agree among themselves; therefore they can under that notion constitute one objective concept; therefore that is the objective concept of being. The antecedent seems self-evident from the terms; for, just as being and non-being are primarily diverse and opposed, on account of which it is said to be the first principle of all, that anything either is or is not, so any being has some agreement and similarity with any being; for the intellect finds greater agreement between substance and accident than between substance and non-being or nothing; creature also participates in some way in the being of God, and therefore is said to be at least a vestige of him on account of some agreement and similarity in being; for which reason from the being of creature we investigate the being of God, and similarly from the being of accident, the being of substance. Finally for this reason we attribute to them some common properties or attributes, as having some goodness or perfection, being able to act or communicate themselves, and similar things; therefore there is in the thing itself some agreement and similarity among all real beings. The first consequence also is sufficiently clear per se, both because all beings under that notion and agreement are knowable; and also because for this reason other things, which have some agreement among themselves, are conceived under it unitedly and conjointly, more or less according to the reason of greater or lesser agreement; and finally because in the thing there is sufficient foundation for this mode of conceiving, and in the intellect

there is no lack of virtue and efficacy for such a mode of conception, for it is supremely abstractive and prescissive of all notions. And hence also the second consequence is easy, because, as we said, the unity of objective concept does not consist in real and numerical unity, but in formal or fundamental unity, which is nothing other than the aforesaid agreement and similarity. The last consequence is evident, presupposing others, because, if such an objective concept is possible, that one is transcendent, most simple, and in this way first of all, which are attributes of the concept of being. Also that agreement is founded in the act of being, which is as it were formal in the concept of being, whence also an argument is taken, that just as the objective concept of being itself or existence is one, so also the concept of being. Finally all are founded in that which we adduced above from Thomas Aquinas, that the analogy of being is not in some form which intrinsically is only in one analogate and extrinsically in others, but in being or entity which is intrinsically participated by all; therefore in that notion all have real agreement, and consequently objective unity in the notion of being.

Second Assertion

15. The objective concept of being is abstracted from every particular notion. I say second: this objective concept is according to reason abstracted from all particulars or members dividing being, even if they are the most simple entities. This conclusion seems to me necessarily consequent from the preceding; because, since all determinate beings in some way dividing being are among themselves distinct and several objectively, they cannot be understood to agree in one objective concept, unless at least according to reason abstraction and abstraction is made from proper notions, in which they are distinguished. But, because the whole difficulty consists in this abstraction and abstraction, it must first be declared, and then the conclusion proved per se and from proper principles.

16. It is therefore to be noted that abstraction or abstraction of the intellect does not require distinction of things, or abstraction of some notion or mode, which from the nature of the thing precedes in the thing itself the abstraction of the intellect, but in the most simple thing such abstraction can be made in various ways, namely, either in the mode of form from subject, or conversely in the mode of subject from form, or in the mode of form from form, as in God we abstract God as such from his act of will, and the act of will from God, and the act of will from the act of intellect; and similarly we abstract the subsistence of God from the nature of God as a mode of it, not that the intellect affirms it to be a mode, but that after the manner of a mode it conceives it on its part. Thus therefore the intellect abstracts and abstracts something from something as common from particular, not on account of distinction or abstraction which precedes in the thing, but on account of imperfect, confused or inadequate mode of its conceiving; by reason of which in the object which it considers it does not comprehend the whole which is in it, as it exists on the part of the thing, but only according to some agreement or similarity which several things have among themselves, which are considered in the manner of one under that notion. Whence it happens that for an objective concept abstracted according to reason from other things or concepts, abstraction of things according to themselves is not necessary, but some denomination from the formal concept representing that objective suffices, because, namely, through it that object is not represented according to all that which is in the thing, but only according to such a notion of agreement, as is evident in the objective concept of man as such, which according to reason is said to be abstracted from Peter, Paul and other singulars, from which in reality it does not differ. That abstraction according to reason is a denomination from the formal concept; because namely man, as he is objected to such a concept, is not represented according to every mode in which he exists in reality, but according to the agreement

which several men have, who are conceived in the manner of one under that notion.

17. Reason of the conclusion. Thus therefore this abstraction of reason in objective concept being explained, it is not difficult to show that it is found in the objective concept of being, because through the formal concept of being neither God, nor created substance, nor accident are represented according to the mode in which they are in reality, nor as they differ among themselves, but only as in some way they agree among themselves and are similar; therefore that which immediately and adequately is objected to this formal concept, is according to reason abstracted from the proper objective concept of substance or accident. The antecedent was proved in the preceding conclusion, with those things also which were said in the superior section being added; the consequence is evident, because abstraction according to reason consists in nothing else, as has been explained. And it is confirmed first, for the objective concept of being according to reason is not the objective concept of substance, or accident, or of any other determinate genus; nor is it an aggregate from all those; therefore it is something one according to reason abstracted from those. The major and minor were proved in the above; the consequence is evident, because this abstraction according to reason consists only in distinction of reason in order to formal concepts. It is confirmed second, for on account of this abstraction this is not identical: substance is being, nor this: accident is being, and yet both are true, because in them something common to both and according to reason distinct from both is understood to be predicated. And for this reason also, as we were arguing above, it can happen that after conception of something under the notion of being, it is doubted whether it is substance or accident, which without distinction at least of reason cannot be understood. It is confirmed third, because for no other reason is there given an objective concept of substance according to reason abstracted from all substances and of accident from accidents, except on account of the agreement which they have,

and according to which they can be conceived precisely; therefore the same must be said of the concept of being.

18. An evasion is refuted. Perhaps someone will respond that there is not real agreement among all beings in the notion of being, as there is among all substances in the notion of substance, or among accidents in the notion of accident. But, the sense is either that among beings as such there is no real agreement, or that there is not as much as there is among others. The first is plainly false, nor can it be understood, except by those who think accident, for example, is not said to be being except by extrinsic denomination, as medicine is said to be healthy, as Cajetan sometimes seems to insinuate, opusculum On Analogous Names, chapter 2; but it is not likely that he meant thus, as will be said more widely below, treating of the analogy of being; and expressly the same Cajetan, I, question 13, article 5, teaches that being, although it is said analogically of God and creatures, is said intrinsically of them; and it seems self-evident per se that something cannot be a real being through extrinsic denomination; for this is the proper notion or foundation of beings of reason, as will be said later, therefore it is necessary that what is real being, be such really and formally through its intrinsic entity, which is the same with itself, and inseparable from itself, even if all other things are understood to be abstracted or separated from it; and thus also accidents, although the entity of substance is separated from them, are understood to retain intrinsically their entity, by which they are real beings; and therefore above with Thomas Aquinas we were saying that the analogy of being does not exclude that the formal notion signified by being be found intrinsically in all analogates. Hence it necessarily follows that those have among themselves some real agreement according to their intrinsic notion of being, as was also proved above. But that this agreement perhaps is not as great as there is among substances or accidents among themselves in their proper notions, does not pertain to the present matter, for at most it concludes that the unity of the concept of being is not as great, not however that there is

not some, and sufficient for abstraction of objective concept according to reason. Just as also there is not as much agreement among substances as such as there is among men, and nonetheless both suffices for unity and abstraction of objective concept.

19. It can be responded otherwise and a difference assigned, because the notion of being is intimate to all, and therefore does not seem to be able to be abstracted even according to reason from some, but other notions are not so intimate to things. But this difference also is null, if it be taken with proportion, for also the notions of substance and accident taken most commonly are intimate to all substances, and accidents, under whatever notion they are abstracted and considered. This therefore impedes nothing to abstraction of objective concept, especially since it has been shown that this abstraction is not always founded in some distinction of the thing, but only in such a mode of conceiving, by which a thing is considered under one relation and not under another.

20. Another evasion is refuted. Against this doctrine, however, many things can be objected, which partly touch the analogy of being, partly the distinction or inclusion of it in all things or modes determining it, concerning which things must be said in the following. Now only this is objected, because from what has been said it follows that the predicaments are not primarily diverse, because they agree in some common notion. It is responded that the predicaments are not said to be primarily diverse because they agree in nothing, since it is established that several agreements or similarities intercede between various predicaments, for the predicaments of accidents besides the notion of being agree in the notion of accident; some also agree in the notion of absolute accident, and are distinguished from relative ones, etc. They are therefore said to be primarily diverse, because they agree in no genus, as Porphyry signified in the chapter on species. Also, because they do not differ by proper differences, but by themselves, as will be established from what will be said in section V.

21. The intrinsic mode of substance or accident is not included in the concept of being. From these I infer first that in this objective concept of being and thus abstracted the intrinsic modes of substance or other members which divide being are not included actually. This is evident, because they would be included either as constituting that concept of being, or as dividing it. Not the first, because it is impossible for one, as one, to be constituted by modes or opposed differences. Nor the second, because then that concept would actually be divided into two, and thus that concept would not be one, the opposite of which has been proved. And I confirm, for I ask what it is to include those modes actually; for it is either that in the thing itself that common concept of being actually includes, in those things in which it exists, those modes; or it is that in the mind or in that objective concept, as precisely terminating such a formal concept, those opposed modes are included actually. The first of these is true, but is not to the point, because this objective concept is considered as abstracted and adequate to the formal concept of being, as such, and not according to the whole reality, which it has in the thing in all its inferiors; for in this way the concept of being can neither be abstracted nor one, since it includes actually all that which is necessary for the distinction of all genera and concepts; nor can it properly and truly be said to be a concept of being as such, but there are rather several concepts of all beings according to their total realities, from which the abstracted concept of being is not distinguished in reality. It is confirmed, for in this way, even the concept of man can be said to include all individuals actually, because the objective concept of man as it exists in the thing itself, really includes the individuals themselves and their proper modes, nor is man more distinguished in reality from his individuals, than being is divided from substance, accident and other genera, as will be established below; but very improperly on account of this cause will the objective concept of man be said to

include all individuals or individuating principles of them actually. Speaking however of the abstracted concept of being in another sense, which is more to the point, it is false that it includes actually the opposed modes of inferior genera, because, as such, it only includes that which is represented through its formal concept; but through that formal concept these modes are not represented expressly and distinctly according to their proper notions, because the intellect so conceiving, perceives nothing of these, as is known from what has been said and from experience itself, and from other similar things; for man is not said to include individuals actually, but only potentially, for no other reason, except because, as he is represented through the abstracted concept of man, no individual notion is considered in him, but only the notion of man.

22. Being does not signify substance or accident immediately. Second it is inferred that this word "being" does not signify immediately substance or accident, or other genera or simple entities according to their proper notions, but the objective concept of being as such, and by reason of that the genera or entities in which in the thing itself it exists. Thus all the authors cited hold, both here, and in the conclusion of the preceding section, especially Scotus, In I, distinction 3, questions 1 and 3; Avicenna is also cited, I of his Metaphysics, chapter 4; Algazel, chapter 6; and it is taken from Thomas Aquinas, in the cited places, and On Being and Essence, chapter 1, where Cajetan in the matter holds the same, although he differs from Scotus and constitutes in this a difference between being and other names signifying determinate genera or species; but in reality no difference intercedes which pertains much to the present matter, except that which is to be treated in the following section. Whence rather this is declared and proved: first, by the example of man (and the same is true of similar things); for it signifies immediately man, and mediately Peter, in whom on the part of the thing the notion of man is found; therefore similarly being, etc. The consequent is proved from parity of reason, because in both cases the

name is common, and in both cases the objective concept is according to reason abstracted from inferiors, and the name does not signify those, except on account of some agreement which they have among themselves.

23. Second it is declared a priori, because, just as words express formal concepts of the mind, so also they immediately signify objects which through such concepts are immediately represented, for insofar they serve to express concepts insofar as that very thing which concepts naturally represent, words from imposition signify; and therefore a word is sometimes imposed in common, because the concept which it expresses, is also common; therefore that very thing which is the immediate object of the formal concept, is the immediate significate of the word adequate to that concept; but such is this word "being" with respect to the formal concept of being.

24. Third, this is further declared, because this word "being" so signifies many things that from a single and first imposition it comprehends all those things; therefore it is a sign that it does not signify them immediately, but through some objective concept common to all those things. The antecedent is declared from the difference between the analogy of this word and others, which are analogous through mere proportionality or extrinsic relation to one thing; for in the others the word always signifies only one thing from its original imposition, but afterwards it has been transferred by some metaphor to signify something else; whence it happens that it immediately signifies both as if by a double imposition and signification. In this they agree with equivocals, and differ only in that in equivocals both impositions are equally first and neither flows from the other, as in the aforementioned analogues. Examples are: laughter from first imposition only signifies a certain action of man; but afterwards this word has been transferred to signify the pleasantness of a field; similarly "healthy" from first imposition signifies only health existing in an animal; then it has been transferred to signify other things which have a relation to the health of an animal. And the reason

is, both because this multiple signification and imposition has not arisen from one concept, but from many, and also because it is not founded on real agreement of the things signified, but only on extrinsic relation or proportion. But truly the name "being," from its proper and original imposition, has a signification common to all beings, as is evident, both from common usage and apprehension of such a word, and from its formal or quasi-formal significate, which is "to be," which is of itself common and intrinsic to all real beings; and finally because that imposition has arisen from a single formal concept of being as such. And hence the first consequence also remains proven, because one word cannot by virtue of one imposition signify many things as many, but as they are somehow one, and therefore it is of the nature of a common word that, at least according to reason and in order to the concepts which words express, it does not immediately signify many things, as they are such. Which in the present case can be shown, for being does not immediately signify substance alone, otherwise accident would not be intrinsically being, nor does it signify simultaneously substance as substance and accident as accident, as can easily be declared by running through those three members posited above, because, namely, it can neither disjunctively, nor copulatively, nor simply signify them immediately, as will easily appear by applying the arguments made above. For these three—formal concept, objective, and word—maintain proportion among themselves, and therefore we often argue from one to another, not indeed committing a vicious circle, but taking from each what seems to us better known, or more easily conceded by others.

25. Fourth, I argue, because on account of this immediate signification of the concept or common account of being, being can most properly be distributed, saying: every being is good, and divided, for example, into substance and accident; for not only the word is divided there, but what is signified by the word. For this reason also comparison is made excellently, saying this is a more perfect being than that, which Aristotle also does, Metaphysics VI, c. 1. And finally

we use this word excellently as extreme or middle of a syllogism, for the unity of the word would not serve for reasoning, unless by reason of one proximate and immediate significate. And in this way that common account is excellent, that being, insofar as being, is the object of the intellect, or of metaphysical science; whence it is necessary that there be something one immediately signified by that word; for this account can be efficacious insofar as that thing is not merely an object in any way, but is also a subject, about which demonstrations are made and a middle term for demonstrating certain things about inferiors. Finally there is added the often-mentioned experience, because when the name of being is heard we conceive something, and not substance, nor accident. For it cannot be said (as some suggest) that we then stop at the concept of the word, because this is against experience; for one who knows the signification of the word "being" forms a different concept than one who is ignorant of it; for the latter conceives the word and stops there, or doubts what is signified by that word; but the former beyond the word conceives the thing signified and in no way doubts about the signification, and yet does not conceive substance nor accident; therefore this word has another more immediate significate.

26. But Soncinas objects with certain reasons, which we shall bring forward in the following section; for they only prove that being does not signify some medium really distinct from substance and accidents, but not that it cannot be distinguished by reason through a confused concept of the mind. He then objects with Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text. 8, saying that being signifies the ten categories, which Averroes expounds concerning first signification and without medium, whom Alexander of Hales follows there. He objects second with Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text. 4, saying that if there are not beings abstracted from matter, natural philosophy would be first philosophy, that is, metaphysical science could be distinguished from it minimally, which consequence would not be good, if being as being signified something common to substance and accident, for that could

be the object of metaphysics, even if there were no immaterial beings. Third, we can object with Aristotle, Physics I, text. 25, where he indicates that being does not signify something one which could be the middle term of a syllogism; for this reason he rejects that reasoning of Parmenides: Whatever is besides being, is non-being; but non-being is nothing; therefore whatever is besides being, is nothing.

27. Fourth, Aristotle can be objected with, Metaphysics VII, c. 4, text. 15, saying that being itself is said of all genera or categories, not however similarly, that is, not according to the same account and concept. Fifth, the same Aristotle is cited, Metaphysics VIII, c. 6, text. 16, saying that being itself, this indeed, that is, per se and as it is such, is immediately substance, quality, quantity, etc., and therefore is not put in definition, as if to say, being immediately descends to the first genera, in which places Averroes, Alexander and St. Thomas so expound and think. Sixth, Aristotle is brought forward, Prior Analytics I, c. 28, where he indicates that the first genera are such that nothing is said of them, as Alexander and Philoponus seem to expound.

28. Solution. To the first testimony it is responded that Aristotle says nothing there about immediate signification, but only about general and equal predication of being and one; for they are found equally in all categories, and from this he concludes that they are the same among themselves. For the efficacy of this reasoning it is not necessary that in this signification every medium of reason be removed. Whence St. Thomas there says that being signifies the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or potency, in which he sufficiently indicates that it does not signify them immediately according to their proper accounts, but according to some common one. Therefore the exposition of Averroes is not necessary to us, although he sufficiently declares that he only excludes a medium which would be a genus, and which would express a definite nature and properly contractible, concerning which we shall speak later. To the second, some respond that Aristotle's argument is good,

yet it is not founded on the fact that being cannot signify a concept common to substance and accident, but on this: that if there were no thing abstracting in being from matter, the account of being as such would not abstract from matter more than the account of body or natural being, and therefore the consideration of being as such would not transcend the limits of natural philosophy, because then material substance would be the first being; but the same science treats of the first being and of common being, as he had said in the beginning of book IV, and St. Thomas and Scotus note in the said place, book VI.

29. But this common response requires greater examination. For it can first be doubted whether, even if there were no immaterial substances, there should be given a science of metaphysics, distinct from physics and mathematics. For it seems that this should be asserted, for then there would be given an account of being abstracting from material substance and from quantity and other accidents. There would also be given common properties, such as true, one, same, diverse, whole, part, etc., about which neither physics nor mathematics treat now, nor would they treat then, since they are more common and exceed their proper objects. Therefore a third science would be necessary, superior to both, which therefore would be metaphysics. Whence it can second be doubted whether that science would then be prior to natural philosophy; for it seems that this should be said, because it would be about a more abstract and prior object.

30. To me indeed it seems probable that, even given that hypothesis, place would still remain for metaphysical science; for now only one part of it is that which disputes about spiritual substances; as to the remaining parts therefore it could then remain, and dispute about being and other transcendentals, and about the ten categories, and about universal principles and causes. This being posited, nevertheless according to the mind of Aristotle, in the cited place, natural philosophy would be the first science or philosophy, at least in dignity and excellence, since it would treat of the most noble object,

namely, of substance as such, and of every substance; and consequently it would also treat of the first causes of things and principles, not indeed according to abstraction of mind, but according to reality.

31. From this it is finally said that it appears more probable that in such a case there would be no need for a special science of metaphysics distinct from natural philosophy. The reason is that then philosophy would treat of every substance, and consequently of all accidents, even of quantity insofar as it is a property of substance, both regarding its entity and essence and insofar as it is distinguished both from substance itself and from all its other properties, because this entire consideration of quantity would not abstract from sensible matter nor exceed the scope of the object of philosophy. And for the same reason, the division and consideration of all the categories would belong to the same philosophy, because nothing in them would be founded in reality except in sensible substance; for the categories of accidents would not extend more broadly than the category of substance. Again, the consideration of all essences and all real causes would belong to philosophy for the same reason. And finally, by equal reasoning, the same science would treat of the common predicates of substance and accidents, nor would it be necessary to constitute a special science on account of those alone, because they would not abstract from sensible matter, and the concept of being would not be other than the concept of material being. Nor would it be an objection that the notion of being and similar common notions would be common to mathematical and physical things, because that commonality would only be according to real agreement, not according to some peculiar abstraction pertaining to constituting the object of a science. Just as even now continuous and discrete quantity agree in the common notion of quantity, and yet there is not given one common mathematics, because physics sufficiently treats of that agreement and common notion, in which no special abstraction

constituting a peculiar knowable object is found; so therefore it would be in that case.

32. To the third testimony, setting aside the exposition of Soto and others who say that proposition is false: "whatever is besides being is non-being," because being taken simply is accepted for substance—for this is strictly false, as I shall show below, and moreover, preserving the proportion of predicate and subject, it would still be true to say that whatever is besides being is non-being—setting aside this exposition, I say, it is replied that Aristotle does not deny that being can be the middle term of a syllogism, nor for this reason reject the argument of Parmenides, but because he both assumed that being is one properly and strictly, when it is only analogous, and also because he used the word "one" equivocally; for thus from the premises set forth above he concluded that what is, or being, is one; therefore whatever is besides the one is nothing; so as to establish that all things are one, which is a manifest equivocation, for he intended that all things be one in reality itself; but being, if taken precisely and as if immovably, is not one in this way, but only in notion; if however it be taken distributively and for individual beings, thus indeed each being is one, but not all things are one.

33. To the fourth, that exposition is denied; for when Aristotle says that being exists in all things, but not similarly, it is not correctly expounded as meaning "not by one concept, but not in the same way," because it is said of substance simply, but of others in a qualified sense, as St. Thomas expounds. The fifth only proves that being is not such a middle term as is properly contracted to inferiors through something that is not being, but through simple determination, by which each genus is of itself being, and such being, which is most true, as we shall see more broadly in sections 5 and 6, yet it does not exclude a middle concept arising from our confused mode of conceiving. To the sixth I reply first that Aristotle makes no mention there of the ten first genera; but he says absolutely that there are certain things which are predicated of others, but nothing of them;

which we can expound of transcendentals, of which nothing is predicated as superior, for thus that proposition seems to need restriction; for as equal, there is nothing of which something cannot be predicated, for the transcendentals themselves are predicated of each other properly, and not entirely identically. Whence if anyone wishes to expound that member concerning the ten genera, it is necessary that he otherwise restrict it to superior predicates, which are genera or species, for absolutely how can it be true, since it evidently appears that many things are predicated of the first genera? Indeed, Aristotle himself, in Posterior Analytics II, chapter 14, signifies that certain superior or more universal predicates are contained within a genus, while others are said of others even outside the genus, which all expositors understand to have been said on account of being and similar things.

34. The concept of being, even as compared to inferiors, is prescinded from them. Finally, it follows from what has been said that being expresses not only one and prescinded concept, as it is considered abstractly in absolute terms, but also as it is compared to inferiors, so as to be predicated of them, or considered as existing in them. This is proved, because after any abstractive knowledge of a common concept from particulars, the intellect can make a comparative one; therefore that very thing which is abstracted in being can be compared to inferiors; for there is no greater repugnance in the concept of being than in other common concepts, but rather the same reason applies, namely, because that whole concept is in the inferiors themselves, whether it be distinguished from them in reality or only in reason, for this makes no difference; indeed, the less the distinction between them in reality, the more truly one will be attributed to the other; thus, although we prescind the wisdom of God, and distinguish it in reason from God, comparing it to God, we truly and properly say that wisdom is in God. In this manner, therefore, the notion of being precisely conceived is correctly compared to substance and accident and is said to be in them, and in this way these predications are made:

substance is being, and accident is being. Whence it is confirmed, because all this comparison or composition is made from simple concepts; therefore after the intellect has conceived being precisely, it can simultaneously conceive substance or accident according to their proper concepts, because these simple concepts have no repugnance among themselves, as is evident per se; therefore similarly the intellect can then compare being to substance as existing in it, and similarly to accident; therefore the concept of being, even as compared to the concept of substance and accident, is according to reason prescinded from them.

35. You will say: therefore the concept of being, even as included in inferiors, is prescinded from them, which contradicts what was said above, because included in inferiors it is nothing other than they themselves, because nothing is in them that is not being. The consequence is clear, because being cannot be compared to inferiors or predicated of them unless as it is in them; therefore, if as expressing a prescinded concept it is compared to inferiors, even as it is in them it will be prescinded. It is replied that there is an equivocation from our mode of conceiving to the thing itself, and conversely. Therefore in rigor the consequence is denied, because, although the concept of being, which is prescinded by us according to reason, is in inferiors, nevertheless as it is prescinded, formally speaking, it is not in inferiors, that is, it does not have in them that state or mode of being which it has through extrinsic denomination from the precision of the intellect. However, when it is said that this concept, even as prescinded, is compared to inferiors and attributed to them, the meaning is not that according to that precision or denomination it is attributed to inferiors, but only that that notion so conceived, compared to inferiors, is found included in all of them. Therefore, if that reduplication concerning the notion of being as prescinded is not made, but the discourse is simply about the notion of being precisely conceived, it is true that that notion is in inferiors and is included in

them wholly and intimately, and nonetheless is prescinded in reason, although in reality it is not prescinded.

36. But immediately a difficulty presses, because according to these things nothing seems to be lacking to the concept of being for the nature of a proper universal, for it will be one in many and of many. But this difficulty depends on two reasons for doubting posited at the beginning of the section. One concerns the univocation of being, because if being is not univocal, that reason suffices for it not to be properly universal; but how from what has been said it does not follow that it is univocal, and what it lacks for univocation, is to be treated below in its proper place, when dealing with the divisions of being; now I only assert that all the things we have said about the unity of the concept of being seem far clearer and more certain than that being is analogous, and therefore it is not right to deny the unity of concept for the sake of defending analogy, but if one of the two had to be denied, rather analogy, which is uncertain, than the unity of concept, which seems to be demonstrated by certain reasons, should be denied. In truth, however, it is not necessary to deny either, because for univocation it does not suffice that a concept be somehow one in itself, but it is necessary that it regard many things with equal relation and order, which the concept of being does not have, as we shall expound more broadly in the place cited. The other difficulty concerned the mode by which being descends, or is drawn to inferiors according to reason, concerning which matter we shall make a proper section a little below, because it both has an obscure difficulty and depends on other things to be said first.

SECTION III

WHETHER THE NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING IS IN SOME WAY DISTINGUISHED FROM ITS INFERIORS IN REALITY ITSELF AND PRIOR TO THE INTELLECT

1. Explanation of the question. This question can seem common to all degrees or superior concepts in respect to inferior ones, which must be treated in disputation V, section 1, and disputation VI, section 2. But here it has a special difficulty on account of the transcendence of being, and therefore it must be briefly resolved here, supposing that, besides the perfect real distinction which obtains between entities that are mutually separable, another lesser distinction can be found in things prior to the intellect, such as is customarily found between a thing and the mode of a thing, as we shall say more extensively below. Here therefore we suppose as certain that the notion of being is not really distinguished in the prior mode from the inferiors in which it exists, which is self-evident in every common predicate, and will become apparent a fortiori from what will be said[27]. We inquire, however, whether to be such or such a being adds some mode distinct from being itself according to the nature of the thing and prior to the intellect, so that being, or such a being (for example, substance), are distinguished according to the nature of the thing in their formal notion, insofar as substance adds some mode which being as such does not express.

Arguments of the Affirmative Position

2. First. It seems to follow from what has been said that this must be affirmed. First, because the notion of being is the same in reality as is conceived in the mind, but as conceived in the mind it does not include the mode of substance or accident; therefore neither in reality itself; but the notions of substance or accident include their own modes; therefore the notion of being in reality is distinct from those. The major premise (for all other things are evident) is proved, because we do not say that the notion of being is in reality in the same way as it is conceived, as regards the mode, namely, which it has from

[27] disp. VII. (Footnote in the Vivés edition.)

the precision of the one conceiving, but we say that the notion thus conceived is the same as that which is in reality, and this seems self-evident, because the intellect in this concept does not fabricate the thing, or the conceived notion; therefore it conceives the same thing that is in reality.

3. Second. Secondly, those things which are separable in reality are in some way distinct in reality, because they include these two negations of the same character or equivalent ones, especially in finite things; but the notion of being is separable in reality from the notion of substance, for it is preserved in accident, and conversely it is separable from the notion of accident, because it is preserved in substance alone; therefore it is in some way distinct in reality from those. You will say that the notion of being which is in substance is not separable from it, nor that which is in accident from that, and therefore there is no need for distinction according to the nature of the thing between them. But on the contrary, for distinction according to the nature of the thing the aforesaid mode of separation suffices, namely, that one notion can be found somewhere without the other; because, if in reality they are altogether the same, it does not seem intelligible, especially in finite things, that they do not always accompany each other, because those things which in reality are altogether the same, are the same everywhere; but in accident, for example, the notion of being and the notion of substance are not the same; therefore neither are they the same according to themselves and absolutely.

4. Third. Which is declared in this way thirdly, because substance on the part of reality is not substance from that from which it is being (and the same applies to accident); therefore there is some distinction according to the nature of the thing between the objective concept of being and substance, even as they are in reality in substance itself. The antecedent is evident, because substance is being from the same principle from which accident is, for in the notion of being they are one; therefore substance is not substance from the fact that it is

being, otherwise whatever would be constituted in the notion of being by that principle would also be constituted in the notion of substance. The first consequence is proved, because distinction according to the nature of the thing is best gathered from distinct formal or constitutive effects; since therefore something else is constituted through the notion of substance than through the notion of being as such, it is necessary that they have some distinction in reality.

5. Fourth. Fourthly, an argument is usually considered difficult, because it seems impossible that the same thing according to the same respect should agree with another and differ from it; but substance on the part of reality and prior to every intellect agrees or is similar to accident in the notion of being, but differs or is dissimilar in the notion of substance; therefore these two are distinguished according to the nature of the thing in some way in substance itself, otherwise according to the very same respect it would be similar and dissimilar to accident. That this is impossible is proved, because these two include a contradiction, for agreement and similarity express some notion of unity; for similarity is founded in unity, as Aristotle said in Metaphysics V; but dissimilarity rather expresses a notion of multiplicity. And the contradiction is confirmed and explained; because, if in substance the notion of substance and being is altogether the same, therefore whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, and conversely; otherwise they would differ essentially, for by anything added or removed the essence is changed; but if they differ essentially, therefore they have some distinction in reality itself, for essential character consists in reality itself. But if whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, it follows both that the notion of substance is found in accident, with which it agrees in the notion of being, and is not found, because truly accident is not substance, but dissimilar to it. It also follows that substance is similar to accident in the notion of being, because this is supposed, and is not similar, because the notion of being in substance is not of the same kind as the notion of being in accident. And

consequently it also follows that the notion of being is affirmed of accident on account of agreement with substance, and can be denied on account of the disagreement which it is said to have in the same notion. Finally, agreement and disagreement express essentially diverse relations; therefore they require in reality essentially diverse foundations and principles of founding or terminating.

6. On account of these and similar arguments, some think that being expresses an objective concept distinct and abstracted according to the nature of the thing from all inferiors and from concepts, however simple, contained under it, such as substance, accident and the like; and this is commonly considered the opinion of Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 1 and 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 1; and the Scotists follow this, who a fortiori hold the same about all universal predicates, concerning which more extensively below.

The True Position

7. Nevertheless, it must be said that the objective concept of being as it exists in reality itself is not something distinct and abstracted according to the nature of the thing from the inferiors in which it exists. This is the common opinion of the entire School of St. Thomas, which those who deny that the objective concept of being is abstracted by reason necessarily teach above all, such as Soncinas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis; and Cajetan especially declared this in the said work On Being and Essence, c. 1, q. 2; and Fonseca holds the same, in the place cited, although he seems to think otherwise about the distinction between superior and inferior essential predicates, II Metaph., c. 2, text. 11, and elsewhere, concerning which below in its place. The same also a fortiori hold all those who deny that genus is distinguished according to the nature of the thing from species, or species from individuals, such as Gregory, In I, dist. 8, q. 2 and 3; Capreolus, q. 4, a. 3, ad argum. contra 2 conc.; Soncinas, VII Metaph.,

q. 36; Soto, in Logic., q. 3, a. 2 [28]. Capreolus especially holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, ad argum. Scoti cont. ult. concl. And it is the clear position of St. Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 26, rat. 4; indeed even Scotus, X Metaph., text. 3, seems to hold this position; for he establishes a difference between being and one; for being (he says) predicates the same nature really and formally of the genera of which it is predicated quidditatively, but one, although it predicates the same nature really, not however formally, because one expresses a property, not an essence. Although perhaps Scotus spoke there in another sense, namely, that being expresses the essence of all genera, but not the whole essence, while one is altogether outside essence. And this position is taken from Aristotle, VIII Metaph., c. ult., text. 16, where he says that being itself is determined to substance, quantity, quality by itself without any addition, and therefore is not placed in definitions, because it does not express a determinate nature contractible through some difference. And thus the Commentator, St. Thomas, and Alexander of Hales explained it there; but Scotus explains that Aristotle excludes differences really distinct, but not formally distinct. But this is both openly against the mind of Aristotle and is not said consistently even by Scotus himself, because even inferior genera are not really distinguished from their differences, but at most formally, according to the same Scotus's doctrine; therefore Aristotle also excludes this distinction and composition in the determination of being to its inferiors.

8. First reason. It is proved by reason first. If being and substance are distinguished according to the nature of the thing, they are related either as whole and part, or including and included, or as altogether co-distinct. No one says this latter, nor can it be apprehended, otherwise substance taken precisely and formally as co-distinct from being would not include being, which is impossible, since it is of the essential concept of substance to be being simply. That

[28] Vide Anton. Trombetam, 7 Metaph., q. 16; Ant. And, q. 7. (Footnote in the Vives edition.)

the first also cannot be said is proved, for if being and substance are distinguished in that way, substance can be resolved into two concepts distinct according to the nature of the thing; therefore in any singular substance there is given that distinction according to the nature of the thing which precedes the intellect, and must be in the singular things themselves; therefore those two concepts will be distinguished not only as apprehended by us, but also in reality itself. That this is impossible can be shown from the part of either concept, first from the part of the concept of being itself, for if in reality itself it abstracts and is distinguished from the mode contracting it to the being of substance, I ask what kind of being is that which is understood to remain when that mode is abstracted. For either it is being common and abstracted from all singularity or determined to singular being. The first is evidently false, both because otherwise in reality itself there would be a universal thing and universally, which is repugnant, because that being is existing and produced on the part of reality; therefore it is intrinsically determined and singular; and also because it is incommunicable to another, except to this substance, if we speak of an individual. The second therefore must necessarily be said, and then I ask whether in being thus abstracted from the mode of substance there is some distinction according to the nature of the thing between the common notion of being and such a being, or not; for if there is distinction, the same argument returns; for it will be necessary to resolve that concept into two, and thus proceed to infinity; but if there is no distinction, therefore, so that the common notion of being may be determined to such a being, it is not necessary to fabricate a distinction according to the nature of the thing between them; therefore neither so that being may be determined to substance; for the reason is the same, and all the arguments made in the beginning can be applied to that concept of being which is said to be abstracted from substance, as it really exists in it, and in that they must necessarily be solved, and thus no foundation will remain for fabricating such a distinction. Besides the fact that an entity that is real

and singular, and yet in its intrinsic and essential character most formally does not include the notion of substance or accident, can scarcely be conceived by the mind.

9. Then the same can be shown from the part of the other concept or contractive mode of being; for I ask whether being is intrinsically included in it or not; if it is not included, it is nothing; therefore substance adds nothing above being, nor can it effect a distinction between being and substance; indeed it cannot determine or contract being or constitute substance; for how will that which is nothing provide all these things? But if it is included, therefore that mode also includes the whole concept of substance, and concerning it the question returns whether it is distinguished according to the nature of the thing from being or not; for if it is not distinguished, the same can be said of substance; but if it is distinguished, it will be necessary to resolve it into two other concepts distinct according to the nature of the thing, and thus proceed to infinity. One could respond to this argument by denying the two-membered partition posited in the beginning, namely, that being is distinguished from substance as part from part, or as part from whole, but as a simple common concept from a simple particular concept, so that the common is included in the particular, although not conversely. But, although this response perhaps takes what is true, as we shall explain more extensively below, nevertheless from it manifestly follows that there cannot be distinction according to the nature of the thing between the concept of being, as existing really in its inferiors, and those inferiors. For if the inferior concept, for example of substance, is simple, so that it cannot be resolved into two concepts mutually distinct according to the nature of the thing, how can it be understood that in it there is distinction according to the nature of the thing between itself and something included in it? Therefore this very fact sufficiently declares that this mode of distinction is not actually in things themselves, but only as in foundation, but is consummated through the abstraction of reason.

10. Second reason. Secondly, the concept of being is abstracted not only from creatures, but also from God, but in God the concept of being, as such, is not distinguished according to the nature of the thing from the concept of such a being, namely, uncreated or infinite; therefore neither in other beings. The major is established from what has been said and the minor is also certain, both from God's supreme simplicity, for if there were some distinction according to the nature of the thing in him, he would not be supremely simple; and also because otherwise there would be given in things some real character distinct according to the nature of the thing from all others, prior by itself and by nature to God, as God is, namely that character of being, which in God would be distinct from the character of God; but this is impossible because God, as God, is essentially the first being both in duration, and perfection, and nature. Finally, because that very character of being, which is in God, essentially has divine properties, such as being independent and uncreated; whence also according to that character of being as it is in reality, God is infinitely distant from creatures. By these arguments Soncinas, lib. IV Metaph., q. 2, strives to prove that being does not express an abstracted objective concept, but they prove concerning abstraction according to reality, not however concerning abstraction according to reason. The first consequence of the argument is proved, because, although the concepts inferior to being in creatures are not equally simple to the concept of God, and therefore their character might seem disparate, nevertheless in the present case it is the same, both because, if the arguments made in the beginning would show distinction according to the nature of the thing between being and inferiors, they would show exactly the same in God, for they can be applied in the same way, as will be apparent in the solutions; and also because with respect to being, as such, even the inferior concepts of creatures are simple and in them no reality can be understood prior by nature than the proper entity of each according to its determinate character. For how can it be conceived that in substance there is really or according to the nature of

the thing some entity prior under the character of being than under the character of substance?

11. Third reason. Finally I argue, because the mere distinction of our concepts, by which we conceive something through the mode of common and particular, does not sufficiently indicate distinction according to the nature of the thing in the thing conceived; therefore neither does it indicate it in the concept of being with respect to inferiors; therefore there is no such distinction. This second consequence is evident, because no other indication or trace of such a distinction can be devised, which is to be asserted not only without sufficient, but even without compelling reason, because, both speaking universally, distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause, and especially and specifically this one, which can scarcely be conceived by the mind. The first consequence is evident, because there is no greater reason concerning the common and particular concept in being than in other things; indeed in being on account of its transcendence there is less reason for distinction. The first antecedent is evident above all in divine things only, for the concept of divine person is common to the three divine persons, which agree in that common character, and are distinguished in their proper ones, and yet in each of them the character of person and the character of such a person are not distinguished according to the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Then it is also evident in characters common to God and creatures, as has already been almost explained in the character of being as it exists in God. And it can also be declared in the character of wisdom, for example, in which created and uncreated wisdom agree in some way, and yet neither in uncreated wisdom are the common character of wisdom and the proper character of such wisdom distinguished according to the nature of the thing, on account of its supreme simplicity and perfection; nor even in created wisdom can those two characters be distinguished according to the nature of the thing, because, however much you may abstract the character of wisdom, if you consider it as existing in reality in created wisdom, you will

understand it as intrinsically created, and consequently indistinct in reality itself, and by no means abstracted according to the nature of the thing from that mode by which it is determined to the being of created wisdom; otherwise it would be necessary to understand in created wisdom some real character of wisdom, which not only according to reason, but also according to reality would abstract from the character of created and uncreated, which is both most absurd and cannot be conceived by the mind, because whatever is of entity in created wisdom is made and dependent. Finally the same can be shown by characters common to created things alone, which we shall extensively accomplish below, disputing about universals; now it is briefly declared, because from the subtlety and mode of conceiving of the human intellect these superior and inferior concepts can be varied and multiplied in infinite ways; it is a sign therefore that this is not always founded in distinction which is in things, but in our mode of conceiving, supposing some foundation of similarity, agreement or eminence of the things themselves; otherwise it would be necessary to fabricate in each thing infinite modes distinct according to the nature of the thing, by which it is fully constituted in itself and fully distinguished from others. This is declared by one example or another, for the common sense, for example, has the power of perceiving the objects of all external senses; therefore a common concept can be abstracted to sight and interior sense, namely, of sense perceptive of color and another common to hearing and common sense, namely, of sense perceptive of sound, and so concerning the rest. But who would say that in common sense the power of perceiving color or sound are distinguished according to the nature of the thing among themselves, or that the power of sensing in common is distinguished in that sense from the proper power and mode by which it attains its objects, and not rather that there is there one simple virtue, which attains all those objects, which the intellect inadequately conceiving compares with other things, and thus abstracts common concepts, distinct not in reality, but by reason? The same is in the light of the sun, insofar as it

both has the virtue of illuminating, in which it agrees with the splendor of fire, and of heating, in which it agrees with heat, and of drying, in which it agrees with dryness, and from all these the intellect can abstract various concepts, all of which to consider distinct according to the nature of the thing in light is frivolous and without foundation.

Solutions to the Arguments

12. Response to the first. To the arguments therefore posited in the beginning the response is, first in general, that in all of them there is great equivocation in arguing from the objective character, as abstracted by the intellect, to it as it is in reality, and attributing to things themselves what only by extrinsic denomination befits conceived and abstracted characters, as they are under such consideration and abstraction of intellect. And this is to be especially considered in all these argumentations, which are founded only in the mode of speaking and conceiving. For we speak as we conceive; whence just as our concepts, even if they are true and not false, are nevertheless not always adequate to things themselves, so also words are commensurate to our concepts, and therefore it must be guarded that we do not transfer our mode of conceiving to things themselves, and on account of diverse mode of speaking consider that there is distinction in things, where truly there is not.

13. To the first therefore the response is by denying the first consequence, for the character of being is said to be the same in reality, which is in mind, because truly all beings have in reality that similarity and agreement, under which the intellect conceives them, when it conceives being, and because this mode of conceiving being is inadequate with respect to beings, as they are in reality, therefore the character of being thus conceived is said not to include the determinate modes of beings, in which manner of speaking there is no longer discourse about the character of being absolutely and as it is in

itself, but as it is under the denomination of intellect; whence it is the same as if it were said that through that concept being is not considered under the express characters of inferior beings, but only by a common and inadequate concept, and therefore it is not correctly inferred that also in reality itself the character of being as it is in singular beings does not include the proper characters or modes of them; the major proposition assumed could also be distinguished, namely, that the character of being is the same in reality, which is conceived by mind; for it is the same really, not however by reason, and this is sufficient so that in reality it can include the proper characters of inferior beings, although as conceived precisely it does not include them; just as divine wisdom is the same in reality, which is conceived by mind, although as conceived by mind it is not understood to include justice, which in reality itself it essentially includes, because, that as conceived it does not include it, is only that it is not expressly and distinctly considered as including it, by that abstractive concept, not negative.

14. To the second. To the second it was correctly responded there that the character of being in substance is not separable from substance, and similarly in accident, and from this is rather gathered identity and indistinction according to the nature of the thing, because those things which are so related in reality, that they are neither really distinguished, nor can one be separated from the other, nor conversely, there is no reason why they should be distinguished in reality itself, unless from elsewhere there is some sufficient principle of distinction, which in the present case none is found. Whence to the reply the response is that the character of being, which is found in substance, is not found the same according to reality in accident, nor conversely, but only the same according to reason, that is, according to a certain agreement and similarity, which reason can conceive through the mode of one thing precisely; and for this it suffices that such a character, which is conceived in this way as common, is distinct according to reason from the proper characters of substance and

accident. For what is proper to an infinite thing alone is, that the same thing numerically is communicable to many things really distinct, through perfect identity with all and each of them, although any of them is incommunicable. But that the same thing, which in itself is really simple, that is, not composed of degrees distinct according to the nature of the thing, is really incommunicable to another, with which it has some similarity and agreement, by reason of which some character common to both is conceived in them, this does not exceed the perfection of a finite thing; indeed in any thing however imperfect something of this kind can be found.

15. To the third. To the third the response is first that substance in reality itself is being from the same principle from which it is substance, and conversely, namely through its intrinsic nature and entity which it has in reality; and the same is, proportion being kept, in accident. Wherefore in the same sense, substance is not being from the same principle from which accident is, nor conversely, for accident is being through accidental entity and in order to substance; but substance is being through substantial entity and in itself absolute from order or relation to subject, nor in this way (speaking in the same sense) are accident and substance one in the character of being, as they are constituted in reality itself. Secondly it is said, if we do not speak according to reality, but according to abstracting reason, thus substance is not substance from the same principle from which it is being, from the same (I say) according to reason; from this sense alone can it be concluded that the character of being and substance are distinguished by reason in substance itself, and similarly the character of being and accident in accident. And in the same way substance and accident can only be said to be constituted from the same principle in the character of being, in that way in which they are one in that concept, namely according to reason. Whence it can only be concluded that that character common to both is distinguished by the abstraction of intellect from their proper ones.

16. How the same entity through the same most simple character can agree and differ. To the fourth, it seems impossible to some that the same thing according to reality without any distinction according to the nature of the thing, which it has in itself, can be the principle or foundation of agreement and distinction from another, on account of the argument made. Others however think that this indeed is repugnant in univocal agreement, but not in analogical, which would be sufficient for us. But I think that even in univocal agreement this is not repugnant, as is evident from examples, both in divine and in created things. For the Father and Son agree univocally in the character of person; for who would deny that there is some unity and agreement there, or affirm that it is analogical, since in the character of person one is as perfect as the other? And yet in singular persons no distinction according to the nature of the thing can be fabricated between the foundation of distinction and agreement. For the same paternity most simple in itself in its relative entity is really distinguished from filiation, and agrees with it in the common character of relation or personality; and it is similar as if generically, and dissimilar as if specifically, although in it these degrees or concepts are not distinguished according to the nature of the thing. In creatures, quantity and quality (as is probable) agree univocally in the character of accident, and yet in each of them the character of accident is not distinguished according to the nature of the thing from the proper one, as will be said more extensively below, and I think the same is true of all species with respect to their individuals, as will be said in its place. The reason indeed is, because if distinction and agreement are of diverse orders, it is not repugnant that they be founded in the same thing; for thus one does not involve the negation of the other, indeed in some way it requires it. Thus indeed it is in the present case; for distinction is real, but agreement only according to reason, and therefore it is not repugnant that two simple things, which according to reality are really first diverse, according to reason have unity founded in real similarity or agreement, which they have among

themselves. For those things which are diverse in reality, in that very thing in which they are distinguished, can be similar; rather, similarity intrinsically postulates distinction according to reality with some unity of reason, or formal, or fundamental, for the same thing properly is not similar to itself. But if this agreement or similarity is imperfect, such as is in the analogy of being and similar things, it is more easily understood how things among themselves, however much first diverse, can nevertheless have some imperfect agreement; for they are not said to be first diverse, because they are in no way similar among themselves, for this is not necessary to be found in any things or real characters, but because they are first distinguished by themselves, with which distinction stands the aforesaid imperfect agreement. An example of this thing is in God, in whom no distinction of degrees according to the nature of the thing can be devised; whence that most simple nature through itself is entirely distinct from created nature, and yet at the same time is the principle of some analogical agreement and in a qualified sense with the same; therefore these two are not repugnant.

17. To the final confirmation, the response is evident from what has been said. For it has already been said that the character of substance and being in substance are indeed altogether the same according to reality, but differ by reason and by prior consideration have in substance the same essential character, but diverse by reason, and the same is true of the character of being and accident as they are found in accident, but conversely accident and substance compared among themselves, are said to have in the character of being the same essential character according to reason only, not according to reality, and in all the inferences made in that confirmation equivocation is committed, by not distinguishing diverse characters and modes of agreement and distinction.

SECTION IV
IN WHAT THE NATURE OF BEING AS BEING CONSISTS, AND HOW IT BELONGS TO LOWER BEINGS

1. What Avicenna understands by the name of being. Since it has been said that being expresses one objective concept, it is necessary to declare briefly in what its formal or essential nature consists, at least through some description or explanation of terms; for, since that nature is most abstract and most simple, it cannot properly be defined. Therefore, there was the opinion of Avicenna, which the Commentator and St. Thomas report, IV Metaphysics, comment 3, and book X Metaphysics, comment 8, that being signifies some common accident belonging to all existing things, namely existence itself which he said happens to things, since it can be conferred upon them and taken away from them. This opinion is founded on the signification of the word being; for it is derived from the verb "I am," and is its participle; but the verb "I am," spoken absolutely, signifies the act of being or existing; for being and existing are the same, as is evident from the common usage and signification of these words; therefore, being adequately signifies that which is; whence in Aristotle, book I Physics, text 17, and often elsewhere, in place of being is put "that which is," that is, what has the act of being or existing, so that being is the same as existing; therefore being formally says being or existence which is outside the quiddity of things.

2. Soto, touching upon this opinion, with the name of Avicenna tacit, chapter 4 Antepraedicamenta, question 1, at the end, first says that being is always the participle of the verb "I am," just as existing is of the verb "I exist," and formally signifies being, but materially, that which has being; but afterwards he declares that being signifies not only what actually is, like existing, but what is actually or

potentially, because of a non-existing man it is truly said to be a being, just as to be an animal or substance, and nevertheless he concludes that being is not predicated quidditatively of things, especially created ones, because it expresses a relation to being, which is outside the essence of a creature. And in this he establishes the difference between being and thing, that thing is predicated quidditatively, because it signifies a true and established quiddity absolutely, and without order to being; but being is not predicated quidditatively, because it does not signify quiddity absolutely, but under the aspect of being, or insofar as it can have existence; and for this reason he thought it was said by Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text 16, that being is not placed in the definitions of things. Soto seems to have taken this entire doctrine from Cajetan, in the work On Being and Essence, chapter 4, just before question 6, where among other things he says that Avicenna is only reproved because he calls being an accidental predicate; for properly being is not an accident, but a substantial act; but he is not worthy of reproof in that he denies being to be an essential or quidditative predicate; for this is true, since being is outside quiddity, and he quotes St. Thomas, Quodlibet II, article 3, saying that being is predicated essentially of God alone, which he also signifies in I, question 3, articles 4 and 5, and I Contra Gentiles, chapters 25 and 26.

3. Being both as participle and as noun. To explain this matter and remove equivocation, we must use the customary distinction of being, which Cajetan and Soto above reject without cause. But Fonseca rightly embraces it, IV Metaphysics, chapter 2, question 3, section 2, and St. Thomas sufficiently suggests it, in the said Quodlibet, although not in the same words. Therefore, being, as has been said, is sometimes taken as a participle of the verb "I am," and as such signifies the act of being as exercised, and is the same as actually existing; but sometimes it is taken as a noun signifying formally the essence of that thing which has or can have being, and can be said to signify being itself, not as actually exercised, but in potency or

aptitude, just as living, when it is a participle,[29] signifies the actual use of life, but when it is a noun it signifies only that which has a nature that can be the principle of vital operation. That this distinction must necessarily be admitted by the aforesaid authors is evident, for the prior signification is founded on the property and rigor of the verb "I am," which spoken absolutely signifies actual being or existence; whence also dialecticians say that in a proposition with a second adjacent the verb "is" is never separated from time. And it is also evident from common usage, for if someone says "Adam is," he signifies that he exists. But this verb in rigor has its participle included in itself, into which the aforesaid proposition can be resolved. Again, it is established from common usage that being, even taken for real being (as we now speak), is attributed not only to existing things, but also to real natures considered in themselves, whether they exist or not; how metaphysics considers being, and in this way being is divided into ten categories. But being in this signification does not retain the force of a participle, because a participle consignifies time, and thus signifies the actual exercise of being or existing, and therefore this word "existing" can never be said of a thing that does not actually exist, because it always retains the force of a participle of the verb "I exist"; therefore it is necessary that being in this latter signification be taken in the force of a noun. Whence the aforesaid authors in fact admit this partition, although they despise it in words, for it is the same to say that being sometimes signifies a thing actually existing, sometimes potentially only, as to say that sometimes it is taken as a participle, sometimes as a noun, or as others speak, participially and nominally. Because by this very fact that being does not signify actual entity and existence, it is no longer taken in the force of a participle, but as a verbal noun. Whence St. Thomas, in the said Quodlibet, after he had treated of being, as it is said from actual being, adds: "But it is true that this name being, according as it imports the thing to which

[29] principium, Madrid 1960; participium, alit. Cf. Madrid 1960, t. 1, p. 416,

such being belongs, thus signifies the essence of the thing, and is divided through the ten genera."

Resolution of the Question

4. What being as participle imports. Therefore, with this signification of the word presupposed, the resolution of the question taken in general is easy. For it must be said first, taking being in act, as it is the significate of that word taken in the force of a participle, that its nature consists in this, that it be something actually existing, or having a real act of being, or having actual reality, which is distinguished from potential, which is actually nothing. All this, since it consists only in the declaration of a most simple concept, cannot be proved otherwise than from the common mode of conceiving and from the signification of the word explained by us. And finally, because from what has been said in the preceding sections it can be established that being under this aspect can have one formal and objective concept, common to all beings actually existing, since they are similar among themselves and agree in actual being and entity, it is also established that that concept can be signified by this word; therefore the nature of being thus taken and of its concept cannot consist in anything else, nor can it be explained otherwise.

5. I say secondly: if being is taken as it is the significate of this word taken in the force of a noun, its nature consists in this, that it be having real essence, that is, not feigned nor chimerical, but true and apt for really existing. The proof of this conclusion is proportionally the same as that of the preceding, because this simple concept cannot be understood or explained in any other way.

What Real Essence is

6. What being as noun is. It remained only to explain what real essence is, or in what its nature consists; for since essence is that

according to which a thing is said or denominated being, as St. Thomas says, On Being and Essence, chapter 2, which is maximally true of being taken in this acceptation, therefore it cannot be sufficiently explained in what the nature of real being consists, unless it is understood in what real essence consists. In this two things can be asked, which are indicated by those two words: first, in what the nature of essence consists; second, in what consists that it be real. The first cannot be explained by us, except either in order to the effects or properties of the thing, or in order to our mode of conceiving and speaking. In the first way we say that the essence of a thing is that which is the first and radical, and most intimate principle of all actions and properties that belong to the thing, and under this aspect is called the nature of each thing, as is established from Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 5; and St. Thomas notes, On Being and Essence, chapter 1, and Quodlibet 2[30], article 4, and often elsewhere. But in the second way we say that the essence of a thing is what is explained through definition, as St. Thomas also says, in the said work On Being and Essence, chapter 2, and thus it is also customary to say that that is the essence of a thing which is first conceived about the thing; first (I say) not in order of origin (for thus we are rather accustomed to begin the conception of a thing from those things that are outside the essence of the thing), but rather in order of notability and primitiveness of the object; for that is of the essence of the thing, which we conceive as primarily belonging to it and as primarily constituted intrinsically in the being of the thing or of such a thing, and in this way essence is also called quiddity in order to our locutions, because it is that through which we respond to the question what the thing is. And finally it is called essence, because it is that which through the act of being is first understood to be in each thing. Therefore the nature of essence can be declared by us in these ways.

[30] Quodl. 2, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; Quodl. 1, Cologne 1614, Paris 1861 (discovered by SD).

7. But what it is for essence to be real, we can explain either through negation or through affirmation. In the prior way we say that real essence is that which involves no repugnance in itself, nor is merely fashioned by the intellect. But in the latter way it can be explained, either a posteriori through this that it be the principle or root of real operations or effects, whether it be in the genus of efficient cause, or formal, or material; for thus there is no real essence that cannot have some real effect or property. But a priori it can be explained through extrinsic cause (although this is not true simply of essence, but has truth of created essence), and thus we say that essence is real, which can be really produced by God, and constituted in the being of actual entity. But through intrinsic cause this nature of essence cannot properly be explained, because it is itself the first cause or intrinsic reason of being and most simple, as it is conceived by this most common concept of essence, whence we can only say that real essence is that which from itself is apt to be, or really exist. Therefore in these ways, the common nature of being can be declared by us; but a more exact understanding of this matter depends on several questions. The first is, what kind is the entity of real essence, when it does not actually exist. The second, what actual existence is, and for what it is necessary in things. The third, how existence is distinguished from essence. But because these questions are almost proper to created being, and require a lengthy disputation, therefore we defer them until disputation VII,[31] content for now with the aforesaid description of being and essence.

In What Being in Act & Being in Potency Agree

8. But one doubt concerning the two conclusions posited here cannot be omitted, although it touches the division of being into being in act and being in potency; namely, whether that double

[31] usque... differimus, Paris 1861; Madrid 1960 iter, linea: prolixam... cas, et om, usque... differimus.

signification of being taken nominally and participially is merely equivocal, or so analogous that no common concept corresponds to either member, or whether it has some common concept; for if this latter is said, the most common nature of being has not yet been sufficiently explained by us; for we have declared the natures of the individual members, but not the nature of being, as common and abstracting from either member. Then it will be most difficult to explain such a concept and its nature, indeed also its name, because since it will be signified neither through being taken nominally nor participially, no other mode of signifying abstracting from these two can be devised. But if the first is said, it follows that no concept of being common to God and creatures, as possible, can be given, but only as actually existing, which seems plainly false and against the common mode of conceiving, and against all things said above about the most common concept of being. It follows then that man is said equivocally of a true possible man, or one actually existing. The consequence is evident, because the same reasoning is about man with respect to those two members, which is about being with respect to being in act and being in potency or being taken nominally and participially; for, as the participle signifies being in act, so the noun signifies being in potency. But the consequent seems plainly false; for man by force of the same imposition signifies man, whether actually existing, or possible; indeed also the simple concept of man, which corresponds to that word, equally represents existing or possible man; therefore there is not equivocal signification there; therefore the same is proportionally true of being taken under that double nature or signification, and of the concept that corresponds to it.

9. Resolution. A fitting example for understanding the resolution. It is answered that being according to that double acceptation does not signify a double nature of being dividing some common nature or common concept, but signifies the concept of being more or less precise; for being taken in the force of a noun signifies that which has real essence prescinding from actual existence,

not indeed excluding it or negating it, but only precisely abstracting; but being as it is a participle, signifies being itself real or having real essence with actual existence, and thus signifies it more contracted. Whence, just as animal said of the genus itself precisely taken, and of a brute insofar as it is such an animal, does not divide some concept common to animal as such and such animal, but says the same nature of animal as precise or as contracted, so it must be said of being under that double acceptation. And a more fitting example is in disposition, as it signifies a certain species of quality distinct from habit and the genus common to both; for it does not have any common signification, by which it immediately signifies another concept common to genus and species (for this is impossible, because nothing is common to genus and species beyond the very concept of the genus); therefore it signifies either immediately the genus itself, or immediately some species by a double signification. Thus therefore being does not signify some concept common to being taken nominally and participially, but immediately has a double signification, by which it signifies either being prescinding from actual existence or being actually existing. Wherefore that double signification is either equivocal or maximally approaches equivocation according to a certain transference founded on some proportionality. For first being seems to have signified a thing having real and actual being, as a participle of the verb of being; but then that word was transferred to precisely signifying that which has real essence. A similar thing is also in that word disposition; for, as it signifies genus and species, without doubt it has equivocal signification, or at most analogous according to a certain proportionality.

10. Therefore to the example about the word man, which was brought forward to the contrary, it is answered that it is not similar; for man does not have a double signification, one by which it signifies man precisely or in potency, another by which it signifies existing man as such, but only one, by which it signifies man precisely, whether he exists or not; which signification is proportional or similar to that

which being has only when taken in the force of a noun. But the other, which it has in the force of a participle, is not found in this word man, nor is there any incomplex and simple term, which signifies this whole that is signified by this complex word, existing man. But if we should imagine the word of man to be transferred to signify this whole, it would now have a double equivocal signification, which we say is in the name of being.

11. From which it is further understood that being taken in the force of a noun does not signify being in potency, insofar as it is privatively or negatively opposed to being in act, but signifies only being as it precisely says real essence, which is very different; for just as precisive abstraction is different from negative, so being taken nominally, although it precisely says being having real essence, does not add negation, namely of lacking actual existence, which negation or privation being in potency adds. Which is also manifestly evident from this, for being taken in the force of a noun is common to God and creatures, and can be truly affirmed of God; but being in potency can in no way be predicated of God; indeed nor of existing creatures as such is it properly said, because they are no longer in potency but in act; although of them being can be said, both as participle and as noun, because, although they have actual existence, it is also truly said of them that they have real essence, prescinding and not negating actual existence.

12. Whence finally it is understood that being taken precisely, as it is signified in the force of a noun, can properly be divided into being in act and being in potency, and being in act is the same as being signified through this word taken in the force of a participle, and thus those two signify the nature of being either precise or determined to actual existence, whether this determination be essential, as it is in God, or be outside essence, as it is thought to be in creatures, concerning which matter is to be disputed below; but being in potency also says real being, as to real essence, contracted and determined not through something positive, but through privation of

actual existence. But being thus contracted, or as conceived in such a state, is not signified through this word being, nor through any other incomplex word known to me, but only through these complex terms, possible being, being in potency and similar; all of which are to be carefully noted, for from these significations of words much depends the true conception of things, and from these also has been incidentally explained in great part the division of being into being in act, and being in potency, which again afterwards we shall treat ex professo.

Whether Being is an Essential Predicate

13. And hence it is incidentally gathered that the most common nature of being, which is signified through that word taken in the force of a noun, is essential and is predicated quidditatively of its inferiors, although being, as it says actual existence and is signified through the participle of being, is absolutely not an essential predicate, except in God alone. This latter part, insofar as it pertains to God is theological, and is customarily treated from natural principles below, book XII, and I have discussed it extensively in tome I of the third part, in disputation XI, section 1, and we shall touch on something below, disputing about God. But insofar as it pertains to creatures, it depends on what is to be said below about the distinction of existence from essence in a creature; now let us suppose, whether they are distinguished or not, that it must absolutely be said that to exist is not of the essence of a creature, because it can be given to it and taken away from it, and thus does not have necessary connection with the essence of a creature precisely conceived, under which aspect it is invariable and is necessarily said of each thing whose essence it is; therefore for this reason being taken participially is said not to be predicated quidditatively or essentially of creatures, and in this respect the opinion of Avicenna recited above is true, and St. Thomas admits it, in the said Quodlibet 2, and other places cited above, and Avicenna

can only be reproved, either because he thought existence to be a true accident, concerning which below in its place, or because he omitted the other acceptation and explanation of being, and therefore thought it should be simply denied that being under some aspect, under which it is divided into ten categories, could be essential to all those.

14. Therefore the other part of the conclusion is proved (which Soto seems undeservedly to deny), because to have real essence belongs to every real being and is maximally essential to it; therefore being under the aforesaid aspect is an essential predicate. Moreover, to be being in this way belongs to a creature, even if it does not exist, in the way that this proposition: man is being, is said to be of eternal truth; but it does not belong to it per se in the second way, as some property, because it does not suppose something prior from which it flows as a passion; for rather that is the first concept of any real being; therefore it belongs as an essential predicate and concerning the quiddity of the thing. And in this way St. Thomas said, in the said Quodlibet, that being signifies the essence of the thing and is divided through ten genera. But Aristotle said that being is not placed in definitions, not because it is outside quiddity, but because it does not say a determinate nature, but intimately transcends all things, just as others say of being, as it is signified by this word, thing, concerning which Soto above concedes that it is predicated quidditatively, because it signifies real quiddity absolutely; for it is the same to signify real quiddity, as to signify real essence, which being signifies, as it prescinds from actual existence, because essence and quiddity are altogether the same, and only the etymology of the names is different. But that essence or real quiddity is, cannot be understood without order to being and real actual entity; for we do not otherwise conceive some essence, which does not actually exist, to be real except because it is such that it does not repugn it to be actual entity, which it has through actual existence; although therefore to actually be is not of the essence of a creature, nevertheless order to being or aptitude of

being is of the intrinsic and essential concept of it; and in this way being is an essential predicate.

15. Whence I incidentally gather that being taken in the force of a noun and thing are altogether the same or signify the same, and differ only in the etymology of names; for thing is said from quiddity, insofar as it is something firm and established, that is, not feigned, for which reason real quiddity is said; but being in the aforesaid signification says that which has real essence; therefore they import altogether the same thing or real nature. Whence Avicenna, tract I of his Metaphysics, chapter 6, because he did not distinguish that double signification of being, divided it between being and thing; for he said that being formally signifies actual existence, but thing only quiddity or real essence, as St. Thomas noted, In II, distinction 37, question 1, article 1. Therefore attributing to being that double signification explained above, the other coincides with the signification of the name thing, namely, that which belongs to being taken in the force of a noun. And thus St. Thomas, in the said Quodlibet II, says that the name being, according as it imports the thing to which being belongs, signifies the essence of the thing and is divided through ten genera. And through these things satisfaction has been given to all things that have been adduced concerning the first opinion.

SECTION V

WHETHER THE NOTION, OF BEING TRANSCENDS ALL NOTIONS, AND DIFFERENCES OF INFERIOR BEINGS IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS INCLUDED IN THEM INTIMATELY AND ESSENTIALLY

1. Complete beings, and indeed even incomplete ones that are resolvable into several concepts, participate in the notion of being. This question presents no difficulty regarding complete beings, or

those which are conceived by the intellect in the manner of complete beings, such as all individuals, species, and genera, which are directly constituted in some category up to the highest genera; for being is divided into these, and is predicated essentially of them, and consequently of all other inferior things that are contained under them. Furthermore, not only regarding complete beings and concepts, but regarding any partial or incomplete beings that are resolvable into several real concepts, it is also undoubtedly the case that being is intimately and essentially included in them, because if they are resolvable into several real concepts, then at minimum they must be resolved into the concept of being, which is the most universal of all. This will also be established more strongly from what follows.

2. These things being presupposed, there is the opinion of Scotus, in Book I, distinction 3, question 3, and distinction 8, question 2, and in Book II, distinction 3, question 6, that being is not included in ultimate differences, nor in intrinsic modes by which it is determined to the first ten genera, nor in its proper passions which are convertible with it, such as one, true, and good, concerning which he elsewhere holds that they are positive and real properties, as is evident in Book II, distinction 3, question 1, to the argument. What Scotus understands by ultimate difference is explained rather obscurely by him; for he does not call that the ultimate difference which constitutes the ultimate species, since there he expressly says that rational or rationality is not an ultimate difference if the rational soul is really diverse from the sensitive soul in the thing itself. Therefore, he calls that an ultimate difference which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form, but a non-ultimate difference that which is taken from the entire form; so that if there is (he says) in man one soul which is really vegetative, sensitive, and rational, in that soul diverse grades or formal realities are distinguished, and the difference which is taken from the ultimate reality is called ultimate, not only because it constitutes the ultimate species, but because it differs from others through itself, and is not resolvable into several concepts; but if we suppose the rational

soul as such to be an integral and per se distinct form from the sensitive and all superior forms, then, just as such a form is intrinsically and quidditatively being, so the difference taken from it is also intrinsically and quidditatively being, and therefore its concept is not simply simple, but can be resolved into the concept of being and some other mode by which the concept of being is determined to be of such a difference, and therefore such a difference is not ultimate, since it differs from others through something distinct from itself.

3. And from this is taken the first and principal foundation of Scotus, for one difference is not another, as is self-evident (as is known per se); therefore either it agrees with others in the quidditative concept of being, or it does not; if it does not agree, then it does not include such a concept in its quiddity and essence, which is what we intend; but if it does agree with others in that concept, it is necessary that it differ through something else; therefore one difference will differ from others through another difference; therefore that difference was not ultimate, since it is resolved into another more ultimate one, and then we must inquire further in the same way about that other difference, whether it includes the quidditative concept of being in which it agrees with others, and so on, either we will proceed to infinity, or we must stop at some ultimate difference which so differs per se from all other things or concepts that it does not even agree with them in the concept of being, and consequently does not intrinsically and quidditatively include the notion of being; for if it included it, it would agree in it with others; but if it agreed, it would need another difference by which it would differ, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, and book X, chapter 5, that those things which agree among themselves differ by differences. And this reasoning can be applied in the same way to the intrinsic modes by which being is contracted to the first ten genera; for since each of those genera is conceived in the manner of a complete being, it is certain that it quidditatively includes the notion of being, in which all those genera agree; therefore they must differ by some modes or

differences; concerning those modes, therefore, it is further asked whether they include being; for if they do not include it, this is what we intend; but if they do include it, it must be asked by what they differ from others and how being is contracted to those modes, and thus either we will proceed to infinity or we must stop at some difference or mode which does not include being; therefore, since there is no greater reason for one than for another, we must stop at that first mode by which being is contracted to substance, quantity, etc.

4. And this is maximally confirmed by Scotus's second argument, taken from the proportion between metaphysical and physical composition; for both are made from potency and act, or (as Scotus speaks) from the determinable and the determining; but in physical composition the ultimate resolution is made to the ultimate determinable potency, which in its entity includes nothing of the determining form or act, and to the ultimate determining form or act, which includes nothing of the determinable potency; therefore similarly in the metaphysical composition of all beings, resolution must be made to ultimate determinable and determining concepts, one of which does not include the other, nor conversely; but all this resolution on the part of determinable concepts is ultimately made to the concept of being, in which as such no determining mode or difference is actually included; therefore also on the part of the determining concept there must correspond some mode or difference which in no way includes the determinable concept of being. Finally, concerning the passions of being, Scotus multiplies several arguments, which I now omit, because those passions must be discussed professionally in the following disputation.

Scotus's Opinion is Refuted

5. The Scotist explanation of ultimate and non-ultimate differences is attacked. This opinion of Scotus is rightly attacked by the

Thomists, although some of them sometimes favor it, as I will note below. And first indeed, that distinction of ultimate and non-ultimate difference, as proposed and explained by Scotus, both supposes a false foundation and is insufficient. The first is evident, because in reality there is no difference which is taken from an entire physical form. First indeed, because according to the truer opinion there is only one form in a substantial composite, and yet every substantial composite has some agreement with other composites and with all created substances, and consequently from that form, as it has agreement with them, some non-ultimate difference is taken; therefore no difference is taken from the entire form, but the ultimate is taken from the ultimate grade or reality of it, as Scotus himself speaks. This reasoning proceeds concerning composite substances, but is more evident in simple or immaterial created things, which consist of genus and difference, because in them there is only one simple nature, physically speaking, from which non-ultimate and ultimate differences are taken according to its diverse grades or concepts. And the reasoning proceeds in the same way in accidental forms, for from one and the same form according to reality, for example whiteness, is taken the non-ultimate difference of color, and the ultimate difference of whiteness. Furthermore, even if we granted that there are several forms in a substantial composite, no difference would be taken from any entire form. For suppose that the rational soul in man is distinct from the sensitive, etc., still rational would not be a difference taken from the entire form. This is proved, because according to that form man would have agreement with angels in intellectuality; therefore another prior difference would be taken from that form; therefore the difference of rationality, as it is proper to man, still in this case would not be taken from the entire form, but from the ultimate grade of it; indeed, between that form and others there would necessarily be agreement, either in the common notion of substantial form, or in the notion of soul and principle of life with respect to other really distinct souls; therefore according to all these notions, non-ultimate differences

could be taken from it; therefore there would be no difference which would be taken from an entire form; for on account of similar reasons in accidental forms none can exist from which any single entire difference is taken, as Scotus admits.

6. Furthermore, it can be shown that Scotus's division is insufficient. For omitting the difference which is said to be taken from the entire form, which is really none, as I have shown, Scotus himself admits that there is given an ultimate difference which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form, therefore it is necessary that he admit another genus of differences, which are taken neither from the entire form, nor from its ultimate reality, but from the form according to some common or superior reality, as will be the difference of the sensitive in man, if in him the sensitive soul is not really distinct from the rational, or like the difference of color in whiteness. Such a difference, therefore, is neither ultimate, as is evident per se, nor non-ultimate according to Scotus's declaration, because it is not taken from the entire form, but only from a certain grade of reality of it; therefore such differences are insufficiently enumerated by Scotus. And it remains to be asked whether according to his opinion these differences, which are neither taken from the entire form nor are ultimate, intrinsically and quidditatively include being or not. For if those do not include being, it follows that there are absolutely no real differences which include being, which he himself denies, and which is per se quite absurd; because if no difference is being, there are no real differences in things, and consequently neither are real essences constituted through them, nor are they essentially distinguished. But if those differences include being, therefore the same must be said of ultimate differences, even if they are not taken from the entire form, but from the ultimate grade of it. This consequence is proved, first, because these subaltern differences, for example, sensible, are not taken from the entire form, but from a certain real grade of it, and this is sufficient for them to include being; therefore much more will this suffice for ultimate differences to include being. The consequence is

evident, because such a difference is taken from a more perfect grade of that form; as for example, sensible and rational, supposing the true opinion about the unity of the soul in man, are differences, neither of which is taken from the entire form, and sensible is taken from it according to a superior and less perfect grade; nevertheless, because the form even according to that precise grade considered is real and true being, therefore that difference intrinsically and essentially includes being; but rational is taken from the same form according to an inferior real and more perfect grade, and the form from which it is taken, even according to that consideration, is real and true being; therefore by much greater reason the real difference includes intimately and essentially being. Furthermore, there is no greater reason for one than for another, for the concept of sensible difference is as simple as the concept of rational difference; for neither formally includes the other, nor conversely. Which I declare thus, for as Scotus himself indicates, this difference, rational, properly does not differ from others through another difference, but through itself, because while it is that by which another differs, it is simultaneously also differing through itself, lest we proceed to infinity and make the difference itself a species, namely one consisting of genus and another difference; but all this proceeds in the same way in the superior difference, namely sensible, because it also does not consist of another difference, nor is it a species, but differs through itself from another opposed to it, insofar as it divides and contracts the superior genus, and constitutes its own proper subaltern species; therefore there is the same reason for both differences, and the same is true of all superiors. But if you say that such subaltern differences are determinable by ultimate differences, this first of all is irrelevant for those rather than these to include being; indeed, according to Scotus's discourse made above, it rather follows that these differences, insofar as they are determinable by inferiors, do not include those, and insofar as they determine superiors, also cannot include those superiors, and consequently are as simple as ultimate differences can be. And

furthermore, ultimate differences also, especially according to Scotus's opinion, are determinable by individual differences; therefore also in this there is the same reason concerning them.

7. Therefore it seems finally to follow, speaking consistently according to Scotus's opinion, that only individual differences ought to be called ultimate, for those alone are taken from the ultimate reality of the form, and differ through others in no way, neither as through constituting differences (which is common to all differences, as has been said), nor as through differences contracting to inferiors, because they do not have them, which is proper to these individual differences. But neither has Scotus spoken of ultimate differences in this sense, as is evident from the cited places and from what we have adduced, nor can it be said of them that they do not include being, on account of other reasons touched upon above, namely, because these also are taken from matter or form according to their true reality. Also, because the concept of individual difference in itself is not simpler than the concept of specific or generic difference, even if it is not so common or contractible; for this is irrelevant to the simplicity of the concept, since rather superiors and more universal things are usually simpler. And furthermore, the arguments which we will make concerning intrinsic modes will also prove concerning these individual differences, for as I will show, their reason is the same or proportional.

8. Now therefore concerning intrinsic modes, Scotus's opinion is also shown to be false. First, because either those modes are positive and real, or not. This second is neither said by Scotus nor is it true, as I will show against some in the following section; for how could they constitute various essences of things and the essential distinction between them, if they were not real and positive modes? But if they are of such a kind, how can it be conceived by the mind that they do not intrinsically and essentially include being? For as we showed in the preceding section, being is intrinsically that which has a true and real essence; therefore either these modes have some real

essence, and thus are intrinsically and essentially being; or they have none, and thus neither can they constitute a real essence, nor add anything real to contract the superior concept and constitute a determinate essence and distinguish it from others. And it is confirmed, for if these modes are not being, therefore they are nothing; therefore they can contribute nothing to constituting real essences. Some respond that these modes are not being as quod, nevertheless they are being as quo or something of being, and hence they are neither simply and univocally being, as Scotus speaks, nor altogether nothing. But this response seems to consist only in words, since to be being as quo is nothing other than to be a real form or act in metaphysical constitution or composition; but no form or real act of something can exist unless it is something real in itself, which is to be real being in itself; therefore it is contradictory to say that something is real quo and not being as quod, for that quo must necessarily be founded in such a quod. This can be shown by induction in every physical composition. But the reason is the same in metaphysical composition, because also in that potency and act are conceived as constituting an integral reality or essence; whence also considered in themselves they must necessarily be conceived as having something of reality or at least partial essence; otherwise they could not be conceived as apt to constitute and complete a real essence; and this reasoning can be applied to all differences both ultimate and non-ultimate, generic, specific, and individual.

9. Second, the arguments made concerning differences can be applied here contrarily, especially that one, that a non-ultimate difference, that is subaltern, therefore includes being because it is taken from the form according to some grade of its reality; but these intrinsic modes also are taken from the form or nature according to some grade of its reality; therefore they also include being. The minor is declared, for in substance the mode per se is taken from the reality of any substantial nature, insofar as it agrees with others in the aptitude for subsisting, and thus in immaterial substances that mode is

taken from the entire simple form according to that precise notion; in material ones indeed from the entire metaphysical form or integral nature, and consequently from matter, insofar as it contributes from its part to subsisting, and from form, insofar as it absolutely constitutes substantial nature. Therefore the first consequence holds from parity of reasoning, and because, just as this intrinsic mode immediately determining being is conceived as something simple differing through itself and not through another mode from others, so also difference both subaltern and ultimate, as has been declared.

10. Third, because if the concept of substance is resolved into the concept of being and the concept of a mode altogether distinct from being, and contracting and not including it, nothing can be lacking to this mode to prevent it from being a true difference, nor to being to prevent it from being a genus, especially since Scotus supposes being to be univocal. The consequence regarding the former part is proved, because the nature of difference is nothing other than that it essentially contract a superior univocal and quidditative predicate, not including it and with it constituting some essential grade in the manner of its form, from which it has that it is predicated (as they say) in quale quid, and consequently that it makes to differ from others; but all these things belong to modes contracting being according to Scotus's doctrine. Regarding the latter part indeed the consequence is proved, because the nature of genus is only that it be a univocal and quidditative predicate or in quid, not expressing the entire quiddity up to the ultimate grade (on account of which it is usually said to be predicated in quid incompletely), and that it be apt to be contracted and determined by essentially distinct differences, from which it has that it is predicated of several essentially differing things; but all this belongs to being according to Scotus's principles. Whence contrarily Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 10, from this proves that being cannot be a genus, because it is essentially included in all differences and modes by which it is contracted, which is repugnant to genus, as the same Aristotle proves, Topics VI, chapter 3. Scotus

responds that being is not a genus, because although not in all, at least in some differences it is included, namely in non-ultimate differences, which are taken from the entire form. But this first of all has been shown to suppose what is false, because there are no differences which are taken from the entire form in the sense intended by Scotus, that is, which are taken from the entire form totally (so to speak) and not according to some precise grade or concept. And then it does not satisfy, for what does it matter that being is included in certain ultimate and remote differences so that it is not a genus with respect to substance and accident, into which it is proximately and univocally divided through proper differences and outside its own notion? Indeed contrarily according to Scotus's opinion it should be inferred that those non-ultimate differences, as they are feigned by him, are not proper differences, but certain species of being; for they are resolvable into a quidditative and univocal concept of being belonging to them, and into some ultimate difference which does not include being; therefore nothing will be lacking there for the constitution and composition of a species.

11. Fourth, these intrinsic modes are unequal in entitative perfection; therefore they are beings. The antecedent is evident, because substance is more perfect than accident, and not by reason of that in which they agree; therefore by reason of that in which they differ; therefore by reason of their proper intrinsic mode. This is also self-evident; for therefore substance is more perfect because it exists per se, but accident in another; therefore the mode itself of existing per se is more perfect than the mode of existing in another; therefore each has some perfection; therefore entity, for perfection cannot be conceived without real entity; for either they are the same, or perfection supposes entity and is its property. Whence a new argument or confirmation can be constructed; for in these modes (and it is the same concerning all differences) are found the passions of being; for they are something, since they are not nothing; and one, for each mode is in itself undivided and distinct from any other; and

good, because they have their definite perfection and appetibility; and true, because they are not fabricated and are per se intelligible. Finally, the mode by which substance is constituted must in some way be substance; for as Aristotle said, Physics I, chapter 6, substance is not constituted from non-substances, and the same is proportionally true of the mode of accident; but what is substance is also being; therefore.

12. Here indeed someone can take occasion to explain Scotus's opinion, or certainly to introduce another new one. For the difference or mode constituting substance is not complete substance, but incomplete; for by this reason substance, which is the most general of the category of substance, can have differences in which it is not included, because that genus is only complete substance, but the difference is only incomplete substance; therefore in this way it can be said that being which is determined to the being of substance, quantity, and others which are placed in the direct lines of the categories, is only complete being, and therefore is not included in the intrinsic modes by which it is determined, indeed nor in differences which are also incomplete beings; and in this sense all the arguments made do not proceed against this opinion, because it is not denied that differences and modes are beings in some way, but only that they are complete beings, which has no absurdity.

13. But this exposition is neither according to Scotus's mind nor true in itself. The first is evident, because Scotus specifically denies that being is included in ultimate differences, but in non-ultimate ones he concedes it is included; therefore he does not speak of complete being, because in this way no difference is complete being. Furthermore, Scotus speaks of the most universal concept of real being, which our mind can abstract, as is manifestly clear from the cited places; but complete being explained in the aforesaid way is not the most universal concept of being, for since incomplete beings have something of entity, they have some real agreement with complete beings; therefore a more universal notion of being can be conceived, which according to reason prescinded from these. That this opinion is

false in itself is shown by three arguments. The first is only ad hominem, supposing Scotus's opinion that being is univocal; then indeed it follows more evidently according to the aforesaid interpretation that complete being is one genus common to the ten categories, because it has real differences outside its notion, and all other things required for the notion of genus, as is evident by applying the argument made above.

14. The second argument is that being taken most commonly, as it is transcendent and the object of metaphysics or of the intellect, abstracts from complete and incomplete; for all these things, as is evident from their mode of signifying, are related by addition to being as being, in order to the precision or expression of our concepts. And at least it is not doubtful that being can be signified and conceived in this generality, as I was saying a little before; but we now speak of being in this way, because as such it is the object of metaphysics; therefore such being is intrinsically included in differences and intrinsic modes. But if perhaps the authors of the aforesaid opinion say that they do not speak of such being, but of complete being, first they do not speak to the point about which we are now dealing. Furthermore, they do not escape the difficulty which is principally intended to be declared in this entire opinion, namely, how being descends to inferiors; for although they say that complete being is contracted to substance through a certain mode, which is neither complete being nor altogether nothing, but incomplete being, it remains for them to explain how and through what being most commonly taken is determined to the being of complete or incomplete. For concerning that which complete being adds above being, I will inquire whether it includes being taken most commonly; for if it does not include it, it will be nothing, and all the arguments made will proceed; but if it does include it, therefore the difference or mode contracting or dividing includes the very thing divided. Whence concerning that mode it will remain to be inquired through what it is distinguished from being itself in common, which it includes in itself,

and through what it differs from other beings, and thus this explanation will fall into the difficulties which Scotus intends to avoid.

15. The third and most proper argument is that that concept of complete being common to the ten categories, as they are constituted in direct lines, and not to other things, is impossible, because more perfect beings are incomplete substances, which are not placed directly in the category of substance, than accidents, which are placed directly in the category of accident. This is evident, whether we consider incomplete substances physically or metaphysically, for prime matter is more perfect and has more of entity than quantity, and substantial form more than quality. Similarly rationality, as it is a substantial difference, is something more perfect than any accident; therefore being as it is common to substance and accidents is much more common to incomplete substances, and consequently to everything which in any way includes entity, for this alone agreement can be considered between substance and accident. Whence that concept of complete being, if it be a concept of being which is per se one, can only be a concept of substance.

Resolution of the Question

16. It must therefore be said that being, insofar as it is being, is intrinsically included in every being and in every concept of a positive difference or mode of real being. This is taught by St. Thomas in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 25, and in question 21[32] of De Veritate, article 1, and he indicates this in Quodlibet II, article 3, and in I, question 3, article 4, question 4, article 3, ad 1, question 5, article 1. The Thomists also teach this: Cajetan in De Ente et essentia, chapter 1; Soncinas in V Metaphysics, question 14; Soto in Antepredicamenta, chapter 4. Fonseca holds the same position in IV Metaphysics, question 4, chapter 2, question 3, and this is taken from Aristotle in III

[32] q. 21, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; q. 31, Cologne 1614, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

Metaphysics, text 10, whom I cited above. And supposing those things which have been said against Scotus, this is sufficiently proven by induction, because if we speak physically about things, the notion of being is included in all substances and in all their parts, and in all accidents and in all positive real modes; for all these things have in some way a true essence, that is, not fictitious nor imaginary, but real, apt to exist outside of nothing. But if things are considered metaphysically, being is included in all genera and species and individuals without controversy, and it has been shown by us that it is also included in differences and in positive intrinsic modes; but beyond these there is nothing in things.

17. The objection is answered. You will say that the properties of being are beyond all these things, about which nothing has been said. It is answered: concerning these properties, it has been established in the controversy whether they formally express something positive distinct from being by the nature of the thing, or only something negative or a being of reason. If therefore this latter is true, it must consequently be said that those properties do not formally include being, nor is this contrary to the conclusion, because those properties do not formally express differences or modes that really determine or affect being. But if the former opinion is true, it must consequently be asserted that these properties include being in their formal concept for the same reasons adduced above, and that these properties are contained under the enumeration made, because they express real modes of being that are adequate to it or convertible with it; which of these opinions is more true will be treated in the following disputation. The a priori[33] reason for the conclusion has also already been touched upon, and is taken from the notion of being explained above, which is to have a real essence, in which it is not included that that essence be perfect or imperfect, integral or partial, but only that it be real; but this must necessarily be included in all

[33] a priori, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605; aptior, Cologne 1614, Paris 1861, Madrid 1960

things and modes or real differences. The general reason a posteriori is also this: because in all these things there is always found some real effect or quasi-effect, which cannot be understood without the inclusion of some entity; for they constitute, complete, or integrate and distinguish real being, to such an extent that even that mode by which, according to our manner of understanding, being in general is determined to God or uncreated being, is conceived as constituting such being; whence it cannot be conceived except under the aspect of some entity. Likewise, differences or modes of this kind are usually the roots of real properties or actions; therefore.

18. To the first foundation of Scotus it is answered that one difference, however ultimate, can be diverse from another, even if it agrees with it in the common notion of being, just as everyone teaches concerning the first most general genera, which are therefore said not to differ properly, but to be primarily diverse, because otherwise they would not be supreme genera, but contained under another superior one, especially given the univocation of being, which Scotus posits; in what way this should be understood will be declared in the following section. To the second it is answered, first, that that proportion between physical and metaphysical composition is not necessary, otherwise, just as it is true of every form that it includes nothing of matter, and of matter, that it includes no form, so it would have to be verified of every genus or determinable concept that it includes no difference, and conversely of every difference that they do not include being, which is the first determinable. Second, it is said that that proportion can be preserved between metaphysical and physical composition as long as one remains within them, and it holds in this, that neither does genus include difference, nor difference genus, just as neither matter form, nor form matter; but if by resolving metaphysical composition one arrives at simple concepts not composed of genus and difference, then in those, with respect to superior transcendental predicates, the aforesaid proportion need not be preserved, because in

them that mode of determination is no longer found, but another already to be explained.

SECTION VI
HOW BEING INSOFAR AS IT IS BEING IS CONTRACTED OR DETERMINED TO LOWER THINGS

1. The difficulty of the question. This is the greatest difficulty, on account of which Scotus, Cajetan, and others have inclined toward extremely opposed opinions; some denying the concept of being as precise and abstract, so that no contraction or determination of it would be necessary, because this cannot be understood in any suitable way; since it cannot be done through non-being, as was shown in the preceding section, nor even through some being, otherwise in that being the determination would already be supposed to have been made, and one would proceed to infinity. But this opinion, if it is understood concerning abstraction according to reality or founded in some distinction from the nature of the thing, is true, and in this respect it satisfies; if, however, it is understood concerning abstraction according to reason only, it is not true, as we have shown, and therefore it is also necessary to explain according to reason how this contraction or determination is made. Others, therefore, so prescind and abstract the concept of being that they think it is contracted and determined by something which intrinsically is not being, in the way that Scotus philosophizes, who devised such a kind of precision not only according to reason, but also from the nature of the thing; nevertheless, he was deceived in two ways, as I have proved: first, by positing such a mode of real abstraction and precision; second, having supposed that, by imagining positive real modes or differences which are not beings.

2. With the precise concept of being not admitted, no contraction of it is necessary. Soncinas favors this position differently, in IV Metaphysics, question 1, reply to 2, and question 19, reply to 7, and book V, question 14, when he says that the mode constituting substance, and consequently determining being to it, is only negation or a being of reason. Whence (he says), although being is included quidditatively in substance, it is not included in that by which it is contracted to the concept of substance, because that is only a certain negation, which we circumscribe by this expression "per se." But I do not see what led Soncinas to that opinion, since he himself does not posit an objective concept of being prescinded from this disjunct "substance or accident," because, if it does not abstract from these, it needs no contracting element, but by the mere removal of one member the other is left determined; but that which is left cannot be intrinsically constituted by the mere removal of the other member, but by that which intrinsically is. For by what reason can substance be understood to be constituted in the nature of substance, which is most perfect, by negation alone or by a being of reason? Whence almost all the arguments by which we proved against Scotus that the mode of being includes being, proceed against this opinion, namely, because substance can only coalesce or be constituted from substances. Likewise, because otherwise the mode by which being is determined to uncreated being would also be negation. Furthermore, the concept of substance would be formally privative or fabricated by reason, and not real; because that by which it is formally constituted is said to be negative or a being of reason. Finally, otherwise accident would also be constituted by negation a fortiori, since it is less perfect than substance; there will therefore be a certain circle, because substance will be constituted by the negation of inherence, but accident by the negation of per-se-ity, which is scarcely intelligible. Wherefore, although these simple things are sometimes explained by us through

negations, nevertheless the mind rightly[34] conceives that real things themselves are not constituted by negations; thus we explain the difference of a brute through "irrational," which we do not therefore conceive to be constituted by negation; similarly we declare the infinity of God by negation, which we rightly conceive to consist in some supreme and positive perfection; thus therefore, although we sometimes explain substance as being per se through the negation of inhering in another, nevertheless we conceive mentally that it is not formally constituted by that negation, but by positive perfection, by which it is understood to have formal power so that it may be per se without a subject in which it inheres; just as conversely in accident we understand there to be such a positive nature which demands adhesion to another so that it may be able to exist.

3. Substance and accident are constituted by positive perfections. The third opinion, therefore, admits the contraction or determination of being to lower things through positive and real modes; but this determination can be explained in two ways. First, so that it may be through the mode of composition from being and some mode, from which, as from metaphysical parts, the concept of substance, for example, is composed, and is resolvable into the same; which composition is not from genus and difference, only because being is included in the mode itself; for in these compositions, which are only according to reason, it is not reputed inconvenient that the determinable, when it is transcendent, should be included in the concept of the determining element. And for this reason they say the concepts of substance and other supreme genera or differences are called simply simple, not because they are not resolvable into two concepts, for this is proper to being alone, but because they are not resolvable into two mutually prescinding concepts, because one must necessarily be included in the other, namely, being in the mode, although conversely the mode is not actually included in being.

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[34] recte, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Cologne 1614, Madrid 1960; recta, Paris 1861 (discovered by Shane Duarte).

4. How some think being is determined. If you should object because it is repugnant to make such a resolution into two concepts, and for one to be included in the other, for if being and per se itself are included in the concept of the mode per se, then everything that is in the concept of substance is included in it; therefore no resolution has been made. It can be responded that being is indeed included in the mode per se, but otherwise than in substance, for in substance it is included as in a complete and perfect being; in the mode, however, only as incomplete. Likewise substance includes the mode per se as a metaphysical part formally constituting it, and that is the whole constituted from being and mode; but the mode per se includes itself, or rather is itself, not as a part of itself, but as that by which substance is constituted; and for this reason a true resolution of substance into being and per se is made; nor is exactly the same thing included in the mode that was conceived in substance.

5. If the difficulty touched upon above concerning the contraction or determination of being to the mode per se itself should be pressed further—by what it is made, or how one does not proceed to infinity—there is a twofold way of responding. The first is that being is determined to per se by another mode, so that the mode per se is resolvable into two concepts, namely into the concept of being and of another unnamed mode, distinct in reason however from per se itself and less perfect, for the same reason that proves substance itself to be thus resolvable also seems to prove concerning the mode per se, for in it is the nature of being modified and otherwise than in substance, and otherwise also than in the mode of accident; therefore the nature of being which is modified, and the nature modifying it, can be distinguished there in reason, distinct in reason from that by which it is modified to substance, so that the modification itself may be of diverse nature. According to this opinion, however, it must consequently be said that that other mode is also resolvable into two other similar concepts, and consequently one can thus proceed to infinity, because there is no greater reason for stopping at one than at

another. But this would be a great inconvenience, if these concepts were posited as distinct from the nature of the thing, because it would be necessary to imagine infinite modes distinct from the nature of the thing in substance and unequal in perfection, having a terminus on the part of the most perfect mode and proximately constitutive of substance itself, but not from the other extreme; so that all those modes would be there simultaneously, and yet in them there would be none assignable as infinite in perfection; for these and similar things are truly absurd. But truly if it should be asserted that there is only a distinction of reason between these things, and that all this resolution and composition is through precision and denomination of the intellect, it does not seem a great inconvenience to admit all this; for the intellect can compare or prescind and abstract things among themselves in infinite ways; just as it can also prescind and abstract between two species into infinite genera or to infinity, insofar as other intermediate species can be multiplied to infinity between two species. But nevertheless this response is not to be approved, even in this opinion; because the mind immediately abhors a process to infinity, because otherwise there would be no mode or terminus of resolution for conceiving a thing distinctly, nor could the mind begin or effect such abstraction and determination, unless always stopping at a concept further resolvable into two other concepts, and beginning from another similar one. Whence all authors have striven to avoid this process; and it seems clearly to be repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chapter 2, texts 10 and 11, where he denies that one can proceed to infinity in quidditative predicates; for the opposite openly follows from the aforesaid process; and we will immediately add other reasons, which are common, even against this response.

6. The second response, therefore, can be that the mode per se is not further resolvable into two concepts, but distinguishes itself from any other complete or incomplete being; for when we proceed by resolving what is constituted into that by which it is constituted, we must stop at that by which, lest we proceed to infinity. For that which

is the reason of constituting or distinguishing another, is by this very fact per se distinct from any other; thus in physical things form is what distinguishes one composite from another, but it is per se distinct; and universally act is what distinguishes, but act itself is per se distinct. Thus therefore the mode per se (and the same is true of the others) contracts being to substance, which it constitutes and distinguishes from others, and simultaneously separates itself from others and per se determines being to itself; and thus the process to infinity ceases. This response is probable, nevertheless it is not said sufficiently consistently, nor does it sufficiently clarify the matter, as will be evident from what will be said in the consequent opinion.

The True Opinion is Explained

7. The fourth opinion, therefore, and the one which I approve, is that this contraction or determination of the objective concept of being to lower things is not to be understood through the mode of composition, but only through the mode of more express conception of some being contained under being; so that each concept, both of being and of substance, for example, is simple and irreducible to two concepts, and they differ only because one is more determined than the other. This is rightly explained in relation to formal concepts; for they differ only because through one a thing is more expressly conceived as it is in itself, than through another, by which it is only confusedly conceived, and precisely according to some agreement with other things; but all this can be done without proper composition through confused or distinct, precise or determinate cognition alone. Thus therefore to these formal concepts there are understood to correspond two objective concepts, simple and irreducible to several concepts, of which one is called superior or more abstract than the other, only because it corresponds to a more confused formal concept, through which a thing is not conceived according to the determinate mode in which it is in itself, but

confusedly and precisely. It can also be understood that the superior concept is included in the inferior without proper composition of the inferior; because everything that is confusedly conceived in that precise concept is found in the other object more expressly conceived, and in that whole, in whatever way it may be considered. And finally the determination of the superior to the inferior and the addition of the inferior to the superior is understood, not as if through addition of part to part, but through greater determination alone, or expression, or confusion of the same thing in relation to diverse concepts of the mind.

8. Such a mode of explaining this matter was indicated by St. Thomas, question 1 of Truth, article 1, saying: "What the intellect first conceives as most known, and into which it resolves all conceptions, is being, whence it is necessary that all other conceptions of the intellect be taken from addition to being; but nothing can be added to being as an extraneous nature in the way that difference is added to genus, because any nature is essentially being; but according to this some things are said to add above being, insofar as they express a mode of it, which is not expressed by the name of being itself," and below: "Substance does not add any difference above being, but by the name of substance a special mode of being is expressed." The same is signified in question 21 of Truth, article 1. Scotus also signified the same mode of speaking, In I, distinction 8, question 3; he differs, however, in the method of explanation, as is easily evident from what has been said.

9. The assigned mode of contracting being is proved to be possible. Furthermore, that this mode of intellectual abstraction and determination is possible is proved by examples; for when we divide quantity into two-cubit, three-cubit, etc., it cannot be understood that the concept of two-cubit quantity is resolved into the concept of quantity and two-cubit, because it is impossible to conceive two-cubit without conceiving quantity; it is therefore a sign that those two concepts are distinguished only as express and confused. The same is

almost the case in the concept of heat and heat as eight, of which this too is a sign, that the common concept of heat is not only included in the whole heat as eight, but also in its individual degrees; when therefore it is said "heat as eight," no distinct mode making composition with heat as such is added, but heat is expressed and conceived as it is in reality. In the present case this is also manifest in the determination of being to infinite being; for neither can infinity be conceived as some mode added to being, or as something less than infinite being itself; therefore there is only a more express and more determinate concept of some most simple being, and for this reason being itself is not simpler than God, although in the mode in which it is conceived it is more abstract. Thus therefore it can be rightly understood in the concept of substance and accident.

10. Such a mode is most apt for resolving all difficulties. If, however, this mode is possible, which suffices for the present, and it should be judged that it happens thus, it can easily be persuaded. First, because in this way the difficulty often emphasized above is easily expedited; and it is explained how being can express a concept prescinded according to reason, and nevertheless be determined to lower things, and be intimately included in all those without a process to infinity and without proper composition. Second, because in this way it is best preserved how the supreme genera express simply simple concepts, and nevertheless the concept of being can be abstracted from them by precision of the intellect alone, which does not consist as in the separation of one from another, namely, the formal from the material or the material from the formal, as happens in the abstraction of genus from differences, but which consists in somewhat confused cognition, by which an object is considered, not distinctly and determinately as it is in reality, but according to some similarity or agreement which it has with others, which agreement in relation to the concept of being is in things according to their total entities and real modes, and therefore the confusion or precision of such a concept is not by precisive separation of one grade from another, but only by

precisive cognition of a confused concept from a distinct and determinate one. Whence this can thirdly be proved ostensively, because the concept of being is not prescinded according to reality, but according to reason, as has been proved; but precision according to reason can happen in those two ways, as has been shown, and another can scarcely be feigned or devised. Again, quasi-formal precision by exclusion of one grade from another has no place in being on account of its unlimitedness and transcendence; and because the containment on which its concept is founded is equally in the total entity according to its whole self; therefore only the other precision through confusion of concept can have place in being; therefore also conversely modification or determination to lower genera can only be through a simple concept more express and determinate, because contraction must proportionately correspond to abstraction, and expression or determination to precision.

11. Finally, no difficulty of any moment occurs against this opinion thus explained; for nothing presents itself by which it can be shown that this mode of abstraction and contraction according to reason is repugnant, or does not suffice for all things which are usually said or conceived about being and its inferiors, and for all experience, which may be taken or perceived from our mode of conceiving. I only see that the testimony of the Philosopher can be objected, Metaphysics III, text 3, saying that a common predicate cannot be contracted by a difference which per se includes that same common predicate. But to omit that testimonies which are taken from that book are not of firm authority, because Aristotle teaches nothing in that book by asserting, but by arguing and doubting, nevertheless it is falsely cited, because he does not speak of any common predicate, but of genus, concerning which there is another reason; but being is not a genus, indeed Aristotle himself wants to conclude this there. Whence that some extend this to every common or univocal predicate, is said gratuitously, and beyond the mind of the Philosopher. Concerning

which matter discourse will return again below, when treating of universals and of the analogy or community of being and accident.

12. For what reason the supreme genera are said to be primarily diverse. Hence it follows that the concept of substance, and the concept of per-se-ity, or of the mode per se, are not distinguished objectively, but only from the mode of conceiving, as what, or as by which, just like God and Deity; because in reality there is properly no "by which" and "what," but only "what"; but the mind, because it cannot explain simple things except in the manner of composite things, uses those modes of conceiving. And therefore I said above that it is indeed rightly said that one of these modes is distinguished from another by itself; nevertheless, speaking consistently, the same must be said of the genera themselves which are apprehended as constituted by such modes; because truly there is no constitution there through the mode of composition, but through simple and adequate identity (as theologians say of relation and divine person), because whatever one includes, the other includes. Nor is there any reason why the mode per se should be distinguished from another mode by itself more than substance, since it is also proximately under being, and intimately and totally includes it. And for this reason the supreme genera are best said to be primarily diverse, not because they do not agree in some common confused concept, but because they do not have determinate differences which are outside the nature of that common thing or being, but they have diversity in their proper and determinate natures by themselves, although they also have imperfect similarity in the nature of being; for these two things do not conflict, as has been declared above.

DISPUTATION III

ON THE PASSIONS OF BEING IN GENERAL AND ITS PRINCIPLES

Having explained the formal character of the adequate object of this science, before we descend to particular objects through various divisions of being, it is necessary to dispute about the passions adequate to it and which are convertible with it, since the proper function of science is to demonstrate the passions of its subject. Here, therefore, we shall speak about these passions in general, and afterwards about each one in particular; but because science uses certain principles to demonstrate its passions, here we shall also briefly declare what principles this doctrine can or ought to use. We treat here, however, of principles of knowing, which are usually called complex principles; for we shall speak below of principles or real causes.

SECTION I

WHETHER BEING AS BEING HAS ANY PASSIONS, AND WHAT SORT THEY ARE

1. The reason for doubt is this: that for something to be a true and real property of another, it requires at minimum four conditions.

The first is that the property itself should be some thing, for if it is nothing, how could it be a real property? The second is that it should be distinguished in some way from the nature of the thing of which it is a property, for if it is entirely the same with that, it would rather be essence, or of the essence of it, than a property. The third is that it should belong adequately to it or be convertible with it, for we are dealing with property which belongs to something per se in the second mode; for this alone is what falls under science and can be demonstrated. The fourth, finally, is that the subject or that of which it is a property should not be of the intrinsic nature and essence of such a property, because, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII, chapter 5, text 18, and Posterior Analytics I, chapter 18, text 35, the subject does not fall intrinsically and essentially, but only as added in the definition of the passion; otherwise they would be mutually related in such a way that the passion would belong to the subject per se in the second mode, but the subject to the passion per se in the first mode; which seems an open contradiction. But it cannot happen that with respect to being there should be any property which has all these conditions, for if the property is real, it is intrinsically and essentially real being; because indeed it cannot be absolutely non-being, nor only a being of reason; because (as I was saying) what is nothing, or is only feigned by reason, cannot be a real passion of real being; it must therefore be something real; therefore it is real being quidditatively and essentially, for, as has been proven above against Scotus, nothing can be real which is not intrinsically and essentially real being. It is therefore contradictory to be a real property of real being as such, because if it is a real property, then being is of its essence; but if it is a property of being, being cannot be of its essence, because, as we were saying, the subject cannot be of the essence of the passion. Again, what is essentially being cannot be distinguished from being by the nature of the thing, as has been proven generally above; therefore it cannot be a passion of being. Likewise, what is essentially being, and is not being itself in general, is inferior to being; therefore it is not convertible with

being; therefore it cannot be a property of being. Finally, what is essentially being must have all the properties of being, if there are any such; therefore it cannot itself be a property of being, otherwise it would be a property of itself, which is plainly contradictory; or certainly it would include another property similar to itself and distinct from itself; and the same could again be said of that, and so it would proceed to infinity.

Various Opinions are Reported

2. The first opinion of Scotus. In this matter I find three ways of speaking. The first is that being has real and positive properties distinct from it by the nature of the thing, which nevertheless are not in themselves intrinsically and essentially beings. This is taken from Scotus in the places cited above, In I, dist. 3, q. 3 and dist. 8, q. 2, and in dist. 2, q. 3 and 6. His foundations regarding the last two parts have been touched upon in the reason for doubt. The first part, however, can be proven briefly, first from the general opinion of all who attribute these passions to being—one, true, good—which are not fabricated by the intellect, but truly and really belong to being, and are outside the nature of being itself, because to be one, etc., is not predicated of things as essentially as to be being. Likewise, because science does not demonstrate about its real object except real properties; but metaphysics is true science demonstrating these passions about its object; therefore these are true and real passions. And Aristotle signified this in Metaphysics IV, chapter 1, saying that this science contemplates being, insofar as it is being, and those things which belong to it per se, for those things which are not real cannot belong per se to the real; therefore being has real properties.

3. The second opinion. The second opinion, which some Thomists defend, agrees with Scotus principally in this, that it is necessary for being to have real passions, because it cannot have absolutely none, otherwise it could not be the object of science; but if

they are not real, they are nothing, because what is not real cannot always, per se, and necessarily belong to being; which nevertheless is of the nature of proper passion. Whence they consequently concede that these passions are distinguished formally by the nature of the thing from being, because this also is of the nature of real property. Likewise, because such passions do not predicate formally the essence of the thing, but a mode outside the essence. Whence this proposition: "Man is being," is in the first mode of saying per se, but not this one: "Man is one," on account of which Aristotle in Metaphysics IV, text 2, says that being and one are the same, not however simply and as synonyms, but as principle and cause. But this opinion adds against Scotus that these passions, even taken formally, essentially include being on account of the same reasons by which this has been proven above about differences or real modes, for the same ones proceed about such passions, supposing that they are positive and real. Whence they consequently assert that in these transcendentals it is not inconvenient for the subject to be included intrinsically in the passion, because it is not included as subject, but as determined to such a mode, which mode is the passion of being itself taken according to itself; and it can be adequate to it and be convertible with it, because it does not determine it to a special genus of being, but affects it with some common and universal mode to all beings. For as St. Thomas says in q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1, in two ways some mode is expressed or added above being, namely, either as a special mode of being or as a mode generally consequent upon every being. And from these things the authors of this opinion think that the entire reason for doubt posited in the beginning can be resolved.

4. The third opinion. The third opinion is that being does not have real positive passions, but all those things which are attributed to being as its passions add to being itself only some negation or relation of reason. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the cited q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1, which he also signifies in I, q. 5, 11 and 16, and wherever he disputes about these properties of being in particular.

The same is held by Soncinas, IV Metaph., q. 1, ad 1, q. 17 and 19, ad 9, and lib. V. q. 14; Javellus, IV Metaph., q. 2; Soto, in Praedic., c. de Proprio, q. 2, ad 2; Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 2; Fonseca, IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 3. The foundation of this opinion has been explained in the reason for doubt posited in the beginning, and in rigor it is true, but it needs explanation.

The True Opinion is Declared

5. What property is distinct from the subject in reality, which is not. Examples. It is therefore first to be noted that it is one thing for some predicate to be a true and real passion of the subject, another thing indeed to be conceived, explained and predicated by us in the mode of passion or property, which would more properly be called in the mode of attribute, in that way in which theologians speak about divine perfections. Of the nature therefore of true and real passion are those conditions posited in the beginning; but for the latter mode of attribute or property they are not necessary, especially that one about distinction by the nature of the thing, but a distinction of reason suffices, by which one thing as subject having some essence or formal character, at least confusedly conceived, but another is conceived in the mode of perfection or property. Examples of this matter besides the one adduced about divine attributes can be taken from Aristotle in the Categories, where he attributes various properties to them which cannot otherwise be distinguished or explained; as, for example, he teaches that it is a property of quantity that it be the foundation of equality and inequality, which property says nothing in reality distinct from quantity, but is only an aptitude, which is nothing other than quantity itself; but it is conceived by us as distinct in reason for more distinctly explaining the functions of quantity itself. And in the same way there could be attributed to quantity, as its property, to be the proximate subject of corporeal accidents, which nevertheless in reality says nothing distinct by the nature of the thing from quantity itself.

6. Secondly, it is to be observed that in such attributes taken formally it is one thing that they themselves are real beings or beings of reason; another that they are distinguished in reality or in reason; for it can very well happen that they are real, although they are distinguished not in reality but in reason, as is easily evident in the examples posited; and the reason is clear, because distinction of reason, which arises from the precision of the intellect, is not through the conception of some feigned entity which is not in reality, but through a merely inadequate mode of conceiving a true thing; therefore there can be a real attribute, although the mode of attribution and distinction is only through reason. Indeed rather, if we speak properly, in order that an attribute be distinct only in reason from a real subject, it is necessary that it be a real attribute and not only of reason or privative; otherwise, speaking formally, it would be distinguished more than in reason, namely as non-being from being, or as feigned being from true being. Wherefore it is also necessary to observe that in such attributes it often is one thing what is formally signified through them, another thing indeed what is intended to be explained by us through them; for often what is formally signified is negative, but through it a positive and real perfection of the thing is explained by us, as simplicity, which is assigned by us as an attribute of God, or of certain other beings in their grade, formally consists in negation; but through it we explain such a mode, or entity of the simple thing.

7. The twofold meaning of being. Lastly, it is to be observed from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 14, and St. Thomas I, q. 48, a. 2 ad 2, and In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1, that being properly and in rigor signifies the entity of the thing, in which way we have spoken about it thus far; but sometimes whatever can be simply affirmed of something is said to be being; for because affirmation is made through the verb of being, whatever is simply attributed to things, although it places no entity in them, is usually said to be being or to be; but such predicates or attributes seem to be able to be reduced to two heads. One is of those

which consist in negation or privation, for thus we say that a thing is indivisible, that a moral act is evil, that a man is blind, and similar things. The other is of those which consist in extrinsic denominations taken from the things themselves, in which way God is said to be creator from time, or a wall seen, etc.; but this denomination is sometimes taken as actual and requires the coexistence of both extremes, as in the examples posited, sometimes however as aptitudinal, just as a wall is said to be visible, etc.

8. Being does not have positive passions distinct from it in reality. These things having been posited, I say first that being as being cannot have true and entirely real positive passions distinct from it by the nature of the thing. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the cited places, who correctly notices that the discourse is about being insofar as it is being; for, insofar as it is such a being, it can well have real passions distinct by the nature of the thing, because such a being as such can be outside the essence of another being, and consequently also outside the essence of its passion; but being insofar as it is being cannot be outside the essence of any being; and therefore no property or passion can be real without being essentially included in it, and therefore it cannot be distinct by the nature of the thing from being; for, as has been shown above, being insofar as it is being is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from every being in which it is essentially included, and this is the strongest foundation of the conclusion; which can be confirmed and explained in various ways. First, because whether the character of being is considered solitarily and precisely, or as it is in things, no passion distinct by the nature of the thing will be found to flow from it, or from any thing, from the fact precisely that it is conceived to be being, but only from the fact that it is such a being. This is evident by induction, for the attributes of being found thus far are only those which are called transcendentals; but those are either not positive or not real intrinsic, or if in some sense they are such, they are not distinct from being by the nature of the thing; which will be better established when treating about each of

these attributes. Now it is briefly declared, because these attributes are common to God and are most properly found in Him without distinction by the nature of the thing. But if you say it is otherwise in creatures, first this is said without foundation; for some special indication of this distinction or necessity would have to be assigned; but nothing of this sort can be brought forward. And then there is an excellent reason, because now we are dealing with being insofar as it is being as it abstracts from God and creatures; therefore those things which are attributed to it are either attributed as distinct by the nature of the thing or not; if the latter is said, that is what we intend, for if in some being these are distinguished, it will be from a peculiar character, which we shall see later; but if the former is said, it follows that in every being, even in God, they are distinguished by the nature of the thing, because whatever is attributed to a superior per se must belong to every inferior.

9. And this can be urged further, because being itself insofar as it is being, from the fact precisely that it is such, without another real mode superadded to it and distinct by the nature of the thing, has whatever is positively necessary for it to be one, true, good, etc., whence in the very mode of explaining we say that being is, because it has a true essence and some real perfection, etc. Nor does it matter that the mind can conceive and consider the character of being without expressly considering other characters, because this at most indicates a distinction of reason, or something negative or extrinsic included or connoted in those attributes, as we shall declare later. Finally, such distinctions by the nature of the thing are understood with great difficulty, and therefore they are not to be multiplied without sufficient indication and reason; but here there is no apparent indication of this distinction, as will easily be evident from what is to be said and from the solutions of arguments. And otherwise on account of the transcendence of being this distinction is much more difficult in it, as the reasons also made in the beginning show, especially that one that the subject is of the essence of the passion,

when nevertheless the passion is like an accident of the subject. In which it also involves a special contradiction, that being insofar as it is being, which abstracts from substantial and accidental essence, simple or composite, actual or potential, perfect or imperfect, perfecting or perfectible, should postulate or require distinct passions, which are like certain intrinsic accidents by which it is perfected.

10. Being has true attributes. The passions of being do not formally signify beings of reason, and how the contrary manner of speaking is to be explained. I say secondly that being insofar as it is being has certain properties or attributes, which are not fabricated by reason, but are truly and in reality itself predicated of it. This whole thing is proven excellently by the reasons touched upon in the first and second opinion. For it is simply true that each being is one and good, etc.; but in order that these be true, it is not necessary that the mind feign some beings of reason; for although the mind thinks nothing about things, gold is true gold and is one determinate thing distinct from others; and similarly God is one and good, etc. Moreover this is correctly proven by that reason that metaphysics, which is real and true science, demonstrates these things about being; but it does not demonstrate something fabricated by the intellect. Wherefore, if we speak in this rigor about being of reason, these attributes are not correctly said to signify formally beings of reason, because such beings are properly said only to be objectively in the intellect; whence they are only when they are known or feigned by the intellect; but these attributes truly do not depend on the fiction of the intellect, but absolutely and before every consideration of the intellect they belong to being itself, as has been said. Such locutions, therefore, in order that they be true, are to be explained in some broader manner, insofar as everything which does not place in the thing to which it is attributed something real positive and intrinsic, can be said to be a being of reason, either as it is distinguished against proper real being, having true and intrinsic entity, or fundamentally, namely, because the

intellect for distinctly conceiving and predicating such attributes takes from them a foundation for fabricating some beings of reason.

11. What the passions of being formally add. I say thirdly: these attributes of being formally add either negation or denomination taken through relation to something extrinsic; through them however is explained the real positive perfection of being, not according to something real superadded to being itself, but according to the very formal or essential character of being. This conclusion seems to me to have been indicated by Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, at the same time saying that being and one signify the same nature, and nevertheless do not formally signify the same thing; because namely one formally adds negation, which being does not signify; but through it nothing other is explained than the very nature of being, which is to be declared more broadly below. But similarly it is to be said about the true and the good, and if there are other such attributes; for these formally, and in order to our conception, do not say the same as being, nor do they signify negation, as is evident from themselves, therefore they signify being under a certain relation to another, namely, insofar as it has in itself whence it is loved, or truly known, or something similar, as we shall declare in their proper places. And thus St. Thomas seems to explain this matter plainly in the cited places. But the reason of this conclusion is, because these attributes are not synonymous with being itself; otherwise they could in no way be called properties or attributes, and it would be nugatory to say that being is one or good; it is therefore necessary that they formally signify something besides being; but they cannot formally signify some entity superadded to being and distinct from it by the nature of the thing, as has been shown; nor can they signify beings of reason taken in rigor, as I have said; therefore they can say nothing else, except either negation, or privation or some relation or extrinsic denomination. Again, this whole character of attributes tends to this, that the nature of being be more perfectly known and explained by us; otherwise it would be vain and impertinent to the science of being; but it is not so,

but very accommodated, for, because we do not perfectly know simple things as they are in themselves, we use partly negations, partly comparisons to other things for distinctly explaining them. Thus therefore, although these attributes formally add negations or other relations, nevertheless through all of them the nature of being is explained, either as to perfection, or as to integrity or something similar. I said that these attributes only add above being negation or something similar, because it is placed under controversy whether formally or in the abstract these attributes signify only negation or relation, or include entity itself, which will be better explained in the individual passions.

Arguments are solved

12. To the reason therefore of doubting posited in the beginning, together with those adjoined in the first and second opinion, there is an easy solution from what has been said; for it has already been conceded that these attributes are not proper real passions with that rigor and propriety that it is necessary for all the conditions there enumerated to belong to them. It has also been declared in what sense these attributes can be called real, namely, because formally they say something which in its own way can truly and simply be attributed to being in things through the mode of privation or real denomination or real aptitude with relation to something extrinsic. And this is sufficient so that these attributes according to all that they include are not properly essential, and therefore are said to be in the mode of passions or properties. This also suffices so that these attributes can fall under science, since they are both in things, and in the way that they are they follow being itself and contribute to explaining its nature. Especially because for the character of science and for constructing demonstrations distinction of reason between attributes suffices, because we reason just as we conceive, and thus we also truly demonstrate about God that He is

immortal because He is immaterial, and thus it could also be done in the attributes of being, even if they were distinguished only in reason from being itself. Finally, from what has been said it is also established how being is not said essentially of these properties or attributes of its own, for according to reality indeed it is said essentially of them, because they explain nothing other than the very nature of being; nevertheless it is not of their essence as to what they add above being, because negation, for example, which one formally adds is not essentially true and real being, such as is that which is said to be as it were the subject of these properties; and thus the process to infinity and other disadvantages which were touched upon in the arguments are avoided.

13. How the attributes of being differ among themselves. Finally, from what has been said it is gathered how these properties or attributes can be distinguished among themselves, for as to the intrinsic reality which they signify in being, they are not distinguished in reality, since they say nothing distinct by the nature of the thing from being, as has been shown; and in this way it is usually said that in reality the entity of the thing is its goodness and truth, and conversely. But truly if we consider what they formally add, they can be said to differ formally, not indeed by intrinsic and positive formal character, but either by negative or extrinsic, as is sufficiently established from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said in particular about each one.

SECTION II

HOW MANY PASSIONS OF BEING THERE ARE AND WHAT ORDER THEY MAINTAIN AMONG THEMSELVES

1. Reasons make the question uncertain. Six transcendentals are commonly enumerated: being, thing, something, one, true, good;

from which it seems to be gathered that there are five passions of being, because there are that many predicates which are convertible with it, and no more. But on the contrary, neither can all of those have the nature of a passion, and besides those others can be conceived by us. The first can be proved from what has been said, because "thing" only expresses formally the quiddity of a thing, and the established or real essence of being; [but this is not a property of being][35]; hence many judge that "thing" is a more essential predicate than being itself. Similarly "something," since it is immediately distinguished against nothing, seems to signify nothing else most formally than being itself; for to say "something" seems equivalent to saying "having some quiddity"; but this formal signification coincides with the signification of thing and being.

2. The second is proved because besides those predicates there seem to be others common to every being, such as, for example, to endure and to be somewhere; for these necessarily accompany all beings. But if you say that these do not belong to being except as existing, but here the discussion concerns being in itself abstracting from actual existence, against this is the fact that even those properties of duration or local presence can be considered in themselves abstracting from actual existence, and as such they will be understood to have a per se connection with being; hence, just as this predication "Being is one" is of perpetual truth when the copula is freed from time, so also is this: "Being has duration or local presence." But there is a special difficulty concerning actual existence itself, for it seems to be a certain property of being itself taken in itself, because it does not belong to it essentially nor entirely accidentally. Again, besides these simple passions there seem to be others that are complex or disjunctive; for just as a property of number can be said to be that it is even or odd, and of quantity that it is finite or infinite, so a passion of

[35] [haec autem... entis), 1605 add. "En algunas ediciones, por ejemplo en la de B. Colosino, sigue a entis esta cláusula: haec autem non est proprietas, sed potius essentia entis." Cf. BHF, v. I, p. 464,

being can be said to be that it is finite or infinite, actual or potential, or similar things. Finally, if negations or relations of reason suffice for the passions of being, as has been said, these can be multiplied infinitely, such as being the same, not being impossible, being lovable, being intelligible, etc.

Resolution of the Question

3. There are only three passions of being. This question is proposed only so that we might reduce this treatment of the passions of being to certain headings, and therefore it must be said briefly that, if we speak properly and do not fabricate distinctions that are hardly necessary, there are only three proper passions of being, namely, one, true, and good. That these three are distinct among themselves at least by formal reason, whether that be negative or positive, whether real or of reason, anyone will easily persuade himself. First, from the common opinion of all who write on this matter. Second, from the common way of conceiving and from the signification and interpretation of these words themselves, for "one" as such only signifies that a thing is integral and undivided in itself; hence it formally adds a negation, in which it is distinguished from true and good. But these are distinguished among themselves, because "true" expresses adequation or relation to the intellect, but "good" to the will or appetite as being suitable to it, whether this expresses this formally or fundamentally; but these are very diverse reasons or relations. This can also be easily declared from contraries; for unity is opposed to multitude, goodness to malice, truth to falsity; but these are very distinct. Finally, from what we shall say in particular about these passions, this will be more evidently established, and at the same time we shall show that each of these attributes belongs to every being and thus is convertible with being; therefore these are the three passions of being.

4. Thing and being are not related as essence and passion. That there are no others besides these can be gathered from the

doctrine of St. Thomas; for although he often enumerates those six transcendentals and declares their reason and sufficiency, as in q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1, q. 21, a. 1, and often elsewhere, nevertheless, when he treats particularly of these properties, he never treats except of those three, as is evident from I, q. 5, 11 and 16, and in the said disputed questions. And this can be declared from what has been said in this way; for "thing" and "being" are used as synonyms according to common usage; and sometimes they are said of actually existing being, but sometimes they prescind from actual existence, wherefore neither is a passion of the other. A sign of this is also that one is never predicated of the other, and if it is so predicated, it is considered to be redundancy or identical predication. But other things are predicated of being and are joined to it, as an adjective to a substantive; for thus it is said "one being," "true being," etc.; but "being" and "thing" are substantive, nor can they be joined in that way; therefore it is a sign that one is not a passion of the other. But if we wish to distinguish these two with that rigor by which St. Thomas above distinguished them from Avicenna, that "thing" prescinds from actual existence and signifies mere quiddity, but "being" is taken from existence and only expresses actually existing being, thus it is established that "thing" does not signify a passion of being, but is a maximally quiditative predicate. And rather "being" would signify something outside essence, at least in creatures. Nevertheless, "being" also could not be called a passion of thing; for existence is not a passion of an existing creature, either because it does not flow from its intrinsic principles, but comes to it from outside, or because it does not belong to it necessarily and per se; hence neither does the actual existence of a creature properly fall under science, insofar as it actually depends on the free will of the creator; but what this existence is and how it is distinguished from the essence of a creature is an obscure matter, which we shall dispute below when treating of created being in particular. But if, according to a certain opinion treated above, "being" not only as expressing actually existing but also as expressing apt to

exist, were distinguished from "thing," insofar as it absolutely expresses having real quiddity, thus "being" would be the first passion of thing; but this was disproved above, because in the first notion of real quiddity enters aptitude to exist, and in this it is first distinguished that real quiddity is from non-real or fictitious. Therefore in these two no passion of being is contained. I know that Averroes, in his paraphrase, in the chapter On Thing, says that "thing" signifies not only true thing but also fictitious; but this is common to being, and is only according to equivocal signification. About this and about other equivocal significations of these words I shall speak in what follows.

5. "Something," according to various etymologies of the word, is either a synonym of being or of one. Again, "something" can have a twofold etymology or interpretation. One is that "something" is the same as having some quiddity; for whether this was the first derivation of the word or not, nevertheless now in common usage it seems to be taken in this sense, for "something" and "nothing" are considered to be contradictorily or privatively opposed; but "nothing" signifies the same as "non-being" or "not having any entity"; therefore "something" is the same as "having some entity or quiddity." In this signification, therefore, it is established that "something" is not a passion, but a synonym of being; and the same is also considered according to formal reason and concept to say of something that it is something and to say being, and thus Fonseca thinks about this attribute, IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.

6. But the other etymology of this attribute is what St. Thomas touches upon in the cited places, namely, that "something" is said as if "other thing," which seems more conformable to the first imposition of this word, as is established from Latin authors, according to which this word signifies formally something distinct from being, namely, distinction from another or negation of identity with another. Nevertheless, in this sense this attribute either is not different from one, or is included in it as following from it. For "one" is said to be what is undivided in itself and divided from any other, as we

shall see below; therefore in the notion of one is included that negation which is imported in the word "something," or it is reduced to it, and therefore this attribute does not so increase the number of these passions that it is necessary to treat of it specially; but when the notion of one is explained, and consequently of multitude, which is opposed to it, and of identity or distinction, which are in some way founded in its notion, this predicate "something" will remain explained. For, although the negation concluded in it can be distinguished by reason from the negation included in one, because one expresses negation of multitude, but something only expresses negation of identity with another, in the way that one and something are distinguished by St. Thomas, q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1, nevertheless because the latter negation is founded in the former, and has no special difficulty in the doctrine to be handed down about these passions, it is not necessary to distinguish them. But some say, like Javellus, in the tract. De Transcend., c. 3, that "something" expresses actual division from another being, so that before the creation of the world God would be one, but not something. But this is most improperly said; for who would say that a being is not something because others do not exist? Indeed, in that sense "something" cannot be a passion of being, since it does not belong to every being; therefore as it is a passion it only expresses that negation in aptitude and respect to another existing or possible being, and in this way, as I said, it is founded in unity and is explained together with it.

7. Therefore, from the said six transcendentals only three enumerated above remain, which can be passions of being, whose sufficiency St. Thomas hands down in the cited place De Veritate, and q. 21, a. 1, because the passions of being must add something above being and cannot add something positive and real; therefore either something negative or something positive of reason or by denomination or agreement to something extrinsic. In the former way the passion of one is constituted, because that negation of indivision in itself and of division from any other follows from every being

considered in itself and absolutely, and there is no other which necessarily belongs to every being as such. In the latter way the other two passions are constituted, one through respect or agreement to the intellect; the other through relation and agreement to appetite and will; for these two faculties and no others are universal, and regard every being under a diverse aspect.

8. What order is maintained among the passions of being. And hence authors gather that, of these three passions, unity is first, because it is absolute; for it belongs to every being from itself, and not by denomination from another extrinsic thing, nor properly through relation to another, which true and good signify in some way, insofar as they express agreement with another; but absolute things are prior to relative ones by their genus. You will say that also "one," as it expresses division from another, imports relation to another. It is answered first that it is not of the notion of one to have that negation, that there be another from which it is distinguished, but only follows from one that it is apt to be distinguished; for God would be one even if there were nothing from which he might be divided. Then that negation is not a relation, but rather a negation of relation, for rather identity is a relation, and that is a negation of identity or certainly is the foundation of it, and consequently cannot be the foundation of any relation of reason. Finally, even if we imagine that through the mode of relation to another, it is of itself prior to the other relations of true or good, because it is in some way more abstract, because it only regards another under the aspect of being, for thus one is said to be divided from any other, of whatever other nature that might be. And so Aristotle, IV Metaph., c. 1, joins one with being as the first passion; and St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4, holds that after being, one is what is first known about each being, which Soncinas, IV Metaph., q. 24, and Javellus, tract. De Transcendentibus, c. 1, treat more broadly.

9. Comparison among the passions of being in perfection. But of the other two transcendentals or passions of being, true is prior to good, as St. Thomas taught, I, q. 16, a. 4. And this is evident,

because goodness is in some way founded in truth; for in order that health be good, it is supposed to be true health; for if it be fictitious, it will not be good, and so of others. Hence true expresses order to the intellect, good to the will, but the intellect is a prior power than the will. But if someone wishes to compare these passions also in perfection and asks which of them is more perfect, it can first be easily answered that, formally and according to what they add above being, none expresses perfection, because they say or add nothing real to being itself; hence under this aspect there is nothing for them to be compared, because comparison supposes something positive; but insofar as they signify in some way being itself and declare its nature, they express entirely the same perfection of being, and thus from this part also they cannot be compared, because comparison requires distinction.

Satisfying the Arguments

10. Why six transcendentals are enumerated. Therefore, to the reason for doubting posited in the beginning, it is answered that six transcendentals are not enumerated because all signify distinct passions of being, but some are distinguished for this reason, others only from diverse etymology or imposition of the word. And thus "thing" and "being" are distinguished, because this is taken from existence, that from real quiddity. And similarly "something" and "one" are distinguished from first imposition, because "one" is said from negation of division in itself, but "something" from negation of identity with another; but in reality they signify the same passion, because those two things are required for perfect unity.

11. But to the other part by which it is proved that these passions are more, it is answered first that concerning duration perhaps it is not something different from actual existence; and thus there will be the same account of both. But if perhaps it is distinct in creatures from the nature of the thing, it is rightly not numbered

among the passions of being, because it is a certain special being, as we shall see below in its place. And the same must be said of local presence; for as it is a mode of some beings, it constitutes a special category, as we shall also say below. But concerning those disjunctive things, finite or infinite, etc., it must be said that either they are not properly passions of being in common, but rather are divisions of it, because they either essentially contract being itself, insofar as it is being, or certainly neither dividing member belongs to it, except as contracted or determined to some special notion of being, as we shall see below concerning finite and infinite; or certainly they signify diverse states of the same being, such as being in act or in potency, as we shall also say below; where we shall also declare how the existence of a creature is not its passion. Or certainly these disjunctive properties are reduced to simple ones, as same or diverse to unity.

12. Some relations of reason common to all beings, why they are not passions of being. To the last it is answered that indeed more negations or relations of reason can be conceived by us in being, which are not formally explained by those passions which have been enumerated by us, in the way that some say that thing is a passion which formally adds above being the negation of fictitious or chimerical being. Others add same and diverse, for any being has a relation of reason of identity to itself and a relation of diversity from another, at least from non-being or from being of reason. Likewise a relation of similarity to another can be imagined, at least fundamentally, so that, just as equal is posited as a passion of quantity, so assimilable (so to speak) might be a passion of being; for there is no being which cannot have something similar to itself in some way, at least analogically; and infinite other denominations of this kind can be multiplied, as was touched upon in the argument. Nevertheless it must be said that those passions are sufficiently enumerated, either because those alone contribute to explaining the nature of being and have, both in things and in the use of men, sufficient cause and utility on account of which they have been conceived and distinguished; or, if

any others of this kind can be conceived, they are virtually contained in these, or are reduced to them.

13. Thing does not formally express negation of fictitious being. Therefore, that "thing" formally expresses some negation of fictitious being is indeed fictitious and beyond all Latin signification of the word and common conception of men; for "thing" is not a negative or privative term, but entirely positive. That negation is also impertinent, both because it is more obscure to explain what fictitious being is than what thing is; and also because if that negation is necessary for the passions of being, it should rather be founded in true; for true being is said to be what is not fictitious; or, if it is taken formally, it is included in one or something, because in the negation which "something" expresses is included that it be divided from any other, and consequently also from fictitious being. Especially because the notion of fictitious being as such consists in negation; for that is properly fictitious being which can be so apprehended by the mind that it involves in itself repugnance and impossibility, which is a certain negation, and therefore real being is not properly divided from it through negation, but formally through its reality, as we shall say more broadly in the following disputation in a similar case. And for the same reason similar negations are excluded, which can be made from mere reflection of the intellect, such as not being diverse from itself, being diverse from being of reason, not being unequal to itself and similar things, which are both useless and can be multiplied infinitely and are mere works of reason, which do not suffice for passions of being, as we have said.

14. And hence it is also established that it is not necessary to add identity or diversity among the passions of being, because as these can formally express relations of reason, they do not pertain to the passions of being, as has been said generally above; because such relations do not belong to being per se, but only extrinsically through thought, reflection, or comparison of the mind; but if they are taken insofar as they have some positive or privative foundation in the thing,

thus they are sufficiently contained under unity, as we shall say below. And in the same way similarity is reduced to unity (if this is common to every being), for if it is taken for true relation, that without doubt is not a passion, because it does not always belong to every being, and to whom it belongs, it belongs not per se, but accidentally. And if perhaps it is said always to belong to an existing creature, nevertheless even with respect to that it will be a certain accident, just like the relation of a creature. But if it is taken fundamentally, thus it must be reduced to unity; for thus Aristotle said that similarity is founded in unity. Finally, according to this mode, the denomination of intelligible, signifiable is reduced to truth; the notion of integral, and perfect, and the denomination of lovable, appetible, and similar things are reduced to good; therefore it is not necessary to fabricate more passions.

SECTION III

BY WHICH PRINCIPLES PASSIONS CAN BE DEMONSTRATED OF BEING, AND WHETHER THIS IS THE FIRST AMONG THEM: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING AT THE SAME TIME TO BE AND TO NOT BE.

1. Reason for doubting on both sides. This question is proposed chiefly on account of Aristotle, who, IV Metaph., c. 3, text. 8, taught that principle, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously," to be first and almost unique, to which all demonstrations of this science, indeed also of other sciences, should be resolved, at least virtually. But on the contrary it seems to be first, because the proper and intrinsic principles of a science must be taken from the cause or reason on account of which the predicate belongs to the subject; hence the same Aristotle, I Posterior., teaches that a posterior passion is demonstrated through a prior one, but the first of all either is not demonstrated, but immediately belongs to the subject,

or is demonstrated only for us through the definition of the subject; but the definition itself is not demonstrated in any way, but is immediately known of the subject. Thus therefore in every science the first principle will be that in which either the first passion is predicated of the subject or the definition of the defined; therefore also in the present science proper and intrinsic principles must be taken from the connection of the first passion with the notion of being, or of the notion of being with being itself; therefore this will be the first principle, "everything that is, is one," because one is the first passion of being, as we have said, or certainly this: "Every being is having essence." Therefore it is not that: "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously," because that is very extrinsic, and cannot serve for proper demonstrations a priori, but at most for reduction to the impossible. Add that that principle is reduced a priori to this: "Every being is one"; for therefore it cannot simultaneously be and not be, because only one thing can be determinately. In the way that many say, it first belongs to being insofar as it is being, to be divided from non-being, which property they think is included in unity, concerning which we shall see later. Finally the difficulty is increased, because even among principles that are in some way intrinsic and most universal, that does not seem to be first, because it is negative; but every negation is founded in some prior affirmation; therefore there is given another principle prior to that, in which it is founded, such as will be either this, "It is necessary for the same thing to be, or not to be"; or this, "one contradictory necessarily destroys the other."

Some More Certain Pronouncements for Declaring the Sense of the Question

2. Metaphysics needs principles into which it ultimately resolves conclusions. In this matter all agree that in metaphysics (just as in other sciences) certain first principles known per se are

necessary, by which passions are demonstrated, whether there is discussion of transcendental passions of being as being is, or of more special properties of some beings as they are within the latitude of the formal object of metaphysics, according to what has been said in the prooemial disputation; although, because being as being in order to this science is prior to others, the passions adequate to it are also prior and consequently also the most universal principles, which in some way consist of those transcendentals themselves, are prior to the rest; and therefore we now treat especially of those. That such principles are necessary, therefore, the same reason is in this science which is in others, because it also proceeds by demonstration, resolving conclusions into principles; in which resolution it cannot proceed to infinity, as is established from the general doctrine on causes; for in no genus of causes can there be infinite regress; therefore it is necessary that it stop at principles or propositions known per se.

3. A single principle does not suffice for that office. Second, from this reason it seems to be concluded that these principles are not only one, but several, and at least two must be, at least for this purpose that they be immediate propositions and indemonstrable a priori. The reason is that from one principle alone nothing can be concluded, as is established from dialectic; because formal inference requires three terms, which cannot be in one principle; therefore the ultimate resolution is necessarily made to two immediate principles. Because if one is immediate and another demonstrable, that which is demonstrable will need to be further resolved and demonstrated; but it cannot be demonstrated through the other immediate principle alone; therefore another must be added; but if that also is demonstrable, another must be sought through which it is demonstrated; lest therefore there be infinite regress, one must stop at something also indemonstrable; therefore several first principles are necessary even in this science. And hence it follows that, if we speak of first principle in this sense, namely, as it only expresses an immediate proposition, or one known per se, in this sense a unique first principle

is not to be sought in this science; nor could Aristotle have spoken in that sense in the cited place, because truly none is unique in this way, and merely first. Therefore in another sense a principle prior to others can be inquired, namely either because it is better known to us, or because in use or causality it is prior and more universal, or because it is in every way more indemonstrable, and in this sense there is controversy among authors which is the first metaphysical principle.

Various Opinions

4. The first opinion is that it is not that first principle which we have related from Aristotle, but this, "every being is being." Thus Anthony Andreas holds, IV Metaph., q. 5. And to Aristotle he responds that he called that other the first principle among those which are circulated as general, such as are those: "Every whole is greater than its part," etc. But this author also does not speak correctly in his principles, because that proposition is identical and nugatory; and therefore in no science is it taken as a principle of demonstration, but is outside every art. Otherwise in every science the first principle would be that in which the subject of the science is predicated of itself. And the first principle of one science would be as much known per se as of another; for every identical proposition is equally known, such as "mobile being is mobile being," just as "being is being." And in this science there would be several principles equally known, although not equally universal, such as "Substance is substance," "Accident is accident." He would therefore speak more apparently if in place of being he took some definition or description explaining the notion of being, and predicated that of being; for, although definition and defined are the same in reality, nevertheless the proposition in which the definition is predicated of the defined is not identical, but doctrinal, because in it a distinct concept is predicated of a confused one. And in this way the reason for doubting posited in the beginning favors this opinion. Nevertheless it seems to contradict Aristotle, in

the said c. 3, lib. IV Metaph., when he absolutely concludes that that principle, "it is impossible," etc., is simply the first of all, and that all demonstrations are resolved to it.

5. Others say that it is not that posited by Aristotle, but this, "it is necessary that anything either be or not be," which is the first principle of all on account of the reason touched upon above, because this is affirmative, but that other is negative. Nor is it true what Javellus, lib. IV Metaph., q. 6, thought, that those two principles signify the same thing in different words, and thus are not to be reputed two, but one; for, if the matter is considered more attentively, diverse are the things which are signified by those principles. For just as in contraries, or privatively opposed things, it is one thing that they cannot simultaneously belong to the same thing, another that one of them must necessarily belong, as is manifest per se, so also in contradictorily opposed things these two are formally and rigorously diverse. But these are signified by those two principles; for by that, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously," the repugnance of contradictorily opposed things is signified; but by that, "anything either is or is not," the immediateness of the same is signified, namely, that no medium can fall between them. And thus, as distinct they are posited by Aristotle, lib. IV Metaph., c. 7, text. 27 and 28, and lib. III, c. 2, and I Poster., c. 8, text. 26 and 27, where he posits the same principles in dialectical terms: "It is impossible for the same thing to be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same thing; It is necessary for the same thing to be affirmed or denied of the same thing," which in other words are usually said by dialecticians: "It is impossible for two contradictories to be simultaneously true," and, "it is impossible for them to be simultaneously false"; which two things are established to be very diverse, and the first to be founded in that principle, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously"; but the second in the other, "it is necessary to be or not to be." But from these reasons it is simultaneously established, comparing these principles among themselves, that that concerning

the impossible posited by Aristotle is prior to the other concerning the necessary. First indeed, because it is more evident per se that contradictories have repugnance among themselves than that they have immediateness. For that shines forth immediately in the terms themselves, but the second needs some discourse and declaration. Hence that is common to all opposites, for insofar as they are opposites, they fight among themselves; but the latter does not belong to all, as is established from the chapter On Opposites. Second, because it is prior according to reason that two contradictories cannot be simultaneously true, than that they cannot be simultaneously false, just as truth is prior to falsity ex se.

Resolution of the Question

6. Two kinds of demonstration and their properties. Therefore, in order to respond to the question, it is necessary to distinguish a twofold kind of demonstration: one is called ostensive, the other reducing to the impossible. The first is required per se and directly for knowledge; and in it one proceeds from causes to effects and from the essence of a thing to the properties to be demonstrated; for we speak in knowledge a priori and propter quid; for that which is a posteriori is not resolved into the principles of which we now treat, but rather into experience. The second kind of demonstration is not necessary per se, but is sometimes added on account of human defect, ignorance, or obstinacy; and it is useful not only for conclusions, but also for persuading and proving first principles; which cannot be done in the prior mode, because, since they are immediate, they do not have a middle term a priori through which they might be proved, yet by reducing to the impossible their truth can be shown and the intellect can be convinced to assent to them. Indeed, in every kind of demonstration, although the principles demonstrate the conclusion a priori and are known per se, the force of inference is grounded in virtue upon reduction to the impossible, namely, because it cannot

happen that the same thing simultaneously is and is not, or that two contradictories are simultaneously true. On account of which Averroes said, in Metaphysics II, chapter 1, that without that principle posited by Aristotle, no one can philosophize, dispute, or reason.

7. What is the mode of demonstrating a priori in this science. It must be said therefore first, that for demonstrating a priori the properties of being concerning being, the first principles must be taken either from the nature of being itself, or from its first property for demonstrating later ones; and this is proven by the discourse made at the beginning. And it is confirmed, for in this respect the same account holds for this science as for others; for since the properties of being are in their own way its properties, they must necessarily arise from its intrinsic nature and essence, because this belongs to the intrinsic nature of a proper property; therefore they will be able to be demonstrated through the very essential nature of being, whether this be through the distinction of these things among themselves or in order to our concepts and discourses, so that one truly is the reason of another, which suffices for human knowledge and demonstration. Whence if the properties of being are so connected among themselves that one arises from another, that which is first will constitute one principle for demonstrating the others; but if (which can sometimes happen) several properties are immediately connected with the nature of being, they will be able to be demonstrated of being only through the very nature of being; how this happens, however, will be established later in the course of the science. In this order, therefore, the first principle will be that in which the nature or essence of being distinctly conceived is predicated of being itself.

8. What is the first principle of reduction to the impossible. Second, it must be said that in the other kind or mode of demonstrating through reduction to the impossible, the first principle, on which that entire mode of demonstrating rests, is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. This is known per se, because every reduction to the impossible finally comes to rest in this, that it

follows that the same thing simultaneously is and is not, and as long as it is not reduced to this, the impossibility is not sufficiently demonstrated; but after it has been reduced to this, it comes to rest there, as in the ultimate term of resolution and the most known principle. And, although sometimes the impossible can be reduced to another inconvenience, that two contradictories are simultaneously false, or that the same thing neither is nor is not, yet this itself is impossible insofar as it virtually includes the other, namely, that something is simultaneously denied and not denied of something, which is to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing.

9. What is the absolutely first principle of human knowledge. Third, it must be said that hence it comes about that that principle, it is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be, is simply first in human knowledge, and especially in metaphysics. The reason is that that principle is rightly called first from which all human knowledge takes its firmness; but such is the aforesaid principle, because from it not only conclusions, but also first principles are demonstrated. Indeed, Fonseca adds, in Metaphysics IV, chapter 3, question 1, section 3, that through that principle the first principles are confirmed a priori. But I do not see why he calls reduction to the impossible a priori, since it is not from a cause, but through an extrinsic middle term. Unless perhaps he understands that through such a principle there is demonstrated a priori, not indeed the truth of other principles, which cannot be done, but the impossibility and repugnance which follows from the opposite; for the ultimate resolution of all repugnance is made to contradiction, to which the reduction is made through that principle. This, however, is sufficient for that principle to be called simply first; for, since the human mind does not immediately comprehend the other first principles as they are in themselves, it is much helped and confirmed in assenting to them by reducing to the impossible, which can be done in others through that first one; but it itself can in no way be shown even by reduction to the impossible, because nothing more impossible can be

inferred than what is pronounced in it, which is a sign that it is most known and first. But I said that the use of this principle is most necessary in this science, because since being is most simple, it can scarcely be defined, and its nature more distinctly explained and applied to effecting true demonstrations, so that the propositions assumed are not judged to be identical.

Solutions to Opposing Arguments

10. Therefore, to the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, as to the prior part, it has already been explained that Aristotle does not call that principle first because metaphysics uses it for its proper and direct demonstrations; for rather the same Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 8, text 26, says that that principle does not usually formally enter into demonstration. It is therefore called the first principle for other reasons already explained; for it is like a universal foundation, by whose power all demonstrations rest, and other principles can, at least as regards us, be declared and confirmed, although this is always done with some other principle adjoined, either granted or known per se. To the first confirmation it is responded that the truth of that principle is not properly founded in unity, but in the opposition and repugnance of contradictories, whence it will not be rightly proved that what is cannot simultaneously not be, because what is is only one, both because, as I shall say below, being insofar as it is one is not properly divided from non-being, but from other being, because it is rather divided from non-being insofar as it is being; and also because this very division of being from non-being is founded on the fact that the same thing cannot simultaneously be and not be, on account of the formal repugnance of these terms. To the last confirmation it is said first, that it can indeed happen that some affirmative proposition, insofar as it is simpler than a negative one, is prior to it in the order of generation or composition, and yet in the account of truth known per se it is not so

manifest, nor equally first; and thus it can be said of that principle, for, although its entire truth is founded in the nature of being itself, which per se excludes non-being, yet this very thing is explained most evidently and most aptly through that principle, although negative, for founding demonstrations reducing to the impossible.

11. What is the first principle in the moral order, and comparison with the first in the order of nature. And hence many arguments are easily solved, which are usually made against Aristotle's opinion concerning this first principle, such as that it consists of many words neither most universal nor very well known, such as "simultaneously," "same," which signify relations, which are posterior to absolutes. Likewise that it is a modal proposition, which presupposes a prior one de inesse. For to these and similar things it is said that they at most prove that this is not the first proposition, or complexion which the intellect forms, but not that it is not the first principle, because for this it is not necessary that it be the first proposition, but only that the knowledge of all other truths depends on it in some way, while it itself is so true, known and indemonstrable, that it does not depend on another; but these things belong to that principle, as has been shown. But that principle could be reduced to simpler terms by saying: No being is and is not; for thus it is made up of simple terms and of most universal and first ones, which is necessary in a first principle, so that it can be common to all sciences, as St. Thomas noted, I-II, question 94, article 2. Where he observes that this principle is first in speculative matters; for in practical or moral matters there is given another first principle, namely, every good is to be done and evil is to be avoided; for, because all moral actions are concerned with good and evil, therefore the first moral principle had to consist of those terms; yet, because practical matters are founded in speculative ones, therefore, what is the first principle in speculative matters is simply and absolutely first. But whether this principle is so known that it cannot be denied in mind by anyone, although he may seem to contend vocally, likewise in what ways it

should be urged against one who obstinately denies it, either by refuting him from things granted, or by leading him to inconveniences repugnant to the senses, Aristotle treats extensively in Metaphysics IV, chapters 3, 4 and 5, in which places the expositors can be seen, because there is no reason to linger further on this matter.

DISPUTATION IV

ON TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IN GENERAL

Order of Treatment. First, unity must be treated because it is maximally connected with being and is in some way presupposed by the other properties, since the remaining properties consist in a certain comparison or relation of distinct things, which cannot be understood without unity. And Aristotle preserved this order in Metaphysics IV, chapter 3, immediately joining the one with being. Since, however, the one is opposed to multitude, and opposites belong to the same rational account or science, consequently we must speak about multitude. And finally, because multitude is caused by distinction or division, which unity denies, we must also treat the various genera of distinctions; and in this way we shall leave explained all genera of unities, distinctions, and multitudes.

SECTION I

WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY ADDS SOME POSITIVE CHARACTER, TO BEING, OR ONLY A PRIVATIVE CHARACTER

1. First Opinion. The first position is that the one adds above being some positive accident, distinct from being by the nature of the

thing, yet following and accompanying every being through itself. So thought Avicenna, in book III of his Metaphysics, chapter 2, and book VII, chapter 1; for in the former place he calls the one an accident and something accompanying essence, but in the latter place he says it is not absolutely the same as being. And Scotus seems to have followed this position, in Metaphysics IV, question 2, and In book II, distinction 3, question 2; Antonio Andreas, Metaphysics IV, question 3, who teaches that the one adds above being something positive distinct from being by the nature of the thing. But this position, insofar as it concerns the distinction by the nature of the thing between being and what the one adds above being, has been sufficiently rejected in the preceding disputation, and plainly contradicts Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapters 2 and 5, and will be further refuted from what follows.

The Position is Proposed that the Rational Account of the One is Positive

2. Hence there can be a second position that the one adds above being a certain positive property not really, or by the nature of the thing, but distinct from being by reason alone, in the manner in which wisdom or justice is said to add something to God and to be His positive attribute, distinct from Him by reason alone. Saint Bonaventure seems to hold this opinion, In book I, distinction 23, article 1, question 1, where he says that the one in God expresses something positive, but in creatures sometimes privative, sometimes positive. Hence he says that although the mode of signifying or explaining unity is through the mode of negation, because simple things are conceived and explained by us only through negation, nevertheless as regards the thing signified and understood, it is something positive. Alexander of Hales indicates the same, part I, question 13, members 1 and 2; Soto, in his Logic, chapter on Properties, question 2, ad 2; and it can be argued first, because

according to everyone's position the one adds indivision above being; but indivision, although it is signified through the mode of negation, nevertheless is not really a negation, but a positive rational account; therefore. The major premise is clear from the very exposition of the term; for the one is said to be what is undivided in itself. Likewise from its opposite, namely multitude; for many things are said to be those which are divided among themselves; therefore the one is said to be what is undivided in itself. It is also clear from the proportion to quantitative unity; for those quantities are called many which are divided, but that one which is not divided; just as quantity is one through the indivision of quantity, so entity is one through the indivision of entity. The minor premise is proved first, because division is negation; therefore indivision, although it has the form of negation, nevertheless in reality is not negation, but rather affirmation. The consequence is proved, because two negations (as they say) affirm, and because in the thing itself negation is never destroyed immediately by negation; for no such opposition is found in things; therefore it is removed by an opposed positive form. But the antecedent, namely that division expresses negation, belongs to Saint Thomas, question 9 On Power, article 7, saying that multitude includes negation, namely the division of one from another. And in part I, question 11, article 2, ad 4, he says that we apprehend division insofar as we apprehend that this being is not that one; and Soncinas says the same, Metaphysics X, question 4. Nor can we conceive division otherwise.

3. Second, this can be explained by reason thus, because in those things which are one through composition, unity arises through the union of many things, which union is something positive in them, as we shall see later; on the contrary, however, many things are many, and not one, for this very reason that they lack union; division therefore formally expresses only the lack of union; it therefore consists in negation; on the contrary, however, indivision expresses the lack of division, which is to deny the lack of union; but this is to

posit union, which is something positive. And consequently, in those things which are not one through the union of many things, but through simple entities, unity expresses a positive perfection consisting in a certain integrity of the thing, which is a higher and more eminent perfection than union, although it is explained by us through negation on account of its simplicity. Hence a twofold confirmation is derived. First, because negation as such does not receive more or less; but the one or unity receives more and less; for that which is one through simple entity is more one than that which is one through the composition of many things, and the more the composition is greater, or the union lesser, the more one departs from unity; therefore it is a sign that unity adds something positive. The second confirmation is that negation expresses no perfection, but unity expresses perfection; for in God it pertains to His maximum perfection that He is only one, and that He is maximally one, and that in Him all things which are not opposed are completely one. And in angels it is considered to pertain to their perfection that there is only one in each species; and their mode of unity, namely through such simplicity, also pertains to their perfection, and the same is proportionally true in the remaining beings.

4. Third, this can be gathered from the species or modes of unity, for all are positive; therefore it is a sign that unity itself as such also adds something positive. The antecedent is clear first in quantitative unity, which is said to be one by continuation according to Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 6; but continuity is not negation, but something positive, since it consists in this, that parts have a common terminus; therefore that integrity which results from continuation is the unity of continuous quantity, and that is something positive. Another is the unity of composition, for example, from matter and form, in which way humanity is called one, which we have already shown to consist in a positive rational account, whence also generation, which tends toward this union, is a positive action; on the contrary, however, corruption, which dissolves it, formally consists

in privation. Another unity is individual, specific, and generic, and all these are positive, because both genus is positively contracted to species, and species to individual, and that conformity or agreement which exists in species or genus is positive.

5. Fourth, we can argue from the effects or properties which are attributed to unity. One is that it founds the relation of identity or similarity, Metaphysics V, chapter 15; but a real relation is not founded in negation, but in something positive. Another is that the one is the first measure of multitude; which cannot belong to negation, since it is nothing. Hence Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chapter 9, text 21, posits a relative opposition between the one and the many in the rational account of measure and measured. Finally, the one as such composes multitude; for multitude formally consists formally of unities, whence also in quantitative number the ultimate unity is said to be its form; just as number is formally something positive, so also is unity.

The True Position

6. It must be said first, that the one adds nothing positive above being, neither of reason nor real, neither distinct from being by the nature of the thing, nor by reason alone. This is the position of Saint Thomas, Metaphysics IV, lecture 2, and In part I, question 11, article 1, where Cajetan agrees; the Scholastics, In book I, distinction 24; where Capreolus, question 1, article 1; Durandus, questions 1 and 2; Gabriel, question 1, article 3, doubt 3; Gregory, question 1, article 1; Henry, Quodlibet I, question 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, question 4; Javelli, questions 5 and 8; John of Jandun, question 4; Fonseca, chapter 2, question 5. And it was also the position of the Commentator, Metaphysics IV, comment 3, text 3, and book X, comment 8. And it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 6, text 11, and book X, chapter 1, where he explains the rational account of the one through indivision, and indivision through the negation of division, and Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, for this reason he says that the

one and being are one and the same nature, because namely it expresses no positive rational account beyond the rational account of being.

7. And indeed concerning being of reason through the mode of the positive (about which there is discussion in the first part of the conclusion) the matter is sufficiently certain and beyond controversy, because no being of reason as it were positive has yet been devised, which the one formally expresses and adds to being; because either that is through the mode of relation, and this is not so, because the name of the one is entirely absolute, as we saw above, and it is established from the very word, and from the common mode of conceiving; or it is through the mode of some absolute and positive predicate; this cannot be said, even if license to invent were given. Someone might perhaps say that the one adds the relation of identity to itself. But this is plainly false; for to be one and to be the same are very different predicates; and the first is in its own way a real predicate belonging to being without fiction of the intellect; the second, however, is a predicate of reason belonging through the operation of the intellect; whence the first is the foundation of the second, in the manner in which a relation of reason can have a foundation in reality.

8. Therefore, this part being omitted, the other concerning positive real rational account, which is chiefly intended, is usually proved by this maximal reason, because if the one adds a positive real rational account to being, therefore it is necessary that being be included in that rational account; therefore also the one; therefore another positive rational account must be added to it, through which it may be one; therefore thus one will proceed to infinity, unless we rest in some real rational account, which is so through itself being and one, that to be thus one adds nothing above its entity; therefore for the same reason we must rest in the very rational account of being itself. But to this argument Scotus responds that that rational account of the one is so positive that nevertheless it is not being. But this has been sufficiently disproved in what precedes. And besides, it cannot be

denied, which pertains to the present matter, that that real mode, or whatever that may be, which the one adds to being, is one something in the manner in which it exists; for each being has such a mode as only one, and not many, and has it distinct from the mode or unity of another being, but undivided in itself; therefore it is rightly inquired whether that mode is one through itself and without any positive addition which would be made to its entity, or with addition; for, if with addition, one will proceed further to infinity; if without positive addition through negation alone, why will the same not be said of any being as such?

9. The Evasion is Refuted. Some say that the very mode of the one, since it is that by which being is one, can also be one through itself, which cannot be said so of the rational account of being, because it is not formally the rational account of the one, or unity as that by which; for that which in some genus is that by which, when it is simple and ultimate, can be through itself that which; but this is not attributed to that which in no way formally participates in that rational account. A common example is in quantity, through which substance is quantified and therefore can through itself be quantified, which substance cannot be. This evasion has a certain appearance of subtlety, but in the present case there is no necessity of feigning that "by which" and "that which"; for that rational account of unity is not understood to be one on account of some positive rational account which it has in itself, and as it were exercises around itself, just as quantity is quantified because it is extended and through itself apt to occupy place; but it is understood to be one through the negation alone of plurality or division; therefore in the same way it can be understood in the rational account of being, nor is it necessary to feign something positive which would be the rational account for it of being one as that by which.

10. Response to the Reply. Finally it can be said that this argument rightly proceeds against Scotus and others, who posit that mode of the one as distinct from being by the nature of the thing, yet

it does not so press, if we say that that mode is indeed positive and real, but distinct from being by reason alone; because then it will be said that that mode, although it is being, is nevertheless not distinct in reality from that very being, and therefore is one by the same unity by which being itself is, and is not considered precisely and according to reason as one, but only as the rational account of the one, but really is one through itself, just as being itself. But against this response it is objected, because other inconveniences follow from this. First, that the rational account of the one is positive and a property of being, and quidditatively includes being itself, which is repugnant to a proper property. Second, that that mode is of the quiddity of being itself, just as the divine attributes are of the quiddity of God, because, although they are distinguished by reason, in reality they express positive rational accounts, which are not distinguished from God by the nature of the thing; but the consequent is false; both because otherwise the one would not be a property of being, but essence; and also because otherwise no created thing could be quidditatively conceived distinctly, unless it were formally conceived as one. These inconveniences are indeed probable, yet perhaps someone would not think it inconvenient to concede them in transcendentals, which are most simple.

11. Therefore proceeding otherwise in the discourse, I show that it concludes in the same way that this positive mode distinct by reason is not to be posited; for when that positive mode is prescinded by the intellect, in the remaining concept of being is understood whatever is necessary for unity; therefore it is a sign that nothing positive is prescinded from being even through reason, by which that would be one. That this may be understood, let us speak of some being in particular, as, for example, of God insofar as He is one; if therefore in Him unity is a positive attribute distinct by reason from God, therefore God can be prescinded by the mind from His unity; but in God thus conceived without the addition of anything positive even according to reason can be conceived the negation of division or

partition, which He has in Himself, and also division or sufficient foundation of division from all others; but by this very fact He is sufficiently conceived as one; therefore whatever positive is afterwards added, even according to reason, is superfluously feigned, nor can it be explained what or for what it may be; and the same argument can be made in some other one being, and consequently in being in general. Second, I declare this in composite beings by retorting the prior arguments; for in such a being, which comes to be through composition, whatever positive physical can be considered, pertains to the rational account of being, as such a being is, even if by reason it is prescinded from the concept of the one; as in humanity the union of soul and body is of the essential rational account of such a being, as such a being is specifically and in reality itself; and similarly in a line the union of parts in a point is of the rational account of being, as it is in such a species of continuous quantity; therefore every positive metaphysical rational account also, which is founded in such physical union, pertains formally and according to reason to the rational account of such a being, not insofar as it is conceived as one, but insofar as it is formally contracted or determined in the rational account of such a being; therefore the rational account of the one can add nothing positive, even distinct by reason. Third, this is explained in simple beings, in which unity seems to be more perfect; indeed simplicity itself seems to be maximum unity; but simplicity formally does not express a positive rational account, even distinct by reason alone from the simple being and from the perfection, which is conceived in it in the rational account of being, or of such a being; so much so that even in God according to the more probable opinion of theologians simplicity as such adds nothing of perfection to God even according to reason, above the perfection of His supreme actuality, in which that negation is founded, which simplicity expresses; therefore much less can unity as such express a positive rational account. And this conclusion will be more apparent from what follows, and from the solutions of the arguments.

12. I say second, that the one adds above being some negation through the mode of privation. So teach the cited authors, and it follows from the preceding assertion; for it is established that the one is in some way distinguished from being, because it is both its property and those names are not synonymous, but diverse formal and objective concepts correspond to them in the mind; therefore the one expresses something beyond being; but it does not express something entirely feigned by reason, as is clear through itself, because to be one truly belongs to things themselves; nor does it express some relation of reason, as has been shown; therefore nothing remains that it can add beyond negation or privation.

What Kind of Negation the One Adds to Being

13. However, two things remain to be explained here. First is, what this negation is and how manifold. Second, how this negation is said to be through the mode of privation. Concerning the first, all agree that the one expresses the negation of division in the very being, which Aristotle signified saying that the one is being undivided in itself, as is clear from the cited places, and from Metaphysics X, chapter 5. And it is clear by reason, because through division we understand one being to become many; therefore by no other rational account is being better conceived to be one, than by the negation of division; and in this all agree. However, the aforesaid words must be attentively considered; for it is one thing for being to express the negation of division in itself, but another to express the negation of division from itself; for although both negations can be attributed to being, nevertheless the former is what pertains to the rational account of the one; for the latter does not suffice, as Soncinas rightly noted, Metaphysics IV, question 23, ad 1. And it is clear, both because that is not a proper negation, which is added to being in reality, but which is considered through the reflection of reason alone; and especially because not to be divided from itself equally belongs to being through

itself and through accident or to multitude; for a heap of stones is as much not divided from itself as a man or angel; nevertheless, because it is not undivided in itself, it is not properly one being; therefore the negation of division in itself, is what constitutes being as one, not the negation of division from itself.

14. However, authors further doubt whether in the rational account of the one some other negation is included. For many define the one as that which is undivided in itself, and divided from anything else; and therefore beyond indivision in itself, they say the one expresses the negation of union with another, which negation is explained by the name of division or distinction from another. So think Capreolus, Gabriel and Soncinas, in the cited places, because, just as it is of the rational account of the one that it not be divided in itself, so that it not be other than itself; for one of these two, namely, to be other than itself or not to be other than itself, must necessarily be included in the rational account of the one, because, since they are contradictorily opposed, they immediately repugn; but to be other than itself is not of the rational account of the one, as is established; therefore it will be of the rational account of the one that it not be other than itself. Indeed some add that the negation of division from another belongs to being by reason prior to indivision in itself, because it belongs to being prior to be divided from non-being than to be undivided in itself; therefore both negations are required for the rational account of the one. Whence also Saint Thomas, part I, question 11, article 2, ad 4, says that the concept of division from another is by reason prior to the concept of unity. But others deny that division from another is of the rational account of the one, but only indivision in itself. So Fonseca above, citing Giles, Metaphysics IV, question 6; and Hervaeus, Quodlibet IV, questions 2 and 3. His reason is, because to be divided from another is not required that being be absolutely one, but only that it be one among many; and therefore a thing is sufficiently conceived as one, when it is understood as undivided, even if it is not conceived as divided from others. And it is

confirmed, because a thing is absolutely one, even though there are not others from which it is distinguished.

15. The Name of the One Can Suffer Equivocation. But concerning this it must be noted that equivocation can be committed in the name both of the one and of division from another; for sometimes by common and vulgar usage the one is accustomed to signify what is solitary and unique, in which way we say there is one God, one sun; and in this way the one expresses the negation of multitude, and does not so much express division from another, as it denies the partnership of another. But in this way to be one is not a property of being, as is clear through itself; nor is that signification proper to the one, nor rigorous, but only from accommodation of usage it is sometimes extended to this, for in rigor it is true to say there is one man here, although there are many; and therefore in rigorous signification, to deny that there are many, the exclusive is added that there is only one. Therefore the negation of multitude or of many in this sense does not enter the formal rational account of transcendent unity.

16. Real Relation of Division from Another Outside the Rational Account of the One. Again, to be divided from another can be conceived through the mode of real relation, or to a real and existing terminus. And in this way it is certain that division from another is not of the rational account of the one, both because it is something posterior to it; for this is divided from that, because it is such in itself and one something; and also because the one of itself is prior to multitude and independent from it; but thus to be divided from another requires multitude; indeed multitude arises from this, because there are many ones, of which one is not another. Finally for this reason we said above that something insofar as it expresses such negation or relation of otherness from a real and existing terminus, is not a property of being; because it does not belong to every being through itself, but through accident from the coexistence of others; therefore much less can this be of the rational account of the one.

Whence, before creatures existed, God was perfectly and completely one without this relation or negation. Indeed rather, even if through impossibility no other things were possible outside God, He would be truly and perfectly one, by this very fact that He would be undivided in essence in Himself, even if He could not be divided from others, because others could not exist. Nevertheless, because in fact and in some way from the intrinsic rational account of being, considered according to its whole latitude, with any being the existence of another is possible, therefore it follows to every being that it can be distinct from another, which truly belongs to each from the fact that it is one in itself. And in this way to be distinct from another aptitudinally and fundamentally can be said to belong to every being, insofar as it is one; nevertheless this itself does not formally enter the rational account of the one, but follows from it, just as it follows from quantity that it be the foundation of equality or inequality.

17. How Being Divided from Another is Necessarily Connected with the One. Finally, to be divided from another can be conceived only through the mode of negation. Which can also be compared, either to a positive existing terminus, and in this way the reasoning about it is the same as about relation; or to a positive terminus taken absolutely, whether existing or possible; and in this way to be divided from another belongs to every being, insofar as it is one, because just as it cannot belong to one being that it be other, so it necessarily belongs that it not be other; for these are contradictory, and therefore if one of them is necessarily separated from the one, namely to be other than itself, the other necessarily belongs to the one, namely not to be other than itself, which is to be distinct from another. This reasoning indeed does not prove that this negation primarily and most formally enters the rational account of the one, but that it belongs to it necessarily, whether through itself primarily, or consequently, and this latter seems truer, which the authors of the second opinion intend, and perhaps the authors of the first do not deny. They can therefore be reconciled; for, what these deny formally

and through itself primarily, those affirm consequently and through itself secondarily. And thus Soncinas explained expressly, Metaphysics IV, questions 23 and 27, and the adduced reasons prove only this.

18. Finally, if this negation or division of one being is not compared to a positive terminus, but to a negative and contradictory one, thus also it belongs to every being, by this very fact that it is one being, that it be divided from non-being, or that it not be non-being; nevertheless this negation is only as it were through reflection of the intellect; for, as it is objectively understood to precede in being, it is rather affirmation; for affirmation is not divided from negation by another negation. For that is impossible, because one would proceed to infinity; therefore it is divided through itself; thus therefore being is divided from non-being, not through another negation, but through itself, just as on the contrary non-being is divided from being, not through another negation or affirmation, but through itself; therefore most formally to be divided from non-being is nothing other than to be being. Therefore by this consideration such negation neither pertains to the rational account of the one nor is it a property of being, since in reality it is nothing; but insofar as it can be devised by the intellect, it is only an extrinsic denomination or relation of reason; and therefore intrinsically also it does not regard the rational account of the one, although Cajetan seems to hold the opposite, part I, question 11, article 4, at the end, about which we shall say more in the solutions of the arguments.

Whether the Negation that Unity Signifies is a Privation

19. The second doubt was how unity signifies this negation by way of privation; and the reason for doubting is that privation signifies negation in a subject naturally apt for it; but indivision, which unity adds beyond being, often signifies negation of division in a being incapable of it; as in God, being one negates division of the divine

essence, which cannot be divided; and it is similar in other things, especially simple or incorruptible ones, indeed even in all beings, insofar as each is inseparable from itself; for no being can be divided from itself; but this indivision alone belongs to the nature of transcendental unity. The difficulty is answered by saying that it consists only in the explanation of the conclusion, namely, why this negation, which unity signifies, is said to be by way of privation. For because it does not negate a form of which the subject or being that is called one is capable, therefore I did not say this negation is privation; for this would require that it negate a form in a naturally apt subject, as the argument proves. But I said it is by way of privation, because in some respect it imitates privation, and departs from mere negation. For, just as privation signifies negation not in just any way, but as if adhering to a real subject, so unity signifies this negation, as if adding it to the real being which it connotes; and therefore non-being, or nothing, insofar as it is such, is called neither one nor many, although negation of division absolutely taken can be attributed to it, because non-being is undivided. But beings of reason or fictitious beings are called one or many only equivocally, insofar as they are also beings equivocally, or rather as they are conceived as beings. Unity therefore signifies negation of division in being, and in this respect is said to be by way of privation, whether such being is capable of division or not. Fonseca adds that the division which unity negates is absolutely possible, even if it is not possible for that being which is denominated one; as God is called one, because undivided in essence, which division is possible in creatures, although it is impossible in God; and thus that division is not impossible to being, as being is; and in this way it can be called privation, by reason of capacity at least in the common concept, in the manner that a mole is called blind, because as animal it is capable of sight, although not as such an animal. This is said less properly in the present case because of the analogy of being.

Solutions to Arguments

20. To the first argument of the contrary opinion, the first and common response is by conceding that division consists in negation, and consequently that indivision is negation of negation. Thus St. Thomas concedes, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. Whence in the solution to 2 he concedes that, according to reality, it relates more to positive unity than to multitude; because negation of one thing from another, which multitude signifies, is in the thing itself; but negation of negation, which unity signifies, is merely through reason. Soncinas embraces this doctrine, lib. X Metaph., q. 4. To the argument therefore, namely, that negation of negation is affirmation, it must be responded according to this opinion that formally and according to reason it is not so, because reason can reflect upon one negation, and negate it, and through this negation explain something positive and simple, which, as it is in itself, it cannot declare. But according to reality and equivalently, that is true; nevertheless that positive thing, which is circumscribed by those negations, is nothing beyond the very entity of the thing, which is called one. This response is probable and can easily be defended; nevertheless it seems to suppose that the negation which unity signifies is either negation of division of this being from another being, or negation of division of this being from itself, which are indeed negations of reason; nevertheless the former does not pertain to the nature of unity, as has been said, but follows from it. But the latter negation is not proper to unity, but common to multitude. Therefore negation of division in itself is properly of the nature of unity; but this does not seem to suppose any real negation in the thing itself, which according to reason is negated through indivision.

21. Therefore it is responded secondly by conceding that unity signifies indivision or negation of division, and by denying that this is negation of negation. For in the division which unity negates, two things can be considered: first, that beings divided among themselves are as if complete in themselves and terminated by their

own entities; second is that one is not another. This latter alone signifies negation, as is evident per se; but the first signifies something positive, which is the foundation of that negation, which nevertheless in reality is nothing beyond the entities themselves, as can be explained in discrete quantity; for lines being plural signifies that each is terminated by its proper terms; whence follows negation, namely, that they do not have a common term. Indivision therefore, which unity signifies, negates division by reason of the positive thing that is found in divided things, not by reason of the negation which division of one from another includes; just as conversely, the negation which division signifies does not negate another negation, but positive union or identity of one with another.

22. The objection is answered. You will say: hence it follows that the negation which unity signifies is negation of multitude, which nevertheless we seem to have denied above. And it appears to be false, because unity is prior to multitude; but negation is posterior to the form which it negates. It is responded that unity negating multitude can be understood in two ways: in one way simply, or in the nature of things; and in this way we denied above that unity signifies negation of multitude, nor does the opposite follow from the stated solution, as is evident per se. In another way, as it negates multitude in the very thing which is called one, that is, that in itself it is not plural; but in this sense it has not been denied by us above that unity signifies negation of multitude. But Fonseca denies this, in the stated q. 5, sect. 5, and it is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 30, a. 3, ad 3, and opusc. 42, c. 2, where he adduces the reason, which Fonseca also uses, namely, that unity is prior to multitude. Which reason, if it were efficacious, the same could be made concerning division; for unity is also by its nature prior to division, as I will say below.

23. Therefore others concede that indivision of unity signifies negation of multitude in being, under that aspect by which it is one; which Aegidius taught, IV Metaph., q. 8, and St. Thomas favors, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, saying that division, according to which something is

distinguished from something, is in affirmation and negation, and therefore multitude in its nature includes negation, according to which many things are, of which one is not another. And of this kind (he says) of division thus accepted in the nature of multitude, negation is imported in the nature of unity. And in solut. ad 4, he says: Unity is not privation of that multitude which it constitutes, but of multitude, which is denied to be in that which is called one. And although St. Thomas there speaks of multitude, as to the negation included in it, as has been said, nevertheless it is perhaps better said that unity negates multitude, as in it there are many things positively. This is also favored by the fact that the same St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 1, says unity is opposed to multitude by way of privation, as the undivided to the divided, which Aristotle also says, lib. X Metaph., text. 9. And this opinion seems to me very probable; but it must be understood of multitude, as multitude is, or by reason of plurality, not insofar as multitude itself can be considered by another aspect as something one; concerning which will be said below. Or certainly it can be said that unity signifies negation of division, not as it formally signifies negation, but as it signifies the foundation of that negation, which is something positive, as I have declared; and because multitude absolutely includes formal negation, therefore, as to this, unity does not entirely signify negation of multitude.

24. How one being is more one than another. To the second, I concede first that the union by which parts are joined to compose one thing is something positive; I also concede that in simple things the whole entity or integrity of the thing is positive. Nevertheless I deny that it follows from this that unity adds a positive aspect beyond being, because all that positive thing pertains to the entity of the thing, not to unity, as I declared above; but it is necessary to add negation of division, so that such being, whether simple or composite, may be understood to be one. To the first confirmation it is responded that negation or total privation formally and according to itself does not admit of more and less, but can do so by reason of its foundation; and

thus one being is more one than another by reason of foundation, insofar as it is more or less composite. But whether in the very negation itself more and less can also be considered, so that that negation is not always simply or totally, but sometimes only secundum quid and in part, will be said below, sect. 4.

25. Whether and how unity signifies perfection. To the second confirmation it is similarly said, with St. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, and Cajetan there, that unity by reason of negation adds no perfection to being, but by reason of foundation supposes some perfection. For, if unity is properly taken, as it only signifies being undivided in itself, it supposes the entity of the thing and union of parts, if the thing is composite, which signify perfection in the thing itself. If however unity is taken as it excludes another, and signifies being unique or solitary, thus it is clear that such negation per se does not signify perfection; indeed nor does it always require it, or proceed from it; for in God being only one in essence proceeds from perfection; nevertheless that there is only one person in him does not pertain to perfection, but rather the distinction of persons there is from the highest perfection.

26. To the third it is responded that all those examples only prove that the negation which unity signifies is not pure negation, but founded in being; which if it is composite, includes some composition or positive union, in which such negation is founded; but if it is simple, it is founded in simple entity; how this befits the individual unities there enumerated, especially generic and specific, will be treated below.

27. What certain attributes of unity are, and how they belong to it, is explained. To the fourth it is responded that all those things which are attributed to unity, insofar as they include something positive, belong to unity by reason of foundation, not by reason of what it adds beyond being; and thus the relation of identity, if it is understood of numerical or real identity, since it is a relation of reason, it is not inconvenient that it be founded in negation; but if it is

understood of specific identity or likeness of one thing to another (supposing that such relation is something real in the foundation distinct from it by nature), it is not founded in unity by reason of negative indivision, but by reason of that positive entity and formal aspect which the foundation has; concerning which more extensively below in its place. Similarly unity is called the measure of multitude, partly by reason of the positive, partly by reason of negation; for multitude also includes both something positive and negative, as we shall see later; for a measure ought to be both known and certain; that it may be known, it is necessary that it have entity; but that it may be certain, it is necessary that it consist in something indivisible, and as to this we use unity, as it is something undivided, as a certain principle for measuring multitude. And in the same way unity composes multitude by reason of positive entity, insofar as multitude itself is positive, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2; but insofar as it includes negation, it can in some way found the negation, which is included in multitude, as we shall see below.

SECTION II

WHETHER UNITY FORMALLY STATES ONLY THE NEGATION WHICH IT ADDS BEYOND BEING, OR SOMETHING ELSE

1. The reason for doubt is that from what has been said in the preceding section, it seems clearly to follow that unity formally states only negation, because it formally states that in which it is distinguished from being; but it is distinguished only in the negation which it adds; therefore it formally states only that negation. Second, because each property or attribute formally states what it adds to its object; but unity is an attribute of being; therefore it formally states only what it adds beyond being; but it adds only negation, therefore [it formally states only negation]. Third, because if beyond negation it

states something, either that something is being, or something else; this second cannot be conceived; for if that something is other than negation, it must be positive; but it cannot be positive of reason, as has been shown above; it is therefore necessary that it be really positive, and consequently that it include being, according to what has been said above against Scotus. But if the first is said, namely, that what unity formally states includes real being, there follow all the inconveniences and arguments made above against the opinion asserting that unity adds something positive beyond being, namely, that being is quidditatively included in its attribute, which is contrary to the nature of subject and attribute. Likewise there follows the infinite regress brought forward above, because that which unity formally signifies will also be one, etc. Finally, it follows that the formal signification of unity is entirely the same as its adequate signification, as it also includes the material. And finally it follows that the attribute of unity includes the entire perfection of being formally, and consequently that the attribute is of equal perfection with its subject.

Various Opinions

2. The First. In this matter there are two opinions. The first affirms that unity formally states only the negation explained above. Cajetan suggests this opinion in I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2 of Scotus, when he says that unity is formally no more outside nothing than other privative or negative terms. Fonseca teaches this more broadly and clearly in the aforementioned q. 5, sect. 5, and St. Thomas favors it in I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, insofar as he says that unity does not import the notion of perfection, but only of indivision. The foundations of this opinion are those placed at the beginning, by which it seems to be concluded that unity in its formal signification does not include being, but only connotes it, and consequently formally states only indivision or negation.

3. The Later Opinion. The second opinion is that unity formally states not negation alone, but entity itself under negation, which is the more common opinion of writers in this place in Metaphysics IV; Soncinas, q. 3, a. 8; Javellus, q. 5 and 8; Flandria, q. 3, a. 8; Landun., q. 4; Capreolus also holds this in I, dist. 24, q. 1, where around the first conclusion he adduces Avicenna, Metaphysics III, c. 3, saying: "Unity is being which is not divided; so that being is of the essence of unity, and not subject to it; for unity substantially is the very being which is not divided." And Soto signifies this in Logic, c. on Propositions, q. 2, ad 2. St. Thomas favors this in I, dist. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2, saying that the very essence of created being, according as it is undivided in itself and distinct from others, is its unity; and dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, where he says that unity encloses in its concept common being and adds the notion of privation; and in De Potentia, q. 9, a. 7, where he says that unity does not signify indivision only, but being with it. But in these last two places St. Thomas clearly speaks of the adequate signification of unity, not of the formal, as Fonseca explains; however, the first place does not seem to admit this explanation.

4. This opinion is founded first, because if unity formally stated only indivision, it would be a privative term; the consequent is false, because every privative term states some imperfection in the thing to which it is attributed, which cannot be said of unity, otherwise it could not be attributed to God; therefore [the antecedent is false]. But this reason is not of great moment; for it is not necessary that a privative term import imperfection, if the form which it negates does not pertain to perfection simply, as is evident in these terms, infinite, immaterial, which, although taken entirely privatively, state no imperfection. The same therefore could be the case with unity, because division, which it negates, does not state perfection simply. Indeed, the same reason would proceed, if it were efficacious, even if unity formally stated being with indivision; for if privation taken purely stated imperfection, even if something were joined to it, it would state the same imperfection joined to perfection.

5. This opinion is usually proved otherwise, because, according to Aristotle's testimony in Metaphysics IV, being and unity signify the same nature; but if unity formally stated pure negation, it could not signify the same nature as being, because being does not state negation, but positive nature. But this reason also does not convince; for if unity, by signifying only negation formally, were of another nature than being, on account of the distinction which exists between privation and positive, by the same reason, although it formally stated being with indivision, it would have to be said to be of another nature than being, at least in the way that a composite whole is distinguished from matter or subject, or as the blind man and Peter are distinguished. Aristotle therefore says that unity and being state the same nature, as regards the entire positive which both state, and is also correctly explained negatively, namely, that unity does not state another nature (certainly positive) than being. Just as the same Aristotle in Physics I, c. 1, said that matter and privation are the same, namely negatively, because privation does not state a thing distinct from matter; so therefore in the present case it can easily be said.

Resolution of the Question

6. I truly think that the diversity between these opinions is more about the manner of speaking than about the thing itself. Because in reality all agree that unity in its total and adequate signification states nothing other than undivided being, and that indivision adds nothing to being except the negation of division; and consequently it is necessary that all confess that in unity there is nothing outside the notion of being, as such, besides negation alone; because everything that is being, besides what is added to it, is of its essential nature; but only negation is what is added to it; therefore that alone is outside its nature; whence it follows further that unity can only be called an attribute of being by reason of the negation which it superadds to being, because it is only an attribute according as it states

something outside the nature of being. But with these things established in reality, the remaining question about formal signification[36] seems to be only about the imposition of the name. In which both cited opinions are probable, and are founded on a probable way of conceiving the signification of this word, unity. For some conceive that, with real being supposed, unity is constituted by negation of division alone superadded to it, and therefore they say that unity formally states only the aforesaid negation. But others conceive that unity is not like some privation joined to being, but is the very nature or entity of the thing, which entity or essence constitutes being; but as it is undivided entity, it constitutes one being.

7. The Later Opinion is Chosen. An Example Illustrating the Entire Matter. And this way of conceiving seems to me more similar to the truth, and therefore I judge that the later opinion should be simply approved. First, on account of the reason now touched upon and suggested by St. Thomas in I, in the place cited above, because unity formally states real unity; but real unity is not negation alone; therefore it is entity itself under negation. The minor is evident by induction; for God is said to be one from the unity of God, which consists in undivided essence; and similarly Peter is said to be numerically one, because he has one nature numerically; whence his unity does not consist in negation alone. And finally, from the very terms it seems evident that real unity states more than negation. Second, because unity is not said univocally of being of reason and real being, as is self-evident; and yet, if you consider precisely negation, it can equally be attributed to and denominate being of reason, just as real being; therefore it is a sign that unity does not formally state negation alone; otherwise the denomination of unity could equally fall upon being of reason and real being, because the signification of a word is most particularly to be attended to from the

[36] de significato formali, 1960; de significato non formali, alit. "En algunas ediciones dice: 'de significato non formali'. Ambas lecturas creemos son defendibles" Cf. BHF, t. I, p. 509.

formal signification. Just as names of artifacts are judged not to signify figure alone in formal signification, because they are not said equally or univocally of things having the same figure in diverse materials, as saw is not said univocally of iron and wax ones; so therefore neither will unity signify negation alone formally, since it is not said equally of all things to which such negation can equally belong; it therefore formally states entity itself as undivided. And from this can be taken a third argument, because unity as it is transcendental does not formally state something presupposing being, and as if adjacent and coming to it, as white formally states whiteness; for a thing is not understood to be one as it is white; for it is one intimately through its very entity, but it is white through a form supervening upon another entity; therefore it is a sign that unity does not formally state negation alone, as if superadded to entity, but the very intrinsic entity as undivided. Finally, from what will be said below it will be established that we must think in nearly this way about the other transcendentals, good and true, which cannot formally state relations of reason alone, but entity itself with some relation or denomination of this kind; therefore the same must be thought about unity, for if the arguments which are made concerning it to the contrary proved anything, the same would proceed concerning the other transcendentals.

Response to the Arguments

8. To the first it is responded that unity is distinguished from being radically indeed (so to speak) by reason of the negation which it superadds to being; but formally it is not distinguished through negation as through the form of unity, but through undivided entity; and so being formally states entity as such, but unity formally states the same entity as undivided.

9. To the second it is responded that that assumption is true in real properties most properly taken and adding to subjects something distinct from them by nature of the thing; for in these it is

true that names signifying such properties are accustomed to signify formally precisely what the property adds to the subject; but in these transcendental properties which do not add something real, it is not necessary to observe this; for, so that they may not be negations only, or entirely beings of reason, but may in some way signify real property, it is necessary that they in some way include entity itself in their formal signification.

10. To the third it is responded that unity in the concrete states being itself as undivided, but unity in the abstract states entity also in the abstract as undivided, and unity of this kind is signified formally through the attribute of unity; nor does any inconvenience follow from this; for that being taken in the concrete is predicated quidditatively of its attributes also taken in the concrete is no inconvenience; for thus good is being, and true likewise, nor in these is it necessary to observe all those things which belong to real and most proper properties; for there the subject entirely prescinds from the property and conversely, because they are distinguished by nature of the thing, but here there is no such distinction, but only the addition of some negation or denomination, and therefore being in that which unity adds is not included, as has been said above; but in unity itself it is necessary that it be intimately included; nor does infinite regress follow from this, because being and unity as regards the positive which it includes, are entirely the same, both in reality and also in concept, except on account of the adjoined negation. But if we speak in the abstract about unity, that will not so properly be said to include being quidditatively as entity or essence; for proportion must be observed in these things, and as regards this at least, in the mode of signifying, the formal signification of unity and its adequate signification are not the same. But I say as regards the mode of signifying, because in these most simple things the thing signified through abstract and concrete is the same, and thus entity and being are the same, unity and one, and they differ only in concept and mode of conceiving and signifying. Wherefore there is no infinite regress,

because just as being is being through its entity, but entity is entity through itself, and that by which being is being, as such indeed is not conceived as that which is, although in reality most formally it is being itself, so in the same proportion one must speak about one and unity; for as regards positive reality they signify the same thing, and they differ only because unity signifies being or entity under indivision. Finally, in this way there is no inconvenience that unity in reality states the entire perfection which being states, although it does not state it under entirely the same concept or formal notion, because it does not state it precisely as it is perfection or entity, but as it is under indivision.

SECTION III

HOW NUMEROUS UNITY IS IN THINGS

1. Various divisions of the one. Concerning this matter, Aristotle disputes in Metaphysics V, chapter 6. This must necessarily be premised in this place so that we may be able to explain what unity is a passion of being. Therefore, Aristotle distinguishes various modes of the one. And his first division is that one thing is per accidens, another per se. And he rightly places this division in first place, because it also seems to be very analogical; for the one per se is simply one, while that per accidens is only one in a qualified sense, and by a certain proportion to the one per se. But Aristotle does not explain the reasons of the one per accidens and per se through their proper definitions, but only by various examples, by which he simultaneously proposes various modes of unity per accidens and per se. For he says that the subject affected by an accident is one per accidens, such as musical Peter. Likewise, two accidents inhering in the same subject are one per accidens or constitute one, such as sweet white. We can explain this unity per accidens in relation to predications in various ways, either through incomplex terms, or through complex ones, or by predicating accident of accident, either in common or in particular.

And according to these things, Aristotle distinguishes various reasons of this unity, which pertain more to dialectical predications than to metaphysical reality. Similarly, Aristotle explains the one per se by various examples, or by subdividing it into various modes. For some things (he says) are one by continuation, such as a line, water; some by connection, such as a house, and other things which are made by art; others, by reason of one form; others, by reason of matter, either proximate or remote, as liquids (he says) are called one. Again (he says) one thing is one in number, another in species, another in genus, etc., which he pursues there. From all of these things it is difficult to gather in what the reason of the one per se and per accidens consists; for among the members which Aristotle numbers in the latter place, many seem to be one only per accidens, such as houses and artificial things. Likewise, in the same place he says that several things are sometimes called one because they either do something one, or suffer something one, or have something one, or are related to something one. But all these things seem to be one only per accidens, or by denomination rather than in reality. Again, among the unities which he posits there, some are real, such as numerical, others are only of reason, such as generic and specific; it is therefore difficult to reduce this doctrine of Aristotle to some certain reason and method.

The Division of Being & One into Per Se & Per Accidens is Explained

2. Therefore, in order that we may clarify this matter, since the one follows being, so that it may be understood what is one per se and one per accidens, it must simultaneously be explained what is being per se and per accidens; for being is also thus divided by the same Aristotle, in the same book V, chapter 7, which division is proper to real being; for beings of reason, just as they are beings only equivocally, so they receive these denominations only equivocally. But real being can be called per se or per accidens in a twofold manner, in

one way in the notion of being, in another way in the notion of effect. In this latter way, that is called per se which comes about from the power and intention of the agent; but that is called per accidens which happens beyond the intention of the agent by chance and fortune; concerning which Aristotle says, Metaphysics VI, chapter 2, that it is outside the consideration of science, insofar as it is exercised in the particular and per accidens, for as such it does not have necessity, but contingency. But truly the common notion itself of cause or effect per accidens falls under science; for thus there is disputation about chance and fortune, and the contingency of effects; but nevertheless being per se and per accidens under this consideration pertains nothing to the present undertaking.

3. What Aristotle indicates to be per se one, what per accidens. Therefore, in the former way, being in the notion of being is called per se or per accidens in relation to the unity which it has, or by reason of such unity, as, for example, because it consists of one nature of one category, or of natures of diverse categories; for thus Aristotle, in the cited book V, texts 13 and 14, calls beings per accidens those which consist of subject and accident, or when many accidents are conjoined in the same subject; but he says being per se is that which is divided into ten categories. The same Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 43, and more clearly book VIII, text 15, and book II On the Soul, text 7, signifies that to be being per se one, which either is simple, or is composed from substantial potency and its proper act. Whence, on the contrary, that will be per accidens which neither is simple, nor has the aforesaid composition, but consists of diverse things in some other more imperfect way. From these things it is permitted to understand that that is called being per se in the notion of being, which is per se one; but that per accidens, which is only per accidens one. For it is not called here per se and per accidens by reason of the mode of existing per se or in another, in which way substance alone is being per se, while the rest can be called per accidens, or rather accidental; but per se and per accidens is taken in relation to unity; but what unity is per

se or per accidens in beings has not been sufficiently declared from what has been said, nor is it explained in the same way by all.

4. Simple existence is not of the nature of the one per se. Some therefore say that that unity or union is per se, from which results one and the same existence, but that that is per accidens, in which the beings which are united have several existences, as are substance and accident, or two accidents of diverse genera. Nevertheless, this explanation either supposes something false, or explains an obscure thing through another equally obscure; for either the discourse is about one simple thing without composition, which is in it, although it results from composition, in which way many say that from matter and form united there results one existence, and this sense supposes something false; for that being may be per se one, it is not necessary that it have existence of this kind which is simple; for below I shall show that beings composed of matter and form do not have simple existence, but composite. Or the discourse is about one composite existence resulting from the union of several partial existences, and this indeed is true, but concerning this very existence it remains to be inquired when from composition there results one per se; for even an accident, for example, whiteness coming to a substance brings with it its own existence; which with respect to the composite white can be called partial, and from that and from the existence of the body or subject can be said to compose one existence of the whole white thing, and nevertheless that is nonetheless said to be being per accidens.

5. How from two beings in act one per accidens comes about: but from one in potency and another in act, how per se. Therefore, in another way it is frequently wont to be said that being per accidens is that which consists of several beings in act; but that that is per se which consists of a being in potency and its act; for from several beings in potency nothing can consist, and therefore it is not necessary to add that member. But this doctrine also, even if it be true, needs exposition; for badly understood it can be an occasion of erring

in many things. For it must be asked what is understood by being in act and in potency. For by being in act can be understood that which from itself has actual entity or existence; but by being in potency, that which has no such actuality or existence. And in this way it is false that being per se cannot be composed from actual partial entities, or that it is required for being per se that it be composed from act of this kind and potency opposed to it; for this is the same as if it were said that being per se is composed from being and nothing, or from being in act and being in objective potency, which is a contradiction in the very terms, as will be established from things to be said below. Therefore, by being in act can be understood otherwise, namely, being consisting of some formal act and receptive potency of that. And in this way it does not happen that something is composed from two beings in act, so that both are composite in the aforesaid way, unless either by aggregation, and then it is clear enough that being per accidens arises, although the reason of that has not yet been sufficiently explained; or in some artificial way; and then Aristotle seems to call such a being per se one, whence it follows that it is also being per se and not per accidens. And in a physical and heterogeneous composite, many think that there are given partial composites of diverse natures and forms, from whose conjunction one per se coalesces. And then it remains to be explained, if to a composite of this kind there is added another not similarly composite, nor by way of continuation or connection, but simple by way of form or act truly and physically united, why there does not result from both one being per se. Or if sometimes it results, sometimes not, whence the reason is to be taken. Where various questions are insinuated, which depend on this, namely, why when subsistence comes to a nature already integral, from both there results one per se, but not when quantity or another similar form comes. Likewise, why a substantial form makes one per se with nude matter, but cannot make one per se with matter already informed by substantial form, and similar questions.

6. In this matter therefore it seems must be said that the nature of being per se consists in this, that it has precisely those things which are required per se and intrinsically for the essence, integrity or complement of such a being in its genus. This Aristotle insinuated in the place cited above. And from the terms themselves it seems clear; for these most common and simple things can scarcely be proved otherwise than by explaining the natures of the terms. Since therefore being is said to be that which has entity or essence, that will be being per se properly and rigorously which has one essence or entity. But that essence or entity will be one most properly, which in its genus has whatever pertains to its intrinsic nature or consummation; therefore that being, which is of this kind, under that aspect will be properly and per se being; but everything that falls short of this unity will be called being per accidens.

7. But this can be further explained, if we divide being per se into simple and composite, which division can also be given of the one per se, and Aristotle insinuated this, Metaphysics X, chapter 6, saying that one thing is divisible, another indivisible. For, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 6, a. 3, and q. 11, a. 1, of the one per se, one is undivided in act and potency, another truly only in act; the former is simple being, the latter truly composite. Therefore, concerning the simple there is no difficulty; for everything simple is being per se and per se one, because it is also per se undivided, and as such it does not have admixture of anything foreign, so that it could be called being per accidens, and in this way any accident taken in the abstract by that consideration is being per se, and the soul in the notion of substance is being per se, although incomplete; but insofar as it consists of several potencies, habits, or acts, it already declines toward being per accidens.

8. But concerning composite being it is certain first of all that it can truly and properly be being per se and one per se, as all philosophers teach about substantial nature, insofar as it consists of

matter and form, and about the supposit insofar as it is composed in its way from nature and subsistence. For since neither matter nor form per se are complete and integral beings in their genus, but are instituted by their nature for composing that, that which is proximately composed from them is rightly called and is one essence and nature per se. And by the same reasoning, because that essence does not have intrinsic complement in its genus, unless it be intrinsically and substantially terminated per se, therefore that also with its subsistence constitutes one being per se. Therefore this unity per se consists in this, that it results from things constituting a complete being in some genus, with a union of them among themselves intervening, accommodated to constituting such a being, which in the composition of one nature is by way of act and substantial potency; but in the composition of one person, it is by way of integral nature and its term. And this reasoning can also be accommodated to beings as composed from genus and difference per se contracting that within the proximate category; for genus and difference are also compared as potency and act per se ordered to constituting one complete and integral thing in its genus, although this composition is more rational than real, and therefore can less impede the real and per se unity of being.

9. But there is besides these another mode of composition in beings, which is said to be from integral parts, which is first discerned in quantity, but through it is also understood to be in material substances and accidents, and this also does not remove unity per se, when it is through true and natural continuation. For thus continuous quantity is in its genus properly and per se one; but the parts of which it consists are not said to be simply several in act, but in potency, as Aristotle often speaks, Metaphysics III, chapter 6, and Metaphysics V, chapter 13, where he says that number properly is not, except where parts are not copulated by a common term. And Averroes says the same thing, On the Soul III, text 23. And the reason is, because quantity by its nature postulates this extension and composition,

which is wholly ordered to its complement in its genus, and therefore within that it has proper terms, by which its parts can be copulated and terminated. Therefore that whole composition and union is per se and by its nature ordered to composing one being within the same genus. Although this per se primarily belongs to quantity taken according to itself, nevertheless it also belongs to material substance, which underlies quantity, as is discerned especially in homogeneous substance; for fire, water, and similar things, are one per se, even if they are taken in any magnitude, provided they are continuous; otherwise such substance could never be one per se, because it can never not consist of these parts, even if it be taken in the smallest quantity, which is against all philosophers and against the common mode of feeling and speaking, and against the reasoning made above, because these beings by their nature postulate this kind of genus of union and composition for their complement and integrity in their genus; therefore such composition does not remove unity per se in beings of this kind.

10. It is necessary however (although this is to be treated more broadly below) here to note briefly what substance has from quantity in this genus of composition, what truly substance itself has from its own substantial entity, although under quantity; for in the former way from substance and quantity there simply does not come about one per se, as we now speak, because quantity is not of the complement of substance within the notion and latitude of its genus, and therefore quantitative integrity, as it is adjoined to substance and makes one with it, does not constitute being, nor one per se. But material substance itself under quantity has its substantial entity, in which it also has entitative parts composing and integrating the substantial entity itself, and having among themselves their substantial union, and in this way we say that substance thus composed is per se one.

11. But this has some difficulty in heterogeneous substances, because their parts do not seem to be thus intrinsically united and

continued, but only as if bound together by certain bonds. But nevertheless this substance also as thus composed is one being per se. For who would deny that man is one being per se? And this can be declared a posteriori, for all parts of this kind serve each other mutually, and when separated per se, either in no way, or not for long can they be conserved; it is therefore a sign that all those are incomplete beings in their genus, and are per se ordered to composing some being; therefore that as thus composed is per se being and one per se. Whence for this it suffices that those parts have naturally some conjunction and copulation, whatever that may be; for that suffices so that all can be informed by the same form, and agree to constitute with it one being, having one existence simply. Add that, although these heterogeneous members are not continuous among themselves immediately in every respect, nevertheless they always have some continuation in some respect, at least in some third thing, as in a nerve, or another similar part, concerning which elsewhere.

12. From these things therefore, as if by induction made, it is sufficiently established how in all substances being per se one consists in the notion explained by us. But almost the same induction can be applied to accidents; for concerning quantity it has already been said; but others, if they are entirely simple according to reality, it is established that they per se have unity and indivision; but if they are composite, so that they may make one per se they ought to imitate quantity in some way. For only a twofold composition of this kind can be understood. One is by way of extension, in which way there is one whiteness, which is extended in the surface of one body, and this composition makes one per se in the manner of an integral whole. For thus the parts of that whiteness are related, so that within their genus they are bound together and united in a way proportioned to themselves and constitute one complete and integral being in their species, which composition and union those parts have under quantity or in quantity; nevertheless they do not have it intrinsically and formally through quantity itself, but through their partial entities

united among themselves by a proper bond and union of their genus. Which can be explained by this reasoning; for, if in the continuous surface of the same body, for example, of a wall, half the part is white, and half black, whiteness and blackness indeed have some continuity on the part of the subject, because the surface also, in which they inhere, is continuous, and nothing can be designated in it, however indivisible, which is not affected by whiteness or blackness; and nevertheless whiteness and blackness do not have among themselves intrinsic union and conjunction, which two partial whitenesses have among themselves; and therefore from those there does not come about per se and properly one, as would come about from parts of whiteness; which the same thing in its way is probable to be able to happen in substances, if it happens that under the same continuous quantity there are substantial forms of diverse species, under diverse parts of quantity, as St. Thomas noted, Metaphysics V, text 7, lecture 7, letter D. Another composition in accidents can be by way of intension, supposing that degrees of intension are distinguished in some way in reality; concerning which elsewhere. And this composition, although it does not come about per se speaking in quantity or through quantity, nevertheless is to be understood and explained by proportion to that. Whence from such composition also there results one per se, because all those degrees are as if partial and incomplete beings within their genus, and by their nature are ordered to completing one within the same genus, and they have among themselves natural union and proper terms by which they may be copulated or terminated. Therefore also in accidents the notion of being or one per se consists in the aforesaid notion explained by us. But if perhaps in accidents there is found another mode of making one from many beings besides those mentioned, as in quantitative number, or according to the opinion of some in the habit of science, which arises from the collection of many species or habits, those are not to be considered beings per se, but per accidens, in the proper and true notion of being, as Fonseca well taught, book V Metaphysics,

chapter 7, question 5, section 2, because those do not have among themselves some true and real union, through which they make one per se, whatever may be whether under some categorical notion they can be considered per se, concerning which below, explaining individual categories.

The Nature of Being & One Per Accidens

13. From these things which have been said about being and one per se, it is permitted to gather what is to be said about being and one per accidens, which is distinguished from that; for first of all everything which consists of distinct things without physical and real union of them among themselves, is rigorously being per accidens and not per se. This is proved, both from what has been said, because in such a being the notion of being per se explained by us cannot be found; and also because that one cannot have one real essence; for one essence cannot be understood, unless either because it is simple, or because it arises through real union of several; but in the aforesaid case neither of these is found. Then every being which is thus one that it consists of distinct things, of which one is a complete being in some genus and through the addition of another is made more perfect by perfection of a diverse genus, such a being also rigorously is one per accidens, because the notion of being per se explained by us does not belong to it, nor can one true essence be found in such a being. Also because, by this very fact that one being is complete and integral in its genus, what is adjoined to it comes accidentally, and therefore is said to compose one per accidens with it; and by this reasoning it is truly said that what consists of things of diverse categories and diverse from the nature of the thing, is one per accidens. Indeed rather, even in things of the same category this is true, if they are of diverse genus or species, and one happens to another in its notion and species already complete, and in this way from potency and habit, or act, there comes

about one per accidens, and similarly a silver vessel gilded is being per accidens, and so concerning the rest.

14. Secondly, from what has been said it is gathered that in being one per accidens there is variety, and in it there is more or less. For one kind of being is entirely by aggregation, in which many beings per se integral and perfect, without any union and without any order are heaped together, and this seems to be maximally per accidens, because it is opposed in every respect to being per se properly taken, and of this kind is a heap of wheat or stones. But another is being per accidens, consisting indeed of integral beings per se, not having among themselves physical union, but having among themselves some order, as is an army, republic, house, and other similar artificial things, in which there can be as much variety and as much difference according to more and less, as there can be greater or lesser union among beings per se, from which it consists; and in this way a tree seems more one, to which a branch of another species is grafted, than a house, and a house more than an army; and so concerning others. And in this order are to be placed mixed liquids, composed from simple ones imperfectly altered, such as wine mixed with water, honey-water, etc. By which it also happens that, although these are beings per accidens simply and absolutely, nevertheless respectively, that is, in comparison with that being which is one by mere aggregation, these are sometimes wont to be called beings per se. For, because middle things participate something of extremes, in comparison with those they are wont to be called by diverse names; but beings of this kind agree in some way with beings per se, insofar as they are united in some form or condition, and therefore they are sometimes thus named. In which way Aristotle seems to have spoken in the cited place, Metaphysics V. Nevertheless by this consideration and comparison, being composed of substance and accident inhering in it, much more seems to be able to be called being per se; for this is the third genus of beings per accidens which more seems to recede from that first and lowest being by aggregation, and more to approach the one per se, because, both

the things of which it consists are not distinguished by supposit, as in others, and they have among themselves greater physical union, and one truly is in potency to another, although accidental, and the other by its nature is ordered to another, and in union to that has its connatural perfection, in all of which things being of this kind imitates that which is properly and per se one; although it is simply and absolutely one per accidens.

Concerning the One Simply & In a Qualified Sense

15. Thirdly, from what has been said the other divisions of the one are easily explained. For one can be called one simply, another in a qualified sense. One simply is properly and rigorously said, that which is one per se; but all the rest can be said one in a qualified sense, which seems manifest from the terms themselves; for therefore being per se one is thus called, because it has unity simply and absolutely; but the rest because they recede from this unity are called per accidens. This is also evident from the definition of the one; for it is being undivided in itself; therefore that which is undivided simply, will be one simply, but that which is simply divided in itself, and only has some indivision in relation to some end or to some form, will be only one in a qualified sense, and thus it happens in those things which are only per accidens one, as is evident from what has been said. Otherwise Gregory, In I, distinction 24, question 1, and there other nominalists, say that only simple being is one simply, because, that it may be one simply, it is necessary that nothing be in it which is not itself; but this definition is gratuitously fabricated by them, and according to it God alone would be one simply. Also it conflicts with Aristotle, Metaphysics X, in the place cited, distinguishing the one into indivisible and only undivided. For it conflicts with the common mode of conceiving and speaking; for being although composite, is called being per se and simply; why therefore would it not also be called simply one? Also such a being is

not many simply, therefore it will be one simply, because these two are immediately opposed and as if contradictorily. Finally by this reasoning theologians teach that Christ, as composite from God and humanity, is one simply.

16. Here however two things seem to be observed: first, it is one thing to say that some thing is one simply or in a qualified sense, another truly for two things to be one, in that way in which soul and body are said to be one humanity, or several men one. We speak here in the former way; for that is proper and absolute, that is, according to the absolute consideration of being and one according to which notion one is a passion of being, and not according to comparison or relation of one thing to another; indeed not even according to comparison of the notion of the same thing to itself, because, as I was saying above, this relation of reason of identity is not of the notion of the one, which is absolute. But the latter mode of speaking, that it may be true, ought to be not so much formal as causal, as is evident in the said examples; for matter and form properly and formally truly are not one, but compose one; and similarly several men are not so much a people, as they compose one people, and so concerning others; and thus that unity which is found in many, whatever that may be, supposes first according to reason some being constituted from those, which proximately and immediately is denominated one, and in this sense is to be understood what is wont to be said, that several are simply one in a qualified sense, as we shall touch again in the following section.

17. Secondly, it is to be observed that here there is discourse about unity of thing and not about unity of reason; for unity of reason (since it is not in things, but from the intellect) is not properly comprehended by the division posited; if nevertheless someone wishes to reduce this unity to the said division, this will be unity maximally in a qualified sense, and of this kind is unity of genus, species, etc., insofar as it is brought about by comparison and denomination of mind, which also can be greater or lesser in its order,

according as it includes greater or lesser indivision according to reason, or according as it is founded in greater or lesser agreement found in those things. But whether this foundation which precedes in things merits the name of unity, we shall say later.

18. And hence further there remain explained other terms which some use, as can be seen in Fonseca, in the said question 5, section 6, namely, that one is sometimes said of something absolutely, sometimes comparatively, as that which is one with itself, or one with Peter in the notion of man or animal, etc. Also, that sometimes something is said to be one in itself and according to its proper notion, as Peter is said to be one in number; but sometimes something is said to be one in a superior or inferior notion, as animal in the notion of living thing, or in man. But these are truly improper, for one is said properly, only absolutely; but that comparative unity is not unity according to thing, but either identity according to reason, or similarity founded in some unity, or certainly it is unity according to reason. And similarly, no being is said to be one properly, except according to its proper notion; for according to a superior or inferior notion something is not said to be one, except perhaps secondarily and by reason of another.

19. Finally, it must be noted that some unity can be considered in things, which belongs to being by reason of its entity, or in that precisely considered; but another unity can be understood as belonging to one being through another being adjoined to it; as, for example, in matter (as we were saying above), we understand entitative unity, belonging to it in its entity and from the force of it, even if it is precisely considered and mentally separated from quantity and any other accident; but another unity is understood in matter by reason of quantity, from which it is said to be one quantitatively or numerically; and the same can be considered in whiteness and in other corporeal beings; for in immaterial things only the former mode of unity is found. Therefore unity immediately belonging to entity through itself can be called unity per se, not in the sense in which we

have spoken above about being and one per se, but as per se is distinguished against per aliud, which mode of unity is found in every being, in that way in which being is, so that even being per accidens, in that way in which it is one per se, and not per aliud, has that unity, and therefore this unity is that which per se belongs to being as being is; and to remove equivocation it could be called intrinsic or entitative unity; for the other unity, which belongs per aliud, is accidental and as if extrinsic, or denominative, concerning which more in section five.

SECTION IV
WHETHER UNITY IS AN ADEQUATE PROPERTY OF BEING, AND ON THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY

1. Up to this point we have only explained the nature of the one and its various modes; but since this entire disputation tends toward showing that this property belongs to being, two tasks remain. First, that we explain how this property is convertible with being and is an adequate property of it. Second, that we explain to what kind of unity this belongs, which we shall accomplish in the following section.

2. Concerning the first point, the reason for doubt is that being is divided by one and many, as is evident from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chapter 1, and from St. Thomas, I, question 11; indeed, many contend that this is the first division of being, as extensively discussed by Soncinas, Metaphysics X, question 1; but a dividing member cannot be convertible with what is divided; therefore neither can the one be convertible with being; therefore it is not a property of it. And this is confirmed; for one and many are opposed, as Aristotle testifies above; therefore they cannot belong to the same thing; therefore being which is many is not one; therefore one is not an adequate property of being.

3. In this doubt it must be briefly said that unity or the one is an adequate property of being. This is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, text 3, saying that being and one follow each other mutually. Plato taught the same thing in the Parmenides, saying: "Neither does being lack the one, nor the one lack being, but rather these two are coequal through all things." The same is taught by St. Thomas, I, question 11, articles 1 and 2, and all philosophers. And this is evident by reason, first, because among the properties of being, one is placed in the first position, as we have seen above; therefore it must be convertible with being, because it belongs to the nature of a property properly so called to be adequate to its subject, and therefore one is placed among the transcendentals, just like being itself. Second, this is shown from the thing itself, because true and real unity presupposes or includes entity, as has been seen above; for what is nothing cannot be called one, except equivocally and by extrinsic denomination; but to every entity, insofar as it is entity, there follows or is necessarily joined indivision in itself; for if it should be actually divided, insofar as it is such, it is not an entity, but entities; therefore the nature of the one runs adequately with being. Third, because every being is either simple or composite; the simple is not only undivided but indivisible, insofar as it is simple; the composite, however, as such, is also undivided; for if it should be actually divided, it will not be composite. Therefore every being, both simple and composite, is one; but what is neither simple nor composite is not being; rather it will either be nothing, or multiple beings.

The Division of Being into One & Many is Explained

4. To the reason for doubt that was presented, St. Thomas responds, I, question 11, article 1, ad 2, that what is undivided in one way can be divided in another way, and that what is many under one aspect can be one under another: "And for this reason," he says, "being

is divided by one and many, as if by one absolutely and many in a qualified sense; for even multitude itself would not be contained under being, unless it were contained in some way under one." And he brings forward Dionysius, final chapter On the Divine Names, saying that there is no multitude that does not participate in some way in unity; for things that are many in parts are one in the whole; and things that are many in accidents are one in subject, etc. From this response it is understood first that, speaking formally and properly, being is not divided into many as they are actually and formally many, because such many, insofar as they are such, are truly not being, but beings.

5. In a twofold way, therefore, multitude can be placed in the division of being: first, if it is not understood concerning actual multitude, that is, actually divided, which alone is properly multitude, as is evident from Metaphysics V, chapter 13, text 18, but concerning multitude only in potency, in the way that in a continuum there is said to be a multitude of integral parts or points, and in human nature a multitude of essential parts. And in this way St. Thomas seems to have understood the division, when he says that being is divided by one and many as if by one absolutely and many in a qualified sense; for that is one absolutely in which there are not many actually divided, and conversely, those are called many in a qualified sense which in reality are not actually divided or disjoined, but only potentially. Hence in this sense these members, properly speaking, need not be distinguished in reality, but only in reason; for the same being that is one absolutely is many in a qualified sense or in potency, as is evident in the examples given; unless we wish to understand these members with precision or exclusion, in this way: that some being is so one that it is in no way many, neither actually nor potentially; but another is so one that it is also many in a qualified sense or potentially or accidentally, in which sense that division would coincide with the division of being or of the one into simple and composite. And according to this way of interpreting, it is easily evident that this

division poses no obstacle to the adequation of being and one; for that multitude does not exclude unity absolutely. Finally, in this sense it can be understood that in this division being is divided, not as it is common to being per se and per accidens, but being per se itself, because among beings per se there are some which, although they are actually one, can nevertheless be many in potency.

6. In another way, however, that division can be explained concerning multitude absolutely and properly, in the way that Cajetan seems to have understood, when he says that those words of St. Thomas in the said solution ad 2, "being is divided by one and many, as if by one absolutely and many in a qualified sense," are to be understood such that "absolutely" and "in a qualified sense" do not fall upon "one" and "many," but upon the verb "is divided," that is, being is so divided by one and many that one is being absolutely, but many only in a qualified sense. And in this way, on the contrary, it must be said that multitude is placed in the division of being insofar as it happens that those things which are many absolutely are one in a qualified sense. Hence the other member is understood concerning the one absolutely and absolutely; and in this sense those members are always distinguished not only in reason but in reality itself, because they include contradictory or privative opposition on the part of the division; for those are many absolutely which are actually divided in themselves; but one is that which is not actually divided in itself. And according to this sense also this division coincides with that by which being is divided into one absolutely and one in a qualified sense; for many absolutely do not divide being except insofar as they are one in a qualified sense. From which it also happens that what is divided in this division thus explained is not being per se, but what is divided into being per se and per accidens, for every being per se is one absolutely; but many are not called one in a qualified sense except insofar as they constitute some being per accidens, and thus they cannot be placed in the division of being except at least under the aspect of being per accidens; therefore what is divided in this division cannot be being per

se; for it would be repugnant for one member to be convertible with the other; it ought therefore to be being abstracting from per se and per accidens. And thus finally it is understood how the aforesaid division does not conflict with the adequation of one and being; for it pertains to this adequation that each thing is one just as it is being, so that if it should be being per se, it is also one per se; but if the being should be per accidens, it is also one per accidens, and just as being can be signified abstractly, so also can one, and therefore, just as being in this sense is divided into one and many, so also one itself could be divided in the same way; for, as I said, it is the same as if it were divided into one absolutely and one in a qualified sense.

SECTION V

WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS ANALOGICAL

1. From what has been said, several doubts which are customarily treated by authors concerning this division can easily be resolved. The first is whether this division is analogical or univocal.

2. The answer is that, if it is understood in the latter sense, it is analogical and almost equivocal, because the division of being into being per se and being per accidens, to which the aforesaid division is equivalent in that sense, as has been said, is analogical with a certain analogy of proportionality, such that to being thus taken there does not correspond one common concept, because being per accidens, as such, is not really being, but beings, and is only called being on account of a certain proportion or imitation of being per se. This position is proved first from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, at the end, where he openly teaches that analogy intervenes here. Then by reason, because those things which are many simply are not one simply; for these two are utterly opposed; therefore neither are they being simply; for being and one, if they are taken in the same

proportion, are convertible; therefore being is not divided univocally into one and many, but analogically. And this is what St. Thomas signified in Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 1, ad 2, according to the exposition of Cajetan cited and explained above. Moreover, that this analogy is as great as we have said is clarified in this way: because to be undivided is of the nature of the one; but this indivision is not found in such a one per accidens except very analogically and almost equivocally, because in it are found many things actually divided, and indivision exists only according to a certain apprehension or relation; therefore the nature of the one does not belong to such a multitude except through a certain proportionality or imitation; therefore the nature of being belongs to it in the same way, because, as has been said, being and one correspond to each other with proportion. Likewise, because being is said from essence or from existence; but in that multitude there is neither essence nor existence, but rather essences and existences.

3. You might say that this proceeds at most concerning those things which are so many simply that they are in no way one except by aggregation, as in a heap of stones, etc., because there is really no unity there, but a certain proximity, which can only be called unity through a certain proportionality, as has been rightly explained. Nevertheless, in other beings per accidens, which have some union or coordination of parts, by reason of which they can in some way be called one per se, as we said above, the argument made does not seem to proceed, nor does such great analogy intervene; for these seem to be comprehended under one concept of the one taken transcendentally; for they have some real unity and indivision which is founded in the things themselves.

4. The response is that this is indeed probable, especially when a physical and real union intervenes, as exists between substance and accident inherent to it intrinsically; for in such a composite, just as there is true and physical union, so there is some real unity, which, although it is not as great as that which is in a substantial composite,

nevertheless has real agreement with it, such as also exists between those unions; therefore that will suffice, at least for unity of concept, even if it be with some analogy, which depends on what will be said below about the analogy of being. Concerning other artificial beings, however, the matter is more doubtful, because real and physical union does not intervene there, and consequently neither real indivision; therefore neither real agreement in unity, which would suffice for unity of concept in the nature of being or one. Nevertheless, the opposite can easily be defended, because that very composition with some conjunction or coordination is some union, which suffices so that these beings are conceived as in some way per se one, on account of which we said above that it is probable that under that aspect they are directly contained under the object of metaphysics, and that there can be science concerning them as such: therefore this will also be sufficient so that they can be conceived under one transcendental concept of the one.

5. And hence it follows a fortiori that, if that division is understood in the prior sense explained above, such that what is divided is being per se strictly speaking into one which is in no way many, and one which is many in potency, thus much more is the one divided according to some common concept of the one per se or simply, because to be many in that way, namely, in potency, does not exclude unity simply, as has been said; nevertheless, it does not seem that all analogy should be excluded from that concept, because God, who is contained in it, just as He is not univocally being, so neither does He seem to be univocally one with other creatures.

6. However, it could probably be said that, although the one, as regards the positive which it includes or connotes, is not said univocally of God and creatures, nevertheless as regards the negation included, it is not repugnant that it be said univocally, because other negative predicates can be said univocally of God and creatures. For example, to be immaterial, insofar as it precisely signifies negation and absence of prime matter, belongs equally to angels and to God,

although the positive foundation of that absence is not univocal in them; thus therefore it seems that it can be said concerning the negation of division which the one expresses. You might say that this proceeds at most concerning things indivisible as such, for example, concerning an angel. But against this, first, because if it is once granted that transcendental one is said univocally of angel and God, from this is taken the argument that it is also said univocally of man, for example, because although man is not as perfectly one as an angel, nevertheless he is univocally one; therefore if an angel is one univocally with God, man will also be univocally one with both. Second, the same is clear a priori by reason, because the one precisely signifies negation of actual division; but this negation is found integrally and perfectly in being most properly and per se one, even if it be composite. But that in an indivisible substance something more beyond that negation is found pertains indeed to a certain greater perfection of entity or unity, but it does not suffice for analogy in the nature of the one. Hence, since otherwise with respect to this negation there is no proper dependence or causality except by reason of the foundation, no sufficient reason for analogy seems to exist in it. Third, the same is confirmed, because otherwise prime matter, for example, would be more perfectly one than composite substance; and the same argument can be made concerning the soul, indeed also concerning any simple accident with respect to composite substance, and concerning a point with respect to quantity, for with respect to all of them it follows that the one is analogical and is said primarily of the simple, however most imperfect being.

7. But, although these things have been said probably, nevertheless it must be said simply that transcendental one is said analogically of God and creatures and of all those things of which being is said analogically, because (whatever may be the case concerning negation) the one does not formally signify negation alone, as has been seen above, but entity or undivided essence, and therefore where essence is not univocal, neither can real unity be

univocal. Likewise, because, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics IV, text 2, as far as the matter is concerned, it is the same to say one and one being; therefore what is not being simply cannot be one simply; therefore, what is being analogically will also be one analogically. But this is especially true in God, in whom not only is essence as such of another order, but also as it founds the negation of the one, it has a certain perfection of another nature and order. But in those beings in which, although essence may be more imperfect, nevertheless, as it founds the negation of division, it has a certain excess of simplicity or indivisibility, it can in some way be said that there is a more perfect nature of the one as regards negation, but not simply, on account of the reason stated. And hence it is again confirmed what was said above, that the one does not formally signify negation alone, but entity under negation.

SECTION VI

HOW ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED

1. In this matter Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, indicates that one and many are opposed privatively. But truly, in book X, chapter 1, he holds that they are opposed neither relatively, because one is not said in relation to another, nor contradictorily, because neither is mere negation, for neither can be truly said as much of those things which are not as of those things which are; nor merely privatively, because neither consists in privation alone, but each signifies something positive, nor finally merely contrarily, because they formally include some negation; whence he concludes that they are opposed in some way contrarily and in some way privatively. St. Thomas, however, in Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 2, holds that this opposition approaches more closely to the privative, because one (he says) is opposed to many, as the undivided to the divided.

2. However, so that this may be explained more fully, it must be considered that many can be compared to one in two ways: first, as many are; second, as they are in some way one; in which way we said that multitude is the dividing member of being in that partition by which it is divided into one and many. Therefore, speaking formally of multitude, as it is a member of that division, it differs from one simply said as the imperfect from the perfect, and thus they are like two disparate and distinct natures. Just as, if we consider number under the aspect of one discrete quantity, or suppose it to have one formal nature as such, it will be distinguished from unity as a certain formal nature distinct from the formal nature of the one, as two disparate natures or species are customarily distinguished, or as a line is distinguished from a point. But truly, considering multitude as multitude is and mere aggregation of several, we can thus consider either only that which is positive in unity and multitude, and thus they are related in the manner of whole and part, because multitude results from unities in this way; or we can consider the negation included, and thus each includes some negation; for multitude, signifying many positive beings, includes this negation, that one is not another, which can be called negation of identity; but one signifies negation of division. And thus they seem to be mutually opposed privatively according to diverse aspects; for one includes negation of division, which is of the nature of multitude; but multitude includes negation of identity or real conjunction, which is of the nature of unity. Nevertheless, because multitude includes unity and requires indivision in the individual unities of which the multitude itself consists, but one on the contrary does not include multitude, nor division, which is of the nature of multitude, but rather removes it, therefore one is said simply to be opposed to multitude by way of privation, rather than conversely.

3. Hence, although St. Thomas above, ad 2, says that unities compose multitude according to what they have of entity, not according to what they have of indivision, which he repeats in other places, as in De Potentia question 9, article 7, ad 10 and 14, this

nevertheless seems to be understood with proportion, namely, concerning multitude insofar as it is something positive. But if all things which multitude includes are considered, it seems that it must be said otherwise, for, as the same St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 2, ad 4, and in the aforementioned De Potentia, article 7, ad 15, in the understanding of multitude is included being divided from another, and that each of them is one in itself: for however much (he says) some things may be understood as divided, multitude will not be understood unless each of the divided things is understood to be one, and consequently undivided; therefore it follows that one composes multitude as regards all things which are of its nature not only by reason of the positive, but also by reason of the negation which one signifies, because it is not only of the nature of multitude that one thing is not another, but also that individual things are undivided in themselves, because otherwise they would not compose a certain and determinate multitude. Nor do I sufficiently understand what Cajetan means concerning the aforesaid solution ad 2 of St. Thomas, saying that multitude formally arises from unities formally, and consequently from negations, and nevertheless the indivision of unity does not concur in composing multitude, insofar as it exercises privation of division, but insofar as it has the nature of being. For what is it for privation to have the nature of being? For if this is said only by reason of the entity in which it is founded, it contradicts his prior statement and the argument made by us; but if negation is said to have the nature of being, insofar as it can be conceived in the manner of being, thus the division is impertinent, because this it has only through extrinsic denomination, and thus negation is rather a being of reason only than that it should have the nature of real being, of which Cajetan speaks.

4. Finally, one and many can be compared in the nature of measure and measured, and in this way they can have relative opposition, whether that be real relation or of reason, which seems more likely, because this nature of measure seems to consist only in a

certain extrinsic denomination, and to be founded more in our apprehension and use and mode of knowing than in some relation or relation which is in the thing. Hence St. Thomas in the aforementioned article 2 attributes this opposition of measure and measured to quantitative unity with respect to number, which is in quantity, but not to transcendental unity and multitude, which I do not see why it could be said, unless in order to human use or according to a certain denomination resulting from it; for, if the things themselves are considered according to themselves, transcendental one maintains the same proportion to its multitude as numerical one or one of quantity to its number, because it is the principle of it and composes it, whence it can also be measured through it.

SECTION VII

WHETHER ONE IS PRIOR TO MANY, AND INDIVISION TO DIVISION

1. Thomists speak in different ways in this matter concerning unity and multitude, division and indivision. For they say that unity is by its nature prior to multitude, which is certain and self-evident, both because, speaking per se, one is independent from multitude in every genus; for one does not depend on many, but many on one, nor is one defined through many, but multitude is defined through unity; and also because one is the principle and composes multitude; whence also as regards consequence of subsisting they are not convertible, for, if there is multitude, it is necessary that there be unity, but not conversely.

2. Concerning division and indivision, however, some say that division is by its nature prior to indivision and unity. Thus teaches Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, question 23, ad 6, and Metaphysics X, question 4; and Javellus, there, question 6; but Cajetan, Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 2, around ad 4, uses a scarcely

intelligible distinction; for he says that division is prior to unity simply according to itself, in intelligible being however, and that it is posterior to unity simply, that is, according to being simply, which is being in the nature of things. He proves the first part, because affirmation is prior to negation; but to be one is to be this, and not to be not-this; therefore division between those contradictory extremes naturally precedes unity; he proves the second, because negation of one being from another, which is real negation, is posterior to unity; from which arguments the sense of the prior distinction proposed by Cajetan is understood; for by negation in intelligible being he seems to understand division of being from non-being, and of each being from such non-being, which others call negation of reason only; but by negation according to the being of the thing he understands division of one being from another, which is usually called real negation. But, as is evident from what has been said above, the division which unity denies per se primarily is neither of these, but is negation of real division of the being itself in itself, and concerning this division it is inquired whether it is prior or posterior to indivision.

3. And it seems to me indeed that such division is in no way prior according to the thing than one or the indivision included in it; for, if we compare these two generally and in their whole latitude, it is prior that some being be undivided in itself, than that there be some division of one being from another or of some being in itself; but if we compare them in individual beings, each from its nature has indivision in itself prior to division. What division, therefore, or in what subject is said or is according to itself prior to indivision or unity? Moreover, there is no reason which persuades the contrary, because, although indivision is opposed to division by way of privation, it is not therefore necessary that division be prior: first indeed, because, although in those things which are properly and strictly opposed privatively, habit is by its nature prior to negation, because such privation is only in an apt subject born, which by its nature first regards habit rather than privation, in privation however taken broadly and improperly, such as

is the indivision of one, as has been explained, it is not necessary that habit be prior to negation; as, although immaterial taken privatively signifies negation, it is simply prior to be immaterial in things than to be material, because it does not signify privation properly said and in an apt subject born, which from itself first postulates being material rather than immaterial; and in man, for example, it is prior in the order of generation that he lack teeth than that he have them, which lack, although for the time of infancy it does not have the most proper nature of privation, nevertheless approaches more closely to it than the negation of division which the indivision of one signifies; therefore much less is it necessary that in the present case division be prior by its nature to indivision. And therefore St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 2, ad 4, rightly taught that division is prior to unity, not simply, but according to the nature of our apprehension.

4. Therefore, comparing these two according to themselves and from their nature, just as unity is prior to multitude, so indivision is prior to division; but as regards us division is said to be prior to indivision, because, since indivision is known as negation, it is necessary that that of which it is the negation be apprehended first, because always as regards us affirmation precedes negation; but this must be understood concerning indivision taken formally for negation or for the foundation of negation, according to the various modes of explaining the indivision of one, which we treated above. And in the same way Aristotle speaks, Metaphysics X, text 6, concerning one or its indivision with respect to multitude; for he says that multitude is prior by reason on account of sense, in which last word he sufficiently declares that he speaks of priority as regards us; and thus St. Thomas expounded there, lecture 4. And he clarifies that this must be understood concerning multitude by reason of division only; for, if multitude is taken according to the whole of what is of its nature, thus also as regards us multitude is posterior, because it is nothing other (he says) than an aggregation of unities. Hence, although those things

which are divided are many, they do not nevertheless have the nature of many, unless after it is attributed to this and that that it be one.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS THE FIRST OF ALL

1. Scotus, In I Sentences, distinction 8, question 3, and in Quodlibetal Questions, question 5, article 1, denies that this is the first division of being, but rather another by which being is divided into finite and infinite, because these two members formally contract being insofar as it is being; but the others contract being insofar as it is one; therefore that division is prior to this. The consequence is clear, because, just as the nature of being is prior to the nature of one, so also the division which belongs to being as being is prior to that which belongs to being as it is one; for that division belongs to being quasi per se primo, but this per se secundo; just as if in man there could be various modes of rationality and risibility, the division of man through modes of rationality would be prior to that through modes of risibility. But the antecedent as regards the first part is clarified, because essence is what constitutes being insofar as it is being; therefore the first diversity of essences as such is also the first division of being insofar as it is being; but one essence, as essence, differs from another, insofar as that one is of such essential perfection, but another of greater or lesser, and this is the first reason, which being posited and all others being set aside, diversity of essences remains, and that being removed it does not remain; but this genus of diversity is found first and per se between infinitely perfect essence and all others which are finite; therefore the first division of being is that into finite and infinite. But the other part of the antecedent is clear from what has been said above, because those two members, namely, one and many, in order that they may divide being, it is necessary that they be equivalent to

the division of being into one simply and one only secundum quid, or into one per se and one per accidens; but this division formally taken is division of being as it is one; therefore. But if someone should contend that being as being can also be divided through these two modes of unity, the same argument can return; for thus this division will be quasi denominative (so to speak), for it will be division through a property of being, whereas the prior is essential or through modes contracting being per se primo and essentially.

2. But truly the Thomists contend that the first division of being is into one and many or into being per se and per accidens. Thus holds Soncinas, Metaphysics X, question 1, who attributes this to St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, question 11, article 2 ad 4, and In I Sentences, distinction 24, question 1, article 3, since he says that first falls into the intellect to be being, second division, third one, fourth multitude. The foundation is, because one is the first adequate passion of being as it is being, belonging to it even as it abstracts from finite or infinite; therefore it belongs to being prior to finite or infinite. But first from that place of St. Thomas nothing can be gathered, because there he does not treat of the comparison of the division of being into one and many to other divisions of being, but of the mode and order by which one and many are conceived by us. That reason also is of no moment, because, so that the comparison may be rightly made, it is not to be made between one, as it is an adequate passion of being, and modes contracting being; for thus Scotus would not deny that one belongs to being prior to finite and infinite, or other similar modes, just as an adequate property of a genus, and convertible with it, is understood to belong to it prior by reason than inferior differences contracting, because such a property belongs to it according to itself and precisely, but contracting difference belongs by reason of the inferior. Indeed, even if contracting modes of being opposed among themselves are taken disjunctively and attributed to being through the mode of one complex property, namely, finite or infinite, etc., still one, as it is an adequate and incomplex property, should be judged prior by

reason, either by this very fact that it is simpler, and according to itself more adequate and less dependent on the conception of another. Or especially because, as I said above, these complex or disjunctive predicates are really not properties of being insofar as it is being, because they essentially divide being itself. Therefore, so that comparison may be properly made, it is necessary to speak of one according to determinate modes of one, and in this way the argument made does not proceed, as is evident per se.

3. Otherwise therefore Javellus, treatise I on Transcendentals, chapter 1, proposing various divisions of being, says the first is into real being and being of reason; the second, of real being into one per se and per accidens; the third, into absolute and respective; the fourth (which is the third of real being) into one and many; the fifth, into five transcendentals; the last, into finite and infinite, which order of divisions he confirms with no reasons. But that which pertains to the present disagreement, namely, that comparing those two divisions, namely, into one and many, and finite and infinite, that one is prior, he proves with this apparent reason, because being is not divided into finite and infinite, unless insofar as it is good; but the other division, as has been said, is given of being insofar as it is one. Therefore this is prior to that, just as a passion of one is prior to a passion of good. The major is clear, because finite and infinite divide being according to various degrees of perfection; therefore they divide it as perfect; therefore as good; for perfect and good are the same. Whence also Scotus, since he thinks there can be some real being which does not formally signify perfection, puts forward another division, saying that being is first divided into quantum and non-quantum, namely, by quantity of perfection, and afterwards he divides quantum being into finite and infinite; therefore according to his opinion being is here divided as quantum or perfect. In which also Scotus seems to signify that that division into absolute and relative is prior, because only relative being is called by him non-quantum, because relation as such does not signify perfection. Whence consequently it happens that

only absolute being is divided into finite and infinite, which Javellus also teaches.

4. In this question it is necessary to suppose that the discourse is concerning real being, for being of reason, as has been said in the preceding, does not have a common concept nor real agreement with real being, and therefore the division of being into real being and being of reason is not rightly numbered among divisions of being, because that is more a division of name than of thing; but here we do not treat of various significations of the same word, but of diverse modes by which the concept of the thing signified through the word can really be determined or contracted. Finally, here we treat only of the division of being, which we said above is the proper object of metaphysics; but this is not being, as it abstracts from real being and being of reason, but real being only.

5. Again, for the same reason it must be asserted that such divisions are not to be understood with respect to being, as it is divided into being per se and being per accidens, taking being per accidens strictly for being entirely through aggregation; for, as has also been shown above, such division is not of some common concept, but of word only according to imperfect analogy of some proportionality. On account of which we said that being accepted in that latitude is not the adequate object of this doctrine, but only real being per se, in that mode by which it can have some unity of reason or concept founded in things, by reason of which it is capable both of properties and of real divisions. And hence it happens that, if that division of being into one and many is taken in that sense, in which it coincides with the aforesaid division of being into per se and per accidens, thus indeed it can be said to be prior to the division of being into finite and infinite, in that way by which division or equivocation of word in every doctrine is to be explained prior to the thing itself being divided, in which sense also that division into being of reason and of thing can be said first. But properly speaking of real divisions contracting or dividing the adequate object of this science, that cannot be computed

in this order, any more than the division of being into real and of reason, because in it also the word only is common, but not the concept, as has been shown.

6. It remains therefore that we compare these divisions insofar as real and per se being, taken most commonly, can be divided in them. But these divisions can be compared, either in universality, for thus one division can be said prior to another, because it is more universal, and the other is in some way contained under it, or in greater diversity and distance between the dividing members, for thus that division can be said prior, in which the dividing members primarily and more greatly distance themselves from each other; or finally they can be compared in the relation of the dividing members to the divided itself, for thus that division seems to be said prior, in which the dividing members more per se and formally contract the divided according to its proper formal nature, as has been declared by arguing for each cited opinion, nor does it appear by what other reason one division can be said prior to another.

7. From these therefore three things seem to be able to be said probably in this disagreement: the first is that, as regards universality, neither of these divisions is prior to the other; for each is adequate to being and encompasses its whole latitude, nor in any way is one contained under the other or is a subdivision of it; this is evident per se, because the divided of each is one and the same, as we suppose, and in each the dividing members include immediate contradiction, by which they exhaust the divided. And this indeed is manifest in the division of being into one and many. Concerning the division into finite and infinite being, however, according to the opinion of Scotus, the matter is not so clear; for he with many others find a medium between those two members of certain real beings which signify no perfection, and therefore Scotus himself, as I was saying above, thought another division should be premised of being into quantum and non-quantum, so that only quantum being could be adequately divided into finite and infinite; whence consequently it

happens that this division thus explained is less universal than that other into one and many; for that being which is called non-quantum, just as it is being, so it also exists as one. I nevertheless suppose that the contrary doctrine is truer, and that there is no real being which from its proper and formal concept is not quantum, and consequently either finite or infinite, either simply or in its proper genus, concerning which we will say below, showing that every being signifies some perfection.

8. I say second, in the aforesaid division of being, the dividing members distance themselves more from each other and differ primarily than in the other division of being into one and many, and in this way the aforesaid division is prior. For I suppose that infinite in that division is taken for infinite in entitative and essential perfection, especially because, as is evident otherwise, only such infinite exists in the nature of things; for in created things, no infinite can exist speaking absolutely, which is not rather simply finite. But within God, whatever is in Him, is simply and essentially infinite, although according to our precise inadequate concepts something, especially the relative, can be conceived as infinite only in some genus, the infinity simply not being conceived distinctly in it, which is nothing to the present purpose. Hence therefore the assertion posited is clear, because the first division is given through the first diversity, which is between God and creatures; but the second not thus, for under one member of it are contained God and several creatures which simply and in complete rigor are one per se; but under the other only other creatures, which are not per se beings in that way; but God and creature distance themselves more from each other than any nature of created being can distance itself from another nature even created or at least common to God and creatures; for those distance themselves infinitely simply; but these minimally. This reason is explained in this way, because those two members of being into one and many differ only according to greater or lesser unity of being itself, and as much as is from the force of that division the two members do not distance

themselves more from each other, than the unity of an army, for example, distances itself from the unity of man, for, although other beings can per se distance themselves more in unity, nevertheless from the force of that division that greater diversity is not explained, but the aforesaid suffices; but finite and infinite being distance themselves much more from each other than unity per se and per accidens as such; therefore in this sense that division is prior, as declaring the highest and primary diversity or distance of being.

9. From which I infer that the same judgment must be made concerning the division of being into uncreated and created, and into being through essence and through participation, or into pure act and being potential in some way; for all these divisions in reality coincide and under diverse negative or connotative concepts declare the same partition and diversity of being. And for the same reason I think that this division is prior to the division of being into substance and accident, even if they are equal in universality; because uncreated being distances itself more from created, and is primarily diverse, than accident distances itself from substance as such or from created substance, which is the same. And for the same or greater reason that division is prior to the other into absolute and relative, because similarly the prior two members distance themselves more and are more diverse; for the whole diversity between absolute and relative in creatures is preserved without infinite distance; indeed those two formal natures conceived are not so diverse among themselves that they cannot coincide in the same most simple thing, at least in God; whence also those two natures not only do not distance themselves as created and uncreated being, but also from themselves neither postulates that it be created or uncreated, as theologians teach in the matter concerning the Trinity.

10. Third, it must be said that if those divisions are compared formally to what is divided, then the division of being into infinite and finite is also prior with respect to being as such, although the other division is prior with respect to the one insofar as it is one. This

assertion is sufficiently proven by the foundation adduced in favor of Scotus, because the modes signified by finite and infinite are per se and formally determinative of the nature of being or essence as such; for every real essence, by the very fact that it essentially includes reality, intrinsically and essentially postulates both some essential perfection and a mode or degree of such perfection. Hence also Cajetan, in the first part, question 11, at the beginning, doubting why St. Thomas dealt first with the perfection and infinity of God rather than with unity, responds that those two are contained within the scope of quidditative predicaments, while unity pertains to the properties of being. Just as in God it is prior according to reason that He be perfect and infinite in essence than that He be one, because those two signify in our mode of understanding the most formal constitution of such an essence, so in created being such and so great an essential perfection of each thing is prior to its unity; therefore in common respect to being, the division of it through modes of essence that are primarily and supremely diverse, such as are signified by those terms "finite" and "infinite," is more formal and prior than the division through modes of unity.

11. Nor does Javelli's argument stand against this; for it is denied that finite or infinite divide being insofar as it is good, speaking formally of good as it is a property of being, because, as we shall see below, to have some perfection as such is not a property of real being, but essence; for by the name of essential perfection nothing else is signified than the very essence of the thing itself, which, in order not to be fictitious but real, must formally be something of perfection; for if it be an essence simply infinite, it is itself the supreme perfection; but if it be finite, it is some participation of that perfection. What the notion of good, as it is a property of being, adds beyond the perfection of being, we shall say later. That the division into one and many, in the manner in which it has been explained, is more formally a division of the one insofar as it is one than of being insofar as it is being, is easily evident from what has been said, because those two members, in

order to be able to divide being per se, must be taken in such a way that they signify diverse modes of unity: either by "one" is signified that which is so one per se that it is in no way accidentally one, while by "many" is signified that which is simply one accidentally, although in some respect it is one per se; or by "one" is signified that which is so one that in it there is no multitude, even in potency, while by "many" is signified every being which, although it is one per se, is in some way many, at least in potency; for by all these considerations only diverse modes of unity are described; but it is evident that various modes of unity more formally contract the one than being.

12. Therefore, the aforesaid divisions can be compared in these ways, nor does any other reason or cause now occur by which one division of being could be called prior to another. Hence it is also incidentally evident that the order of those divisions which Javelli establishes rests on no reason or foundation; and especially most improper is that division by which he divides being into six transcendentals (for concerning the others enough has already been said); since all transcendentals are equal among themselves and are convertible with being, that cannot properly be called a division of being, but is a certain enumeration both of being and of those things which belong to being itself per se and adequately.

13. Finally, it could be inquired here whether multitude or number as such expresses one real formality, and whether in this there is some difference between transcendental multitude and the number which is posited as a species of quantity; but concerning this matter we shall speak more conveniently below when disputing about quantity.

SECTION IX

WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IS NUMERICAL UNITY, OR WHAT KIND OF UNITY IT IS

1. This question can be treated in a twofold sense according to the twofold acceptation of numerical unity, namely, either for quantitative unity or for singular unity; for thus Aristotle spoke, in book III of the Metaphysics, text 14: "Whether you call it one in number or singular makes no difference; for in this way we explain the singular as that which is one in number." According to these two acceptations, therefore, two questions or opinions are to be treated.

Various Opinions Concerning Quantitative Unity

2. The first opinion was that of Avicenna, which St. Thomas reports in I, q. 11, a. 1, and In I, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 3, and IV Metaph., lect. 2, and there in the Commentary, com. 3, who asserted that the unity which comes to beings from quantity is the very transcendental unity of things; whence he concluded that the one adds quantity above being. This opinion, taken so universally, is plainly false, both because it would be necessary to say either that no beings exist except quantified ones, or that unity is not an adequate property of being, but proper to material beings; and also because in material and quantified beings themselves there exists a proper unity and integrity, which each being has in itself, which is not formally from quantity, although it is not without quantity, as was touched upon in section 3, and will be said again in the following disputation, and also in the disputation on quantity.

3. If, however, this opinion only asserted that the unity of quantity is one of the transcendental unities, it would have some apparent probability. For just as common being is common to quantity and the other categories, so also transcendent one is common to all of them; whence, just as being is determined to individual categories through proper modes of entity, and transcendent being, as included in individual categories, is nothing

other than such and such being, so transcendent one is determined to individual categories through such modes of unity, and transcendent one as included in individual categories will be nothing other than such and such one. Therefore transcendent unity in quantity is nothing other than such unity as quantity by its nature requires. Therefore in this way it seems that quantitative unity can be said not to be distinguished from transcendental unity, not because it is convertible with it, but because it is a certain subjective part of it, in the same way that quantity can also be said not to be distinguished from being. And in this way Durandus taught that opinion, In I, dist. 24, q. 2, who consequently says that in individual categories special modes of unity and multitude can be distinguished, yet there are no peculiar names imposed to signify these, except in quantity, because the notion of divisibility or divisible continuum, from whose division number results, as is said in III Physics, c. 7, is found in a peculiar way in quantity.

4. And this opinion proceeds by distinguishing quantity from the quantified thing; for those who think that quantity adds nothing to substance consequently say that transcendent one and that which is the principle of number are in no way distinguished from each other, which Gregory tries to defend with many arguments, In I, dist. 24, q. 1 and 2. Not that he thinks every one is quantified, but conversely, because he thinks every one is transcendent, and quantitative one is nothing other than transcendent one in material substances or accidents. But the distinction of quantity from the quantified thing must be discussed elsewhere; now we suppose that quantity has an entity distinct from the rest. With this supposition, Durandus's opinion can be confirmed by this argument; for transcendent being and one are convertible; therefore of whatever one is predicated, the other is also predicated, but quantity is being; therefore it is transcendent one; but it is not transcendent one except by its quantitative unity; therefore that unity is contained under transcendental unity. Otherwise it would be necessary to imagine two

unities in one quantity, one transcendental, the other quantitative, which is superfluous and can scarcely be conceived by the mind.

5. But Averroes above, and St. Thomas, disapprove this opinion of Avicenna, who consequently teach that quantitative unity differs from transcendental unity in this, that it adds something positive and real to being, which transcendental unity does not add. From this some conclude that quantitative unity adds something positive to quantity itself, and in this way differs from the transcendental unity of quantity itself, and by reason of that positive element is the principle of number, which is posited as a species of quantity, although transcendental multitude is not considered to constitute a proper and real species of being. Thus holds Javellus, IV Metaph., q. 8, with Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, q. unica, where he adduces various passages of St. Thomas, and is founded principally on this, that if quantitative unity were not something positive beyond the negative indivision of quantity, neither would quantitative number be some certain real species, nor would there be any reason for constituting that number among the species of things rather than the number of any beings whatever. But if you ask what that is which unity adds above quantity, Capreolus seems to respond, in the explanation of the first conclusion, that two things are to be distinguished in quantity, namely, the form of continuity, and the being which such continuous quantity gives to the subject; and he indicates that unity adds this latter above quantity: "Because the form (he says) of continuity is divisible into many things, and therefore does not deserve to be called unity, of whose nature is indivisibility; but the being which that form gives to the subject is called unity, because that is in no way divisible, because, if that form or the subject is divided, the first being does not remain, nor is it divided, but each part of the divided thing has new being and does not have that which was before." And he cites Avicenna, III Metaph., c. 2, saying that unity is substantially that very thing which is not divided. Whence Capreolus indicates that this positive element which quantitative unity adds above quantity is really

distinct from it. Giles, however, in the same dist., q. 2, dub. 2, holding the same opinion, thinks concerning the positive addition that the added element is distinguished only by reason in this way, that quantity insofar as it extends the parts of substance is called continuous quantity, but insofar as it perfects substance, with no consideration had of parts, is called unity. But others say that quantitative unity adds above quantity the notion of measure, from St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 2, and IV Metaph., lect. 3.

6. But this opinion is undoubtedly false, as Hervaeus, Thomas of Argentina, Durandus, Gregory, and others have noted with the aforementioned distinction. For that distinction which Capreolus imagines is fictitious and utterly unintelligible. Both because the being which quantity gives (according to the truer opinion) is not a thing distinct from actual and real quantity itself, as will be said generally below, and also because, granted that it were distinct, nevertheless it would not be distinguished in quantity any more than the form of whiteness is distinguished from the being which it gives to the subject in whiteness, or in the form of stone the form itself from the being which it gives to matter; therefore either this distinction is not sufficient for the unity of quantity to be said to add something above quantity, or the same must be said about the unity of whiteness and of any other created form; and furthermore because, admitting that being distinct from quantity, it is imagined without foundation to be more indivisible than quantity itself; for who would believe that, when wood is divided, the same quantity which was before remains in the individual divided parts, and the same being of quantity which quantity itself conferred does not remain? For there is no greater reason for the corruption of one than of the other; indeed all those who think that being is really distinguished from the form from which it proceeds, think that at least naturally and by ordinary power it is inseparable from it, while it remains. But if perhaps Capreolus says he is not speaking of the being of the existence of quantity, but of something else distinct from quantity and its existence, this surely

needs no refutation, because it is a mere fabrication contrived without foundation. And furthermore, however that being is explained, it cannot be more indivisible than quantity itself, because, just as the whole quantity gives being to the whole subject, so a part of quantity to a part of the subject, and from the partial quantity which is in one part of the subject there does not proceed any being which is in other parts of the subject, nor conversely; therefore that being must necessarily be coextended with quantity itself, and cannot be more indivisible than it. Especially since it is material and corporeal, and in a divisible subject. Nor is it true what Capreolus says that the form of continuity cannot be called unity because indivisibility is of the nature of unity; for in the preceding sections it was proved by us that not indivisibility, but only indivision is of the nature of unity, and therefore nothing prevents the form of unity, that is, that in which unity is founded, from being divisible, provided that it be undivided. Therefore this declaration of Capreolus subsists by no reasoning.

7. The other distinction of Giles is also nothing at all, except only in words, both because quantity does not otherwise perfect substance than by extending it into parts, and also because it is contradictory to say that quantity has the nature of numerical unity insofar as it abstracts from parts; for it is of the intrinsic nature of this unity that it be in a quantified subject having parts, and this alone is almost what it adds above transcendental unity. The final exposition concerning the notion of measure is easily refuted, both because the notion of measure does not pertain per se primarily to unity, but follows upon it, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, lib. IV Metaph., lect. 8, and lib. X, lect. 2. And also because this notion of measure, if it is considered as to aptitude, which is in the thing itself, is found in the same proportion in transcendental one with respect to multitude, as it is in quantitative one with respect to the number of quantity; but if it is considered as to the use of men, that matters little to the nature of unity as it exists in itself. Finally, against this whole opinion work both the testimonies of Aristotle and all the arguments by which it was

proved above that the nature of the one is posited in negation; for all those things proceed in the same proportion in numerical or quantitative unity, as is evident from Aristotle, lib. V Metaph., text. 11, and lib. X, from the beginning, and from the argument made above, because, after someone has imagined the entity or positive nature which this unity adds above quantity, if he understands it mentally or really to be separated, and only undivided quantity to remain, he will understand undivided quantity to remain one; therefore, whatever is added, is added superfluously and without foundation.

The True Nature of Quantitative Unity is Declared

8. It must be noted, therefore, so that both the thing itself and the opinion of St. Thomas in this part may be understood, that above, at the end of section 3, we were saying that in material substance can be considered intrinsic and entitative unity, and accidental unity fitting it denominatively from the affection of quantity; whence it happens that quantity itself could be considered, either as it is one in itself, or as by reason of it that which is affected by it is rendered one. With this supposition, it must be said first regarding this part that transcendental unity is not quantitative unity, which fits material substance denominatively and accidentally through the mediation of quantity. This is evident from what was said above, because neither in other things does transcendental unity consist in this, as is evident per se, nor in substance itself, or in any other material form, as is evident from what was said in section 3. For transcendental unity is most intrinsic to each being and belongs to it by virtue of entity alone conjoined with negation, as has been shown, whence with quantity removed the intrinsic entitative transcendental unity is understood in material substance also. And it is confirmed, because substance, as it is one through quantity, speaking simply, is one per accidens in the genus of being, since it consists of things from diverse categories; but

substance, as it is one transcendentally, is not one per accidens, but per se, otherwise material substance could not have per se unity in its proper genus, which is very absurd. And the arguments which Gregory adduces in the aforesaid place also rightly prove this.

9. Next it must be said that in quantity itself the unity by which it is one is not different from transcendental unity applied[37] to such a being, namely, quantity; the arguments of Durandus, and those which we adduced in reporting his opinion, also rightly prove this. And from these things it follows first that numerical or quantitative unity with respect to quantity adds nothing beyond indivision, which is only a certain negation, as was said above. Thus hold the other cited authors, and Soncinas, lib. X Metaph., q. 2; Soto, in Praedic., c. de Quant., q. 1. And the arguments made against Capreolus and others prove this. And it is also evident, because this unity is transcendental with respect to quantity; therefore it is of the same nature in it as it is in other things; just as therefore in other beings unity is the undivided entity of each, so in quantity its unity is quantity itself or the continuity of quantity as undivided. You will say: when continuous quantity is divided, its quantitative unity is lost and number results, as is said in III Physics, and yet transcendental unity is not lost, because, as we were saying above, the same entity remains in the individual divided parts which they had in the continuum; therefore they are diverse unities. It is answered by denying the minor premise, because, although the divided parts retain the same entity which they had as partial in the continuum, nevertheless simply the entity of the continuum was not posited in those parts alone, but also in their union and the boundary by which they were joined, or rather in that whole composite which resulted from all these things, whose unity both quantitative and transcendental consisted in that whole as undivided; whence that unity is therefore destroyed by division,

[37] applicata, 1597, 1960; explicata, ed. Vives. "La sustitución de applicata por explicata, por ejemplo en la de Vivés, creemos que resulta dificilmente inteligible." Cf. BHF, t. 1, p. 555.

because the same indivision which was before does not remain, and because that whole is dissolved in the nature of a certain whole.

10. Secondly, it is inferred from what has been said that quantitative or numerical unity, insofar as it fits substance denominatively, adds above substance a positive thing under negation, namely quantity itself with indivision. Thus I think St. Thomas is to be understood; and Fonseca rightly noted this, lib. V Metaph., c. 13, q. 3, sect. 3, from the same St. Thomas, IV Metaph., lect. 3. And it is easily evident, because, just as substance is quantified through quantity adjoined to it, so also it is quantitatively one on account of the one quantity which it has in itself; likewise from this it often happens that substances which do not have transcendental unity in their genus are said in some way to be quantitatively one by reason of quantity, in the way that one rod is said which is partly green, partly dry.

11. Thirdly, finally, it is established from what has been said how transcendent unity is related to quantitative unity; for in no sense are they the same convertibly, as the things adduced above evidently prove. If however we speak of quantitative unity in itself or with respect to quantity, thus they are related as inferior and superior; for it has been shown that quantitative unity is a certain transcendental unity, although not every transcendental unity is also quantitative. Whence transcendent one is found in all categories; but the unity of quantity in only one category. But if we speak of quantitative unity, as it fits substance accidentally and denominatively through quantity, thus it differs from transcendental unity; for this is intrinsic and per se accompanying the entity of the thing; but that is quasi-extrinsic, insofar as it is adjoined through another entity. Because, however, this numerical unity, with respect to substance, is also real, therefore it is necessary that it be contained under transcendental unity in some way, but it is contained in the way that substance as quantified is contained under being, just as therefore substance by the adjunction of quantity is accidentally quantified, and from both results a certain being composed per accidens, so it is also accidentally one, and that unity

which results from both is also per accidens and proportioned to such a composite, and with respect to it is transcendental, although with respect to substance it is accidental. And from these things it is also established that quantitative number and multitude maintain the same proportion among themselves, which numerical and transcendent one maintain. But what is to be said about the nature of number, namely whether it constitutes a proper genus and species of being, and whether in this it differs from multitude, is to be said below when treating of quantity.

Transcendental Unity is Compared with Singular Unity

12. The second opinion to be examined in this place is that of certain persons saying that transcendent unity is the individual unity of each singular being, which is also usually called numerical unity, with a different signification from that which was treated in the preceding opinion; for there numerical unity was taken for that which is the principle of quantitative number. For, because our knowledge begins from sense, and through sense we can number those things which have magnitude, therefore the multitude of these things has specially received the name of number, and therefore in this special way unity founded in quantity is called numerical unity. But here numerical unity is taken more broadly as it is distinguished against generic or specific unity and is found in any singular being, and it is called numerical insofar as from it multitude or transcendental number can be composed; but it is called individual or singular insofar as, as such, it is incommunicable to inferior many things, wherein it differs from formal unity, both specific and generic. This opinion therefore says that this singular unity is the proper and real property of being, or transcendental unity. The foundation can be, because transcendental unity, which is a property of real being, must be real unity; but in things there is no real unity besides numerical and

singular unity; therefore that alone is the adequate property of being; therefore that alone is transcendent unity. And it is confirmed, for this unity is convertible with real being; for everything which is one in this way is real being. For although a being of reason can be called numerically one, and thus genera, species and individuals are distinguished by dialecticians in beings of reason themselves, nevertheless that is as it were equivocally through extrinsic denomination alone; but properly and speaking rigorously, whatever is simply numerically one is real being; and conversely every real being is also singular, and consequently numerically one, because it is not called real being unless it is that which is in things, or which is capable of real existence; but in things nothing exists unless singular, nor is anything capable of real existence unless an individual thing; therefore real being and numerically one or singular are convertible, therefore the aforesaid singular unity is transcendent unity or a property of being.

13. But this opinion, if we attend to the common mode of speaking and conceiving, can seem difficult and singular. For first Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 6, text. 11, among the unities of being posits not only singular unity, but also specific, generic and analogous unity, and universally says: "Whatever things do not have division, insofar as they do not have it, are thus called one." And lib. IV, text. 6, from this he concludes that it pertains to metaphysics to treat of genus and species, because these belong to being, namely, as comprehended among its properties; but they are not comprehended except insofar as they are contained under unity. Furthermore, the adequate property of some common object must belong not only to the inferiors contained under such an object, but also to the common object itself taken according to itself and formally; therefore to be one must belong not only to individual beings, but also to being as such; but as such it is not numerically one, but only analogically and by formal reason; therefore. A similar argument is that of whatever being is predicated, transcendent one is predicated, but being is predicated

not only of individuals, namely Peter and Paul, but also of common natures taken precisely, as of man, horse, etc.; for, although perhaps in these universality is through reason, as we shall say below, nevertheless the universal natures themselves are real, and are called true real beings; and thus Aristotle, lib. I Periher., c. 5, distinguishes that of things some are universal, others particular; therefore man as such is real being; therefore one with transcendental unity; and yet he is not one with singular and numerical unity; therefore transcendental unity extends more broadly than individual or singular unity.

Resolution of the Question

14. This difficulty depends much upon the understanding of that difficult question about transcendent[38] and numerical unity, how they differ, and whether both are true unity existing in things, and consequently whether universal unity is also in things. But since these things are to be treated individually for the exact explanation of this matter, now it is briefly said that transcendental unity, about which we now treat, is not to be limited to singular or universal, material and formal unity, but is to comprehend every unity, which can be found in some real being or in the formal notion of real being. Therefore transcendental unity will be whatever notion of real being per se, insofar as it is adequately and according to itself undivided. I say of being per se in the way that above it was explained by us to be the object of metaphysics; for, if it is taken more broadly, it has no unity, even formal, as has been said. I also say as undivided, because neither the reason of being alone nor negation alone makes unity, but the undivided reason of being, as was shown above. Finally I say adequately and according to itself, because unity in each thing or real objective concept must be attended to according to its proper nature,

[38] transcendenti, 1960; formali, alit "En otras ediciones en vez de transcendenti aparece formali, estando acaso esta segunda palabra más acorde con el problema tratado concretamente en este número." Cf. BHF, 1. 1, p. 559.

and not according to some superior, inferior, or extraneous one; for these are either inadequate, or in some way per accidens; but the unity of each is adequate to it and belongs to it per se. Whence man is said to be essentially one, because according to his proper adequate nature he is not divided in essential nature, although he is entitatively divided in individuals; but man will not be called simply one in that way, because he is undivided in the nature of animal; for that indivision would not suffice for the aforesaid unity, because it does not belong to man adequately and per se primarily, but by reason of a superior. From these things, therefore, the nature of unity taken in common is sufficiently explained. But so that it may be explained more distinctly and radically, it is necessary that we speak in particular about individual, formal and universal unity, which are the proper unities of metaphysics.

DISPUTATION V

ON INDIVIDUAL UNITY AND I TS PRINCIPLE

We shall investigate three things in this disputation: first, whether this unity belongs to all existing things; then what it consists in within them; and finally what principle or root it has in individual things. And since this last point cannot be explained in the same way for all things, we shall inquire separately concerning material substances, spiritual substances, and accidents.

SECTION I

WHETHER ALL THINGS THAT EXIST OR CAN EXIST ARE SINGULAR AND INDIVIDUAL

1. The reason for doubt can be, first, because the divine nature really exists, and yet it is not singular and individual, since according to faith it is communicable to many. Second, each angel is an existing thing, and yet it does not have this numerical and individual unity, but precisely essential unity, such as we understand to exist in man as such; therefore. The minor is proved, because this individual unity is understood to add something beyond the formal or essential unity, by reason of which the essential nature can be

contracted and consequently divided into several individuals; but in an angel there is no such addition, but in it there is the whole essence as if precise and abstract, for which reason it cannot be multiplied according to number; just as, if man as abstractly conceived existed thus, he could not be multiplied. Third, man actually exists in reality in Peter and in Paul, and as such he is not something individual and singular; therefore not everything that exists in the nature of things has this unity. On the contrary is what Aristotle very often teaches against Plato, that whatever exists in things is individual and singular.

2. It must be supposed that individual or singular being is opposed to common or universal being, not only relatively, insofar as according to a comparison of the mind or dialectical consideration the individual is subjected to the species; for this neither belongs to every individual nature, as is clear in the divine nature, nor does it pertain to the present consideration; it is opposed therefore as if privatively, almost in the way that unity is opposed to multitude. For common or universal is said of what is communicated to many or is found in many according to some one nature, but one in number or singular and individual is said of what is so one being that according to that nature of being by which it is called one, it is not communicable to many, as to inferiors and things subject to it, or which are many in that nature; for these coincide in the same thing, and are signified by Aristotle in Metaphysics III, chapter 3, text 14, saying: "We explain the singular as what is one in number, but the universal as what is in these." And they are explained by example; for humanity, as such, in its objective concept does not say anything singular and individual, because that concept is of itself common to many humanities, which are really many and in which the very nature of humanity is multiplied. Whence it happens that according to reason the nature of humanity is superior and common to many as to inferiors; but this humanity, for example, of Christ, is individual and singular, because that whole nature or objective concept of this humanity cannot be common to many, which are many under that nature, that is, to many humanities; but

that this humanity is communicable to the divine Word, for example, or even to several supposits, is not against its singular and individual unity, because it is not communicated to them as superior to inferiors, but as form to a supposit or supposits, in which according to its proper nature it is neither multiplied nor divided. Through this negation of communicability or division, therefore, this singular and individual unity is completed.

3. This is further confirmed and explained thus, for just as the nature of the one in common is completed through negation of division, as has been explained with Aristotle, so the nature of such a one, namely, singular and individual, must also be completed by negation, both because there is no greater reason in one than in another, and also because the natures of the more and less common ought to preserve proportion, so that, just as difference per se and in the same order contracts genus, so universally determination is related to the determinable, so that they are per se subordinated, as happens in the present case. But no other negation of division or divisibility can be devised, which completes the nature of individual and singular entity, except that which has been explained by us, namely, that such entity is such that its whole nature is not communicable to many similar entities, or (which is the same) that it is not divisible into several entities such as it itself is. For by this reason man as such is not a singular entity, because he is divisible into several, in which the whole nature of man is found; on the contrary, however, this two-foot quantity is individual, because, although it is divisible, it is not however into several, each of which is such as the whole that was divided, and thus that is division of a whole into parts, not of a common into particulars. You will say: this nature of the individual is common to multitude and to being per accidens, because even a heap of stones is such that it is not communicable to many nor divisible into several such as it itself is, and any number taken particularly has the same; indeed even some species or genus, for example, man or animal are not divisible into several which are such as that which is divided. It

is answered by conceding that all those things which participate in that negation are individual and singular as to that, so that this heap of stones is singular and individual in that nature, and similarly this binary or ternary is a certain individual of such a species of number, and this genus or this species under the nature of genus or species is one individual; nevertheless these participate in that unity only according to reason, those however only in the nature of being per accidens or of number or multitude. Wherefore, so that the aforesaid negation or indivision may be accommodated to being and one per se (of which we are treating), it must be taken as adjoined to entity per se; for the nature of unity, as we said above, does not consist in indivision alone, but in undivided entity. Therefore the nature of unity per se individual and singular will consist in its entity by nature per se one and individed or incommunicable in the aforesaid way. You will say: at least this water will not be singular, because it is divisible into several in which the whole nature of water is found. It is answered that it is not divisible into several which are this water which is divided, but which are water; and therefore this water is singular, but water is common.

Resolution of the Question

4. Having thus explained the nature of the individual or singular being, it must be said that all things, which are actual beings or which exist or can exist immediately, are singular and individual. I say immediately, so as to exclude common natures of beings, which as such cannot immediately exist, nor have actual entity, except in singular and individual entities, which being removed it is impossible for anything real to remain, as Aristotle said of first substances in the Categories, chapter on Substance. And the assertion thus explained is self-evident, which Aristotle proves against Plato, Metaphysics I, chapter 6, and book VII, texts 26 and 27, and often elsewhere. Although many think that Aristotle sinisterly interpreted Plato's

opinion about ideas, whether he placed them in the divine mind, or certainly not really, but only by formal reason separated from individuals; but this matters little to us, and we shall touch on that again in the following disputation. Now the assertion is proved, because whatever exists has a certain and determinate entity; but every such entity necessarily has the aforementioned negation adjoined; therefore also singularity and individual unity. The minor is clear, because every entity, by the very fact that it is determinate entity, cannot be divided from itself; therefore neither can it be divided into several which are such as it itself is, otherwise that whole entity would be in each one, and consequently, as it is in one, it would be divided from itself as it is in another, which involves manifest contradiction. Every entity, therefore, by the very fact that it is one entity in the nature of things, is necessarily one in the aforesaid way, and therefore singular and individual.

5. This reasoning also concludes that even by absolute power it cannot be understood that real entity, as it exists in reality itself, is not singular and individual, because it implies contradiction to be entity and to be divisible into several entities, which are such as it itself is. Otherwise it could be simultaneously one and several entitatively or according to the same real entity, which involves contradiction. And this reasoning also convinces that universals cannot be separated from singulars, because if universal man existed outside Peter and Paul, etc., either he would also be in Peter and Paul or would remain completely separated outside them; if the latter is said, then man as such would be a certain singular thing divided from Peter and Paul; therefore he would be falsely called universal. And furthermore it follows that neither Peter nor Paul would be men, because, for an essential predicate to belong to something, it is necessary that it not be separated from it. For how will it be able to be truly said of it, if it is not in it? Or how can it be understood to essentially constitute him in whom it is not? But if it is in Peter and Paul, either it is completely the same really and entitatively in both, and thus Peter and Paul will not

be two men, but one; or it is distinct according to thing and entity in each of them, and thus that universal and separated man would either be some third thing co-distinct from Peter and Paul, and thus would be falsely said to be in them and to be universal, because it would be nothing but some singular distinct from others, or certainly if the same thing were in one and in the other it would have to be both distinct from itself and one and several really according to the same essence as existing in reality, which are openly contradictory. By this reasoning, therefore, it is necessary that every thing as it exists on the side of reality be singular and individual.

Responses to Arguments

6. To the first, there are not lacking theologians[39] who say that the divine essence is neither singular nor universal. But this is false, for those two include immediate contradiction; whence it is impossible that one of them should not belong to any being whatsoever. Furthermore the divine nature is so one in itself that it cannot be multiplied or divided into several similar ones; it is therefore one individual and singular nature, by reason of which God is so numerically one that he can in no way be multiplied. Therefore the divine nature has individual and singular unity, to which it is not repugnant that that nature be communicable to three persons, because it is communicated to them not as universal to particular, nor as superior to inferior, but as form or nature to supposits, in which it is divided neither from them nor from itself, because it is whole in each and in all simultaneously, entirely undistinct from them; but of this elsewhere.

7. To the second, some Thomists (as I touched upon concerning the third part of St. Thomas, question 4, article 4) think that spiritual natures exist abstract in only specific essence and perfection, as it were, without proper individual contraction. But

[39] Vide Durandum et alios, In I, dist. 35.

concerning this opinion, and concerning the sense which it can have lest it say something entirely absurd and unintelligible, we shall speak more fittingly in the following section, number 21; for as pertains to the present, it cannot be denied that every angelic nature, as it exists in the nature of things, is singular and individual. For if the divine nature itself, which is supremely immaterial, is singular and individual, much more will any angelic nature be so; for it is incommunicable not only to many natures, but also to many supposits, at least by its nature. Then the reasoning of the conclusion proceeds equally concerning any spiritual nature or entity, because it is impossible that such negation of communicability or division of such entity into several similar to itself should not be adjoined to such entity, because it cannot be divided from itself and be one and several. Finally, it matters nothing to this whether spiritual substance and nature can be multiplied according to number within the same species or not. For if it can, it is necessary that any individual of that species have individual and singular unity, nor will the species itself be able to exist except in some individual, as has been said of other universals. But if such multiplication of individuals is repugnant to such nature, by this very fact such nature existing in reality is more singular and individual, because it is more incommunicable, namely, as if essentially, in the manner of the divine nature. Therefore for the nature of individual unity, of which we now treat, the addition of the aforesaid negation suffices. But whether for this negation some positive addition beyond specific nature is required, will be said in the following section.

8. To the third it is responded that man as he exists in the nature of things is singular, because he is not other than Peter and Paul; but whether in them he has some distinction from the nature of the thing from the same, will be said in the following section and also in the following disputation.

SECTION II
WHETHER IN ALL NATURES THE INDIVIDUAL AND SINGULAR THING, AS SUCH, ADDS SOMETHING BEYOND THE COMMON OR SPECIFIC NATURE.

1. We have shown that there is individual and singular unity in things; now we begin to declare what it is, which cannot be done better otherwise than by declaring what it adds beyond the common nature or that which is conceived by us abstractly and universally.

Various Opinions Are Related

2. The first opinion generally affirms that at least in created things the individual adds to the common nature some real mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the nature itself and composing with it the individual itself. This seems to be the opinion of Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and in Quodl., q. 2, and VII Metaph., q. 16; and there Antonius Andreas, q. 17; which opinion Fonseca seems to defend, lib. V, q. 3, sect. 2, q. 5, throughout. And Joannes Baptista Monlerius fights most keenly for it, in a special work on universals, c. 6. The foundation of this opinion can be that which (as Aristotle testifies) moved Plato to posit ideas of universals abstracted from singulars, namely, because sciences and demonstrations are about universals and not about singulars. Likewise, because essential and proper definitions are given of universals and not of singulars. Likewise, because properties, which per se belong to things, belong to them through the mediation of universal natures, so that it is true to say Peter is capable of laughter, because man is capable of laughter; just as on the contrary contingent predicates belong to common natures by reason of individuals; for man runs, because Peter runs;

therefore all these things indicate some distinction from the nature of the thing between the individual and the common nature; but this distinction cannot be except insofar as the individual adds something beyond the common nature, because it includes that whole nature; therefore it cannot be distinguished from it except as something adding to it.

3. Second I argue because man, for example, is not essentially an individual something; therefore when he becomes individual, something is added to him outside the essence of man; therefore it is necessary that that be distinct from the nature of the thing from man as such. The antecedent is clear, because if man were essentially this individual, he could not be multiplied into several; indeed he could not even be conceived without some individuation and singularity, because a thing cannot be conceived without that which is of its essence; but man can be conceived distinctly, indeed even defined essentially without any individuation. Just as God, because he is essentially this singular individual, therefore can neither be multiplied nor truly and properly conceived, unless he be conceived under this individual and singular aspect. But the first consequence seems per se evident, because to be individual is something in the nature of things, and that is not essential to the common nature, indeed not even to the individual itself (as is commonly said), because all individuals are of the same essence; therefore it is necessary that it add something beyond the common essence. And hence the second consequence is easily proved, because what is of the essence and what is outside the essence seem to be distinguished from the nature of the thing; indeed those are maximally so distinguished, one of which is not of the essence of the other; but that which the individual adds to the species is outside its essence, as has been shown; therefore.

4. Third, Peter as Peter and as man is not constituted by the same thing formally, both because that by which man is constituted is common to Peter himself and to other men; but that by which he is constituted in the being of Peter is proper to him; and also because

otherwise man could not be conceived more under a common concept than Peter. And here can be added all the arguments by which universals are usually proved to be distinguished from the nature of the thing from inferiors, which we have partly touched upon above when treating of the concept of being, and partly we shall touch upon in the following disputation.

5. The second opinion is extremely contrary, that the individual adds nothing at all to the common nature which is positive and real, or distinct in thing or reason from it, but that each thing or nature is per se individual primarily and immediately. Thus think the nominalists, In I, dist. 2, where Ockham, q. 4 and 6; and Gabriel, q. 6, 7 and 8; this opinion can also be attributed to Henry, Quodl. V, q. 8, where he thinks the individual adds only negation to the species, concerning which opinion we shall say more in the following section, opinion 3. The foundation is because nothing can be understood as real which is not singular, as has been proved in the preceding section; therefore it is repugnant that a thing become singular through the addition of something real beyond the common nature. Second, because no thing can be made one through real addition of something positive, as has been shown above, therefore neither singular and individual. The consequence is clear, both because singularity is a certain unity, and also because there is no true and real unity besides singular and individual unity. Third, because either that which is added is essential, or accidental; if essential, it follows that the species can be divided through essential differences, against Porphyry, c. on Species; whence it further follows that individuals differ essentially, and the species does not express the whole essence or quiddity of individuals, which is against Porphyry and all dialecticians. Finally it follows that individuals can and ought to be defined by proper and adequate essential definition, against Aristotle, VII Metaph., text. 53. But if that which is added is accidental, it follows that the individual is being per accidens; it also follows that the accident does not come to the individual subject but constitutes it, which is impossible, because

if one is individuated by another, rather the accident receives individuation from the subject, than conversely.

6. The third opinion can use a distinction between spiritual and material things; for in immaterial things the singular thing adds nothing beyond the common nature; but in material things something. This distinction seems founded in Aristotle, VII Metaph., c. 11, text. 4, where he says that in immaterial things the what-it-is is not distinguished from that whose it is, but in material things it is distinguished, where by what-it-is he understands the essence or essential definition, which can be compared both to the defined itself and to the individuals in which such defined thing and definition exist. In the former way Aristotle compared them, VII Metaphys., c. 6, text. 20 and 21, and generally taught that in beings per se the what-it-is is the same as that whose it is, or the definition with the defined, because they express the same essence and differ only in the confused or distinct mode in which they are conceived. This is common both to simple and composite substances and to accidents, if insofar as they are per se one they are defined. For beings per accidens either cannot be defined by one definition, or if they are somehow defined through the mode of one by reason of accidental form, that definition is in some way distinct from that subject to which it is attributed. But in the latter way, which pertains to the present, they are compared by Aristotle in the other place cited, and in this way he says that in immaterial things the what-it-is, that is, the specific essence, which is explained by definition, is the same as that whose it is, that is, as the individual or singular thing, which he says is otherwise in things composed of matter and form. Therefore he thinks that an immaterial thing is per se individual without any addition, but a material thing not so, but becomes this individual through some addition; and thus St. Thomas and others expound this place. And in III de Anim., text. 9, Aristotle says that in some things the thing, supply individual, is other than the specific quiddity of the thing, which he says in these words: "Magnitude is one thing, the being of magnitude another"; but he

adds that this distinction is not found in all things, which all expositors understand to have been said because of immaterial things, in which individuals are nothing but the specific natures themselves subsisting. Thus Averroes, Philoponus, and at length St. Thomas. Whence the same St. Thomas seems to teach this opinion I, q. 3, a. 3, and De Ente et essentia, c. 5, in which places Cajetan agrees, and III, q. 4, a. 4, he thinks the same, and it seems to be the received opinion in the School of St. Thomas, as will be more evident from what we shall relate in sect. 4. For from what will be treated there the foundation of this opinion must be taken, namely, because immaterial substances, since they have no matter nor express relation to it, nothing also can be devised in them which they add beyond essence, and therefore they are per se individual; but in composite things signate matter is added, from which something can be taken which the individual adds beyond the species.

The Point of Difficulty is Opened

7. First, it is undoubted among all authors that the individual adds beyond the common nature some negation formally completing or constituting the unity of the individual. This is per se evident from the nature of unity explained above, together with those things which we noted in the preceding section concerning the nature or what the name of individual means. Rather, if we speak formally of the individual, insofar as it is one in such a way, it adds negation in its formal concept, not only beyond the common nature abstractly and universally conceived, but also beyond the whole singular entity precisely conceived under positive aspect, because this whole entity is not conceived as one singularly and individually, until it is conceived as incapable of division into several of the same nature. Therefore the present difficulty is not about this negation, whether it formally pertains to the nature of this unity or not; for concerning this there are also opinions, concerning which we have already said in the preceding

disputation what we think more true; but the difficulty is about the foundation of that negation; for since it does not seem to be able to be founded in the common nature alone, for that is of itself indifferent and does not postulate such indivision into several similar things, but rather is divided in it, we therefore inquire what there is in the singular and individual, by reason of which such negation belongs to it.

Resolution of the Question

8. I say first: the individual adds something real beyond the common nature, by reason of which such individual is and that negation of divisibility into several similar things belongs to it. In this conclusion we agree with Scotus, and it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 40, a. 2, saying that wherever there is something common to many there must be something distinctive. And I cont. Gent., c. 42, rat. 7, he says that distinctive must be something added to the common intention. And the Thomists do not dissent from this conclusion, as is clear from Cajetan, lib. I Poster., c. 4, De Ente et essentia, c. 4; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 31; Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 9; Soto, in Logica, q. 2 universalium. And it is proved from what we have just said; for the common nature of itself does not postulate such negation, and yet to that nature, as it exists in reality and has been made this, such negation belongs per se and intrinsically; therefore something has been added to it, by reason of which it has been adjoined to it, because every negation intrinsically and necessarily belonging to some thing, is founded in something positive, which cannot be of reason, but real, since that unity and negation truly and of itself belongs to the thing itself. Or this reasoning can be proposed otherwise, because specific nature according to itself and insofar as it is the proximate object of the common concept of man, lion, etc., has nothing repugnant to communicability, and therefore is said to be negatively indifferent as we shall see below; but through this individuation this indifference of it is removed and it becomes

incapable of such division, insofar as it has been made singular; therefore it is necessary that something positive be understood to have been added to it, by reason of which this is repugnant to it. Finally Peter and Paul agree in common nature and differ among themselves in proper natures; therefore they add those to the common nature; but those are positive; for they are not constituted by negations in the nature of such substance; therefore. The same arguments also conclude which were adduced to confirm the opinion of Scotus.

9. I say second: the individual, as such, does not add something distinct from the nature of the thing from the specific nature, so that in the individual Peter himself, for example, humanity, as such, and this humanity, or rather that which is added to humanity so that it becomes this (which is usually called haecceitas or individual difference), are distinguished from the nature of the thing and consequently make true composition in the thing itself. In this assertion all who attack the opinion of Scotus ought to agree, such as Cajetan, De Ente et essentia, q. 5, and I, q. 5, a. 6; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 3; Niphus, lib. IV Metaph., disp. 5, and others. Who nevertheless do not sufficiently distinguish whether they attack Scotus as to the whole opinion, even as to the addition of individual difference beyond the specific, or only as to the distinction from the nature of the thing, and their arguments seem to be common to both parts, and therefore are not very efficacious. In the same assertion it is necessary that those agree who deny that nature is universal on the side of reality, such as the more serious philosophers and theologians, and the whole school of St. Thomas, as we shall see in the following disputation. But that one follows from the other is clear, because if in the individuals themselves that which the individual adds beyond the common nature is distinct from the nature of the thing from it, therefore conversely the nature itself in reality itself prescinds from such addition or individual difference; and thus on the side of reality nature and haecceitas are two, if not as two things, at least as thing and mode; therefore each of them has its unity per se, because it cannot be

understood that some things are two, unless they are one and one: for number supposes unities; therefore that nature as prescinded from individual difference has unity in reality itself; therefore either individual unity, or universal. The first cannot be said, according to the aforesaid opinion, otherwise nature would be individual before individual difference, and thus such difference would be superfluously adjoined, therefore according to this opinion it must necessarily be said that that nature, insofar as it prescinds in reality itself and is distinguished from the nature of the thing from individual difference, has universal unity, which can be understood to be impossible from what has been said in the preceding section, and we shall show more widely below.

10. It can be responded according to the doctrine of Scotus that nature, as prescinded in reality from individuation, has neither individual unity, nor universal, but formal unity, which is as if intermediate between the aforesaid unities, and is nothing other than unity of essence, which is explained through definition. But against this first, because although in such nature this formal unity can be distinguished by reason from individual unity, nevertheless it cannot be conceived that on the side of reality it is according to its entity prescinded and distinct from the nature of the thing from individual unity and that as such it also lacks universal unity. It is proved, because either that as such is common or incommunicable; for these two are immediately opposed, if incommunicable, it is individual; if common, it is universal. Likewise, either that nature which is in Peter is distinct from haecceitas of Peter, is per se really distinct from the nature which is in John, insofar as it also is distinguished in him from the nature of the thing from his haecceitas, or as such it is not distinct; if the second is said, that nature will be common; but if the first is said, it is necessary that those natures as such be individual and singular, because they do not differ except as distinct in number and really within the same species.

11. And hence I argue second, directly showing that there cannot be such distinction in things which is true and actual distinction from the nature of the thing preventing every operation of the intellect; for every such distinction must be between real entities or between real entity and its mode. And indeed, if it is in the superior way it will be real distinction, which necessarily supposes each entity singular and individual in itself, which is per se evident and thus denied by no one, because distinction of entities supposes each entity constituted in itself and thus one and singular. But if the distinction is between entity and its mode, such as is here said to be, so that it is true distinction of the nature of the thing it is necessary that such entity with the mode prescinded be understood to have true real entity in reality itself, otherwise distinction from the nature of the thing between such mode and entity could not be understood. Because either that mode intrinsically and formally constitutes that entity or not; if it constitutes, therefore it is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from it, because it will be intrinsically and essentially included in it, so that nothing can be conceived in that entity which does not include that mode; but if that mode is not understood to so intrinsically and formally constitute such entity, it is necessary that it be understood to suppose it constituted in its entity and really to come to it and modify it, since it is posited as distinct in reality itself from it. But it is impossible to understand this mode of distinction between individual difference and common nature; therefore. The minor is proved, because, if with that mode prescinded the nature is understood to have its entity, therefore that entity per se, and as it is prior to that mode, must necessarily be singular and individual; therefore it does not need superadded individuation, nor can it be distinguished from the nature of the thing from it; just as, if a line could not be understood constituted in the nature of line without rectitude, rectitude could not be conceived as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing co-distinct from the line, and coming to it; but if now a mode distinct from the nature of the thing is conceived, it is

because line can be conceived existing in reality itself, and constituted in the nature of line without such mode.

12. But the first consequence is proved, because every entity existing in things must necessarily be per se singular and individual: first, because as such it is understood to be outside its causes and to have real actuality and existence; therefore as such it is understood as singular, because nothing can terminate the action of causes or be capable of existence, unless it be singular. Second, because such entity, as so conceived before the mode distinct from itself, is incommunicable to many inferiors or of the same nature, because it can neither be divided from itself nor become several; therefore already as such it is individual. Third, because that mode of haecceitas, which constitutes Peter, is singular and proper to him and is said to constitute and compose Peter by modifying the nature; therefore if that modification is through true distinction and composition which is in reality, it is necessary that to that mode, which is like a certain particular act, there also correspond particular entity through the mode of potency actualizable; therefore that entity, which is supposed to such act, ought to be individual and particular. This is explained fourth, for in Peter and Paul, for example, there is double composition from common nature and individual difference; therefore in each there is really distinct not only the individual difference of one from the individual difference of the other, but also the entity of nature which is in one, from the entity of nature which is in the other; therefore those two natures are distinguished intrinsically and entitatively as two singular things, even prescinding through the intellect the individual differences, because real distinction between actual entities cannot be understood, except insofar as they are individual and singular.

13. You will say they are distinguished indeed through individual differences, just as two matters are said to be distinguished through forms or quantities. But concerning this example we shall speak later; for in general I think it cannot happen that one thing be

really distinguished from another through another distinct from itself, but through its very entity, through which it is constituted in such being, because keeping proportion, a thing is distinguished through that through which it is constituted. But in the present this is manifest, because in Peter and Paul there are two individual differences really distinct among themselves, and each of them actuates real nature, from which it is distinguished from the nature of the thing and with which it composes its individual entirely really distinct from the other, not only as to difference, but also as to the whole entity of nature; therefore it is necessary that, even with the differences themselves prescinded through the intellect, that which remains on the side of reality in Peter and Paul, be really distinct and therefore singular; otherwise it would have to be said that some thing entirely really the same is contracted through individual differences in Peter and Paul. For it is not sufficient to say not the same nature really to be contracted, but the same formally, for this formal identity, insofar as it can be in reality, is only a certain similarity, which supposes real distinction, and consequently individuation of those things which are called similar, but insofar as it is conceived through the mode of unity, it is not real unity, but of reason only through denomination from a concept of the mind, as we shall say later.

14. Fifth, this can be clarified because those very individual differences of Peter and Paul are really distinguished among themselves as two incomplete things, singular nonetheless and individual in the manner in which they exist, and nevertheless they have similarity and agreement among themselves, because they are truly more similar among themselves than with the individual difference of a horse or lion, and in them it would not be necessary to distinguish from the nature of the thing something in which they are similar and in which they are distinguished, otherwise one would proceed to infinity, which is inconvenient in things or modes distinguished from the nature of the thing, as was said above in a similar case; therefore the same can be said of the individuals

themselves, Peter and Paul, that, although they are distinguished among themselves and are similar, it is not necessary that there be distinguished in them from the nature of the thing that by which they are similar and that by which they are distinguished; therefore there is no reason why the individual difference should be distinguished from the nature of the thing, either from the common nature, as from an extreme component of the individual, or from the whole individual, as from an integral composite. Nor does it matter if someone responds that those individual differences are simpler and are that by which individuals are constituted and distinguished, and therefore can more readily be distinguished by themselves; because, although perhaps this contributes something regarding distinction or mental concepts, as I shall say immediately, nevertheless, if this distinction were in things, the argument would press, because those differences must be considered as two real modes existing on the side of the thing and distinct from the nature of the thing from any other entity; because, just as they have quasi-formal effects distinct in number, namely, to constitute this or that individual, so also they are distinct in number. And although they are the "by which" with respect to individuals, nevertheless insofar as they are something in themselves and real beings, although incomplete, they are also "what" at least incompletely, as we noted above in a similar case, treating of the concept of being, as Cajetan also noted, I, q. 11, a. 1, around ad 1. And yet with this distinction and simplicity they have among themselves real agreement in the common notion of such modes, as the same Cajetan says, De Ente et essentia, q. 5; therefore either in these also the common notion must be distinguished from the proper ones, or certainly such a mode of arguing is fallacious in any individual. Some respond that among these individual differences there is no real agreement from which a common concept can be abstracted; but this is difficult to believe, concerning which will be discussed generally in the following disputation.

15. And from this is taken the sixth argument, because that entire distinction which is feigned to exist from the nature of the thing between nature and individual, is taken from the mode of conceiving and speaking from the agreement and distinction which is found among the individuals themselves; but this is no sign for indicating a distinction from the nature of the thing, and from elsewhere there are many things which more urgently indicate that there is no such distinction in the thing; therefore. The major premise is established from the arguments made in favor of Scotus. The minor premise as to the first part is evident, both from the example adduced concerning the individuating differences themselves, and from what was treated above concerning the concept of being, about which nearly the same arguments are made; and because otherwise it would be necessary to distinguish from the nature of the thing all common concepts from particular ones, which I shall show below to be false. Finally this part will be more fully established from the solutions of the arguments. The other part of the minor premise has been sufficiently proved by the arguments made. Which is finally confirmed by the sign of inseparability; for those things which, although they are conceived by us in a diverse mode, are so related in the thing that neither is separated from the other nor can be separated even by absolute power, are feigned to be distinct from the nature of the thing without cause, as I shall say more broadly below in the disputation on distinctions; but so are related in Peter the notion of man and the proper individuation of Peter, that they can in no way be separated, neither such a mode from nature, nor nature as it exists in Peter from such a mode; therefore. Nor does it help anything to say that the notion of man is separable from Peter because it can exist in Paul, because this is not to consider the notion of man as it really exists, but only as it is conceived by the mind, and therefore it is not sufficient for a distinction from the nature of the thing, which ought to exist between those things which are on the side of the thing, if there is a distinction between positive things, or between a thing and a positive real mode. Whence that

distinction which is understood between the common notion abstractly understood, and the individual, is only of reason, because that nature as such exists nowhere except objectively in the mind. But if someone should call it a formal distinction, because the mind conceives another definition of man as such, and another of Peter, he will make a question about a word; because, as far as the thing is concerned, that distinction is not so in the thing that in Peter or Paul those things are understood to be distinct from the nature of the thing, or to make a composition in the thing, as has been shown.

16. I say third, the individual adds above the common nature something distinct by reason from it, pertaining to the same category, and composing the individual metaphysically, as an individual difference contracting the species and constituting the individual. The first part of this assertion follows from the two preceding ones; for it was said in the first that the individual adds something to the common nature, and in the second it was denied that this is distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore it is necessary that it be distinguished at least by reason, because, if it were distinguished in no way, it would be added in no way. Nor indeed does it follow from this that what is added is something of reason; for, just as it is one thing to be distinguished by reason, another truly to be only of reason, for it can happen that things which are real are distinguished by reason alone, so also what is added can be real, as it truly is, although it is distinguished by reason alone. You will say: that addition is only through reason. I respond: as to the thing added, I deny; as to the mode of addition or contraction or composition, I concede; for just as the separation of common nature from individual differences is only through reason, so conversely, that the individual difference is understood as added to the common nature, is only through reason; for in the thing there is not that proper addition, but in each individual there is one entity having both notions really through itself.

17. The second part of the conclusion also follows openly from what has been said, and is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1,

where he says that substance is individuated through itself, and q. 10 De Potentia, a. 3, he denies that substance can be constituted through accident; therefore this addition is not outside the genus of the thing itself, but in substances it is substance, at least incomplete, because in the thing there is nothing but individual substance. Finally the third part is easily evident, because this addition is not some physical part of substance, because it is predicated of the individual as expressing its total essence, which a physical part does not express, and therefore is not predicated of the whole. Nor is it something in the mode of a whole directly placed in the category of substance; therefore it is something incomplete in the mode of a difference. Likewise it contracts the common nature and divides it into individuals, and constitutes the individual metaphysically, as something per se one in its genus.

18. But against this conclusion a certain argument made in the preceding can be objected; for, if the individual adds something, at least distinct by reason, it follows that there is a process to infinity in objective concepts distinct by reason, which also above in a similar case we considered inconvenient; the consequence is evident, because the individual is said to add above the species something distinct by reason, because it agrees with another individual in the specific notion, and differs in the individual; but the individual difference itself also agrees with another similar difference in a common notion, and differs numerically from it; therefore it also adds according to reason something distinct by reason above the common notion of such a difference; and again concerning that addition the same argument will be made, and so to infinity. It can be responded first, that in these our concepts there is no great inconvenience in admitting such a process, because the intellect divides those things which are in reality completely indivisible, and therefore it would not be surprising if the intellect in these divisions or concepts could proceed to infinity. Second, someone could philosophize thus about the concept of species and individual, just as we reasoned above about the concept of

being and its inferiors; for we said that inferiors add above being something distinct by reason, yet in such a way that the inferior concept immediately under the concept of being is not properly resolvable into two concepts, but is only a simple concept more expressed and determined than the concept of being; so therefore in the present case it can be said that the concept of the individual is not properly composite and resolvable into the concept of another mode, or individual difference, but is only a more expressed concept of the specific nature itself as it exists in the thing in such an entity, in which neither can such an entity be conceived nor anything of that entity, unless it includes such a specific notion, nor can the specific notion itself, as it exists in the thing, be distinctly conceived, unless as contracted in such or such an entity. And by this reasoning the process to infinity is easily avoided, as is established from what was said in a similar case about being.

19. But this mode of responding can seem little consonant with the common mode of conceiving and speaking of philosophers, who explain this contraction of species to individuals through the mode of metaphysical composition. And not without reason does this seem to be commonly affirmed, because also genus and difference are not distinguished in the thing in which they are joined, as we shall show below, and nevertheless on account of various agreements and disagreements, which are found among several things, the intellect forms diverse concepts of genus and difference, one of which is not included in the other, so therefore it can also do between species and individuals; for there is nearly the same proportion of them among themselves, and the same difference from the concept of being. For that is transcendent, and therefore cannot properly be contracted through the mode of composition, nor can anything be added to it according to reason in which that is not included, but truly the concept of species (just as also the concept of genus) is of itself limited and not transcendent, and therefore it is not necessary that it be included in every determinative concept of it; therefore it will be

able to be contracted through the mode of composition, and consequently the individual will also be able to be resolved into the concept of species and individual difference; for that is not man, nor Peter, for example, but the difference contracting man and constituting Peter. You will also say there is a difference between genus and species, because the generic notion not only as abstracted and made universal in the mind, but also as existing in the thing itself can be prescinded by the mind and distinguished by reason from the specific difference, as we shall see below; but the specific notion cannot be distinguished even by reason from the individual difference, except as abstracted and made universal in the mind, because as existing in the thing it cannot be conceived except as including individuation; and because every composition, even according to reason, must be understood in the thing as it actually exists, therefore such composition between the generic and specific notion is more easily understood than between the specific and individual. But notwithstanding this, that metaphysical composition of the individual is not to be denied, because for it, it suffices that the specific notion can be prescinded by the mind as not included in this individual difference.

20. And therefore, having admitted that kind of composition and resolution of the individual, it is responded third that it is not necessary to proceed to infinity; for the same mind which conceives the individual as composed from the objective concept of species and individual difference, conceives the individual difference as completely simple and irresolvable, because it does not conceive it under the concept of species, but of difference only, of whose nature it is that it be simple and not composed from a common notion and another contracting difference. As can be seen in the specific or subaltern differences themselves; for the sensible or rational are not formally composed from other differences, but by this very fact that they are notions of differing, they differ from others by themselves; so therefore individual differences are also to be conceived, in which as to

this can be admitted that mode of determining being to themselves through simple determination of concept without composition. And that notion of individual difference, insofar as it can be conceived as a real and common notion, will also be as it were transcendent to singular individual differences, because nothing will be able to be conceived in them in which such a notion is not included, and therefore that common notion also will be determined to singular differences, not through new composition but through simple determination of a more expressed and determined concept, and thus further resolution and process ceases.

21. I say fourth: the individual not only in material things and accidents, but also in immaterial created and finite substances adds something distinct by reason above the species. We exclude from this conclusion the divine nature, because since it is essentially so determined to this nature in number, that it entirely repugnant to it to be multiplied according to it, neither can the common notion of deity be abstracted according to reason (if it be true) from such deity; for, by this very fact that it is so abstracted, true deity is not conceived, because it is of the true concept of deity that it be this in number, and not another; because this its infinity requires. And hence it consequently happens that this individual deity adds nothing even according to reason above the concept of true deity. Whence Cajetan is rightly reproved, in that I, q. 3, a. 3, and in other places, he said that God can be taken in one way as signifying the concrete, as it were specific of the divine nature. For such a truly common concept is repugnant to true divinity, of whose essence it is that it be this singular nature, and therefore true God cannot more be conceived by a common concept and abstracted from this God than Peter.

22. From this exception, which is singular and specially befits God on account of his infinity, the conclusion posited and the general rule contrary in all creatures is confirmed, even if they be immaterial. It is proved, because in any individual and finite immaterial substance, for example, the Archangel Gabriel, the mind conceives both this

individual, insofar as it conceives this entity in number, and his essential and specific notion, which does not include essentially this entity in number nor positive repugnance that it be able to be communicated to another individual; therefore there the mind conceives something common and something which according to reason is added to it so that it be determined to this individual; therefore as to this precisely there is no difference between immaterial substances and other things. It will perhaps be said that any angelic essence or species is essentially and intrinsically determined to this individual, and consequently this individual adds nothing positive and real, even distinct by reason, above the species itself, but only the negation of communicability to several similar things, which immediately befits such a species, by reason of itself without any addition.

23. This indeed seems to have been the sense of the authors whom I cited in the third opinion, and the same think those who deny that angels differing only in number can be created within the same species, even by absolute power; for by no other reason can this be denied to divine power, unless because it is considered to be against the intrinsic and essential notion of such a nature. But that opinion has foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 50, a. 4, and Quaest. de Spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8, and II cont. Gentes, c. 95, De Ente et essentia, c. 5, where Cajetan holds it, q. 9; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, concl. 5; and Abulensis, Paradox. IV, c. 34. And it seems much to favor Aristotle, XII Metaph., text. 40; and Avicenna, V Metaph., c. 5.

24. But this opinion first supposes that signate matter is the adequate principle of that individuation, in which the individual adds something positive to the specific notion, which can be called positive individuation; but this supposition in the aforesaid sense is false. The major premise is openly established from the aforesaid authors. And its reason is clear, because they deny such individuation in the aforesaid substances for no other cause than because they lack matter; therefore they suppose that matter either according to itself or as

signate by quantity is the adequate root of such individuation, so that from that principle: If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, they infer from the absence of matter the absence of the aforesaid addition or individuation. But the minor proposition will be proved broadly in the following section, even in material substances. But even if we were to grant in material substances such individual difference is taken from matter, it could not be efficaciously inferred that matter is the adequate principle of that difference in the entire breadth of created being; for diverse substances have diverse principles accommodated to their natures, nor from the mode of composition or individuation found in external things can sufficient argument be taken for things of higher order; otherwise by the same reasoning someone could deny that there is given in angels metaphysical composition from genus and difference, because in material things genus is taken from matter and difference from form, which many want to be understood with propriety. Likewise with the same facility someone could say that in celestial bodies the individual does not add above the species anything positive, even distinct by reason, either because they do not have matter, as Averroes thought, or certainly because they have matter of another order. For if it is true that in these lower things matter is the unique root of individual difference, we can only attribute this to this lower matter; for concerning the higher we can collect by no sufficient reason whether this also befits it, since it is of diverse order. They will perhaps say that that matter is subject to quantity of the same order, and this is sufficient that it be the principle of the same mode of individuation. But this does not satisfy; for, as I shall show below, quantity, since it is an accident, can in no way enter into the principle of individuation of substances. Therefore substances of higher order can agree in metaphysical composition with substances of lower order, and have the principle of that in a simpler and more perfect mode. And thus from the negation of matter no efficacious argument can be made.

25. Then I return to the reason begun; for, that the divine nature essentially includes its positive individuation and incommunicability with respect to inferiors, comes precisely from the fact that such multiplication is repugnant to its infinity; but every created immaterial substance is finite; therefore there is no reason why it should be repugnant to it to have another completely similar essence, distinguished nonetheless really in entity. It can be responded, that although a spiritual substance is finite simply in the genus of being, it is nevertheless infinite in its species and has the total perfection possible in its species, because since it is abstract and separated from matter, it has no source of limitation, and therefore it cannot be multiplied within that species. But such infinity is both asserted without sufficient foundation, and can hardly be declared in what it consists, except by begging the question.

26. I ask therefore whether this infinity is intensive or extensive. The first cannot be said, both because the total intensive perfection of such an angel is contained within a certain grade and limit of such a species, in which there is no formal intensive infinity; unless perhaps it be said infinite in a qualified sense, because it can contain under itself species of lower order syncategorematically infinite, which however does not indicate infinity, but a certain perfection of higher order, whence this can be common to species of material things, as is evident in the human species, under which species of brutes can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore this genus of perfection or infinity is irrelevant to the question of which we treat, nor can it be the reason on account of which some species is individual per se and cannot be multiplied in individuals. Indeed even if we were to admit that intensive infinity, true and formal, in some limited grade intrinsically, it does not follow that such perfection cannot be found in many similar individuals, because this has no necessary connection with that. So that, even if there were granted grace infinitely intense in the soul of Christ the Lord, for example, it would not therefore follow that there cannot be given other qualities

of grace distinct in number, whether finite or infinite. Which argument also declares that that intensive infinity proper and formal can no more be given in substances than in accidents.

27. But if there is talk of extensive infinity, first the principle is begged, because this extension is nothing other than the multiplication of individuals in that species. Then what is said involves repugnance; for that individual is formally and in itself only one; how therefore can it contain extensive infinity in itself, which consists in the sole multiplication of individuals? You will say it contains virtually, not formally. But it cannot be explained in what this virtual infinity or containment consists or in what it is founded, since it does not consist in the intensive infinity of such a nature, nor can it be founded in it, as has been proved; therefore no reason is assigned on account of which it is repugnant to the perfection of such a nature to be communicated to many individuals similar in essential perfection. Such substances therefore, although abstract from matter, are simply finite. For it is not necessary that they have limitation from matter properly said (whatever may be the case as to this concerning material forms), but from their proper difference, or from themselves and from their proper entity, or because they have such being received, or finally because their nature exists in such a suppositum; therefore from infinity no reason can be taken on account of which such immaterial natures are essentially individual and incommunicable.

28. It can be said otherwise that from immateriality alone sufficient reason is taken. Because things which lack matter cannot be multiplied materially, as is evident per se; therefore only formally and essentially or specifically; therefore not individually or according to numerical multiplication, because this is material multiplication. But this reason also, if the words materially and formally are taken properly in the first antecedent, is insufficient and begs the principle; for it takes the conclusion itself in the reasoning, namely, either that numerical distinction is taken from matter, or that it is the same to differ in number as to differ materially. For granted that in material

things these may have some truth, which we shall examine later, nevertheless from that no sufficient argument can be taken for immaterial things. Individual distinction therefore extends more broadly than material difference taken in the aforesaid mode; for to differ in number is only to be distinguished in proper entities with agreement and similarity in the integral essential notion; which can be common to spiritual as well as corporeal things. Whence if material and formal are taken more broadly, insofar as formal expresses the essential notion prescinded, but material whatever contracts and determines that to such an entity, so two angels of the same species, although they are distinguished as two integral forms, can be said to be distinguished not formally but materially or entitatively, just as two rational souls are distinguished among themselves.

29. And by this example this opinion can first be confirmed; for the rational soul physically considered is also a simple and spiritual entity, and yet it is not individual from its essential notion, but adds something according to reason. But they say that the rational soul has a transcendental relation to the body, and from that is individuated. But this is first uncertain, for perhaps it is as true that this soul therefore expresses such a relation to the body, because it is such, as conversely. And then whatever may be the case about this, it is not relevant for the present, for the same proportional argument can be taken; for the rational soul, which has its specific notion with transcendental relation to the body, does not have individuation from the force of that precisely, but from some addition according to reason, through which that relation is determined to such a body, or rather to such a relation to the body; therefore by the same proportion, the substance of an angel, which has an absolute essential notion without transcendental relation, will not be individual from the force of that, but from something added according to reason proportionate to that. And a similar argument can be taken from spiritual accidents, in which the individual adds something above the species, not only in order to diverse subjects, but also with respect to

the same; for therefore these accidents can be distinguished in number and multiplied with respect to the same subject, at least successively, as is evident concerning diverse acts of the same kind in the same angelic intellect; if therefore in those acts the same spiritual specific notion is found contractible to diverse individuals, not from diverse subjects, but from diverse individual differences in order to the same subject, why will not the same substantial and spiritual specific notion be able to be contracted similarly through individual differences proportioned to itself? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given. And similar arguments can be taken from other simple entities, which from themselves can be distinguished in number, as are two matters or two quantities, as we shall see more broadly in the following section.

30. Finally divine power is limited without cause so that it cannot create several angels similar in essence and species, or if it had willed to annihilate the bad angels, it could not have created others similar, which is certainly incredible per se; and therefore the remaining theologians almost all teach, In II, dist. 3, that this can be done by God. Scotus, q. 7; Durandus, q. 3; Gabriel, q. 1, and others; and Marsilius, In II, q. 3, a. 3; Alexander of Hales, II p., q. 20, memb. ult., a. 2, and VII Metaph., text. 41; and from Thomas, Ferrariensis, II cont. Gent., 93, says it is not repugnant by absolute power for such numerical distinction of spiritual substances, although he denies it is according to the natural order of things; and St. Thomas favors this, Opusc. 16, ultimo capite, where he teaches broadly that an immaterial substance is one in number, singular and individual, because from itself it is not apt to be participated by many; he adds however that it is of a crude intellect to conclude from this that it cannot be multiplied by God. But whatever may be the case about this mode of speaking, whether this should be said possible by absolute power or natural or ordinary, which perhaps is a question of name, nevertheless, by whatever reasoning this is possible, it is sufficiently concluded that an immaterial substance is not individual from the force of its essential

and specific notion; for if it had this, it would imply contradiction for such a substance to be multiplied individually, just as it implies for the same individual to be multiplied numerically. Whence also it is incidentally established that he knows not the proper voice who says that in angelic natures there is given an objective concept truly specific and logically (as they say) universal, and yet that nature is from itself so incommunicable, that it implies contradiction to be in several individuals distinguished by number alone; for this is open repugnance; for, if that nature cannot in any way be in many individuals, it is therefore because from itself and from its proper essential concept it is so incommunicable; therefore, if it is such, it is repugnant to abstract it from this individual and render it communicable or indifferent, because this same abstraction is against its nature and essence, as is openly established in the divine nature. Therefore it is said more truly and more consequently, just as in immaterial substances there are given true and proper species, so also there is given the individual, which adds something according to reason above the species, and consequently there can also be given several similar individuals. Whether truly they are given in fact, and what in this is more consonant with the Scriptures and Fathers, pertains to theological disputations.

The Foundations of Other Opinions are Satisfied

31. To the foundation of the first opinion it is responded that all those things which are enumerated in the first argument only indicate that the specific nature expresses an objective concept according to reason prescinded from individuals, and conversely that the individual adds something distinct by reason above the specific nature. For human science is of things universally conceived, concerning which immediately are definitions and demonstrations; and for this it suffices that they can be abstracted according to reason, although in the thing itself they are not separated. Which is evident

from what was said about the concept of being, concerning which there is given science and demonstrations are made, although it is established that in reality it is not prescinded from the proper notions of beings, but is only abstracted according to reason. Whence this distinction also suffices for those causal locutions: because man is risible, Peter is risible; because in them there is not given a real and physical cause which intervenes between Peter and the risible, but the adequate reason and origin of that property is explained.

32. To the second it is responded that in such arguments (which I noted above treating of the concept of being) equivocation is easily committed arguing from our mode of conceiving and from the use of words by which we signify things as conceived by us to the things themselves as they are in themselves, collecting distinction of things from distinction according to reason, which is a fallacious argument. It is therefore responded that man as such signified and conceived neither expresses nor includes in his essential notion any individual difference, as the argument correctly proves. And it is evident, because according to reason he is prescinded from all those and can be contracted and determined through several such differences according to reason. Whence it is correctly concluded that something must be added, which is outside the essence of man so conceived, so that he becomes singular; I deny however that distinction in the thing between the common nature of man and his individual difference follows from this, because the nature of man is not found in the thing so common and abstract as it is conceived through the intellect. But when it is said, that what is of the essence, and what is outside the essence, are distinguished from the nature of the thing, and not only by reason; it is responded that in two ways something can be understood to be outside the essence. In one way according to the thing or considering the things themselves as they are on the side of the thing; in another way according to reason prescinding one from the other, although in the thing it is not prescinded. In the prior way it is true (especially in finite things) that

whatever is outside the essence on the side of the thing must be distinguished from the nature of the thing from it, because it cannot be said to be outside the essence for another reason; I deny however that in this way the individual difference, for example, of Peter or Paul, is outside the essence of man as existing in the thing itself; for man does not exist in the thing, except in Peter, Paul, etc., and in each his proper difference is of the essence of man as existing in him. You will say that it follows from this that man in Peter and Paul differs essentially, or that Peter and Paul do not have the same essence. It is responded that they do not have the same really, nevertheless they have the same by reason, which in the thing is nothing other than to have similar; and because to differ essentially under these words does not only signify real distinction of essences, but also denies essential similarity and agreement, and thus unity of essence according to reason, therefore it is not simply conceded that those things which differ only in number differ essentially. Nevertheless, if those words were taken only in the prior sense, it would be true that Peter and Paul differ essentially, according to which signification we deny that in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit differ essentially, because they have neither essential difference nor distinction of essences. But in the posterior way, namely, according to precision of reason, everything is said to be outside the essence of the objective concept without which such a conceived notion can be preserved; and in this way it is not necessary that what is said to be outside the essence, be distinct from the nature of the thing from the other; but it suffices that it be distinguished by reason, because that very word "outside" does not signify to be absolutely outside the thing, but to be outside the concept or to be outside the thing as conceived.

33. Whence to the confirmation nearly the same distinction must be responded, for on the side of the thing man is not constituted as man precisely, nor separated in himself, but is constituted as Peter, Paul, Francis; whence in each he is constituted as man by the same thing by which as Peter; nor is there in the thing anything truly one

constitutive of man, which is really common, but there are several constitutives of singular men, in which there is said to be a common notion fundamentally on account of the agreement and similarity which they have among themselves, as we shall say more broadly in the following disputation. But truly according to reason, just as common man is abstracted, so he is understood to have an adequate and common constitutive; from that however it can only be concluded that that is distinct by reason from the singular differences, which constitute the individuals specially. To the third it is responded from what was said about the concept of being that it is established that those arguments do not prove distinction from the nature of the thing; and we shall show the same about universal and inferior natures, in the following disputation.

34. To the first argument of the second opinion it is responded that it correctly proves that a thing is not made singular through addition of reality or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the nature, which is said to be made singular, because every such distinction supposes entity and consequently singularity in both extremes. But that argument does not prove that a thing cannot be made singular through addition of something distinct by reason, because this distinction does not suppose actual entity, and consequently neither singularity in both extremes, because since this distinction is through concepts, it can easily be understood between a thing universally conceived and its mode.

35. According to this doctrine, certain objections that Cajetan raises in De Ente et essentia, chapter 2, question 4, against the doctrine of Scotus can be easily resolved, insofar as they can be applied against the first and third conclusions we have established. One such objection is this: a singular act presupposes a singular potency, as stated in Physics II, chapter 3, text 36; but what is said to be added by the individual above the species is a singular act of nature; therefore it presupposes a singular nature, because it regards that nature as potency. The response is that the major premise is true

concerning act and potency that are real and distinct ex natura rei, about which Aristotle speaks in the cited passage; but not concerning act and potency that are distinct by reason alone, for the cause we have explained. Just as a specific act does not presuppose a specific potency, but a generic one. Another argument of his is: what belongs to one individual and is incompatible with another presupposes a distinction between them; but individual difference is of this kind; therefore it does not make the distinction, but presupposes it. But this argument is weaker in terms of its formal structure. For the major premise can easily be denied, as is evident in a similar form: what belongs to one species and is incompatible with another presupposes a distinction between them; but one should add "or makes it," and therefore the same should be added in the present case. Nevertheless, if the argument were made not about the individuals themselves, but about the nature that is contracted through this individual difference, it could have force against the distinction ex natura rei between that difference and the nature, but not against our position. For in distinct individuals there are also really distinct natures; hence if individuating differences are distinct from them ex natura rei, it is necessary that the difference which belongs to one and is incompatible with another should presuppose their distinction and not make it; because it presupposes, as has been said, a singular potency proportioned to itself, and consequently distinct from another that is not proportioned to itself; and thus it would no longer be an individual difference, as we have also argued above. But when the distinction ex natura rei is removed, the argument does not proceed with respect to the nature to be contracted, because thus there is not one nature and another, so that the difference could belong to one and be incompatible with the other, but there is one according to reason. But if the discourse concerns nature not as contractible, but as contracted, then it is already the individual thing itself, which is constituted and distinguished from another through the difference itself.

36. To the second objection, the response is that it only proceeds concerning the ultimate formal reason of unity, or individual unity, which consists in negation, concerning which we admit that it adds nothing above individual entity except negation; but we are treating of the foundation of this negation and of what singular entity adds above common nature, by reason of which it is capable of such negation.

37. To the third objection, some say that what the individual adds above the species is accidental. But this is proven false, both by the arguments made there, and by others that we will make in the following section, and also from what has been said; for if this addition is only distinct by reason from the substance or essence of the thing, and is per se joined to it as per se determining the common nature to the particular, how can it be accidental? Others therefore simply call this essential to the individual, not to the species, which is indeed so if we consider the thing itself, for what intrinsically constitutes and composes this individual is its proper difference together with the common nature; nor can this individual not only exist, but not even be conceived without such a difference. Nevertheless, according to reason, and according to the mode of speaking of dialecticians and metaphysicians accommodated to our mode of conceiving, this individual difference is not called essential, but intrinsic, entitative, and quasi-material, so as to be distinguished from specific difference, which is maximally formal, for it is taken from that grade in which individuals formally agree or are assimilated. Therefore this seems to be declared thus: that individuals of the same species with real distinction have complete and perfect similitude in nature, in which they differ from individuals differing in species under the same genus, which do not have among themselves such great and perfect similitude. Hence it happens that our mind conceives that in which those individuals agree among themselves as something one and as that which is formal in them and which per se contributes to science; for distinction in entity alone is considered to be quasi per

accidens, and therefore is called material. For the same reason, scientific definition is given only of the common and specific concept, and in this sense the ultimate species is said to be the whole essence of individuals, namely, taken and conceived formally and precisely, and insofar as its knowledge serves human science, which does not descend to particulars according to their proper and individual reasons, because it can neither perceive them as they are in themselves nor does it deal with the proper accidents of individuals, because they either belong to them contingently and per accidens, or if perhaps there are some entirely proper ones, they lie hidden equally with the individual differences themselves. Finally, because it would be very laborious and almost infinite to descend to singular particulars. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that individuals, even if they differ only in number, have distinct essences in reality, which if they are conceived and explained as they are in themselves, will have to be declared by diverse concepts and definitions; and they will also have distinct properties at least according to reality or according to some proper mode, under which aspect they fall under angelic or divine science.

38. To the foundations of the third opinion, the response is given. To Aristotle in Metaphysics VII, it can first be responded with Alexander of Hales there, that when Aristotle says that in things separated from matter, the quiddity is not distinguished from that whose it is, he does not take matter with every property for prime matter or for the proper subject of some form, but for any supposit that is in some way distinct from its nature in reality, in which way no created substance can be said to abstract from matter, because in all of them nature is in a supposit that is in some way distinct from it. This doctrine is true, but I do not think Aristotle spoke in that sense in that place. Alexander of Aphrodisias expounds it differently, who thinks, and indeed very probably, that Aristotle in both places cited above spoke about the same substances and in the same way compared the quiddity with that whose it is. This can be confirmed from the words

of the same Philosopher; for he says in that text 41: "Moreover it has been said that quiddity and each thing are the same in some cases, as in primary substances," for thus Alexander himself reads it. And although in the text commonly in that place that particle "it has been said" is not repeated, nevertheless, since it had preceded a little before, it also comprehends this clause, as is sufficiently evident from the context. Hence Alexander does not understand by primary substance immaterial substances, as St. Thomas does, because Aristotle in the later place refers himself to what he had said in the earlier; but there he had said nothing about immaterial substance in particular, nor does he elsewhere bring forward a special reason why he should constitute a difference in this between material and immaterial substances; nor is there any indication why we should say he uses that term equivocally, so that in the earlier place it is taken for the defined, but here for the supposit, so that a different comparison is made in each place. And finally, Aristotle never used the name of primary substance to signify immaterial substances specifically, for although in book IV, chapter 3, text 7, he seems to use that word in that signification, nevertheless both the Commentator there understands God by primary substance, and whatever may be the case about that place, no argument is taken from it for the other in which we are now engaged. Therefore according to this exposition, Aristotle's meaning is the same in both places. By primary substances, therefore, Alexander understands any substantial supposits, from which the quiddity, that is, the common nature, is not separated. But what Aristotle adds: "I call primary substance that which is not said to be because something else exists in another, as in a subject or matter," is explained by Alexander concerning substance which is not signified as something else in another, but as something one subsisting per se, in which it differs from an accidental composite, such as white, for example, or snub-nosed, in which something is signified as existing in a subject as in matter; for concerning such a composite made from such a subject as matter, and an accident as existing in it, Aristotle adds that in it, since

it is one per accidens, the quiddity is distinguished from the subject in which it is. And thus according to this exposition, nothing can be gathered from the aforesaid text against our position. Besides this probable exposition, that place has another perhaps more probable one; nevertheless, because it touches the question of the distinction of nature from supposit in immaterial things, it will be treated more conveniently below in the disputation on the distinction of nature and supposit in created things.

39. To the other testimony from De Anima III, if the common exposition is to be retained, nothing can be responded except that Aristotle was of that opinion, which Scotus finally concedes in In II, distinction 3, question 7, ad 1, where he says that Aristotle thought angels to be per se necessary beings, and therefore could not consistently think that several angels could be given in one species; for if they could be given, they would be given in fact, because in per se necessary and eternal things, to be and to be able are the same. And similarly if several could exist, they could also be multiplied to infinity, and finally would actually be infinite. But the foundation of this reasoning is uncertain, namely, that Aristotle thought angels to be per se necessary beings. And perhaps Aristotle, when he establishes this difference between material and immaterial individuals, does not speak precisely and metaphysically of the individual as it denotes a singular substance alone, but speaks physically of the individual as it actually exists affected by its accidents; in which way he seems to speak in the said place in De Anima III; for he says the material individual is such that sense is concerned with it, which is not true of the individual taken with rigorous and metaphysical precision, but only in the posterior and physical mode. And thus a difference between material and spiritual individual can easily be found.

40. To the argument of the aforesaid position (whatever may be the case about that opinion that in material things signate matter is the principle of individuation, which we will dispute immediately), the response is that although in immaterial things this principle of

individuation is not given, nevertheless some proportional one must be given, because those substances too are individual, not by virtue of their specific reason, but singular. Hence when it is said that a spiritual substance is individual through itself, if "through itself" is understood, that is, by virtue of its specific reason, the principle is begged and something false is assumed, as has been proven; but if "through itself" is understood, that is, through its own entity, this is indeed true, but nothing prevents the specific reason and individual difference from being distinguished by reason in that same entity, and the same entity according to diverse respects can be the principle and foundation of both. For in this regard there is nearly the same account of material substances; for whether signate matter is said to be the principle of their individuation, or anything else, nevertheless nothing can exist that is not the essential entity of the thing itself, either total or partial; hence in the same thing one must distinguish both the specific reason, on account of which it is said to be an essence or part of an essence, and another reason distinct not in reality but by reason, on account of which it is said to be the principle of individuation.

SECTION III

WHETHER DESIGNATED MATTER IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES

1. We omit divine substance, because, as we have said, it is individual per se and essentially, whence there is no need to seek in it a principle of individuation, any more than of its essence or existence itself.

The Meaning of the Question

2. In order that the meaning of the question be understood, it must be taken from what was said in the preceding section that in such created substances there can be considered a metaphysical composition, which according to reason consists of specific nature and individual difference; for just as that which species adds above genus, according to metaphysical consideration, is the divisive or contractive difference of the genus and constitutive of the species, so that which the individual adds above the species is rightly called the contractive difference of the species and constitutive and distinctive of individuals, which are truly and properly said to differ in number; for this reason the species is said to be predicated of many differing in number. Likewise we have shown that what the individual adds above the species, although it is distinct only by reason, is nevertheless real and positive, founding the negation, or proper indivision of the individual, because it is per se incommunicable and distinct from others or incommunicable to other individuals, and therefore joined to the species, it constitutes with it an individual per se one under such a species; therefore nothing is lacking to it to have the true nature of a difference. Hence some think this should be assigned as the principle of individuation, and no other should be sought, as can be seen in Scotus, In II, dist. 2, q. 6; and Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 6, sect. 1. But the question is not disputed in this sense, nor is there truly diversity of opinions about it among those who dispute concerning the principle of individuation. The meaning of the question is therefore: what foundation or principle in the thing itself does that individual difference have? For these metaphysical predicates are customarily taken from real principles constituting the thing, in the way that genus is customarily said to be taken from matter and difference from form; and substantial denominations are sometimes taken from matter, as when man is called material, sometimes from form, as when he is called rational, sometimes from the whole composite nature, as when he is called man; in this manner therefore it is presently inquired what is the principle of this individual difference.

From this declaration it is clear that here we do not inquire into the extrinsic principles or causes of individuation, or rather of individuals, such as are the efficient and final cause; for these do not cause individuation otherwise than by causing individual entity, or by giving the intrinsic principle of individuation itself; this therefore is what we inquire into. And, although the question is general concerning all created substances, because nevertheless material ones are better known to us, we shall speak first of them, and then it will easily be clear what we can conjecture about spiritual ones. And since there are various opinions about this matter, which demand lengthy examination, we shall treat them individually.

3. There is therefore a celebrated opinion affirming that the principle of individuation is designated matter. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 50, a. 4, III, q. 77, a. 2, and In IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, and Opusc. 29, and De Ente et essentia, c. 2, where Cajetan extensively disputes and defends this; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 3; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 33 and 34; Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 21, and others cited below. And this opinion is considered to be Aristotle's; for in various places he judges that numerical distinction and identity should be attributed to prime matter. Hence lib. V Metaph., c. 6, text. 42, he says that those things are one in number whose matter is one; and lib. VII, c. 8, text. 28, he says: form in these flesh and bones is Socrates and Callias; and c. 10, text. 25: the singular (he says) is from ultimate matter, now Socrates is; and from this principle, in lib. XII, Metaph., c. 8, text. 49, he concludes: the prime mover cannot be except one in number, because it is without matter, considering it necessary that those things which agree in species and differ in number have matter and differ through matter. And similarly, I de Caelo, c. 9, he proves that there cannot be another world, because this world embraces all the matter of natural things. From these testimonies therefore it appears that this was Aristotle's opinion, according to which it must consequently be said (as the aforesaid authors say) that in immaterial substances there is no

positive principle of individuation nor proper individual difference, but only a nature incommunicable of itself.

4. The foundation of this opinion, if we look at reason, I find almost none, which does not go back to Aristotle's authority, namely, because matter is the principle of multiplication and distinction of individuals within the same species, as Aristotle testifies in the cited places; but that is the principle of individuation which is the principle of numerical distinction; therefore. Second, because that is individual which is incommunicable to similar inferiors; but matter is the first foundation of this incommunicability; for form, since it is act, is of itself communicable, but matter since it is first potency, is of itself incommunicable, and form is then limited and determined when it is restricted to this matter. Third, because the individual is the first subject in metaphysical coordination; for all superior things are predicated of it, and it is not predicated of others; therefore the first principle and foundation of the individual, as such, ought to be that which is the first subject among physical principles; but matter is of this kind: therefore.

The Reasons of the Said Opinion are Examined

5. But before we proceed further, these reasons, setting aside authority, are not of great moment. For to the first it can easily be responded by denying the major; for rather that is the principle of multiplication, which is the principle of distinction; but the principle of distinction is not matter, but rather form, for as it is in common parlance, act is what distinguishes. Hence St. Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 40, ex professo proves that matter is not the first cause of distinction of things; and although he intends to speak principally of essential distinction, nevertheless his reasons seem to press also concerning numerical distinction, especially what he says in the second reason, that form does not follow the disposition of matter as a first cause, but

rather conversely matter is so disposed that such a form follows. Likewise what he says there, that those things which are reduced to matter as to a first cause, are beyond the intention of the agent, and happen by chance. If therefore matter were the first cause on account of which there would be such an individual, the individual as such would happen by chance and beyond the intention of the agent. Likewise, what he says there in the fourth reason, that one matter needs something distinct from itself in order to be distinguished from another matter; therefore it is not the first cause of distinction, as was assumed in the reason made. Wherefore convinced by these and other reasons, many of the authors who follow the aforesaid opinion confess that, since there are two things pertaining to the nature of the individual, namely to be incommunicable to inferiors and to be distinct from other individuals, matter is the principle of individuation as to the first, but as to the second it is quantity, for this is what distinguishes the matters themselves; how truly and consequently this is said, we shall examine later; for now we shall only examine the force of the said reasons. But the first reason proceeded only about individuation as to the distinction of one from another, concerning which the aforesaid authors already confess does not arise from matter. I note however that the arguments made do not convince concerning every distinction, for, as I shall say below, matter in its own way has something whereby it distinguishes one from another, insofar as it itself has some entitative act; they prove nevertheless that there is no reason why the first reason of the whole numerical distinction should be attributed to it rather than to some form.

6. The second reason proceeds concerning the first root of incommunicability, in which the nature of the individual primarily consists, as was declared above; for distinction from another is rather consequent, according to what was said above about unity in general; hence if that reason were efficacious, it would sufficiently prove that matter is the principle of individuation. But if anyone rightly considers, an open equivocation is committed in that discourse; for

when it is said that matter is the principle of incommunicability of the individual, because it itself is the first subject, maximally incommunicable of itself, either that word incommunicable is taken equivocally or something false is assumed in the proof. For in many ways it can be understood that matter is incommunicable: first, that it is incommunicable to something as a physical subject which it informs or in which it inheres, and this sense is most true, and from it is rightly proved that matter is the first subject; this however is irrelevant to the matter we are treating, both because it is not of the nature of the individual as such, that it be incommunicable to another as subject, for accidents are individual, although they are communicated in this way, and substantial forms also; and also because that incommunicability does not suffice for the nature of the individual; for matter by virtue of its species is incommunicable in that way, and yet it is not individual by virtue of the species, but common to many matters differing in number; therefore that incommunicability is not the first root of individuation, even in matter itself; much less therefore will matter be able to be the first principle of individuation of substance by reason of this incommunicability. In another way therefore matter can be said incommunicable, either by way of cause, or by way of part, or by way of nature to the supposit, or by way of superior to inferiors, and all these ways are false; for matter is communicated to form in the way that it is cause of it and sustains it. Likewise matter is communicated to the composite as part to whole and as cause also to effect, which it does not cause otherwise than by communicating intrinsically its entity to it. Likewise matter as part of nature is communicated only to its own supposit, if we speak naturally, but supernaturally also to an alien one, as can be seen in Christ's humanity; but all these ways have nothing to do with the present matter, as is evident per se. But the last way (in which alone the terms assumed in the aforesaid reason would be taken univocally) is openly false, as is convinced by the reason made above, because matter as such by virtue of its species is communicable to many inferiors, which can be subjected to it in order

to predication, although they cannot be subjects of inherence. But if you say that matter as such is common, but designated matter, of which that opinion speaks, is incommunicable, against this is that designated matter, whatever it may be, does not have that it is incommunicable from the nature of the first subject, on which the said argument was founded; if therefore designated matter is incommunicable, it will be on account of another cause which will be able to be common to forms or other things, as we shall see in the following. Wherefore to that incommunicability which is of the nature of the individual, that reason of the first subject is irrelevant; for both angelic forms and God himself are incommunicable in that way although they are wholly act, and not potencies. Hence when it is said there that form is of itself communicable, it is also beside the point; for form, as form, is communicable to matter as subject, not as inferior; according to its specific nature also it is communicable to distinct forms, and therefore according to that nature it is not individual; nevertheless this form is as incommunicable as this matter; therefore as to this there is no greater reason for one than for the other.

7. And from these things it is clear that the third conjecture has no efficacy, because there is a far different nature of the subject of inherence and of the subject of predication; for although some proportion between these two subjects can be devised, for the superior is compared to the inferior subjected to it as form giving being, nevertheless they are simply not of the same nature, nor is one founded in the other; hence in simple substances there is subjection or subordination of inferiors to superiors, without a subject of inherence or information. Add that what is the subject of predication, is not of itself more imperfect than its superior predicate, just as matter, which is the first subject, is inferior to form, and therefore it is not necessary that what is the first subject in the order of generation and imperfection, be the first principle and foundation of the individual, which is the first subject in the order of predication, containing in

itself all the perfection of superiors and adding something proper by which it as it were completes and perfects it.

Many Things are Objected Against the Said Opinion

8. But it must be seen, although this opinion cannot be convinced by reason, whether it can be conveniently defended and sustained, for this will be enough for us so that at least on account of the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas we may defend it. And the first reason of difficulty about it can be, because matter is of itself common not only insofar as the same according to specific nature is common to many individuals of matter, but also because the same matter in number can underlie many forms either specifically distinct or diverse only in number, at least successively; how therefore can matter be the principle of individuation? For the principle of individuation ought to be maximally proper, and in no way common to many individuals, neither simultaneously nor successively. On account of this difficulty it was added in that opinion that matter not in any way, but designated by quantity, is the principle of individuation. But what is signified by that word, is so obscure that in explaining that matter the defenders of this opinion disagree among themselves in a wonderful way. It is necessary to report and examine their various expositions, so that how great the probability of this opinion is may appear more clearly.

The First Mode of Explaining Designated Matter is Rejected

9. The first exposition is that matter designated by quantity is nothing other than matter with quantity or affected by quantity; for from these two they judge this principle of individuation to be as it were integrated, so that matter gives incommunicability, quantity

distinction, as we were saying above. Thus Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 5, and a. 3, in response to arguments against it. The same Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 21, and Soncinas, lib. VII, q. 34. St. Thomas favors this, q. 2 De Verit., a. 6, ad 1, where he explains that natural designated matter is matter with determination of these or those dimensions; and q. 16 De Malo, a. 1, ad 18, he says that matter subjected to dimensions is the principle of numerical distinction in those things in which many individuals of one species are found; and super Boetium, de Trinit., q. 4, a. 2, he says that quantity distinguishes material things. And it seems founded in Aristotle, III Metaph., c. 3, text. 11, where he judges that specific distinction is made through form, but numerical through quantity, and Lib. X, c. 3, text. 4, he posits only those modes of division, namely, according to form or according to quantity; and V Metaph., c. 13, he attributes to quantity that it is the principle of division; hence he says that quantum is that which can be divided into those things each of which is naturally apt to be something; and III Phys., c. 7, text. 78, he says that number is born from division of continuous quantity. The reason can be because, in order that matter be the principle of individuation, something is necessary which distinguishes this matter from that; but this is not matter itself, because distinction ought to be made through act; nor is it form, for rather this form is distinct from that, because it is made and received in distinct matter.

10. But this opinion is false and can be attacked by grave reasons. We can proceed in two ways, first, supposing another opinion, which the aforesaid authors hold, that quantity is not in prime matter, but in the whole composite, and is destroyed when the substance is corrupted, and a new one is compared to the generation of substance. From which it happens that, speaking simply, this substantial form in number is first introduced into this matter and quantity follows. Hence an argument is constructed, because this form, when it is first understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in matter distinct from others; therefore formally and

intrinsically it is not made distinct through quantity. Likewise from matter and form precisely conceived and as preceding quantity, this substantial individual results; therefore it as such is one, not with unity of reason, but with real and singular and transcendental unity; therefore, just as by virtue of its substantial entity it is undivided in itself, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others; therefore it does not have distinction through quantity. Nor does it matter if you say that in the genus of material cause quantity is prior in matter. Both because in that opinion this cannot be conveniently said consequently, as is to be treated below; and also because at least this cannot be understood according to true inherence of quantity in matter, because according to that principle quantity never inheres in matter in real duration, but in the composite; therefore neither in any prior sign can it belong to it, because what does not belong a parte rei, and in real duration, can belong neither before nor after; but quantity does not make a thing divided or distinct from others, except by inhering and informing; therefore in no sign does quantity have this effect first in matter, but in the whole composite; therefore it supposes that already individual, and consequently distinct by another prior division. Then finally because for the force of the reason it is enough that in some genus of cause, what is simply prior, matter, as it precedes quantity, has distinction from itself. Finally the reason can be concluded thus: form is received in matter nude of quantity; therefore this form in this matter, because generation happens in the singular; therefore from those this individual results before the advent of quantity; indeed it comes to an individual already constituted, which God could preserve distinct from all others without quantity; therefore quantity does not intrinsically and formally enter the principle of individuation, either of the whole composite substance, or of the singular parts of this, namely of form and matter.

11. Second, we can proceed in another opinion, that quantity is present in prime matter and remains the same in what is generated and corrupted, and then from elsewhere is taken a no less efficacious

argument, because not only this matter according to itself, but also as affected by this quantity, can be under diverse forms, and consequently in individuals numerically distinct; therefore it cannot be the principle of individuation any more than matter alone. It will perhaps be said that matter with indeterminate dimensions can be under diverse forms, and as such is not the principle of individuation, but matter with these determinate dimensions is proper to this individual, and as such is the principle of individuation. But I ask what these determinate dimensions add above quantity. For dimensions can be called indeterminate only because they do not indicate a certain term of length, or breadth, etc., and thus terminated quantity will only add certain terms of dimensions; and this is not sufficient for the present case, because the same matter existing in this way under the same certain and determinate quantity, can underlie distinct forms, as is evident in the same rod first green, then dry, and similar cases. In another way quantity can be called indeterminate which is not affected by certain dispositions, such as such rarity or density, or other qualities, by which matter is determined to this form rather than to another. And in this sense it can be admitted that matter affected by quantity or dimensions thus determined, that is, thus proximately disposed, is so proper to this individual, that it cannot be in another. Nevertheless neither can the said authors speak in this sense, nor in that sense would their opinion be true. The first is evident, because they themselves say that quantity by its proper nature and formal effect distinguishes one individual from another, therefore this does not belong to it by reason of other qualities or dispositions, otherwise not matter designated by quantity, but quantified matter designated by qualities ought to be called the principle of individuation. The second is evident, because otherwise it follows that accidents, by which matter is disposed to form, are intrinsically included in the principle of individuation of substance, the consequent is false; therefore. The sequence is evident, because designated matter, according to this opinion, intrinsically and formally includes these accidents as inhering

in it and determining it to such a form. But the minor is proved first, because the individual of substance is per se one directly placed under species in the category of substance; therefore it does not intrinsically include accidents, since nevertheless it intrinsically includes the principle of individuation. Second, because it was shown above that the individual difference in reality is not distinct ex natura rei from substantial nature, and thus is the individual substance itself; therefore its intrinsic principle cannot be accident, but substance.

12. And these reasons can proceed also in another opinion, that quantity is not in prime matter, but in the whole composite; because quantity is accident; therefore in whatever subject it may be, it cannot intrinsically enter the constitution of substantial individual; therefore it cannot effect its distinction. Hence abstracting from those opinions, we can argue thirdly because, although a thing is prior by nature one in itself than distinct from others, nevertheless this latter intrinsically follows from the first without any positive addition which is made to the thing itself which is one, but only through negation, by which, another extreme being posited, it is true to say this is not that. Therefore that same positive thing which founds unity as to the first negation or indivision in itself, consequently founds the posterior negation of distinction from another, in which sense it is customarily said, and it is most true, that a thing is distinguished from others through that by which it is constituted in itself, because it is distinguished through that by which it is. In almost this sense St. Thomas said, I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2, that each thing has unity in the way it has being. And it is evident in specific unity, for the same difference, which constitutes the species one in itself, makes it distinct from other species; hence what is the principle of such difference is also the principle not only of unity, but also of specific distinction; therefore similarly in individual unity that, which is the principle of the individual as to its constitution, and incommunicability or indivisibility in itself, is also the principle of its distinction from others; and conversely, what is the principle of distinction, ought also

to be the principle of constitution. If therefore matter per se, and setting aside quantity constitutes the individual incommunicable and one in itself, it also distinguishes it from others, or, if it cannot give distinction, neither can it give the incommunicability of individuation. And it is confirmed. For incommunicable is said in this way of that which is so one in itself that it cannot be divided into many similar things; but what is of this kind, from this precisely has it that, if others exist, it is distinguished from them. And the same argument can be made conversely about quantity, that, if it is what distinguishes individuals of substance, it ought also to constitute them, or conversely, if it cannot constitute, as is more true, because, since it is accident, it is outside the whole latitude of substance, and rather supposes an individual subject, neither can it distinguish.

13. Some respond that this reason rightly proves that quantity does not effect the first distinction between individuals of substance, but nevertheless does not prove that it does not effect some distinction, namely, numerical and quantitative, which is sufficient so that quantity as to this part can intrinsically pertain to the principle of individuation. But this response labors in equivocation, for if quantity does not cause the first distinction, but another, I ask what is that which it supposes, and what is that which it causes; the prior surely can be no other than entitative distinction, by which this matter is not that, or this substance is not that. Both because no other prior distinction can be devised; and also because this is most intrinsic to any entity; for just as nothing can be conceived more intrinsic to each being, than its entity, so no distinction or separation from another being is prior to that which is explained by this negation: This being is not that; on account of which it cannot be understood that one entity is distinguished from another entitatively, and first, through something other than itself.

14. Hence also it happens (which is a new and sufficient argument against this whole opinion) that it does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity to distinguish entitatively one matter from

another, or part of matter from part of matter, because, just as quantity supposes matter as subject, so it supposes its individual entity, which through itself is entitatively distinct from another similar entity; therefore distinct quantities suppose distinct subjects in which they are received, and distinct parts of quantity, parts also of the subject entitatively distinct. For here also that argument of Cajetan has place, that singular act supposes singular potency, which is maximally true in act and potency really distinct. Especially since, when quantity is really distinct from the matter in which it is present, it cannot make it really distinct from itself; therefore it supposes in it an entity which per se can be distinguished from its quantity; therefore through the same it will be able to be distinguished from all others which are not itself; therefore this does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity. Which finally can be confirmed a posteriori; for, if God, quantity being separated, were to conserve the substance of Peter's body, for example, the partial entities of matter, which are in hands, feet, head, etc., would always remain entitatively distinct, whether they remained united, or not, because, although one entity can be conjoined to or separated from another, nevertheless that one should become another, or that both should coalesce into one indivisible, conserving their entity, is open repugnance, because they would both be distinct and not be distinct.

15. The distinction, therefore, which quantity supposes in substance, is entitative and substantial distinction; but this is what per se pertains to individual unity, concerning which we treat; for through this the individual is understood to be distinct from all others, either under the same species, if it is compared with similars, or also under genus, or under any common predicate, if it is compared with all others; therefore, if quantity confers some distinction, that will be per accidens to the nature of the individual, and supervening to it; therefore quantity will not pertain to the principle of individuation, concerning which we are treating, for that reason. Which is explained from the thing itself, for quantity, just as it gives quantitative unity to

substance, so it can only give either quantitative or situational distinction, of which the prior consists only in this that one substance is under diverse terms of quantity from another, and thus is not continuous to it with the continuity proper to quantity; but the posterior consists in this that one substance is outside the site or place of another. Hence also what is preserved is that quantity distinguishes just as it constitutes; for first it makes substance extended in itself, united and determined quantitatively and having this corporeal bulk, but consequently it makes it fill local space; and similarly it distinguishes primarily quantitatively, and then situally; but this whole distinction is outside the nature of individual substance, and accidental to it, just as quantity itself is.

16. Which indeed in situational distinction is per se evident, because it is very extrinsic and changeable, and however much a quantified thing changes site, it remains the same in number; indeed through God's power the same corporeal substance in number can be preserved, either without quantity, or with it without site, in the manner in which Christ's body is in the Eucharist. And similarly the same quantified thing can be constituted with double site through God's power, as I have shown at length in treating the mystery of the Eucharist[40] and two distinct bodies can be placed in the same site, and this has often been done by God, as was demonstrated in the matter of resurrection.[41] This situational distinction therefore contributes nothing to numerical unity and distinction. But concerning quantitative distinction, the same judgment is to be made as concerning quantity itself, and the unity proceeding from it, which we showed above to be accidental to the intrinsic and entitative unity of material substance; hence, although it naturally accompanies it in the manner of a property, nevertheless in the order of nature it supposes it, and is rather caused by it than causes it. And finally by absolute

[40] Tertio tom., in III part., disp. LII, sect. 3.

[41] Secundo tom., in III part., disp. XLVIII, sect. 5.

power a material substance could be preserved the same in number without its quantity, and consequently retain the whole individual unity with incommunicability and substantial distinction without quantitative unity and distinction.

17. Wherefore also Soncinas and Ferrariensis finally confess that material substance does not have transcendental unity from quantity, but nevertheless is one in number through quantity. But it is wonderful that they so easily turn away from the true sense of the question and use terms equivocally. For as we have often admonished and all suppose, and they themselves (as I think) are not ignorant, when we here treat of numerical unity, we do not take number, as it is a species of quantity, but as it can be found in any beings, as St. Thomas notes, Opusc. 16, c. ult., where in this way he says that even immaterial substance is one in number; in which way also Aristotle, in V Metaph. distinguished one in number, species, genus and proportion. This numerical unity therefore in each thing is transcendental, just as specific or formal unity in its own way is transcendental with respect to common nature; therefore, if material substance has transcendental individual unity, and not through quantity, quantity does not intrinsically pertain to the principle of individuation of substance. Add that in the way that substance is one in predicamental number through quantity, it is not only distinguished, but also constituted and made undivided in itself and quantitatively incommunicable through the same quantity; for quantity could not make something one in its genus, unless it also made it undivided, since the nature of one consists in this; if therefore they speak constantly and univocally about incommunicability and distinction of the same genus, they badly distribute these offices, attributing one to matter, another to quantity; but if now they speak of substantial incommunicability, later of quantitative distinction, they do not persist in the true sense of the question and admit equivocation in the use of words.

Disputation V

The Second Mode of Explaining Designated Matter is Rejected

18. The second exposition is that matter designated by quantity does not include quantity itself intrinsically, but as it is the term of the relation of matter to quantity itself. For matter is by its nature capable of quantity, but as such it cannot be the complete principle of individuation, because it is indifferent to any quantity whatsoever, just as it is to any form whatsoever. However, through the action of an agent preceding generation, it is determined to be capable of this quantity and not another, and matter thus determined is said to be the principle of individuation. By quantity, however, we understand in this context not only mathematical quantity (so to speak), but physical quantity, that is, quantity affected by physical qualities and dispositions. Cajetan explained this matter in this way in De Ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 5. Javellus follows this in V Metaph., q. 15, and before them Aegidius in Quodl. I, q. 5, a. 1. But this opinion displeased the same Cajetan in I, q. 29, a. 1, because of an argument which I shall relate below, and therefore he found another way of speaking (if indeed it is another way). For he says that it is not matter as it is in potency to this quantity, but as it virtually pre-possesses this quantity, or as it is the root and foundation of this quantity, that is the principle of individuation. Nevertheless, I do not sufficiently understand what these words signify that is distinct from the former view, because matter (especially in the opinion of Cajetan and other Thomists) does not pre-possess quantity in the genus of efficient causality, but quantity comes to be or results from form through an extrinsic agent. Therefore, it can only pre-possess quantity in the genus of material causality; but this is nothing other than having it in receptive potency, or (which is the same thing) having potency toward it. Just as matter as pre-possessing form can be nothing other than matter as it is in potency to form, or rather as it is in receptive potency of form, because it does not pre-possess otherwise than in the genus of material

causality—the same is true in the present case for the same reason. Therefore, all those words—matter as foundation, as root, as cause—come to the same thing, because matter is not the foundation of quantity except materially and passively, nor is it the root except as the first subject, nor the cause except materially, which consists in the nature of receptive potency from which form is educed. Therefore, under all those words nothing else can be understood except the potency of matter itself. For this reason, both Cajetan's own argument and those we shall make proceed equally against this opinion, and therefore it is not necessary to treat it as different.

19. With these views must also be joined another, which says that designated matter is nothing other than matter ultimately disposed to this form, because it is not disposed except by quantity affected by such qualities. But this opinion can be affirmed in two ways: first, by understanding that quantity and other dispositions inhere and remain in matter, and simply precede by natural order the introduction of form, and thus matter can rightly be understood as disposed and designated to form. However, to posit designated matter as the principle of individuation in this way is to fall into the previous opinion of Capreolus, because this designated matter intrinsically includes quantity and accidents, which it is impossible to include in the principle of individuation, as we have shown. But if it is said that these dispositions, although they inhere in matter, are nevertheless not included in the individual intrinsically and formally, but are like required conditions, this is contrary because hence the principle of individuation would be intrinsically and formally only something common to many individuals, namely, matter itself according to itself; but this is impossible, as we argued above. Hence this would not be to assign that which in itself and truly is the principle of individuation, but at most that which can be a sign of individuation for us, or an occasion for the production of such an individual with respect to the agent, concerning which modes we shall speak later. Therefore, this opinion can be taught in another way, supposing that quantity and

other dispositions do not inhere in matter, but in the composite, and as they constitute the ultimate disposition they follow form, and in this sense it is the same for matter to be disposed as to have order or determinate potency to this quantity with these dispositions; and in this way this mode of speaking coincides with the second exposition adduced.

20. I therefore judge this entire exposition to be false. And first, it supposes that matter does not have quantity and other dispositions inhering in it, which, although it may be probable, perhaps is not as probable as the contrary. Then, supposing that opinion, Cajetan argues in I, that the potency of matter for receiving quantity is in the genus of quantity, since potency and act are in the same genus, as Aristotle says in X Metaph.; therefore, neither can that potency to quantity intrinsically pertain to the principle of individuation of substance, otherwise the individual of substance would not be per se one, for it would consist of things from diverse categories. However, this argument taken by itself is not effective; for Javellus responds well that potency pertains to the genus of its primary act, to which it is ordered per se first, and from which it takes its species in its own way. But matter is not potency to quantity in such a way that it is ordered per se first to quantity, but to substantial form, and therefore it is not necessary that it pertain to the category of quantity. However, what Fonseca urges in favor of Cajetan in V Metaph., c. 6, q. 4, that although the potency of matter simply does not pertain to quantity, nevertheless as receptive of quantity it pertains to that category, this (I say) is not compelling, because that reduplication of matter, as receptive of quantity, does not add real potency to matter itself, but only according to our mode of conceiving and speaking explains that potency through relation to a secondary term, which is quantity, and therefore it is not necessary that for this reason it pertain to the category of quantity. Therefore, as regards the force of the argument founded on that maxim, that act and potency

are in the same genus, Javellus's response is good, as we shall say more extensively below when treating of the material cause of accidents.

21. Nevertheless, from the same response an effective argument is taken against this very opinion. For if the potency of matter first regards substantial form rather than quantity, therefore its potency is also determined first to this substantial form rather than to this quantity; therefore it is not designated or determined to this form through potency to this quantity. The first consequence is evident, both because potency is determined to act in a manner proportioned to itself—if therefore the potency itself is substantial and does not regard an accidental act except through what is substantial, it is not determined except with the same relation and proportion—and also because according to the opinion of these authors, in reality matter does not receive this quantity except through this form, and because it receives this form, therefore it receives this quantity; therefore similarly in potency its capacity is not determined to this quantity except insofar as it is determined to this form. The same argument also proceeds according to Cajetan's other way of speaking about matter as it pre-possesses quantity, because matter does not pre-possess quantity except insofar as it pre-possesses the form to which quantity follows; therefore neither does it pre-possess this quantity with these dispositions except insofar as it pre-possesses this form, to which this quantity and these dispositions follow; therefore it cannot be designated to this form in that it pre-possesses this quantity. Finally, the same form of argument proceeds against the other way of speaking about matter disposed by ultimate disposition, because matter is not determined to such ultimate disposition except through form; for we suppose that disposition is not received in matter, but in the composite; therefore matter cannot be designated either through relation to such disposition, or through the disposition itself as actually received, because in either way the determination of this matter to this form precedes simply, both according to relation and according to actual reception. But this argument proceeds concerning

ultimate disposition, which is in the instant of generation and follows form. If anyone should contend that matter is designated through immediately preceding dispositions, another way must be taken.

22. Hence I argue secondly and principally against this entire exposition[42], because matter of itself is indifferent to this quantity and these dispositions, and to others; but in the instant of generation (according to this opinion) by priority of nature before it receives substantial form, it is left bare of every accident and without any entity superadded to it; therefore it remains as indifferent as it exists of itself; therefore its potency is not determined to this quantity, because it cannot be understood that potency indifferent of itself should be determined without any addition or change made in it; therefore it is not designated through such potency thus indeterminate. The major premise is self-evident from the nature of matter. The minor premise is also self-evident in the principles of this opinion which we are attacking, because before substantial form nothing else substantial can be pre-understood as added to matter; for what would that be, or by what would it be made, or on what foundation, or for what purpose would it be posited? Nor indeed anything accidental, because no accident precedes in matter before substantial form, and in every opinion no accident precedes quantity itself in matter. Some say that in that instant a certain real mode distinct from matter by the nature of the thing is added to matter, preceding the introduction of substantial form with its quantity and other dispositions, and through this mode matter is designated, and some call that mode substantial, others accidental. But both speak gratuitously, nor can they explain or give reason for what they say, which is alien to the true method of philosophizing. For first I ask: to what end is this mode? They will say: so that matter may be determined to this form. On the contrary, matter itself is indifferent to this mode and to infinite others; by what then is matter determined to receive this mode in that instant rather than another? For if you say it is determined by another mode, we

[42] exposition, 1597; disposition, 1861, 1960. Cf. BHF, t. I, p. 620.

shall proceed to infinity; but if you say it is determined by immediately preceding dispositions, it will be better said that matter is immediately determined to form, and thus this mode is superfluous. Besides, the arguments by which we shall immediately show that matter cannot be determined to form through preceding dispositions prove in the same way that it cannot be determined through them to receive such a mode. But if finally it is said that matter receives this mode through the power of the agent without any preceding determination, why is the same not said of form? Therefore, this mode is interposed without reason or foundation.

23. Second, I shall ask when and by what this mode is made. For either it is made gradually while matter is disposed, or it is made in one instant, either preceding generation or in the very instant of generation. But none of these can be conveniently understood or explained. For if it is said to be made successively and gradually with dispositions, it will be intensifiable like them; therefore it will be some accident, and consequently will be corrupted in the instant of generation. Also, from this aspect the principle of individuation will be intensifiable and remissible; also matter will be sealed in itself and modified to form earlier in time than it receives that form. And consequently, since this mode is immediately repugnant to another mode of determination which matter has with respect to the form under which it exists, it follows that matter would also gradually lose that mode, and by the same reasoning it could be inferred that it would gradually and successively lose union with such form, all of which are absurd and improbable. The same things follow more clearly if this mode is posited as being made all at once in some instant before the instant of generation; for then matter would be simultaneously under one form and ultimately sealed to another, besides the fact that no reason can be given why it should be made in one instant rather than another, speaking of those cases in which matter is not apt to receive form. But if it is said to be made simultaneously in the instant of generation, it follows that matter is left bare by priority of nature

before it receives such a mode, and consequently nothing resists the agent from acting upon it as much as it can; therefore, just as the agent is said to act such a mode immediately, much better will it be said to act its form immediately.

24. Third, I shall ask what this mode is. For it is not substantial, first, because since it is neither nature nor part of nature, nor subsistence nor existence, it cannot be conceived what it is. Then, either it is entirely absolute even according to transcendental relation, and this will not be said consistently, both because through it matter is said to be determined to this form or quantity, and also because through it matter is said to be sealed; if therefore it is entirely absolute, designated matter will be something entirely absolute from quantity and from order to quantity, which is contrary to the aforesaid opinion. And almost the same argument will be made if that mode is posited with some transcendental relation; for in order that the mode be substantial, it is necessary that the primary term of that relation be substantial form and not quantity, and thus in no way will order to quantity pertain to the principle of individuation. But if that mode is posited as accidental, it cannot be explained what it is or to what category it should be reduced; it is also repugnant to that opinion that accidents are not in prime matter; it also follows that the principle of individuation is an accidental being composed of substance and accident, and that the individual adds above the species an accidental mode distinct from substance by the nature of the thing, which is entirely false.

25. For this reason others respond that the potency of matter in that instant is determined to this quantity by the agent itself without any real thing or intrinsic mode superadded to it. But this involves open contradiction. For either the discourse is about the agent as pre-understood in first act before its action, and in this way it is impossible that through it the intrinsic potency and capacity of matter should be determined, since they are entirely distinct things, and one as such in act does not change the other. Hence, if in that instant that agent were

annihilated before it acted on matter, and another were applied, it would introduce a distinct form proportioned to itself into the same matter. But if the discourse is about the agent in second act, or about its action, it implies understanding that the agent through its action determines matter and places nothing intrinsic in it to determine it, because such action of the agent is in the patient, in which it necessarily has some term.

26. It can be responded that the agent determines matter through its action, not which it has in the instant of generation, but which it had immediately before that instant. This response coincides with that opinion which says that dispositions which immediately preceded leave the potency of matter determined, even if they leave nothing real in it. This indeed cannot be understood concerning intrinsic and positive determination, because of the argument made, that the capacity of matter is of itself universal and indifferent; therefore it cannot be limited intrinsically unless something is added to it, or it is changed in itself in some way; but nothing of this kind happens in it. But that relation to preceding dispositions is only a certain relation of reason, or extrinsic determination. And this is confirmed. For if preceding dispositions determine matter, they do so either effectively or formally; for they can have no other genus of causality—those accidents in matter. For although in comparison with form they are said to concur materially, nevertheless with respect to matter they do not, because they are not compared to it as potency but as act; therefore they can only determine it formally or effectively. But not formally, because a form that does not exist has no real formal effect; hence just as matter in that instant lost those accidental forms, it lost all their formal effects. Nor effectively either, for the same reason, because what does not exist does not effect anything, and also because matter receives nothing before form, as has been shown. Therefore, the potency of matter determined intrinsically to this quantity cannot be understood in any way, so that in this way it can be the principle of individuation. And this entire discourse can be

applied against Cajetan's later mode of speaking, because matter of itself does not pre-possess this quantity more than another, or is the root of this one more than another; I ask therefore by what it is determined so that in that instant of generation it pre-possesses this quantity more than another, or is the root of this one rather than another, and the entire argument made returns. This also proceeds in the same way against the other mode of explaining designated matter, that it is matter disposed through preceding dispositions (for concerning subsequent ones enough has already been said in the first argument and in the arguments made against Capreolus's opinion). For those dispositions leave nothing in matter, since they are entirely corrupted, as is supposed; therefore they cannot leave it intrinsically and positively disposed, as is proven by the arguments made. For whether you say disposed or determined, it is the same thing; for the same reality underlies these words.

27. But I always say intrinsically and positively, because negatively, by force of preceding dispositions, matter is left not repugnant to the introduction of this form, which is rather to remain indifferent than determined. Again, extrinsically it can be said to be here and now naturally determined to receive this form, because perhaps by a certain natural consequence this agent here and now concerning this subject immediately after this alteration is by natural order determined to introduce this form. But this is really rather a determination of the agent than of matter, and therefore this determination cannot make matter be the intrinsic principle of individuation, but pertains to the extrinsic principle, which is on the part of the agent. Especially since also according to this mode of determination the agent is understood to be determined to introduce this form before it is determined to introduce this quantity and other dispositions; for it induces this form per se, but this quantity and dispositions insofar as they result from this form, according to the opinion we are pursuing. Hence finally a general argument can be constructed, because matter is not disposed or determined per se first

except to this form and on account of this form, and by reason of that form it receives these accidents; and therefore, according to itself and by natural order, form cannot be this form on account of these accidents, nor on account of order to them, and consequently nor through matter designated through order to any accidents; therefore matter designated in that mode explained cannot be the principle of individuation.

Third Exposition of the Same Opinion About Designated Matter

28. The third explanation is that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first, according to itself, that is, insofar as it truly is the principle constituting the individual as such, and is the root or foundation from which the individual difference is taken. Second, we can speak of the principle of individuation in order to the production or multiplication of individuals, which is to seek what is the principle and root on account of which substantial individuals are multiplied, or why this individual is produced rather than another, or why it is produced distinct from the rest. Again, in either consideration can be sought that which is the principle per se and in itself of individuation, or only that which in order to us is the principle of distinguishing one individual from another, or which is only the occasion of such distinction. First, therefore, speaking of the principle constituting the individual in reality and from which the individual difference contractive of the species and constitutive of the individual is truly taken, this opinion denies that matter designated by quantity is the principle of individuation, because the discourses made seem to conclude this.

29. Second, this opinion says that matter is the principle and root of the multiplication of individuals in material substances. This is proved because it is the origin of generations and corruptions, through which the multiplication of individuals occurs. Also, because the

composite from such matter by reason of it is corruptible, and hence has it that it cannot be perpetually conserved; and therefore, so that the species may be conserved, multiplication of individuals is required; therefore the root of this multiplication is matter. And it can also be added that this root is matter affected by quantity, because matter without quantity would not be capable of physical alteration and change through various and contrary dispositions, from which this variety and multiplication of individuals is born. But this function does not belong to matter as designated and determined to a certain form or quantity, but absolutely according to itself, because thus far we have not dealt with the root of this individual in particular, but absolutely with the root of multiplication of individuals in the same species. But matter is not the root of this multiplication absolutely insofar as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather insofar as it is determinable to many. You will say: in this way matter will also be said to be the root of multiplication of species in generable and corruptible substances; for they can be multiplied from the same matter because it is capable of all forms and according to itself indifferent to them and to their various dispositions. It is responded that the reason is not similar. For although that property of matter is necessary for the aforesaid multiplication, nevertheless it is not properly the first root of that variety, both because, since all matter itself is of one species and its parts or portions according to themselves are distinguished only numerically, it is of itself content with forms distinguished numerically, and also because specific distinction is per se in things, and therefore radically comes from form, which per se gives species, and therefore this distinction is found without controversy in material and immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible things, which is not established concerning numerical distinction, nor does it appear so necessary.

30. Third, this opinion says that matter designated by quantity is the principle and root, or at least the occasion, of the production of this individual distinct from the rest. This is explained:

for this individual can be compared either to other existing individuals or to other possible ones which can be produced from the same matter, even by the same agent. In the first way, the sufficient and first reason why this individual is produced distinct from the rest is that it is produced from numerically diverse matter, because since the same form numerically cannot be in diverse total matters numerically, by this very fact that matter is numerically diverse, it is necessary that form be at least numerically diverse. Hence for this distinction it is not necessary to add other dispositions or another designation of matter, because numerical distinction of matter according to itself suffices, or with its quantity, which nevertheless does not suffice so that this matter be the root of distinction of this individual from others which do not exist, or which have been made or can be made from the same matter. Hence some have said that Aristotle did not assign a principle of individuation by which an individual is distinguished from all things which do not exist, because these are sufficiently distinguished by contradiction alone; but he assigned only the principle distinguishing in the aforesaid way one individual from other existing ones, which Fonseca taught in lib. V, c. 6, q. 4, sect. 4, and he relates this from Hervaeus, Quodl. V, q. 9, and Cajetan, c. 2, De Ente et essent., q. 5. But it should be added that through matter considered in the aforesaid way, an individual is distinguished not only from other existing ones, but also from any other possible ones, even non-existing ones, which can be generated from other numerically distinct matters, especially in those whose forms are educed from matter, because it is very probable that the same form numerically cannot be educed from diverse matters numerically, not only simultaneously but not even successively. But in individuals which can be generated from the same matter numerically, the distinction of one existing individual from another existing one has no place, because several individuals consisting of the same matter numerically cannot exist simultaneously, and therefore such distinction is always of an existing thing from a non-existing one.

31. But although this contradictory opposition is a sufficient argument for the distinction of such individuals, nevertheless the principle and root can still be investigated of why they are so distinguished that, with one existing, another does not exist, or why this form numerically is introduced into this matter rather than another which could be made. For the cause of this cannot be given from prime matter alone, since the same matter is successively in either individual, which is perhaps also true of quantity coeval with matter itself. Therefore, other dispositions and circumstances of action must be added, namely, that from this subject thus prepared and disposed at this time, by this agent, this action is made. For here it happens that, although prime or remote matter is the same, nevertheless from it this individual is made distinct from all others which either have been made from it or can be made from it, because production occurs with diverse dispositions and circumstances. And this is confirmed and explained: for fire, for example, is of itself capable of producing several forms similar to itself in species and numerically distinct, and yet here and now in this matter it introduces this form numerically rather than others, which determination cannot come from fire itself, since it is a natural agent and of itself equally capable of introducing any form whatsoever; nor can it come from the form to be educed, because it does not yet exist, nor does it have whence it might determine the power of the agent; nor does it come from remote matter, because that too is of itself equally indifferent; therefore it comes either from dispositions, if they remain in matter, or from the natural order of acting here and now with these circumstances. For no other natural cause can easily be devised. For what some think, that this should be referred to divine will, although it has truth in those effects which are made immediately by God himself, nevertheless to attribute this to all natural causes does not seem philosophical, and in theology it has a special difficulty because of the determination of free acts, and especially evil ones, which we shall touch upon below when treating of God's concurrence with secondary

causes. Therefore, in this way matter designated and affected by these circumstances is the principle or occasion of such individuation, because neither does matter suffice without circumstances, as has been said, nor circumstances without matter; for if matter is diverse, the effect will also be diverse.

32. You will say: therefore the same matter will be the intrinsic constitutive principle of the individual in its being; for as a thing is related to becoming, so also to being. It is responded by denying the consequence, both because it is one thing for this thing to be such an individual, another for this individual to be produced now rather than another, and therefore these can come from diverse roots; and also because according to this explanation matter designated is not so much the principle of individuation as the occasion of inducing this form in a subject rather than another. But that form is not this form because it is made in this subject, at this time, and by this agent, because these are accidental to it according to itself, and the same form numerically could be made by God without these circumstances, and speaking of dispositions, rather those are ordered to such a form than conversely. Therefore, matter designated in the said way can only be the occasion why this form is produced by a natural agent from the natural order by which the power of the natural agent is determined to effect such an effect rather than another in such a subject applied and affected by such circumstances.

33. Fourth, this opinion adds that matter designated by sensible quantity is said to be the principle of individuation in regard to us, because through it we know the distinction of material individuals among themselves. Thus St. Thomas in Opusc. 32, De Natura materiae et dimensionibus indeterminatis, c. 3, says that from this prime matter and this form an individual of substance is made, nevertheless it is not demonstrable here and now without determinate dimensions; and therefore (he says) matter under certain dimensions is said to be the cause of individuation, not that dimensions cause the individual, since accident does not cause its subject, but because

through certain dimensions the individual is demonstrated here and now, as through a proper sign of the individual and inseparable from it. And the same is indicated in Opusc. 29, De Principio individuationis. Hence, when in other places St. Thomas signifies that the individual adds accidents above specific nature, as in I, q. 3, and Quodl. II, a. 4, and q. 2 De Verit., a. 6, ad 1, and other places cited above, he seems to be expounded in order to our knowledge. For it is that sign by which we distinguish one individual from another a posteriori, not truly that by which it is distinguished in itself, as St. Thomas himself seems to have explained in other places or opuscula cited, and to have proved by excellent reason, namely, because accident does not cause its subject, especially since the same St. Thomas in I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 9, De Potentia, a. 1, ad 8, says that substance is individuated through itself and through its proper principles, but accidents are individuated through substance; therefore when in other places he posits accidents or order to accidents among those things which individuate substance, he must necessarily be expounded either in regard to our knowledge or in regard to the occasion which they provide to the production of such an individual substance, as has been explained. But this is attributed to matter by reason of quantity rather than by reason of qualities, because the numerical distinction of qualities themselves is known to us chiefly from quantity; for if two images are very similar to each other, we distinguish them in no other way than by numbering them in diverse quantified subjects. And in the same sense it seems that quantities themselves should be understood to be distinguished numerically from positions; for this is true in regard to us; for we distinguish and number them sensibly because we perceive them in diverse positions; but it is not true according to itself, for rather quantities occupy diverse positions because they are distinct in themselves. Therefore, only because quantity by its nature has this, that it constitutes part outside part, body outside body, in order to position, is it a more suitable principle for distinguishing material individuals in order to us.

Section III

Resolution of the Question

34. This entire opinion is indeed probable in itself and once pleased me; nevertheless I fear whether according to it the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas is sufficiently explained, both because, otherwise very incompletely and with great equivocation, they would have handed down to us the principle of individuation, if, omitting that which truly and in itself is the constitutive principle of the individual, they had handed down to us only a posteriori signs, or occasions of distinguishing or producing individuals; and especially because from this principle they seem to have inferred that in things separated from matter several individuals are not given, because this kind of principle of individuation is not given. Also, what was said in that opinion about the determination of agents to particular effects and forms, from matter with circumstances of action, seems difficult to believe to many learned men, because if the matter is considered attentively, everything is reduced to the circumstance of time, which seems very extrinsic for such determination to be able to come from it. But concerning this last point I shall speak more conveniently in the following section. Concerning the other point truly pertaining to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas, as regards St. Thomas, it is established that that exposition is founded on other places and words of his, which cannot be reconciled otherwise. But as regards Aristotle, he does not seem ever to have investigated and explained this principle ex professo and metaphysically, but only to have taught in physical manner from sensible things how to distinguish one material individual from another. But what the said authors inferred from this, that in immaterial substances there is no multiplication of individuals in the same species, can at most have this probable sense, namely, that we do not have reasons and principles for distinguishing spiritual substances numerically distinct such as we have in material ones. Indeed, many extend this also to incorruptible material substances, in

which also we do not have as many principles for knowing or positing numerical distinction in them as we have in corruptible substances, concerning which all the things that have been said chiefly proceed. Finally, what Aristotle said in I De Caelo, that there cannot be another world besides this one, because in this is all matter, certainly seems to have understood either that God created the world from matter and cannot create matter itself, or that God acts from necessity of nature and therefore cannot create more matter than he created, or certainly that God is so determined in his mode of acting that he cannot establish any integral and material substance in time from nothing, as we shall see in the course of this work. Therefore, from that opinion it is only collected for the present, from Aristotle's mind, that material substances are not multiplied except from matter. But whatever may be about the mind of these authors, it is established from this opinion thus explained that the proper and internal principle of individual difference is not handed down to us even in material things. For the arguments made against this opinion expounded in other ways plainly conclude that designated matter cannot be such a principle.

SECTION IV

WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES

1. There is another principal opinion in this matter, namely that the internal principle of individuation is the substantial form. This is usually attributed to Durandus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, who does not entirely affirm it, as I shall say later; but it seems to have been taught by Averroes, I de Anima, c. 7, and lib. II, in principio, and com. 7, 8 and 9, and 60, and III Phys., com. 60, and lib. IV, com. 38; Avicenna is also cited, VI Natural., part. I, saying that form gives numerical unity to the subject; Zimara holds this view, Theorem. 97; and Sebastian,

bishop of Osma, II de Anima, c. 1. Aristotle also favors this, ibid., when he says that form is what constitutes "this something" (hoc aliquid). And from this word of Aristotle the principal foundation of this opinion must be taken; for the principle of individuation ought to be that which intrinsically constitutes this substance, and is most proper to it; therefore, by reason of the first property, it ought to be something substantial; for accidents, as has often been said, neither constitute substance nor this substance; for this substance, even as it is this, is a being per se and substantial. By reason of the second property, however, this principle cannot be matter, but form, because this matter is not most proper to this individual, since it can exist under other forms; therefore form is the principle of individuation.

2. Hence I argue secondly, because the same thing is the principle of unity as of entity, on account of which St. Thomas said, quaest. unica, de Anima, a. 1, ad 2, that each thing has being and individuation according to the same principle. But each thing properly has being from form; therefore also individual unity. The major premise is evident, because unity is a property consequent upon entity, and adds nothing to it except negation; therefore it cannot have another positive and real principle except what is the principle of entity itself.

3. But someone might object against this opinion and reasoning, because, although it correctly proves that form contributes to unity, it does not prove that it alone is the principle of individuation; for matter is also an intrinsic principle constituting the entity of a thing, and therefore it will also be a principle of individuation, if not alone, at least together with form. One could respond according to the opinion of Durandus, In IV, dist. 44, q. 1, that form has the power not only of individuating the composite, but also matter itself, because form not only gives being to the composite, but also to matter; whence it happens (he says) that by the very fact that matter is joined to the same form numerically, it is itself the same numerically. But this opinion of Durandus is false, and is deservedly

rejected by other theologians, as I showed in the second tome, III part, disp. XLIV, sect. 2. For one and the same matter numerically, which was in the corrupted thing, remains in the generated thing, otherwise there would not be the same subject numerically, from which generation occurs. Likewise, because it is impossible that either a thing which was previously numerically distinct from another should afterwards become that thing, or the same numerically with that thing indivisibly, or that a thing which was one numerically should afterwards become entirely another numerically distinct thing; therefore matter which under the form of food is one numerically cannot become another numerically, by the fact that it begins to be under the form of soul; and the matters of Peter and Paul, which are numerically distinct, will not become one numerically, even if they are successively under the form of Peter and Paul. Finally, otherwise the same matter numerically, once annihilated, would be restored by the mere union of other matter to the same form; and we speak of true unity according to real and physical entity, and not only according to appearance, or the common mode of speaking, by which mode a thing that is in continuous flux, and changes only gradually, is accustomed to be called one; for thus, even if change occurs in form, such unity can be preserved, as is evident in a river, or in a tree or animal.

4. Therefore, the response is otherwise: it is indeed true that the adequate intrinsic cause of the individual unity of material substance is form and matter, as the argument concludes; nevertheless, if these two are compared among themselves, the principal cause of this unity is form, and in this sense individuation is specially attributed to it as its principle. Just as matter is also necessary for the specific nature or unity; for the nature of man or humanity as such cannot be constituted without matter, and the same is true of the generic nature of animal, living thing, etc.; and nevertheless the specific nature is said absolutely to be taken from form, because that gives the ultimate complement, and only presupposes matter as something potential and indifferent; therefore by the same reasoning,

that will be called the principle of individuation, because it gives the ultimate substantial complement to the individual, although it presupposes matter as potential in itself and indifferent, on account of which Aristotle said above, and I Phys., c. 7, text. 69, that form constitutes "this something." And since, as we said above, a thing is distinguished by the same principle by which it is constituted, the same form which constitutes "this something" distinguishes it from others, because it is act that distinguishes, VII Metaph., c. 13, text. 49; therefore form is what completes the nature of the individual. And this is confirmed by the common mode of conceiving and speaking; for if to the soul of Peter, for example, a body consisting of matter distinct from the body which he previously had were united, although that composite would not be the same in every respect as it was before, nevertheless, speaking simply, that individual is said to be the same by reason of the same soul; but on the contrary, if to a body consisting of the same matter a soul numerically distinct were united, it is simply not considered the same individual, but distinct; therefore it is a sign that individuation is taken principally from form.

5. But it is still objected against this opinion and the reasoning made, because, although form as such gives specific being, nevertheless it does not give individual and numerical being except as it is this; therefore not form as such, but that from which the form itself has that it is this, is the principle of individuation; but it is this by reason of matter; therefore matter is rather the first root of individuation. The minor is proved first, because form is not this through itself; otherwise the same could be said of any entity, nor would it be necessary to seek another principle of individuation; therefore it is this through matter, for no other root can be conceived. Second, because form has its whole being in order to matter; therefore also its individuation; therefore matter is the principle of individuation of form, and consequently of the whole composite. Third, because forms are multiplied numerically, insofar as they are received in diverse matters, and therefore separated forms are not

multiplied numerically, because they are not received in matter; therefore they are also individuated through order to matter; therefore the ultimate resolution of this individuation is made to matter; for this form is this, because it is received in such matter; therefore the first root of individuation is matter.

6. These objections are the foundations of the opinion treated in the preceding section, which rather declare and confirm this opinion which we now treat. For they can almost all be retorted, and made about matter itself. I therefore concede that form is not the principle of individuation of the composite according to its specific nature, as is per se evident, but insofar as it is this; but this same thing must be said of matter, because matter also has a specific and common nature, according to which it is not sufficient to constitute an individual; therefore, if it constitutes, it does this insofar as it is this. I therefore ask again whence it has that it is this. Some respond, because God willed to create this rather than another; but this is beside the point, for we are not here inquiring about the extrinsic principle of individuation, but the intrinsic; otherwise someone could also say that this soul is this, because God willed to infuse it rather than another; or this form is this, because God determined his concurrence to it, as is highly probable, as we shall say in the following section. Others respond that this matter is this by reason of this quantity. But this is both false, and does not remove the difficulty. The first is evident from what was said above, because, since this matter is simply presupposed to this quantity, it cannot be individuated through it. Likewise, because the reasons made above universally prove that nothing substantial can be individuated through a superadded accident; for this matter is also something per se one constituted under the specific nature of matter, per se contracting it. Indeed, from the nature of the thing, matter and this matter are not distinguished, as was shown above concerning any individual in respect to the common nature; therefore this matter cannot be intrinsically individuated through quantity, which is a thing distinct from it, nor through order to it, since

rather this quantity bespeaks order to this matter, than conversely. The second about quantity is evident, because concerning it I shall also inquire whence it is this, since it does not have this from its specific nature, and since one must not proceed to infinity, nor commit a vicious and useless circle, one must rest in some thing, which through itself is this; therefore this should rather be attributed to substance than to accident, since that is prior and a more absolute entity; or, if it must be admitted that two incomplete entities are individuated through mutual relation to each other, according to diverse genera of causes, this should rather be said of matter and substantial form among themselves, than with some accident, because they are more per se connected, and mutually regard each other. Therefore all the arguments made can conclude the same thing about matter as they intend about form, for there is a certain equality between them in this regard. And on the other hand, matter only surpasses form in this, that it is a certain occasion for producing various and individual forms, as was declared above; but form surpasses matter in this, that it principally constitutes the individual, and that it is more proper to it, and that matter is rather for the sake of form than conversely, as is said II Phys., c. 9, text. 91; therefore, all things considered, the most powerful principle of individuation is form.

Resolution of the Question

7. Therefore this opinion, as expounded by us, is sufficiently probable, and approaches closely to the truth. But it must be said simply that form alone is not the full and adequate principle of individuation of material things, if we speak of their total entity, although it is the principal one, and therefore according to the formal mode of speaking it is sometimes considered sufficient for the denomination of the same individual. All of which must be declared and proved at length, sect. 6.

SECTION V
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE SINGULAR THING

1. There have been those who affirmed this, whose opinion is reported by Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 3; and Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 32; and Henry indicates it, Quodl. II, q. 8; and Carthusianus attributes it to him, and inclines toward it, In II, dist. 3. But Fonseca, lib. V, c. 6, q. 2, sect. 2, reports Henry, Quodl. V, q. 8, denying that individuation occurs through existence; nor through anything intrinsic, but through the agent alone. But this, as it is improbable per se, so it is asserted by no one that I have seen, for, although the agent is the extrinsic cause of the individual, nevertheless what it effects is distinct from the agent itself; but it effects the individual and confers upon it an individual nature; therefore that by which the nature is individual is something intrinsic to the individual itself. And so Henry, ibidem, expressly concedes that that by which the individual has being as this is something besides matter and besides the agent, which he explains as being the nature or disposition of the supposit. Hence he seems to hold that subsistence is the principle of individuation in all created substances, and so in the former place he had spoken under distinction of existence or subsistence, and therefore something must be said about each.

2. The opinion therefore about existence is rejected by all, as entirely false and improbable; but one can proceed in it in two ways: first, supposing existence to be really distinct from the essence of the individual; second, according to the opinion asserting that existence is nothing other than the actual entity of each thing. In this latter way this opinion coincides in reality with the opinion asserting that each thing is individuated by itself, and needs no other principle of individuation, besides its own entity; whence in reality this opinion is

not worthy of greater reproach than that which we shall speak of later. It can only be reproved because it uses obscure and ambiguous terms, and because it attributes this nature of individuation to existence rather than to essence, when rather existence cannot have this, except insofar as it is the same as essence. But if one proceeds in the former opinion, it will indeed be formally true that each thing in the nature of existing has some individual nature from existence itself, just as this white thing, as to the formal nature of white, is constituted by whiteness, although simply this white thing, because it is taken for the subject, is not constituted by whiteness. Hence also in the present case, speaking materially (so to speak) of the existing thing, or of this essence numerically, it is improbable to say that it is individuated by the existence by which it exists, if this is a thing distinct from it, or a mode really diverse from nature.

3. First indeed, because essence, remaining within the latitude of essence, becomes individual, and in it the specific essence is contracted and determined; but specific essence is not contracted by something really distinct from itself, as was proved above; therefore it is not contracted to individual essence through existence. The major premise is per se evident, both because man, for example, is of himself common to many individuals, whether they exist or do not exist; and also because Peter and Paul, as they abstract from actual existence, or as possible, intrinsically include their individual natures, by which they are distinguished; and finally because specific or essential differences belong to species by necessary connection, according to which propositions in which essential predicates are predicated are said to be of perpetual truth; so the individual difference belongs to the individual. Hence as necessarily as Peter is this man, so is he man, and as necessarily as Peter is placed under man, so is man under animal; therefore this contraction and subordination is not made through actual existence, which contingently comes to essence fully constituted and individuated.

4. Second, here the argument related above from Cajetan has place, that singular act presupposes singular potency, which principle we said is true in act and potency really distinct, because then potency is really presupposed to act by order of nature, and is something one distinct from its act, and one not by thought, but in reality, and therefore it cannot happen that it formally and intrinsically has unity from its act. But so are essence and existence compared according to the aforesaid opinion; therefore essence, in the way by which it per se has entity of essence distinct from existence and apt to be actuated by it, so also has its unity and individuation. Otherwise it would be necessary to understand existence to be the act of specific and universal nature, which is sufficiently absurd.

5. Third, because in existence itself there can be considered the common nature of human existence, for example, and the nature of this existence of Peter or Paul; therefore concerning existence itself it remains to be inquired by what it becomes this; not indeed from essence, since it does not presuppose that as individual according to this opinion, but as common; nor from some accident, as is per se evident, and sufficiently proved in the above; from what therefore? If you say it becomes this by itself, why will you not say this with greater reason of essence, since it is both prior by order of nature and also by perfection, and since it is in some way more absolute? For existence is the act of this essence; hence this existence will rather be this because it actuates this essence; just as in general also the existence of man and lion differ, because they either follow, or regard diverse essences, supposing the aforesaid distinction. From which a new confirmation can be taken, because, just as human existence in general is outside the essence of man in general, so this existence of Peter is outside this individual essence of Peter, and just as in Peter and Paul there are two existences numerically, so two humanities numerically, having distinct individual entities of essence. Finally the argument a posteriori is, because (supposing that opinion) the same individual entity is conserved without its existence, or changes various existences, as the

humanity of Christ in that opinion lacks proper existence, and yet is individual, and has an intrinsic principle of individuation; similarly the same entity numerically of prime matter, as it changes forms, is said to change existences, and yet always remains the same numerically.

6. From these things, however, it is easily understood what should be thought of that opinion, if it speaks not of proper existence, but of subsistence. For either we speak formally of the supposit, or of nature in the abstract, or in the concrete and formally of the individual, as contained under such a species of substance, namely of this man. In the first way it is true that the supposit is individuated through this subsistence, because it is formally constituted through it, and for this reason in the Trinity there are three supposits, although there is one nature, because there are three subsistences; but the person of Christ is one numerically, and one supposit numerically, although it has a double nature, because it only has one subsistence numerically; therefore the supposit as such is individuated through subsistence. Although concerning subsistence itself the question remains, by what it becomes this; for also the nature of subsistence, for example, human, is common and specific; but in Peter there is this subsistence numerically, or that, concerning which question the same must be said as concerning other substances, or substantial modes, which we shall see below.

7. In the second way, that is, speaking of substantial nature integral in the abstract, for example, humanity, it is false and improbable that it is individuated through subsistence, as is evident a fortiori from all the arguments made about existence. For it is certain that subsistence is something really distinct from substantial nature, even individually taken. It is also certain that such a nature can be conserved as individual without its connatural subsistence, as it is conserved in Christ the Lord; therefore it cannot be intrinsically individuated through it. But if someone perhaps says that it is individuated at least through order to it, he will say this gratuitously and without foundation, because, if one thing is to be individuated

through order to another, rather subsistence is this through order to this nature, than conversely, because nature is prior and more perfect, but subsistence is only a certain mode and term of nature. Likewise in the divine nature we find one unique individual nature with triple subsistence; therefore it is a sign that the individuation of nature is absolute from subsistence.

8. Wherefore in this Henry seems clearly to have erred, for he holds that nature itself becomes this and individual by reason of the supposit. Concerning which he also teaches another thing entirely false and improbable, namely, that the supposit only adds above specific nature a double negation, of indivisibility in itself and of division from any other, and through this double negation the nature becomes formally individual without any other positive thing superadded to the specific nature, in which three false things are contained. The first is that the supposit only adds negation above nature, concerning which we shall see later in its place; for, speaking with respect to individual nature, this is less improbable, although not true; nevertheless with respect to specific nature it is entirely improbable. Second, it is false that individual nature above the specific only adds negation, as is evidently clear from what was said in the second section, because otherwise substantial individual nature, as such, would not be a real being, but would be only specific nature with negations, which cannot even be conceived by the mind. Likewise because that negation requires a positive foundation, which cannot be the specific nature alone, as was sufficiently shown there. The third is more false, that through those very negations, by which (according to Henry) the supposit is constituted, the nature becomes individual; for from this it follows that either Christ's humanity is not individual, or it is a supposit; but both are errors. The consequence is declared; for, since in that double negation it is said to be undivided in itself and divided from any other, either this "to be divided from any other" signifies not to be united to another, or not to be in another, and this either is not of the nature of individual substantial nature, or Christ's

humanity is not individual; or to be divided from another (which Henry openly holds), removes only identity, and signifies distinction from any other entity, or similar nature, and in this way that double negation does not suffice for the nature of the supposit, or Christ's humanity is a supposit; therefore in no way does subsistence, in whatever way its nature is explained, pertain to the individuation of nature.

9. Rather, speaking also in the third way in the concrete and formally of the individual of specific nature, it must be said that it per se speaking does not take its individuation from subsistence, but from nature. For thus theologians say that if three persons assumed one humanity, there would be one man numerically, just as now there is one God numerically on account of one divine nature; therefore that man would have numerical unity from individual nature. And Christ the Lord now, insofar as he is this man, is the same man numerically who he would be if he subsisted in his proper nature, although nevertheless the person and subsistence are very diverse from the proper and connatural to such humanity, therefore the individuation of this man is not to be taken from subsistence, but from nature. The reason indeed is, because the individual is formally constituted under the species by reason of nature and not by reason of subsistence; whence it happens that although it may happen that the subsistence is diverse in species or genus, nevertheless, if the nature is of the same species, the individual is contained univocally and most properly under such a species, for which reason Christ is univocally man with other men; and by similar reasoning, if the nature is the same numerically, it is the same man numerically even if the subsistence is diverse.

10. Conclusion of the Whole Question. I said however per se speaking, because here the question insinuated itself, whether with double nature there can be the same individual numerically on account of unity of subsistence; for thus it is disputed by theologians, whether, if the divine Word assumed two humanities, there would be

one man or several. For from what was said it seems to follow that there would be several men numerically on account of several humanities numerically, because it was said that the individuation of the concrete is taken from individual nature. Nevertheless, as I said in the first tome, III part, with St. Thomas, he would be called simply and in the common mode of speaking one man, not indeed per se and formally, but as it were materially by reason of the supposit, in the way that one is called one artificer who has several arts, not only numerically, but also specifically distinct. But this unity is diverse from the preceding, which is taken from unity of nature, nor is it the unity of the individual formally contained under the species, as the argument proves; just as also the unity of the artificer having several specifically distinct arts is not the unity of the species contained under the genus, but is material or suppositial unity, which is considered sufficient for that mode of speaking, on account of the real or substantial union of several natures in one supposit, because the substantive name signifies nature by the mode of something standing per se, as was explained more broadly in the said place. Therefore from all these things it is sufficiently evident that the principle of individuation of substantial nature, or of the individual constituted through it, is not correctly constituted in subsistence or existence.

SECTION VI

WHAT IS FINALLY THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN ALL CREATED SUBSTANCES

1. From what has been said thus far against the preceding opinions, it seems to be left by a sufficient enumeration of parts that every singular substance is singular through itself, or through its own

being[43], and needs no other principle of individuation beyond its own being, or beyond the intrinsic principles of which its being consists. For if such a substance, considered physically, is simple, it is individual from itself and from its simple being; but if it is composite, for example, from matter and form united, just as the principles of its being are matter, form, and their union, so the same taken in the individual are the principles of its individuation; but these, since they are simple, will be individual through themselves. This opinion was held by Aureolus apud Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2; and Durandus substantially holds it, In II, dist. 3, q. 2. But Fonseca, referring to it in V Metaph., c. 6, q. 3, says in sect. 2 that it is the most confused of all, and that if it is reduced to its true sense, it leaves the question unsolved. Yet it seems to me the clearest of all, and that both he himself and almost all others finally fall into it, because truly the foundation of unity cannot be distinguished from being itself. Hence, just as individual unity formally cannot add anything positively real above individual being, because in this respect the same reasoning applies to it as to all unity, so the positive foundation of this unity, with respect to the negation which it expresses, can add nothing positive, speaking physically, to that being which is denominated one and individual; therefore that being through itself is the foundation of this negation, and in this sense it is said by that opinion to be through itself the principle of individuation. For this opinion does not deny that in that individual being a common nature can be distinguished by reason from singular being, and in this way[44] the individual adds above the species something rationally distinct, which, according to metaphysical consideration, has the character of an individual difference, as was said in the preceding section and as Durandus does not deny, but rather seems to suppose. But nevertheless this opinion adds (which properly pertains to the present question) that this

[43] se ipsa, seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem, 1597, 1600, 1960; 1861 om.

[44] modo, 1960 add.; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. I, p. 645

individual difference does not have in the individual substance some special principle or foundation that is really distinct from its being; and therefore in this sense it says that each being is through itself the principle of its own individuation. This opinion is therefore true when correctly explained; yet so that it may become clearer, we shall declare it individually in all substantial things.

By What is Prime Matter Individuated

2. First, therefore, beginning from prime matter, it must be said that it is individual in reality, and the foundation of such unity is its being through itself, as it exists in reality without any extrinsic addition. This is proved because the matter which is under this form of wood is numerically different from that which is under the form of water or man; therefore it is individual and singular in itself. But the foundation of such unity in it is not substantial form, nor the relation to this or that form, as was proved above against Durandus, because when any substantial form is changed, the same matter numerically always remains, which, although it is actually united to this or that form, nevertheless from itself expresses a common and indifferent relation to whatever form it can receive. Again, neither can quantity be the foundation of this individual unity of matter, as the same argument proves, if it is true that matter loses and acquires various quantities as substantial forms are varied. Also because according to the same opinion, matter is by nature prior to receiving quantity, and is subject to the action of an agent inducing form or quantity; but it is not subject except as individual and singular, because actions are about singulars. But if we hold that the same quantity is coeval with matter, the same argument can be accommodated, at least in order to God's power; for God can take away this quantity from this matter and give another, or preserve it entirely without quantity; therefore the same matter numerically would exist without the same quantity numerically; therefore quantity is not the foundation of such unity in

matter itself, otherwise it could in no way preserve its unity without it. And besides, all the common arguments made above apply, that substance is not individuated through accident, nor through relation to accident; for matter is substance, although partial. Also that individual substance is being per se. Also that accident presupposes its subject as it exists in reality, and consequently as singular. Also that individual difference is not really distinct from the being which it constitutes; hence neither can it be founded in a distinct being.

3. Corollary. And these reasons proceed a fortiori concerning any accidents or dispositions of matter. Therefore, although it is customary for some to say that matter is individuated by an agent, insofar as its indifference to this form is individuated and constrained through dispositions, so that it may be true in some way, it must be understood in a sound manner; because an agent, in order to act upon matter, presupposes it as individual, and by its action cannot remove or change its individuation; otherwise it would destroy it and introduce another in its place; nor can it happen that what is already individual in reality should receive another individuation in itself through the addition of some being. Therefore matter is said to be limited or determined by an agent to this form through dispositions, not in order to being, but in order to the action of the agent itself and the reception of form, and this either only accidentally and quasi-negatively, because through dispositions impediments to this action and the introduction of this form are removed, or also in some way per se and positively, if these dispositions are naturally necessary for the eduction or union of this form with this matter; for this is controversial among philosophers and does not pertain to the present difficulty, because this adaptation through dispositions is quasi-extrinsic to the matter itself, which even taken individually is from itself capable of any form; and if dispositions are required, it is rather by reason of the form than by reason of the matter itself; therefore this contributes nothing to its intrinsic individuation.

4. Several objections are answered. You might say: this matter is not distinguished from another except through quantity, because, since it is pure potency, it cannot be distinguished except through act. Also, matter essentially regards form according to its species; therefore this individual matter ought to be individuated through form, or through relation to this form. To the first it is replied that one matter is distinguished from another in order to position through quantity, but entitatively and really it is distinguished through its own being, as was said above, because, just as matter from itself has some being, whether of existence or of essence, so by reason of that it has some entitative actuality, through which it can be transcendentally distinguished from another. To the second it is replied: in the manner in which matter essentially has a transcendental relation to form, so this matter has this transcendental relation to form, because it has this numerical capacity and potency, and man is individuated through relation to form; but this itself is to be individuated physically through itself, because its being essentially includes this relation. But it is not necessary that this individuation be made through determination of form (in which sense the argument would have to proceed to have some difficulty), because not only matter in species, but also this matter numerically regards form in common as the adequate object of its capacity, even when taken individually, and therefore it is not correctly said that matter is individuated through this form, but that it is individuated by an individuated relation to form. Just as visual potency in species expresses a relation to color in common, and in the individual similarly expresses a relation not to this or that color, but to color in common; and therefore it is not properly individuated through this color, although it is individuated with such or through such a transcendental and entitative relation to color.

What is the Principle of Individuation of Substantial Form

5. Second, it must be said that substantial form is this intrinsically through its own being, from which according to its ultimate grade or reality its individual difference is taken. This conclusion can be proved by the same proportional reasons as the preceding one, and can easily be confirmed from the above, especially from what was said in the first and second opinions. For first, no accidents can be intrinsic principles individuating substantial form, because such a form also, as it is this, is being per se, although incomplete, and pertains to the category of substance, and is placed under the specific character of such form, although reductively. Also this form is either simply and in every way prior to accidents, and their origin, or, if it presupposes some in the genus of material cause, it does not express a per se relation to them, but at most requires them as conditions or dispositions necessary for preparing the subject; therefore it can in no way be individuated by accidents. Then matter cannot through itself be an intrinsic principle of individuating any form, because it is not an intrinsic principle of its being; but the same is the principle of unity that is the principle of being, as has often been said, because unity adds no thing to being, but a negation intrinsically accompanying it. But the antecedent is clear, because matter is an intrinsic principle of the composite, because through its own being it composes it; but it does not thus compose the being of form; therefore it is not its intrinsic principle. But with respect to those forms which depend on matter in becoming and in being, matter is a per se cause in its genus of form, not as intrinsically composing it, but as sustaining it, which is a certain genus of causality as it were extrinsic; and in this way matter can be called a cause and principle of individuation of such forms in its genus, from the principle laid down, that the cause of being is the cause of unity, and because matter does not cause form except as singular and individual; therefore by causing being it causes its individuation. Nevertheless, because individual difference is intrinsically predicated of an individual thing, therefore it is not taken from causes in any way extrinsic to the individual thing

itself, but from its intrinsic principle or being, and therefore in this way matter cannot be an intrinsic principle of individuation of forms. This is declared a posteriori in order to divine power: for this substantial form can be conserved without matter, and then, just as it retains its individual difference, so also its intrinsic principle of individuation; therefore matter is not such an intrinsic principle. But this is more manifest in the rational soul, in which, just as being is not caused per se by matter, so neither is unity or individuation, as St. Thomas noted, II cont. Gent., c. 75, in the solution of the first reason, and c. 81, in the beginning; therefore matter is not only not an intrinsic principle of individuation of the soul, but also not a per se cause of it, although it is as it were a certain occasion so that, when such a body is organized, God creates such a soul in it.

6. A small difficulty. But the difficulty is whether form is at least individuated through matter as through a term to which it expresses a relation. For in this there seems to be a difference between matter and form, that matter, because the same numerically underlies several forms, cannot have individual termination from the form which it regards; but truly form does not have that indifference, but is determined to actuating this matter, and therefore can be individuated from this matter, as from the term to which it expresses a relation, as such a form is. And thus the Thomists commonly think, and thus they understand St. Thomas, in the places cited above and others, where he says that form is individuated through matter. And in the same sense can be explained what he says, q. unic. de Anima, a. 3, ad 13, that the principles of individuation of forms are not of their essence, but this is true only in composites. But first the reason given does not have place in the rational soul, which remaining the same numerically can actuate diverse matters. For first it so actuates diverse parts of matter composing the same body that it is whole in singular parts; therefore it cannot be individuated through adaptation to the whole body and to its singular parts. But it presses more that successively it can inform diverse integral matters, as when through continuous nutrition

gradually all the matter is lost into which the form was first introduced, and other new matter is acquired, and the same form is informed. Also it is accidental to nutrition itself that it is made by these or those foods, and yet thence it comes about that the soul afterwards informs this or that matter; therefore this also is contingent and accidental to it; therefore it is not individuated thence, nor is it from itself adapted to this matter numerically.

7. Perhaps someone will say that this soul from itself demands to be introduced at least in the beginning in such matter, although afterwards it can leave it and inform another; and for this reason it is individuated by that matter in which it is first introduced. But this is said without foundation; for if the same soul can naturally inform various matters at different times, it is a sign that its informative power or aptitude for informing does not regard this matter numerically as its adequate term. On what foundation therefore can it be said that it from itself more demands one matter in the beginning than another, or more intrinsically regards one than another? Otherwise in the same way it could be said that matter by its nature demanded to be created under those forms numerically under which it was created, and to have been individuated by them, although it could afterwards be conserved under other forms; just as therefore this would be said there without foundation, so also it is said about the soul without foundation. For suppose that matter numerically which offspring acquires and informs through proper nutrition was previously under the form of maternal blood, from which the body of the same offspring was formed in the beginning; certainly, just as in that matter afterwards disposed through nutrition this form numerically could be introduced, so also, if in the first formation it had been disposed by the power of seed from maternal blood, similarly the same form could naturally be introduced into it; for no philosophical reason can be given why it could not; therefore this soul also as this is indifferent to informing several matters, whether in the beginning in production, or afterwards in conservation.

8. A theological note. Nor does it matter if someone says that these matters are considered one and the same because the change is made gradually under dispositions and organization of the same character; because this unity of matter or body is more according to external species and appearance than according to true and physical being of body or matter. Add that, even if it should happen that all matter be made through integral separation of one body and conjunction of other matter, nevertheless the soul would naturally inform both. As is probable sometimes to happen in the resurrection. As if it should happen that in this life two souls informed the same matters entirely, one of them could be given a body from other matter, which it would inform no less connaturally than if it consisted of prior matter. Therefore it is a sign that this soul, as apt for informing, in no way regards this matter determinately, and consequently is not individuated by this matter, as it is this, even as by the term of its transcendental relation: because it is not the adequate term of that. Therefore this soul is individuated through itself and from the force of its own being; and consequently because it intrinsically has such an individual aptitude for informing human body, in the manner in which we were saying a little before about the relation of matter. And thus in particular about the rational soul teaches Toletus, lib. III de Anima, q. 18, concl. 2 et 3, who confirms this by the argument made above by us, that in assigning the principle of individuation one must stop at something that is individuated per se; therefore if matter or quantity are said to be individuated per se, much more must this be said of the rational soul, which is per se subsistent, and gives being to the rest more than it receives from them. Therefore the variety of bodies is the best sign a posteriori of the distinction of souls, because it is as it were the occasion of producing diverse souls, but it is not the proper and intrinsic principle of their individuation.

9. But whether there is the same reasoning about all other substantial forms, which depend on matter in being, does not seem to be able to be judged by the argument recently made, because these

forms so inform this matter numerically that they are entirely determined to informing it, nor can they naturally inform another matter numerically distinct, since they cannot be separated from this, neither simultaneously nor gradually, which also proceeds concerning the souls of perfect brutes, if they are extended and divisible, as the common and perhaps more probable opinion holds (for if they are supposed to be indivisible, the argument made about rational souls will proceed in them); correctly therefore it can be said that material substantial form is this intrinsically indeed through adaptation to this matter numerically, but through matter itself, as through the term of this relation. But nevertheless even in these material forms this cannot properly be said; because either in this matter numerically are included the dispositions by which this matter is prepared by an agent for this form, or only this prime matter is understood according to its bare being; but in neither way can this be sufficiently understood or explained.

10. The first is clear, because matter with accidents cannot be the reason of individuation of form, even as the term of its relation, because since this relation is transcendental and substantial, it does not include accidents in its primary and per se term. Also, because if we suppose that the same dispositions are not in the generated thing that preceded in the corrupted thing, the arguments made above proceed, that form prior[45] by nature absolutely and simply informs matter bare of accidents; but it informs it as individual and singular; therefore in the same way it regards it according to its individual aptitude and adaptation. But if we suppose that the dispositions which were in the corrupted thing remain in matter, thus also form does not inform matter as affected by accidents, although they are presupposed as necessary conditions, or perhaps only because they are left from preceding alteration; therefore neither does this form as this regard accidents, but only matter. Especially since, although these accidents numerically may be varied, either gradually naturally, or

[45] prius, 1960; potius, alit. Cf. BHF, t. I, p. 653.

simultaneously supernaturally, and other similar ones be given, the same form numerically will be conserved in the same matter; therefore this form, as this, in no way regards such accidents numerically, so as to be individuated by them. Rather, even if we were to grant that this form requires these accidents numerically, therefore the form itself would not be such in the individual on account of accidents, but rather on the contrary accidents would be required to be such on account of such a form, speaking a priori and simply, although for us, or in order to production or generation, such dispositions are the principle or occasion of distinguishing forms.

11. The second point, namely, that this prime matter taken purely cannot be the principle individuating form in this way, is proven first because this matter can be common to many forms that are diverse either in species or in number; therefore, as such, it is not a sufficient principle for individuating form, because what is of itself common cannot, as such, be a principle of individuation. Second, from the part of the form itself, because although this form, once it has been made in this matter and from this matter, cannot exist in another on account of the dependence it has upon that matter—which dependence is such that neither can that form be naturally preserved without that kind of material causality, nor is there any way or natural mode by which this form could be transferred into another matter so as to be preserved by it—nevertheless, if the entity of such a form is considered according to itself, its intrinsic aptitude does not appear to be determined to informing this particular matter numerically, so that it would be intrinsically unsuited to naturally inform any other matter that is numerically distinct. Therefore, it does not receive its intrinsic individuation from this particular matter, even as from the term of its relation or informative aptitude. The consequence is proven because this matter is not the adequate term of that relation, since the aptitude of this form according to itself could equally connaturally be exercised in one matter or another, if it were placed in any of them. For the fact that it is placed in this matter and not in another only through natural

causes does not remove its intrinsic aptitude, nor does it make this matter the adequate term of that aptitude. Just as perhaps there is some portion of matter in the universe that has always been under the same form numerically, and always will be, and perhaps there is no natural way to vary it, yet the aptitude of matter is not thereby determined of itself to such a form.

12. The antecedent can be persuaded by many conjectures, which are also common to rational souls. First, because by absolute power this form can be transferred into another matter and inform it; therefore it is a sign that there exists in such a form a natural intrinsic aptitude for informing that matter, insofar as it comes from the form itself. The consequence is proven because, although that action or transmigration of this form from matter to matter would be supernatural as to its mode, nevertheless the term produced would be natural, for that composite of such form and matter would subsist naturally. Second: any other matter that is numerically distinct is capable, insofar as it is of itself, of any individual form, even if it happens to exist in another matter that is numerically distinct. For without foundation would anyone think that the capacity of this particular matter is of itself limited to these forms rather than to those, because perhaps natural agents according to the natural order cannot effect in it those individual forms which they effect in other matters. Because since matter is of itself pure potency and indifferent, such determination cannot be attributed to it with good reason. Therefore, that particular matter which is in fact under this form of this horse would be capable, insofar as it is of itself, of another soul of a horse that is numerically distinct, which in fact informs another matter; therefore, conversely, that soul also is apt, insofar as it is of itself, to inform this or that matter. The consequence is clear because natural potency and act correspond to each other mutually: whence potency does not naturally regard except that act which has a natural aptitude to inform it.

13. Third, because if this equine soul, for example, were only apt of itself to inform this particular matter, all equine souls that could inform that particular matter at different times would have among themselves some real agreement that they would not have with equine souls informing other matters, because all those would have an aptitude to inform this particular matter, which other equine souls could not inform. And the same argument can be made concerning all forms of water, fire, and similar things, namely, that under the same species of the form of fire, for example, there would be given a certain latitude of individuals regarding only this particular matter, and another latitude of others regarding this particular matter, and so on with others. And thus under the specific concept there could be given a substantial objective concept common to many individuals of that species and not to others, which seems absurd. For that agreement, since it is real and substantial, will also be essential to such forms, and consequently the ultimate species will be divisible through several essential differences, which involves an open contradiction. But this reason is more apparent than efficacious, because it can have several evasions and difficulties, which we shall touch upon more conveniently in the following disputations. Nevertheless, the other reasons are efficacious, which we shall confirm and declare further in the following section. Therefore, the conclusion that was posited remains sufficiently proven, that the intrinsic principle from which the individual difference of substantial form is taken is the very entity of the form itself, insofar as it has of itself such an aptitude for informing matter. For all extrinsic things or those distinct from the form itself have been excluded, so that it cannot be individuated by them. It follows that form is not this particular form because it regards this matter, but only insofar as it has such an aptitude for informing matter.

By What Principle Substantial Modes Are Individuated

14. I say third: a substantial mode, which is simple and in its own way indivisible, also has its individuation from itself, and not from some principle distinct from itself in the nature of the thing. This is illustrated by examples: in the union, for instance, of form to matter, or of matter to form, which I suppose from what will be said below to be a substantial mode. Likewise in simple subsistence, and the same would be true of existence, if it were a real mode of essence distinct from it in the nature of the thing. Thus it is established that the union which my soul now has to my body is one numerically and individual, both because it is something real and existing on the part of the thing, and distinct in the nature of the thing from the soul; and also because it differs numerically and not specifically from the mode of union of another soul to its body. Therefore it has its individual difference; therefore also some intrinsic principle or foundation of it. This principle, therefore, we say can be nothing other than the entity of the mode itself, whatever that entity may be. This can be proven first by the general reasons that have been made, that each thing is one just as it is, and that the negation which unity adds is immediately founded in the entity of the thing according as it is in itself; and finally because each simple entity is intrinsically such of itself or is constituted in our way of understanding in its being, and consequently also distinguishes itself from others by itself. Second, it is proven by excluding other principles of this individuation. For if there were any, they would especially be this soul or this matter, with respect to this union (to pursue the example that was begun; I omit accidents, however, because they have already been sufficiently excluded by the reasons made concerning matter and form). But this mode is not properly individuated by this matter and by this form, because although this mode of union in the individual cannot exist in another form, on account of the special real identity which it has with this form, nor can it be made or preserved in another matter that is numerically distinct, because it regards this matter not according to aptitude, but according to some actual relation which is adequately terminated to this matter,

nevertheless this soul and this matter could be united by another union that is numerically distinct. For it is not necessary that if the union of this soul and form is now dissolved and perishes, and again this matter and this form are united by God, they should receive the same union numerically that they had before. For although we grant that this can happen, about which some also doubt, there is no reason why it should be necessary, because in other modes of figure, position, or similar things, it is not necessary that the same numerically be reproduced; indeed, that is not natural. Therefore those unions can be distinguished numerically in the same form with respect to the same matter; therefore the principle of individuation of it is not taken sufficiently from this form or this matter; therefore it is necessary that such a mode should have from itself the intrinsic foundation of its individuation, although according to that foundation it regards this form and this matter with a transcendental relation, because this is the nature of such a mode.

What Is the Principle of Individuation of a Substantial Composite

15. Fourth, it must be said that in a composite substance, as such a composite is, the adequate principle of individuation is this matter and this form united among themselves, among which the principal principle is the form, which alone suffices so that this composite, insofar as it is an individual of such a species, is considered the same numerically. This conclusion follows from the preceding points and from what was said in section 4, and is consonant with the opinion of Durandus and Toletus treated above, and in reality Scotus and Henry do not dissent, nor do all the nominalists; Fonseca also does not dissent, lib. V Metaph., q. 5, although he says that the expression is improper when we say that this matter and this form are physical principles of individuation, because neither this form, nor this matter, nor both together could be added to the specific nature of

man so as to constitute this man with it, and because also this matter and this form are individual, constituted from their specific natures and proper principles of individuation. But in these reasons he turns from the physical account to metaphysical composition. For when this matter and this form are called physical principles of individuation of this composite, they are not compared to the common specific nature, but to the physical composite which they compose; and therefore it is not necessary that they be added to the common specific nature, but that they compose it by composing the individual in which it is included. Whence according to the same physical constitution such simple principles are, and they do not have others by which they are physically individuated, but they are individuated by themselves, as has been declared. The expression is not improper, therefore, but true and proper, because the same are the intrinsic principles of individuation which are the intrinsic principles of entity, as has often been said, because individuation follows entity, as it is a certain negation; but as it includes the positive, it is the very entity itself, and adds nothing to it. But this matter and this form united among themselves are the intrinsic principles of the whole entity of the composite substance of which we treat; therefore they are also the intrinsic physical principles of individuation. And it is confirmed, for matter and form taken absolutely are the physical principles of the species of composite substance and of its specification; therefore this matter and this form will be the physical principles of the individual and of its individuation. And in the same way it can be concluded that neither by itself, but both together are this adequate principle. Because this composite, in order to be entirely and completely the same numerically, requires not only this form or this matter, but both together, and with either one varied, there does not remain simply and in every respect the same composite numerically that was before, because its entity has been varied in some respect; therefore matter and form are the adequate principle of the numerical unity of the whole composite, as such. And it is confirmed by the reason that was

made, because the same are the principles of unity which are of entity; but this matter and this form are the adequate intrinsic principle of this composite entity; therefore also of unity and individuation.

16. Inference. An objection is solved. And hence it is also established that this same union numerically is required for the perfect unity of such a composite, because in its own way it intrinsically concurs to its constitution. For the entity of the composite includes intrinsically not only the entity of matter and form, but also the union of them among themselves; therefore, with the union varied in some way, the entity is varied, and consequently the unity of the composite itself; therefore it is required for perfect unity and individuation. For this reason, therefore, this union could also be numbered among those things which complete the perfect principle of individuation of the composite itself. But it is not as necessary as matter and form, because these are simply the essential principles of such a composite; but union is as it were a required condition or the causality of matter and form, as I said in the second tome of the third part, disp. XXXIV, sect. 2. Comparing also matter and form among themselves, the principal principle is form, not only with respect to the specific nature, taking form in species, but also with respect to this individual, taking individual form; because this form is most proper to this individual, and because it is that which completes this integral substance numerically. For this matter only begins it, and insofar as it is of itself, it does not begin this more than another. Likewise because this form is the principal principle of being, and consequently it is also the principal principle of distinguishing this substance from others; but the same is the principle of unity which is the principle of being and of its distinction from others; therefore. You will say that form is the principle of specific distinction, because it makes things differ formally; therefore it cannot be the principle of numerical distinction, otherwise numerical distinction would be formal and essential. It is answered that form according to its specific and essential character makes specific and essential difference, but individual form according

to its entity makes entitative and numerical distinction. For Peter and Paul differ among themselves numerically more because they have souls that are numerically distinct, than because they have distinct bodies. And from these things the last part of the conclusion is clear, which is also sufficiently proven from the common way of speaking, which we noted above. For simply the same man is considered, not only according to appearance, but also according to truth, who has the same soul numerically, even if the body has been changed. The reason is that form is simply considered to constitute the species, and similarly this form constitutes this individual under such a species.

17. Question. Response. But you will ask whether the individual difference is taken in rigor from the complete principle, namely, matter and form, or indeed from only one of them. For authors seem more frequently to think that it is taken from only one of them. For since this difference is simple, it does not seem that it should be taken from the whole composite, nor from a double partial principle, but from only one which is simple. Nevertheless they differ; for some say that that principle is matter, like Cajetan and others; others indeed say that it is form, like Scotus; and Durandus inclines to the same. And this latter is truer, supposing the prior foundation, namely, that the individual difference should be taken from only one of these principles. But we speak of the thing itself according to itself; for as regards us, who take knowledge from material things, often the distinction of individuals is taken from matter, or from accidents which follow upon matter, such as quantity and other properties. But truly according to itself, just as the difference should be taken from a substantial principle and not from an accidental one, so among the substantial principles themselves, it should be taken from that which is principal and more proper and the ultimate constitutive of the thing itself; such, however, is form, as has been shown. Likewise this is true, speaking of an individual of such a nature or species, as it is formally constituted in it. For which reason we said above that a suppositum is one numerically, if it has one subsistence numerically, even if the

nature is not one, because the formal constitutive of the suppositum is incommunicable subsistence, from which alone the individual character of the suppositum as such should be taken. Conversely, however, we said that the unity and individual difference of a singular thing, as constituted under such a species or substantial essence, should be taken from the substantial nature, which formally constitutes such an individual. In this way, therefore, we say in the present case that the individual difference of this man formally taken as he is an individual of the human species, is taken from this soul. But truly, if we speak of this composite, as it is perfectly and in every respect one, it will be said more truly that its individual difference is taken from its whole entity, and thus from the adequate physical principle, which includes matter and form, so that in this way also it may be verified of that whole composite that it is individuated through itself, or through its entity. For through that it has identity simply in itself, and diversity from every other. Nor is it inconvenient that the difference, which according to the metaphysical concept is simple, that is, not composed of genus and difference, should be taken from an entity or nature that is physically composite, insofar as it is one, and is conceived in the manner of one individual nature.

18. By what complete spiritual substances are individuated. Finally, from what has been said, it is sufficiently established what should be said about immaterial substances in which individual differences are also found, as we have shown. Whence, since in them there is only a simple complete substantial entity, it is established that in them there can be no other principle of individuation besides the very entity of each thing, which is such of itself, and is distinguished from others by itself. And in this all agree who confess that these substances are individual, by whatever reason they explain their individuation. But those who say that they agree of themselves with such a spiritual specific nature, much more and a fortiori teach that they are individuated through their entities, as is clear from Capreolus, In II, dist. 3; Cajetan, and others, I, q. 3, a. 3, q. 50, a. 4; Soncinas, XII

Metaph., q. 49; Javellus, q. 25; Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 21. Those, however, who think that even in immaterial things individuation is made through the addition of a difference, necessarily also teach that it should be taken from the very substantial entity of the angel according to itself; because it is not to be taken from accidents, nor is there anything else from which it can be taken; all of which things are sufficiently proven from what has been said. But the common argument, that if these substances differ through their entities, they necessarily differ formally and essentially, has already been solved in similar cases concerning other forms. For those entities, however formal they may be, can be entirely similar in essential character; and then, although they are distinguished by themselves, nevertheless the distinction is numerical, because it is in entity, not in formal character. They are said to be distinguished by themselves, not because they are not similar, but because one of itself has it that it is not the other; for similarity does not exclude distinction, as will be said below.

SECTION VII
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT

1. In this inquiry, nearly the same ways of speaking can be maintained as those that were related in the preceding section; nevertheless, because the same doctrine that was given concerning substantial forms is to be applied proportionally to accidental forms, this matter can therefore be dispatched very briefly by adding a few things that are proper to accidents. We suppose therefore, from what was said in section 2, that in accidental forms individual differences are necessary, which individual forms add to specific concepts, from which they are distinguished at least by reason; for the doctrine given there is general, and the arguments made proceed concerning all

species and individuals. Whence it follows that, speaking of the metaphysical principles that constitute and distinguish things, no question remains concerning the principle of individuation of accidents; for there is in them an individual difference, which is proper in each one and contracts the species to the being of such an individual. Therefore, it only remains to be asked what might be the physical foundation and principle of this difference, and in this sense we investigate here the principle of individuation of accidents, just as we said concerning substances. And therefore we have no controversy in this place with Scotus, who judged that this question should be settled by his haecceities (which are nothing other than individual differences); for we also admit those differences; nevertheless, we further inquire into the physical root of those differences.

2. Therefore, only two opinions can be related here. The first is that accidents are individuated through the subject. Thus teaches St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 39, a. 3, and Opusc. 29, at the end. But in Quodl. VII, a. 19, he limits this opinion and says it is true in other accidents besides quantity, which he says is individuated not from the subject, but from position, while the remaining accidents are individuated from the subject, at least from quantity. Whence he infers that, although individual quantity can be preserved by God without a subject, nevertheless whiteness or other accidents cannot be, which necessarily require a subject, at least quantity itself, in order to become individual. And hence St. Thomas often teaches that two separated whitenesses distinguished by number alone cannot be given, because they would not have that by which they would be distinguished, I, q. 50, a. 4, and q. 75, a. 7. The same thing Capreolus teaches and defends, In I, dist. 54, a. 2, concl. 2. The foundations of this opinion are the same as those that were brought forward above to prove that substantial form is individuated by matter designated by quantity. And it is confirmed first, for an accident has its whole being in order to the subject; therefore it ought to have individuation from the subject, for each thing ought to be individuated from the same principles from

which it has being. Second, because if accidents were not individuated by the subject, several accidents differing in number alone could be received in the same subject, because, notwithstanding the identity of the subject, they could have distinction among themselves, whence no reason for this repugnance could be assigned; but we see that the same subject cannot receive two whitenesses or two heats; therefore the whole reason for this is that they are individuated by the subject; and therefore, by this very fact that they are received in the same subject, they are one and not two.

3. The opinion of others. The second opinion is that each accidental form is physically individuated through itself, as it is such an entity in act or in aptitude, and does not have another intrinsic principle of individuation besides its own entity. This is taken from the opinion of Durandus treated above; and all the arguments that we adduced concerning substantial form prove the same concerning accidental form. And the summary is this: because each thing is formally and intrinsically one in number (as regards the foundation of unity or the negation that "one" signifies) through the same thing by which it is a being in act in the nature of things, or apt to be such; because every such being is singular, as was shown above; but every thing through its own entity is intrinsically and formally such a being in act; therefore through the same it is something singular and individual; therefore accidents also have this. And it is confirmed, because the subject cannot be the principle individuating accidents; therefore only the intrinsic entity of the accidents themselves can be such a principle. The antecedent is clear, because first the subject cannot be called the intrinsic principle of individuation of the accident, as intrinsically and per se composing the accident, because now we are not dealing with the composite of subject and accident, but with the accidental form itself, which clearly is not composed intrinsically from the subject itself, nor is the subject in this way an intrinsic principle of it. Again, neither can the subject be called the principle individuating the accident as the term of the relation or

aptitude of such an accident to inform such a subject; first, because with respect to the same subject in number, two accidents distinguished by number alone can have aptitude to inform it; therefore those aptitudes cannot be distinguished in number from the subject; therefore from themselves. Second, this especially presses concerning certain accidents, which according to their relation do not rest in the subject, but refer it or in some way lead it into another, as are relations, acts, habits and similar things; for if an accident is said to be individuated by the subject, because it regards it naturally, why are these accidents not said rather to be individuated by the ultimate terms which they naturally regard, especially since from those, according to common accounts, they take their essential or specific characters? Third, because it is said without foundation that this accident in number has natural coaptation and relation only to this subject; for, although perhaps through natural causes it can be made in that alone, nevertheless it is itself apt to inform any subject capable of such an accident; just as on the contrary it can happen that this subject cannot naturally have except this whiteness or this quantity, and yet not therefore is its capacity to be understood so limited and determined from itself to this accident that it is not from itself sufficient for receiving similar accidents. Finally, this very thing can be persuaded by all the arguments that we made concerning substantial form.

Resolution of the Question

4. This controversy is to be settled and defined by the distinction intimated above. For we said that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first, in order to being and to the proper constitution of the thing according to itself. Second, in order to production, insofar as the agent is determined to produce a distinct individual, or to effect one rather than another, and consequently in order to our knowledge insofar as we can distinguish

one from another sensibly (so to speak). Therefore, by the former consideration (which is most a priori, and most proper to this science), the latter opinion is true, teaching that accidents have their individuation and numerical distinction not from the subject, but from their own entities, as the arguments made sufficiently prove, both here and in the preceding section, and will appear more fully from what will be said in the solutions of the arguments. But by the latter consideration (which is more physical and a posteriori), accidents can be said to receive individuation from the subject as from a root, or rather occasion of their multiplication and distinction. This, however, is to be understood not of the subject taken nakedly, but with other circumstances or conditions necessary for action added, as will be explained more conveniently in the solutions of the arguments.

5. Therefore, the foundations of the former opinion, insofar as they are the same as the arguments by which matter designated by quantity is usually proved to be the principle of individuation, and can oppose the first part of the opinion posited by us, have been sufficiently treated and dispatched in the preceding section. But the first confirmation only proves that an accident has its individuation in order to the subject and naturally depends on it, not however that the individuation of the subject is the intrinsic principle of individuation of the accident. But in the second confirmation and in the foundations of the latter opinion, a common doubt is raised, which cannot be passed over in this place, yet demands its own proper question.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER IT IS CONTRADICTORY FOR TWO ACCIDENTS DIFFERING ONLY IN NUMBER TO EXIST SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE SAME SUBJECT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR INDIVIDUALIZATION.

Disputation V

1. Accidents differing only in number can exist in the same subject in two ways, namely, simultaneously or only successively; both are matters of controversy, and in the present section we treat only the former.

The First Opinion is Treated

2. The first opinion holds that not only accidents of the same species, but also those of different species, if they are contained under the same proximate genus, cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. See St. Thomas, I, q. 85, a. 1, where he says: "It is impossible for the same subject to be perfected simultaneously by several forms of one genus and of different species, just as it is impossible for the same body to be colored simultaneously with different colors according to the same aspect, or to be shaped with different figures." In q. 8 of De Veritate, a. 14, he explains this concerning forms existing in perfect actuality. The Thomists commonly embrace this exposition, and thus they resolve arguments concerning several intelligible or sensible species contained under the same proximate genus (such as the species of man and horse) existing simultaneously in the same power, and concerning two sciences, for example, or two moral or theological virtues, which, since they differ in species and are contained under the same proximate genus, can exist simultaneously in the same power, even with perfect intensity. For they say that these and similar things exist simultaneously only in incomplete actuality, because they exist simultaneously only in first act or in habit, not in second act.

3. But in truth it is difficult to sustain this opinion in such generality simply and absolutely. First, because no sufficient reason for it can be given; for as Scotus rightly objects, In I, dist. 3, q. 6, § Ad quaestionem igitur, in the examples that St. Thomas brought forward above, those accidents differing in species cannot exist simultaneously because they include some opposition in relation to the subject; for two colors are always opposed, either as extreme contraries, or as

extreme and intermediate, or as approaching more closely to one of the extremes; figures also include repugnance in position or in straightness and obliquity or something similar. But it is not necessary that all accidents differing in species have such opposition with respect to the subject. Furthermore, Durandus presses not badly, In II, dist. 3, q. 8, the argument concerning intelligible species (although he himself uses it badly to deny intelligible species); he argues, therefore, that although the intellect does not actually understand, several species are perfect and complete as regards the act of informing; for actual operation contributes nothing to the complete being of the form. Cajetan responds, I, q. 85, a. 4, that this is true of species in real being, but not in intelligible being. But, to omit that this is a certain begging of the question in the matter he disputes there, namely, whether the intellect can simultaneously have several acts of understanding, because as he himself explains, that intelligible being is nothing other than what actually moves the power to actual consideration; to omit this, I say, it suffices for the question we are treating here that two accidents according to their real being simultaneously have a complete act of informing in the same subject. And the same argument can be made concerning habits of moral virtues or sciences, in which that distinction of real or intelligible being has no place. And from these the argument can be extended even to acts; for they will not be contradictory to exist simultaneously, insofar as it depends on their part or on the part of the receptive power, if the active power that can simultaneously effect them is not lacking, because in other respects there is no greater repugnance between acts than between habits of the same genus, if they are not otherwise contrary.

4. And thus the reason that St. Thomas suggests in the said q. 8 of De Veritate is also resolved, namely, that acts of the same genus regard the same power and terminate it; but the same power cannot simultaneously be terminated by several acts. For it is answered that this is true of acts adequate to the same power, but not of inadequate

ones; as in the present case, one species or one habit is not the adequate first act of the intellect, because it does not perfect it in relation to its adequate object; and therefore several can exist in it simultaneously, even if they are of the same genus, until they perfect it integrally and adequately. And the same must be said of any accidental forms. For example, heat and dryness, although they perhaps agree in the proximate genus, can exist simultaneously in the same fire, because neither of those qualities by itself fills the natural capacity of fire, neither the passive capacity it has by reason of matter, nor in a certain way the active capacity it has by reason of form through natural emanation. Therefore, that proposition of St. Thomas, in order to be true in some sense, must be understood of forms that completely and adequately actuate the power of the subject in such a genus or respect, as will be clearer from what will be said. For this opinion, which has been treated thus far, is not founded on the individualization of accidents, and thus it did not pertain to the present question; nevertheless it had to be premised necessarily, both for the completeness of the doctrine, and also because it brings light to what we shall say.

The Second Opinion

5. The second opinion is also extreme, holding that no accidents of the same species can exist simultaneously in the same subject. This is thought to be Aristotle's view, V Metaph., c. 10, text. 15, saying that those accidents differ in species which, when they are in the same substance, have a difference. Here St. Thomas, lect. 12, gives the general reason for that assertion, because it is impossible for several accidents of the same species to exist in the same subject. He teaches the same in III, q. 35, a. 5, where he also does not admit several relations differing only in number in the same father with respect to several sons, nor in the same son with respect to father and mother. And thus Capreolus, In I, dist. 7, q. 2; Cajetan, III, q. 35, a. 5;

Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 9, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1; there Paludanus, q. 2; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 4, where he adduces several reasons, generally defend this opinion. But the principal reason is taken from individualization; for distinction in forms is either formal, which is specific, or material from the subject, which is numerical, according to Aristotle, III Metaph., c. 3; lib. V, c. 6; therefore where neither of these intervenes, there can be no distinction; therefore, where there is specific unity of accident in the same subject, there cannot be numerical plurality. This is confirmed, because otherwise, by what reason could two accidents differing only in number simultaneously inhere in the same subject, they could also be multiplied infinitely, since there is no greater reason for one multitude than for another; whence it is inferred that there are infinite relations in the same subject, and other similar inconveniences.

6. But it is also difficult to sustain this opinion in all this generality without any exception, because of various examples in which it plainly seems to fail, which we shall immediately bring forward. And therefore, although none of the authors simply teaches the extremely contrary opinion, namely, that any accidents differing only in number, of whatever species they may be, can exist simultaneously in the same subject (for this not only openly contradicts Aristotle and all philosophers, but also experience itself, as was touched upon above, and will be established more broadly from what will be said), nevertheless several apply exceptions and limitations to the aforesaid opinion. But because it is difficult to choose a middle way and give a reason for it, therefore they do not agree among themselves in making this exception.

The Third Opinion

7. The third opinion is that of the Thomists, who distinguish concerning accidents in complete or incomplete act; for in the former way they deny that accidents differing only in number can exist

simultaneously in one subject, because of the reasons given and the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas, whom they thus explain. But in the latter way they admit it. Thus Cajetan, I, q. 95, a. 4. More clearly Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, ad argumenta cont. 9 concl.; Javellus, V Metaph., q. 16. These seem to have taken this from St. Thomas, q. 8 of De Veritate, a. 14, and especially they seem to be led by the argument of intentional species; because they cannot deny that several differing only in number can exist in the same subject, namely, in the same intellect, or in the same phantasy, or in the same medium according to the same part.

8. But first, this distinction is not sufficient, for we shall show below that not only these intentional accidents, but also several others according to their complete being, can exist simultaneously in the same subject. Furthermore, concerning these intentional accidents, the argument made above returns, namely, in what sense they are said to exist incompletely in the subject, whether because they do not effect, or because they do not fully inform. The latter is false, because they inhere according to their whole being; therefore they inform. The former seems impertinent, because the complete being of an accident does not consist in effecting, but in informing. Finally, it is added that, if these accidents cannot exist in the same subject because of individualization, therefore it will be the same whether they are in actual operation or not; because before they operate, they have their individualization from the subject; therefore, either that reason is not fitting, or it equally proves that these accidents cannot be distinguished numerically in the same subject, even while they are not operating.

The Fourth Opinion

9. The fourth opinion is that proper accidents, or those which intrinsically emanate from the subject, cannot exist in the same subject as several differing only in number; but those which are

common accidents can exist simultaneously. Thus Jandun, V Metaph., q. 36. The reason for the first part is that nature abhors superfluity; whence, since a proper accident is intrinsic to nature, and one suffices for the function and end of nature, it is not multiplied. And hence the reason for the other part is taken; for since a common accident often comes from the extrinsic and accidentally, it is not contradictory for it to be multiplied in the same subject, and thus it happens that several heatings are made simultaneously in the same wood by different fires.

10. But this opinion, although it is true as to the first part, nevertheless as to the latter part it is not universally true, because neither several whitenesses nor several heats can exist simultaneously in the same subject, although these are common accidents. Nor is what is said about several heatings true, for when two fires heat the same wood according to the same part, just as they effect one heat, so also one heating, which is partially from each, and from both simultaneously as from a total cause. Moreover, if that rule were generally true, it would follow that two sciences of the same species and in relation to the same object, similarly two temperances differing only in number, could exist simultaneously in the same subject, which is not probable. Finally, the general reason stands in the way, because even in extraneous and accidental changes, the extrinsic agent intends to assimilate the patient to itself; whence, if it finds something similar, it does not act again on that; otherwise, after it had once assimilated that to itself, it would act on it again and again, and thus the action would proceed to infinity, at least as regards the multiplication of accidental forms. And by the same reason, things entirely similar in the same accident would mutually change one another, and would multiply similar accidents in themselves. Indeed, by the same or greater reason, the same thing would act on itself, by producing through one accident another similar one in itself, or, if it already had two, it would effect a third, and so on to infinity, which are all plainly false and absurd. Whence it is gathered that even in these accidental changes, the principle of them on the part of the subject is the

privation of a similar form; and therefore such change does not tend toward multiplying an accident of the same species in the same subject.

The Fifth Opinion

11. The fifth opinion distinguishes concerning accidents which are made through proper motion or which are made without motion, and concerning the former it denies that they can exist simultaneously in the same subject, because of the reason adduced that motion is from contrary to contrary; but concerning the latter it affirms that accidents differing only in number can exist simultaneously in the same subject. Fonseca reports this opinion, lib. V, c. 10, q. 1, sect. 1, and it is usually attributed to Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus and others, In III, dist. 8; however Durandus there, q. 3, says nothing about this, but rather in the solution ad 1, in absolute accidents he only admits that those which are of the same species can exist in the same supposit according to one part and another; but in relatives according to one foundation and another. But Gabriel there, a. 3, dub. 1, applies no distinction, but simply denies that it is contradictory for two accidents differing only in number to exist in the same subject. And Scotus speaks in almost the same way there, in the single question. Nevertheless, he indicates that through the operation of a natural agent there is no multiplication of qualities of the same nature in the same subject; because a natural agent intends to perfect a preexisting imperfect form; and therefore it does not introduce an entirely different form, but some degree or quasi-part which it unites to the preexisting one in order to perfect it. In which he signifies that distinction concerning accidents which are made through motion or without it. Which Antonio Andreas also suggests, V Metaph., q. 8. For he says that relative accidents differing only in number can exist in the same subject; but concerning absolutes he subdivides, for some are educed from the potency of the subject, and these are not multiplied

numerically in the same subject; but others are not educed, and these can be multiplied. And he thinks that light is of this kind, concerning which the students of optics contend that two lights are produced by two luminous bodies in the same part of the subject, because they effect two shadows, and because when one luminous body is removed, some light in the air is corrupted and some remains.

12. But these things are partly false, partly do not satisfy. And, to begin with the latter, it is false that there are some accidents in the subject which, in the way they are made in it, are not educed from its potency[46], because all depend on the subject in becoming and in being, and especially it is established that light is educed from the potency of the subject; for it is not created, nor is it only made in the subject, but from the subject, with the air, for example, concurring in the genus of material cause for its production. It is also false that lights are multiplied numerically in the same subject; nor is there any experience by which this can be proved; for experience only teaches that, other things being equal, two luminous bodies act more in the same part than only one; but this is not because of the multiplication of lights, but because of the greater intensity of the same light, from which it happens that, when one agent is removed, or in that part to which the action of one reaches and not of the other, a lesser effect appears, not because one light is corrupted and another remains, but because the same is made and conserved more remissly. And hence it is also that sometimes two shadows result, because shadow is nothing other than the absence or diminution of light, and it often happens that, when one body is interposed between two luminous bodies distant from each other, in one place it impedes the action of one, and in another distant place the action of the other, but in the intermediate place the action of neither is impeded; and hence it happens that several shadows appear. And hence the first distinction concerning accidents which are made through motion or without it is easily refuted; for, if motion is taken in the strict sense for successive motion,

[46] De hoc latius disp. IV

which is made from a contrary, it is established by the example of light that the latter part is false; for light is not made through motion, but through instantaneous change, nor is it made from a positive contrary term, but from a privative one, and yet it cannot be multiplied in the same subject. Also, that distinction seems very accidental; for what does it matter for this numerical distinction or identity of accidents whether they are made through motion or through change? Because the distinction of accidents is not taken from thence, but either from themselves or from the subject. For if the subject is only in potency to one heat which is made successively, why will it not also be said to be only in potency to one light, although it is made simultaneously? Or conversely, if it is in potency to several lights, why will it not be in potency to several heats? For if it is said that in those things which are made successively, the agent does not intend to introduce a new accident, but to perfect the preexisting one, the same will be said of light and any other similar quality, which just as it is made in an instant from the opposite privation, so also it can be intensified in an instant from the privation of such intensity. Whence here also the reason touched upon above from Scotus has place, because not only successive motion, but every action of a natural agent is to render the patient similar to itself; and therefore it does not act on the similar, but requires privation in the patient as the principle of its action. Therefore, when light is in the air as four degrees, and a new luminous body is applied, it will not act on the air insofar as it is similar to itself in four degrees, but rather insofar as it is dissimilar in further degrees; therefore there is the same reason for accidents which are made through change or through motion.

13. But if motion in that distinction is not taken in that strict sense, but as it comprehends change, so that the meaning is that those accidents which are made per se through proper action are not multiplied in the subject according to number, but others are multiplied, thus also the distinction can be impugned: first, because it is given through things that are very extrinsic and accidental to the

numerical distinction of accidents. Second, because neither part seems to be constant; for sensible species are made through proper action, and yet they are multiplied numerically in the same part of the medium; sound also seems to be made per se through proper action, and yet it is multiplied numerically in the same subject, as experience seems to prove; for we hear the harmony of several voices at the same time and through the same medium, which could not happen unless the sounds were diverse. But conversely, figure is not made per se first through motion, and yet it cannot be multiplied numerically in the same subject, and the same is true in all similar absolutes, because they cannot be multiplied through the change of something extrinsic, like relatives, and therefore, just as they are not made per se, so neither can they be multiplied per se in the same subject; nor even concomitantly, since that form which is made per se and to which they are consequent, is not multiplied numerically in the same subject.

14. Moreover, the distinction concerning absolutes and relatives does not satisfy completely; for, if relatives are taken in the strict sense for relatives according to being and predicamental ones, it is indeed true that these can sometimes be multiplied numerically in the same subject, as we shall say when treating of relations; but this is not universally true; for the relation of creature cannot be multiplied in the same subject. But the other part concerning absolutes is less universal, as is clear from the examples adduced concerning species and sounds, and similar ones. Fonseca uses another distinction in the place cited above, sect. III, which largely coincides with the preceding ones. And summarily he says that from accidents naturally acquired through motion or change conjoined to motion, there cannot be given several of the same species in the same subject, and concerning these he explains what Aristotle said in the fourth book, which he understands to be universally and without exception true in this sense. But he adds next that from accidents which are not intensified and remitted, whether they are acquired through motion or change conjoined to motion, or in another way, it is necessary that most of the

same species be given in the same subject. Whence he seems to limit the prior opinion to those accidents which are intensified and remitted; and thus the prior opinion is not entirely general, as he signifies in the fourth conclusion. But neither with that limitation does this opinion seem to be universally true, because intentional species can be intensified and remitted, and nevertheless they are multiplied in the same subject; it is also probable that sound is remitted and intensified, which nevertheless he himself says is multiplied in the same subject. What he also adds there, that in relation to the absolute power of God there cannot be in the same subject several accidents distinct in number, when they are such that by their nature they coalesce into one numerically more intense, is difficult to believe, as I shall immediately declare more broadly.

Resolution of the Question as to the Way in Which Several Similar Accidents Can Exist Simultaneously in the Same Subject

15. Therefore, in such a variety of opinions, it is difficult to prescribe some certain rule in this matter and to assign its true reason. Nevertheless, two things seem certain to me in this matter. One is that this universal negative proposition, that several accidents of the same species cannot exist in the same subject, cannot be verified absolutely and simply, or without some limitation. This is proved to me especially by the examples concerning intentional species and relations, supposing that these are something real distinct by the nature of the thing from absolutes. But the example adduced concerning sound is not so convincing, both because it is not certain that sound is made per se first through that motion or action, and especially because it is not sufficiently established that the several sounds which are heard are in the same part of the subject; for they are always made in the beginning in distinct places, and there they are properly perceived; but when they reach the hearing, or the part of the medium near to the hearing, perhaps they no longer reach according to real being, but

according to intentional being only. Other examples are usually adduced concerning the continuities and durations of two motions which can be made simultaneously in the same thing, as for example, the same wood can simultaneously be heated and dried, which two motions, although they are diverse in species, nevertheless their continuities and durations seem to differ only in number. But these examples are not very compelling, both because it is very probable that neither duration is an accident or mode distinct by the nature of the thing from the existence of the thing enduring, nor continuity intrinsic or entitative from the thing itself continuous; and also because, even if we admit such accidents, those do not inhere immediately in the mobile thing, but mediately through the motion which they affect; and therefore they are not properly in the same subject according to the same respect. Nevertheless, the prior examples suffice, to which can be added that the same power can have simultaneously several acts distinct in number, although perhaps not entirely similar or supremely perfect, as if the will or appetite simultaneously love two men with diverse acts; or if the blessed person (as many hold) simultaneously loves God necessarily and freely from charity.

16. The second thing that is certain is that it cannot naturally happen in any species of accidents that several which differ only in number exist simultaneously in the same subject. This is established concerning all properties that belong intrinsically, such as quantity, which belongs intrinsically by reason of matter, natural powers or faculties, which emanate from the form in each thing, and are never multiplied within the same species in the same part of the subject, as is sufficiently established by induction. Likewise real and absolute qualities, either primary ones by which matter is disposed, or secondary ones which result from these, as can also be proved by experience; for the instance which is usually adduced concerning degrees of intensity is not to the point; for those do not properly differ in number, as will be discussed elsewhere. Finally, the same is more

probable concerning light and similar things. But what general rule should be given, or what reason for the difference should be assigned, I find nothing that satisfies me in every respect. But we can explain it in this way. Some accidents differ only in number in such a way that besides the distinction of entities, they have in all other respects a certain similitude and agreement, namely, in the function or duties to which they are destined, and in whatever relation they express, such as two heats, two whitenesses, and similar things. But others exist which, although they agree in specific nature and differ under it only in number, nevertheless do not have such great similitude among themselves, but differ either in function or in relation. For example, two visible species of Peter differ in number in the former way. But two visible species of Peter and Paul differ in number in this latter way; for they are not so similar among themselves as those two; for they have diverse transcendental relations to objects and are ordered to diverse functions.

17. Therefore I say, third, that accidents of the former kind cannot be multiplied numerically in the same subject, but those which are of the latter kind can be multiplied. And both can be proved by induction and the examples adduced. For therefore accidents that are entirely absolute are never multiplied numerically in the same subject, because they are similar in the former way; but accidents that are respective, whether by predicamental or transcendental respect, can be multiplied, because with specific unity they can have some dissimilitude, as it were material, on account of which they can be multiplied. Whence it happens that they can never be multiplied with respect to the same thing; and therefore the relation of creature cannot be multiplied, because the term of that can only be one, and with respect to the same term relations cannot be multiplied. Therefore also, although we grant that relations to father and mother are several and diverse only in number, nevertheless the relation to the father cannot be multiplied in the same son. But the reason for the difference between both kinds of accidents can be assigned as

sufficiently probable from what has been said. First, from the final cause, because when accidents are entirely similar, their multiplication in the same subject would be superfluous and idle, which nature abhors; but when they are in some way diverse or are ordered to diverse ends, as is clear in intentional species, or result from things ordered to diverse ends, and thence participate diverse relations, as happens in relations, therefore the numerical multiplication is not superfluous, nor contrary to the end consonant with nature.

18. Second, from the part of the agent, because when accidents are entirely similar, no agent per se intends either their plurality, or to introduce something else into a subject already having another entirely similar thing, because the agent only intends to render the patient similar to itself, which is sufficiently achieved through one such form alone. But when accidents are not similar in the aforesaid way, this reason ceases and the subject needs greater assimilation; and therefore the agent also procures that. As, for example, although the medium having received the species of Peter is similar to him intentionally, it is not sufficiently similar to Paul, and therefore there remains in Paul the power to introduce a species by which he renders it similar to himself, and so concerning others.

19. Whence, third, the reason is given from the capacity of the subject; for just as prime matter, although it is indifferent to all substantial forms, nevertheless does not have the capacity to have all simultaneously, nor several, because it is sufficiently actuated by one form, so also the subject of accidents, although it is per se first capable of some species of accident, and consequently is indifferent to any individual of it, nevertheless it is not capable of simultaneously receiving all or several individuals of such species, insofar as the specific nature is found in them in the same way, because such capacity is sufficiently actuated by one form of such species. And this happens when the individual forms are entirely similar and of the same nature and relation; but when accidents are dissimilar and have various relations, then one does not suffice to fill the capacity of the

subject, and therefore it can happen that they are multiplied in the same subject until they entirely fill its capacity. As the intellective power, insofar as it is capable of natural science of God or man, is sufficiently disposed in first act by one science of metaphysics or philosophy, and therefore it no longer remains capable of another similar science; nevertheless the same intellective faculty, as it is capable of actual cognition of men, is not fully actuated by one act by which it knows Peter or Paul, nor by one intelligible species; and therefore it is capable of several, until its faculty is sufficiently completed, because those several do not actuate it entirely in the same way, but in relation to diverse things. By which it finally happens that, from the distinctions brought forward above, that one which distinguishes between absolute and respective comes closest to the truth; for absolutes are not multiplied, because they are always entirely similar; but respectival ones, either according to being or according to predication, or by predicamental relation or transcendental relation, can be multiplied when they regard diverse terms or are ordered to diverse functions, because of the dissimilitude which they have in themselves, since none of them fully actuates the subject, as has been explained. And according to these things the place of Aristotle in V Metaph. is to be explained. For it is not necessary that that indication of specific diversity be entirely universal concerning all accidents, but concerning those which are perfectly similar in the individual.

Formal Response to the Question Insofar as it Pertains to Individualization

20. From these things the formal response to the present question is gathered, for the sake of which all these things have been said, namely, that it does not arise per se from individualization that some accidents differing only in number cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. For, although they were simultaneously in it, they could very well be understood as distinct in number by reason of their

entities, just as those are distinguished which can exist simultaneously, as has been said, or just as those are distinguished which successively inhere in the same subject, as will immediately be said. But that some cannot inhere arises from the natural incapacity of the subject and the adequation which is found between its receptive power and such an act, and consequently from the defect of a natural agent which can effect that multiplication.

21. Whence I further infer that by absolute power it is not contradictory for several accidents differing only in number, even if they are entirely similar, to be placed simultaneously in the same subject; because from their individualization and distinction it is not contradictory, and God can operate in a subject beyond its natural capacity; and if God wished to do this for the demonstration of His power, it would not be entirely superfluous. But some limit this to those accidents which are not intensified or remitted; for concerning those which receive intensification, they think it impossible even by absolute power to place several differing only in number in the same subject without their composing one intense quality, if both of them inhere in the subject, because by this very fact they are necessarily united among themselves into one more intense thing; because two degrees of heat require no other union to compose one intense heat than that they be in the same subject. Whence if one of them inheres in the subject, but the other does not inhere, but is sustained by the same subject in another way without inherence, then it will not be contradictory for them to exist simultaneously, or rather to be sustained simultaneously by the same subject, because then they do not have among themselves the union necessary for composing one more intense quality. And in this opinion Aegidius is cited, In I, dist. 17, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 1; but there he says nothing.

22. Nevertheless, this opinion seems to suppose false principles concerning the intensification of qualities. The first is that intensification occurs through addition or congregation of several degrees of the same quality entirely similar among themselves. The

second is that those degrees have no union among themselves, neither in some common and real positive term, nor in another kind of union through the mode of act and potency, but are only united in the subject and in the same part of the subject, if it has parts. The third is that those degrees do not regard the subject in any order, but all equally immediately, so that there is no order among them of first, second, and third degree, except perhaps in the order of generation and production; but if they are made simultaneously, all are equally first. From this doctrine it follows very well that God cannot multiply degrees of heat inherent in the same subject without their making one more intense; because such intensification is nothing other than the congregation of several similar degrees in the same subject. But without these principles, I do not see on what foundation that limitation can rest, as I shall immediately show; indeed, that opinion thus explained does not properly limit God's power to place any intensible qualities differing only in number in the same subject, but adds that by the very fact that He places them, they will necessarily effect one more intense.

23. Nevertheless, that doctrine concerning intensification involves certain contradictions which, since they are foreign to this place, cannot be declared ex professo, yet they are briefly indicated. For either those degrees by which an intense quality is said to be composed—for example, eight degrees of heat—are indivisible in themselves, or they have a particular latitude of intensification and remission. The first cannot be said: first, because otherwise intensification could not be continuous motion; for each of those degrees would necessarily have to be acquired all at once, otherwise it would not be indivisible; therefore the entire intensification would have to occur through momentary and indivisible changes; therefore not by continuous succession, which is contrary both to sense and experience, and to reason, because as long as a natural agent overcomes what is passive, there is no reason why it should interrupt its action, otherwise it would not be in its power to repeat that action

afterward, nor could a philosophical reason be given why it should effect it now rather than before or after. Second, because otherwise the degrees of heat would in no way make one heat per se, but would be united merely per accidens in the same subject, just as whiteness and sweetness; but this is not sufficient to make them constitute one individual heat, any more than if God were to place two intellects in the same soul. Indeed, if this were sufficient for intensification, no reason could be given why, if God were to place two intellects in the same soul, they would not make one more intense; for if you say that intellects are not qualities that are apt to coalesce into one more intense, this is contrary because according to that opinion, in order for qualities to be able to coalesce into one more intense, nothing else is required except that, since they are entirely of the same nature, they can be united in the same subject; but intellects would have this at least in relation to divine power. Third, many absurd consequences follow from that position, namely, that a remiss quality could intensify another equal or even more intense one by producing as many degrees as it has in itself; or, if similarity prevents this, it follows that a more intense quality cannot intensify a more remiss one, because they are entirely similar in form. It also follows that no natural reason can be given for why, when a form is remitted, one degree is cast off rather than another, and other similar problems, which would be lengthy to pursue. Therefore it must necessarily be said that in those degrees of intensification of heat, for example, which we mentally divide, there is latitude according to which there can be continuous intensification or remission in them, which latitude must necessarily be infinitely divisible, otherwise continuous alteration could not occur by reason of them, because continuous motion must necessarily be infinitely divisible; whence consequently it is also necessary that these degrees be joined together by some common boundary, because continuity cannot otherwise be conceived between them, nor true real union, without which that latitude cannot be understood; because if two degrees are not united between themselves in this way, then neither

will two parts or halves of one degree (so to speak) be united between themselves; because the whole quality is composed of several degrees in the same way that each degree is composed of two or three equal parts; but these things cannot be understood without the said union, any more than a continuum can be understood as divided into all its parts.

24. From these contrary principles concerning intensification, it clearly follows that God can place in the same subject several intensifiable qualities differing only in number, which do not make one more intense, as for example, two heats of eight degrees each, because he can place them inhering in the subject and not having any union per se between themselves, but only per accidens by reason of the subject, which is not sufficient for intensification. Nor can any new contradiction be alleged in this; and thus the doctors more frequently hold, In I Sent., dist. 17, where Gregorius, q. 5; Ocham, q. 7; Aegidius, Quodl. IV, q. 1, where he adduces a not contemptible conjecture, because God can place two quantities differing only in number intimately in the same place, preserving their distinction and without any real union between them, by reason of which they would make one greater quantity; why therefore could he not place two whitenesses in the same subject, preserving their distinction, and without the union by reason of which they would compose one more intense?

SECTION IX

WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS THAT SEVERAL ACCIDENTS DIFFERING ONLY IN NUMBER SHOULD EXIST SUCCESSIVELY IN THE SAME SUBJECT

Section IX

1. Several accidents are said to exist successively in the same subject when the subject first possessed one accident, then lost it, and afterward acquired an accident of the same species. The question then arises whether the later accident is necessarily or possibly numerically distinct from the earlier one. For some defend the individuation of accidents by their subject so tenaciously that they consider it impossible even in this manner for there to be several accidents differing only in number in the same subject. From this it follows that the same accident in number that had previously perished is always reproduced in the same subject—namely, the same heat, the same light, and consequently the same location (ubi), the same local motion, especially if it occurs through the same space, for the reasoning is the same for all these cases. Scotus partially defends this opinion, at least when the same agent and the same subject are involved. He bases this not on individuation, but on the principle that the same agent acting upon the same subject is naturally disposed always to produce the same thing, and no sufficient reason can be assigned why it should produce something numerically distinct. Indeed, Aristotle in Metaphysics VIII, text 11, indicates that if the agent and matter are numerically one, the effect is also numerically one. This is explained as follows: if I continuously gaze at this wall with open eyes for an hour, I produce and conserve the same act in number; therefore, if I close my eyes briefly and then open them again, I will again produce the same act in number, for that interruption does not prevent that power from being able to produce and receive the same act in number throughout that entire hour and in any part of it taken separately. If you object that it would also follow that the same substantial form in number would be reproduced in the same part of matter whenever a similar form in species is induced, and consequently that the same individual that existed before would naturally be reproduced—which is to say that resurrection could occur naturally—there are those who concede this, as can be seen in Paul of Venice, book II On Generation, at the end. Others, however,

deny that the reasoning is the same, because substantial form requires disposed matter and never coincides with the same dispositions.

2. Another opinion is extremely contrary, namely, that not only can several accidents differing only in number exist successively in the same subject, but that this necessarily occurs whenever a similar accident in species is reproduced in the same subject. This was held to be necessary even with respect to God's absolute power by Durandus, Marsilius, and others, whose opinion along with Scotus's I have treated extensively in the second volume of the third part, disputation XLIV, section 9. Durandus's foundation is that whenever such production occurs, a distinct action is repeated from that which existed before, for action cannot be reproduced, just as successive beings cannot be; therefore, the term of the action must also be distinct. This is confirmed because if such permanent accidents that are successively produced in the same subject were not distinct, successive accidents could also not be distinct, and thus the same time in number could be reproduced, which everyone considers impossible.

Resolution of the Question

3. But a middle way must be held, and it must be said that it is possible for several accidents differing only in number to exist successively in the same subject. If this is understood regarding God's power, it is self-evident, because it involves no contradiction, and it follows a fortiori from what has been said that they can even exist simultaneously—much more so, therefore, successively. This is sufficient to show that accidents of the same species do not have intrinsic numerical and entitative distinction through their subject or through their relation to this particular subject; otherwise, they could not be distinguished in any way, even if the production or reproduction occurs at different times. For, as I shall immediately explain, the mere diversity of time is not in itself sufficient for this

distinction, if there is not otherwise a sufficient foundation of distinction and individual difference in the forms themselves that are produced. If, however, the assertion is understood regarding the power and order of natural agents, it is also true in this way, as will be evident a fortiori from what follows.

4. Second, I say that not only is it possible, but it actually occurs according to the order of nature that accidents numerically distinct are produced successively in the same subject. This is the more common opinion of the philosophers in Physics V, chapter 4, and On Generation II, last chapter, and of the theologians in Book IV, distinctions 43 and 44. I have said several things about this in the second volume of the third part, disputation XLIV, section 7, where I showed that according to the order of nature, the same accident in number that had been corrupted is not reproduced in the same subject; for from this principle it follows that it must be distinct, which is what we intend here. However, it is not easy to assign the primary cause and root of this natural necessity. For Durandus renders it from the diversity of action or change, in which Henry agrees in Quodlibet VII, question 16, although he differs from Durandus in that he does not place this necessity with respect to God's power, as Durandus does, who erred gravely in this, as I showed in the aforementioned place, because God in acting does not depend on time or on other circumstances on which natural agents can depend, since they act through motion and transmutation. For this reason Aristotle said in Physics V, chapter 4, that the unity of time is required for the unity of motion, which reasoning Toledo embraces in book II On Generation, question 13.

5. But this reasoning is difficult and does not seem to satisfy. First, because the numerical unity of change should rather be sought from the numerical unity of the term or form produced, than conversely, as Aristotle taught in Physics V, in the same place; therefore, when the accidents produced are said to be numerically diverse because the actions are diverse, a vicious circle is committed.

Second, because even if we grant that the actions are diverse, it does not follow that the forms will be diverse, because more things are required for the unity of action than the unity of the form produced, according to the same Aristotle in the cited place, and otherwise form does not have unity and distinction from action, but from elsewhere. Hence it happens that the same light in number produced by one lamp is conserved by another, which must necessarily occur through diverse action. Third, because concerning the actions themselves, the question remains why it is necessary, according to the order of nature, for them to be numerically distinct; for what is said about the diversity of time does not satisfy. For either the discussion concerns extrinsic time, which is considered in the motion of the heavens, and this seems to contribute nothing to the intrinsic individuation or numerical distinction of actions, because from this time only a certain extrinsic denomination is taken of those things that are said to exist in such time; but numerical unity or distinction does not consist in extrinsic denomination. Also because the same action in number, even if indivisible, can permanently endure and coexist with prior and posterior extrinsic time, as is evident in the action of illuminating, seeing, and similar actions. Or the discussion concerns the time or intrinsic duration of the action itself and the change by which it is produced, and thus, since such duration in reality is nothing other than the existence of the action itself, to say that these actions are distinct because they occur at different times is the same as saying they are distinct because they have diverse durations and existences, which is the same or equally obscure; for this is what we are investigating, why it is necessary for those durations, existences, or entities of those actions to be distinct, and not rather the same repeated again and again. Just as when God reproduces the same form in number, it is certain that He can reproduce it by the same action in number by which He had previously produced it; for this involves no contradiction, as has been said more extensively in the aforementioned place. Therefore, for the action to be distinct, or for it

to have distinct intrinsic duration, it is not sufficient that it occurs twice or with prior and posterior extrinsic time; therefore, to show that with respect to a natural agent these actions will necessarily be distinct, the reason must be sought elsewhere.

6. Nor does the reasoning of those authors convince, namely, that if the same action in number could be reproduced, successive things could also be reproduced, which seems plainly contradictory. For if this reasoning were valid, it would also proceed with respect to God's absolute power. Hence it seems necessary to say that in successive things one can consider what is real and positive, and what is included in succession by way of negation or privation, for succession intrinsically implies that something was and now is not, and something future will be, but is not yet. Therefore, as regards this negation or privation, a successive being cannot be restored, because in this way there is no potency with respect to the past. As regards the positive aspect, however, there seems to be no contradiction that, just as the same heat is reproduced by God, the same heating should also be reproduced; and just as the same sitting and the same location (ubi), so consequently the same local motion. For all these signify real positive modes, which have their individuation from themselves and do not depend on extrinsic time any more than other things, but on intrinsic duration; therefore, there is the same reasoning concerning these as concerning other things in this regard. Therefore, from the part of action, no sufficient reason can be given for why this should be repugnant to natural agents.

7. Others therefore say that the cause and reason of this matter depends on another question, namely, from what source a secondary cause is determined to produce this particular effect here and now rather than another; for that same thing which is the cause of this determination must also be the cause why, whenever a secondary cause acts anew, it is determined to produce a new effect distinct from all preceding ones. For from the force of the efficient cause alone or from the capacity of the subject alone, no sufficient cause of this

matter can be given, since both the force of the agent and the capacity of the subject itself always remains the same and intact, and is equally indifferent of itself to acting upon or receiving any individual. Therefore, some say in the aforementioned question that the entire cause and root of this determination should be reduced to the divine will and predefinition. For God, seeing that this agent is here and now disposed to change this subject to such a form in species, and is of itself indifferent to this or that form in the individual, and cannot of itself choose or determine its action to this rather than to that, He by His will decreed to give concurrence to producing such a particular individual at this moment and in this subject. And because a secondary cause cannot act without God's concurrence, consequently it is determined to act here and now upon such an individual and not another. I touched upon this way of speaking in the cited place and indicated that it did not please me because the reasoning does not seem sufficiently philosophical, and because in free acts it has certain difficulties. Now, however, with the matter considered more attentively, I judge it to be very probable, both because I see that it pleases not only Gregory in Book I, distinction 17, question 4, article 2, ad 7, and distinction 35, question 1, article 1, and other Nominalists, but also many very learned modern writers. For Toledo in Physics VIII, question 3, conclusion 2, reasoning 3, gathers from this the freedom of the first cause, that by His will alone He determines secondary causes to individual effects. Fonseca also in Metaphysics I, chapter 2, question 3, section 8, says that in certain effects it is necessary to have recourse to divine determination and predefinition, which he repeats in book V, chapter 2, question 9, section 2, reasoning 9, by which he proves the essential dependence of secondary causes on the first in acting; and the same is taught by the Coimbra Commentaries, book II Physics, chapter 7, question 15, article 2. Also because it is neither arbitrary nor contrary to physical and natural reasoning that the first cause should help secondary causes and supply their defects in those matters in which they seem to be

deficient; in the present case, however, they seem to lack the mode by which they can be determined to certain singular effects rather than to others. I will treat this matter again below when discussing causes. Now, therefore, according to that opinion, it must be said consistently that God has determined His concurrence with secondary causes always to produce new and distinct effects, not indeed to produce again an effect that previously existed and has now ceased to be.

8. But it will be rightly asked by the authors of this opinion from what source it is established that the first cause has determined His concurrence in this way; for either this was in some way owed to the secondary causes themselves or founded in their connatural mode of acting, or it is from God's will alone, just as the determination of production to this individual rather than to another. If the second is said, since such a will of God is not had by revelation, the matter will be entirely uncertain, since it cannot be shown by reason nor deduced from any natural principles. If, however, the first is said, then the primary and quasi-ultimate reason of this determination is not from the divine will, but from the nature of the proximate causes; and this is what we are investigating, in what way this can be founded in the nature of the proximate cause, especially if the determination to produce this particular effect rather than another is not founded in it.

9. For this reason, someone could say that secondary and finite causes contain in their power each singular effect only once (so to speak), and therefore after such a cause has once produced some effect, no power remains in it to produce that effect again, nor to repeat the action by which it produced it, because through the first production its power is, as it were, exhausted, insofar as it can be terminated to such a particular effect. But this is said gratuitously and without proof, and cannot even be understood; for active power per se and as such does not operate through any diminution or change of itself, but through the change or production of another. Hence its efficacy remains as complete and perfect as if it had produced nothing; therefore, from the force of production once made, it does not remain

powerless to make the same again and again, if there is no contradiction from the part of the effect itself. For by this reasoning, any active power, however finite, can act successively to infinity, if it perseveres complete in its being, because it also remains complete in its efficacy, and from the part of the effect that succession or multiplication to infinity is not contradictory; therefore, the same will be the case regarding the reproduction of the same effect, if there is no contradiction from its part. I say this because, after a thing has once been produced and remains in being, it cannot again be produced by the agent, although its active power remains complete, because it is contradictory from the part of the effect, at least from the nature of the thing. But that what does not exist should come to be cannot be contradictory from its own part, even if it existed before. For what can this hinder that it should come to be again, if it no longer exists? Since it is now as distant from being as if it had never existed. Therefore, if the active power otherwise remains complete, the reason for this necessity cannot be taken from its inefficacy.

10. Finally, it can be added that natural agents, although they have from themselves a power that is quasi-general and indifferent to several individuals of the same species, nevertheless postulate from themselves a certain mode and order in the use and exercise of such power, so that nature is determined to act here and now upon such a subject producing such an individual, and after that another, and after this yet another, and so forth; for nature itself seems to postulate this determination and order, lest it involve in itself a certain perplexity and confusion. Hence it comes about that it never returns in acting to the same effect, but always produces a new one. I chose this way of speaking in the aforementioned place because in an obscure and difficult matter nothing occurred that would entirely satisfy, nor does it present itself now; indeed, this very thing that is attributed to the natures of such agents does not seem to be able to be sufficiently founded or explained. For since the natural force of acting is in itself simple and entirely the same, it does not appear how this natural

determination can be founded in it, or from what source it can be established. Nor can extrinsic circumstances as such help in this, as was shown above concerning time; and there is entirely the same reasoning concerning place, insofar as it signifies an extrinsic surface or relation to extrinsic bodies. Therefore, it must be confessed either that this depends on the divine will alone, or, if it has some natural cause, that it is hidden from us, and at most it can be said that, since these natural powers are ordered to the multiplication of individuals and naturally intend this, it is more consonant with their natures that they always receive concurrence for new effects. For this reason, not only in God's will, but also in the very natures of things, it is founded that in human generations new souls are always produced and are not again united to bodies that, having once been created and separated, already exist.

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